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The Psychology of Religion is the youngest and not the least 
diffident of the daughters of general psychology. This new 
branch of inquiry came into "being, and has flourished.best on Amer- 
:ican soil. , America provides conditions peculiarly favourable to 
the Birth and development of such a science. Observation indi- 
:cates that there is much religion in the United States, and that 
its varieties are many. America is notorious for the plethora of 
its religious sects. Moreover in the New World religion has not
become stereotyped, as is frequently the case in purely Roman
1. 
Catholic countries. Yet again, the average citizen of the Amer-
:ican States appears to be less trammelled by convention, and more 
inclined to relate his religious experiences, than for example, a 
member of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland.
1. Pratt J.B. Art. "The Psychology of Religion" Harv. Theol.
Rev. Vol.1. No.4. (1908) p.442.
2.
Along with these most serviceable circumstances we need to 
consider certain new philosophical and scientific developments, 
and the whole psychological climate of the last decade of the 
19th. century, all of which conspired to make this period peculiar- 
:ly favourable to the genesis of this new science in America. 
A new scientific interest had arisen in the individual and social 
aspects of man's mental life. It was inevitable therefore that
the type of experience organised in the religious consciousness
1. 
should at last be subjected to the scalple and scrutiny of science.
Religion had seen every other department of human life and activity 
succumb to the conqueror. Science had as a matter of fact, simply
o
given religion the privilege Polyphemus permitted Ul£yses, that of 
being eaten last. Therefore when at length Psychology turned its 
attention to religious experience, the psychological vivisectionist 
was more than eager to plunge his probe into this new quivering 
body of fascinating psychic phenomena.
Among the many and varied motives which united to drive 
forward the study of the religious consciousness by scientific 
methods two at least were conspicuous. There was first, the 
purely scientific motive, and second, the practical religious 
incentive. Psychology was keen to discover if its principle of 
the unity of the mental life held good in the world of religious 
consciousness. The religious interest was governed by practical 
motives. Religious leaders, educationalists, and evangelists 
became seized with the importance of a scientific knowledge of the 
mental processes which were involved in religious experience, in
1. Ames E.S.«The Psychology of Religious Experience", p.3.
3.
1. 
order to control and manipulate these processes.
The whole concern of the Church was conceived of, as that of 
making converts both within and without her precincts. A clamant 
need was felt for more efficient methods in this connection. It 
was soon realized, that the question of methods depended upon the 
psychology of religious experience. In Evangelical Christianity 
the conversion experience is the presupposition of all else in the 
religious life . It was doubtless the striking nature of this ex- 
:perience, as much as its evident centrality, that appealed to the
first psychologists who began to look into the phenomena of the
2. 
religious life.
The first works of the American School of Religious Psychology 
therefore, deal almost exclusively with the phenomenon of conver- 
sion and its ramifications.
Mysticism was the next subject to fall into the hands of the 
living psychologist. Contemporaneously with this new psychologic- 
:al interest in the Mystics, attention was drawn to a fresh mass of
material rich in psychological possibilities which had just been
3. 
unearthed by modern historical and anthropological research. In
the course of its inquiries Anthropology had culled a number of 
interesting facts concerning cults, and the pgfatti&iwg elementary 
forms of religious life, the elucidation of which, lies outside 
the province of history and anthropological science. Psychology 
eagerly responded to anthropology's invitation to investigate its
1. Ames E.S. "The Psychology of Religious Experience" p.4.
2. Leuba J.A. Art. "The Psychology of Religious Phenomena"
American Journal Psych.Vol.
3. Ames E.S. "The Psychology of
4
religious data, and a psychological study of origins of religion 
and cults was begun. Following upon this line of study, came 
comprehensive treatments of the whole field of religion, and
attempts were made by religious psychologists to coordinate re-
1. 
:suits. This then may be taken as a broad statement of the
circumstances which attended the birth of the new science of the 
psychology of religion in America, and of the general course it 
has taken. This frame-work however needs to be implemented 
with certain particulars, before the outline can be at all 
adequate. To this matter we will now address ourselves.
II.
If the honour of being the pioneer in the field of experimen- 
:tal religion is to go to the man who made the first attempt at 
systematic observation and analysis of the facts of religious
\
experience, then this distinction certainly belongs to Jonathan 
Edwards. He was born in the year 1703, and was educated at Yale 
and at the time of his death in the year 1758, was President of 
Princeton. Edwards was a man of singular philosophic genius, 
and remarkable ratiocinative talent; he moreover possessed marvel- 
:lous introspective powers. One hundred and seventy seven years 
before Freud, Edwards was seized with the significance of dreams
for revealing a concealed inclination repressed from conscious-
2. 
mess during the waking life.
Edwards spent the greater part of his life as a clergyman of 
the Presbyterian Church of America. He witnessed two important 
revivals during his ministry. The first took place in the year
1. Coe G.A. "The Psychology of Religion'1 , p.2.
2. Edwards Jonathan, collected works, original extracts
from diary. Vol.I. p.69.
5.
The results of Edwards keen observations of this revival were 
embodied in a work entitled the "Narrative of Surprising Conver- 
sions". The second revival occurred in the year 1740. It 
spread over Boston, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Virginia, and his own parish of Northampton. Edwards watched 
this revival closely, and in 1742 he published his acute observa- 
:tions on the subject entitled, "Thoughts on the Revival in New 
England". This work was at once republished in Scotland. The 
publication however which possesses the greatest value for the 
student of religious psychology is, "A Treatise concerning the 
Religious Affections", which Edwards published in the year 1746. 
It was immediately republished in England and Scotland. This was
the first important work on experimental religion ever published
1. 
in America. Edwards was well qualified to write on this subject.
He was a religious man himself; he possessed a piercing intellect, 
in the presence of which, no fanaticism nor sophistry could live; 
he was a Minister on active service, continually moving within the 
circle of a spiritual clinic; in addition to all this, Edwards was 
a careful observer. In the treatise on the "Religious Affections" 
Edwards turns the search-light of a merciless intellect upon that 
mass of emotions and sentiments which are commonly annexed to the 
religious life. With pitiless analysis he discriminates the 
spurious from the genuine, and distinguishes the merely accidental 
from the essential elements in religious experience. This 
systematic, critical examination of the religious emotions on the
1. Edwards Jonathan, OP. Cit. PP.234-540.
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part of Edwards, is the first great piece of work from the 
positive side, which has been done in America, in connection 
with the phenomena of the religious life. It is true that 
Psychology was not then a distinct science differentiated from
Philosophy, and that Wundt's Laboratory was only established in
1. 
1897, but there were thinkers who psychologised before Wundt, and
Edwards was one of these. All Edwards'work was done in the 
first half of the 18th. Century, and is necessarily expressed in 
terms of the then current principles of mental philosophy.
For more than a century Edwards 1 work on experimental relig- 
:ion remained in splendid isolation. Then suddenly in 1882, 
President Stanley Hall of Clark University broke the silence of 
136 years with an article which was published in the Princeton 
Review, entitled "The Moral and Religious Training of Children".
Dr. Stanley Hall's articles were the first in the 19th. Century
2. 
to deal empirically with the subject of religion. He also
inspired a number of the psychological students of Clark Univer- 
sity to pursue Independent research along lines which he suggest-
:ed. This was the origin of the Clark School of Religious
3. 
Psychology. Professor Stanley Hall may be said to have founded
a new dynasty of religious psychologists. The phenomena of 
adolescence seems to have attracted these pioneer investigators.
1. Coe G.A. "The Psychology of Religion", p.5.
2. Hall G.S.Art."The Moral and Religious Training of Children" 
Princeton Rev.New Series,IX.(1882) pp.26-45,see also Art. 
"The Moral and Religious Training of Children and Adoles- 
cents , Pedagogical Seminary, Vol.I.No.2.(1891)pu 196-21Q
3. Pratt J.B.Artl'The Psychology of Religion" Harv.Theol.Rev.
Vol.I.No.4. (1906) p.436.
7.
In 1891, W.H.Burnham published an article on the subject of
1. 
adolescence. Four years later, A.H.Daniels wrote an article
entitled "The New Life", in connection with which, he worked up
2. 
anthropological data. In the same year another Clark man,
E.G.Lancaster produced an article dealing with the psychology of
3. 
adolescence.
These early essays of the research students of Clark Univer- 
:sity owe their importance chiefly to the fact, that they are of 
the nature of first contributions to a nascent science. The
work of the Clark School culminated in Professor Stanley Hall's
4. 
great book which was published in 1904. In this work Dr. Stanley
Hall treats of adolescence in all its relations to physiology, 
anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion and education. In 
the same year Professor Hall founded a periodical for the exclus- 
:ive study of the psychology of religion called "The Journal of 
Religious Psychology and Education". Its appearances were
spasmodic, and its principal -foalue lay in its reviews of the lit-
5. 
:erature of the subject. In 1912 this was succeeded by "The
Journal of Religious Psychology including its Anthropological and 
Sociological Aspects". This journal appeared quarterly, and 
finally was suspended in 1918. The credit of having emphasised 
the importance of the empirical study of the child, and of the
1. Burnham W.H."A Study of Adolescence", Pedagogical Seminary
Vol.I.No.2. (1891) pp.174-195.
2. Daniels A.H."The New Life;a Study in Regeneration" Amer.
Journ.Psych.Vol.VI.(1893) pp.61-105.
3. Lancaster E.G. The Psychology and Pedagogy of Adolescence"
Ped.Sem.Vol.V.(1895) pp.61-128.
4. Hall G.S. 1 Adolescence" 2 Vols.London & New York
(Appleton & Co.) (1904.5. Pratt J.B. Art. The Psychology of Religion" Harv.Theol.
Rev. Vol.1. No.4. (1908) p.440.
8. 
adolescent period in human life belongs to Stanley Hall and the
school he created. While this school undoubtably gave the 
modern impulse to the empirical study of the facts of the religious
consciousness, its own contribution was chiefly to pedagogical
1. 
theory, and to the solution of educational problems in general.
While Professor Hall and the majority of his students were 
engaged in researches more or less confined to adolescence, and 
its pedagogical implications, two of them concentrated upon the 
specifically religious aspect of adolescence, and allied phenomena. 
One of these students was James A. Leuba, the other was Edwin D. 
Starbuck. Starbuck gave himself to the study of the religious 
questions annexed to adolescence, while Leuba turned his attention 
to the special subject of conversion. Leuba 1 s work in this con- 
:nection was the first important modern contribution to that young
branch of scientific inquiry which, strictly speaking deserves to
2. 
be called the Psychology of Religion. Leuba got his data by means
of a questionnaire, and from the reports of the conversions of 
notable religious men. He subjected this empirical data to keen 
analysis, and arrived at what appeared to be the psychological con- 
iditions of the ante-conversion complex, the crisis itself, and the 
post-conversion feelings. It was Leuba who first drew attention 
to three facts which Starbuck afterwards elaborated, namely, the 
necessity of self-surrender in conversion, the cataclysmic nature 
of the transition, and the passivity of the subject immediately 
before the crisis. Leuba's attitude is that of the dispassionate
1. Pillsbury W.B. Art. "The New Developments in Psychology"
Phil. Rev. Vol.XXVI. No.l. p.57. 1917* 
9.
scientist throughout. The supernatural factor in conversion is 
ruled out of court. This is the general attitude of the Americar 
investigators with few exceptions. At the same time, Professor
Leuba more than any other member of the school represents the
1. 
naturalistic point of view. . Starbuck's study on conversion
2. 
followed Leuba 1 s valuable article 10 months later. A second
3. 
article from Starbuck's pen appeared the same year. Both these
articles were based entirely on answers to question circulars, 
and revealed a penchant for the statistical method.
The pioneer contributions of Leuba, and Starbuck, may fairly 
be considered the antennae of the nascent science of religious 
psychology, for which the labours of their predecessors at Worces- 
:ter had cleared the way.
In 1899, Professor Starbuck published the first really elabor- 
ate treatment of religious phenomena by the scientific method, 
entitled "The Psychology of Religion". This book marked an epoch 
in the history of American religious psychology.
It is interesting to note, that up to the year 1907, nearly 
half the work of any value that had been done in the field of the 
psychology of religion had been done by Clark men, but there were 
contemporary investigators outside the pale of Clark University.
i
In 1897, Luther Gulick published an article on the subject of sex 
and religion. Then in 1900, Professor Coe f s book on conversion
l.Pratt J.B. Art."The Psychology of Religion",Harv.Theol.Rev.
Vol.1. No.4. (1908) p.438. 
2.Starbuck E.D. Art.A Study of Conversion.Amer.Journ.Psych.
Vol.VII. Jan. (1897) pp.268-308. 
3.Starbuck E.D. Art.Some Aspects of Religious Growth.Op.Git.
Vol.IX. Oct. pp.70-124. 
4.(&ulick Luther. Art. Sex and Religion. Association Outlook,
Vol.VII. Dec. (1897).
10.
and temperament appeared. In this work called "The Spiritual 
Life", Coe though working independently arrives at conclusions, 
which agree in the main with Starbuck f s. One Year after the 
appearance of Coe's book, Professor William James of Harvard de- 
livered the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University during the 
years 1901 - 1902. Starbuck's book had influenced James con- 
siderably, and doubtless determined the choice of his subject, 
"The Varieties of Religious Experience". These lectures were 
published in 1905. James's "Varieties" is a piece of seductive 
writing, and is certainly the most widely read and reviewed work 
of the American School.
In 1905, Professor F.M. Davenport, a Sociologist, published
a study on the psychology of religious revivals, which was of the
1. 
nature of a special contribution to crowd psychology.
The next contribution to the now rapidly growing literature 
on the subject, came from the pen of Professor J.B. Pratt. It 
was called "The Psychology of Religious Belief", and made out a 
strong case for Mysticism. This was in the year 1907.
In 1908, George Barton Cuttan published a book on "The 
Psychological Phenomena of Christianity". Although this book is 
extremely interesting, it has not been very influential as a 
technical contribution. Its appeal is rather to the popular 
mind than to a scientific clientele' .
The most important work subsequent to Pratt f s "Psychology of 
Religious Belief", was "The Psychology of Religious Experience", 
published by Professor E.S.Ames in 1910. The Author puts down
1. Davenport F.M."Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals"
MacMillan Co. New York. (1905).
11.
the loud pedal on the social origin and function of religion, and 
his point of view is that of the new functional psychology.
In 1911, a new and rare book appeared from the pen of 
Professor George Malcolm Stratton, entitled "The Psychology of 
the Religious Life". His valuable work is Catholic in its range 
of instances, and is based almost entirely on the sacred scrip- 
:tures, and ethnic records of the different races of mankind.
In 1912, Professor James A. Leuba, (who since his first 
study in 1896, had been the most prolific writer of articles on 
the psychology of religion, over a score of which had appeared in 
rapid succession in the various scientific journals of both Amer- 
:ica and France), now published one of the most interesting and 
important books on the subject, its title was, "A Psychological 
Study of Religion, its origin, function, and future".
In 1916, Professor Coe produced his "Psychology of Religion 1', 
which is considered by many, to be the most useful textbook on 
the subject in America. This book runs the whole gamut of the 
religious life, and attempts a coordination of the results of pre- 
:vious investigations.
In the year 1920, Professor Pratt gave us his second book, 
called "The Religious Consciousness". This is probably the most 
helpful, and best balanced single contribution, which the American 
School has yet made to the psychological study of religion.
A new book is to be published in 1924 by Professor Leuba 
entitled "The Psychology of Mysticism". It is to appear both in 




The term American School of Religious Psychology which has 
been freely used in the foregoing account, needs to be elastically 
interpreted. It is an arbitrary term whose only title to exist- 
ence is utility. The group of investigators who have given 
themselves to the scientific study of the religious consciousness 
and its phenomena in the New World since 1899, have one thing only 
in common, namely, the naturalistic postulate, that everything in 
the religious consciousness, may in the last analysis, be expli-
:cated in terms of natural law. In all else they differ, no
1. 
three agree upon what constitutes religious consciousness. Each
investigator has chosen his own problem, and his own way of deal- 
zing with it. The utmost diversity obtains in the gathering of 
data. One psychologist will pin his faith to the questionnaire; 
another will gather all his material from biographies; a third will 
rely on data furnished by anthropology; yet again, another will 
work with the comparative and genetic method. Moreover psychol- 
ogists are divided into warring camps. One may be a structural- 
list, another a behaviourist, and a third a functionalist. One 
psychologist places all the accent on the individualistic aspect 
of the religious life, another stresses the social phase, while a 
third will attempt to hold the scales evenly. These then are 
some of the reasons why the term American School can scarcely be 
considered as one of nice precision. The term as used in this 
essay simply connotes that group of eminent psychologists in 
America, who while differing as doctors proverbially do in almost 
1. Coe G.A. "The Psychology of Religion" Preface p.IX.
13.
every respect, are at one upon the principle, that the religious 
consciousness and all that it contains, can by patient investi- 
gation tie brought under the known or knowable laws of the science 
of psychology.
IV.
It will be obvious that an adequate treatment of all the 
literature of the subject would run into several large volumes.
In America alone, this adolescent science has already given rise
1. 
to a literature formidable in extent. In an essay therefore
selection is imperative. For this reason semi-psychological 
works of great value such as Irving King's "The Development of 
Religion", and William Ernest Hocking 1 s valuable contribution to
the Philosophy of Religion, "The Meaning of God in Human Experience^ 
i
are not treated. With Hocking, the work of interpretation of the 
deliverances of Religious Psychology has begun. The purpose of 
this essay is to give an informing and critical account of the 
principal works of representative investigators of the American 
School of Religious Psychology, and to introduce clarity into a 
field v/hich is rapidly becoming so overgrown that it is difficult 
to see the wood for the trees.
1. Coe G.A. "The Psychology of Religion", See Bibliographical




The purpose of the psychology of religion, is to get at the 
laws of the cognitive, affective, and conative processes of the 
human mind, as these are directed to, or evoked by an object, or
objects felt to be Divine. This mind which psychology studies is
1. 
not mind in general, but the mind of particular persons. There-
:fore what the psychologist would be at in this connection is the 
private experiences of religious persons. The psychologist of 
religion may indeed make use of material procured in other fields 
of inquiry, but in the last analysis that which he must construe, 
is the religious experience of individual minds.
Several modes of procedure have been utilised by American 
investigators to secure data on which to build a psychology of
1. James W. Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p.183.
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of religion . Four methods in particular have appealed to work-
:ers in this field. These are the Questionnaire, the Biograph- 
ical, the Historical, and the Comparative and Genetic methods. 
Let us subject these methods to closer scrutiny.
I. THE QUESTIONNAIRE METHOD.
In connection with the Questionnaire Method the psychologist 
draws up a list of searching questions .designed to evoke reliable 
information respecting the subjective religious life. These 
syllabi are then sent to subjects thought to be suitable. The 
responses, are collected and analysed, and on this personal data 
a psychological superstructure is reared. This was the favourite 
method of all the earlier investigators. Starbuck ! s first book 
was founded exclusively on faith in the question circular. It is 
argued that the advantage of the Questionnaire is, that it goes 
directly to the subject of religious experience, it questions the 
living, and this is better than reading about the dead. The 
Questionnaire Method more than any other has serious drawbacks 
which outweigh its advantages. In the first place, the question 
circular procedure in religious psychology, accentuates a method- 
ological difficulty with which general psychology has long been 
conversant, namely, the difficulty of introspection.
Psychology is an inductive science which seeks to derive gen- 
:eral laws from an adequate number of observations. The psychol- 
ogist may observe the behaviour of other men; he may study 
children, savages, and the conduct of animals; he may look into the 
data of philology, sociology, and anthropology; or he may investi- 
gate pathological conditions of mental life, in a word, nothing
16. 
that has the hallmark of mind upon it, is a matter of indifference
to the psychologist. But when all's done and said, he must
1   
interpret all this material in terms of his own mind. All his
constructions and inferences in the last analysis depend upon
introspection. Introspection then is strictly speaking the one
2. 
method of psychology.
Now this method has certain defects which psychologists at 
once deplore and concede. First it is universally admitted, 
that introspection tends to distort, or to disintegrate the state 
of consciousness it would be at. We arrest the subjective pro- 
:cess in the endeavour to examine it, especially if our attention 
is focussed upon it. If this method is to yield results at all, 
it must proceed by means of surreptitious peeps. Introspection 
moreover is most successful with sensations, and leait successful
with subjective processes such as willing, desiring, believing,
3. 
and the emotional activities. The psychologist then gathers up
the glimpses of his mind and pieces them together as best he may. 
Most modern psychologists maintain that a pure act of introspect- 
ion is an impossibility. There is always an interval between 
the act of introspection and the experience we would observe. We
can never get at the original experience, for it is sui generis.
4. The original experience can however be reconstructed in the memory
We then read back into the original experience the results of our 
observation of its duplicate. Introspection then is simply
1. Stout G.F. Manual of Psychology, p.30.
2. James W. Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p.185.
3. Stout G.F. OP. Git. pp. 45. 46.
4. Hoffding H. Outlines of Psychology, p. 17.
17.
retrospection under another name. Now the memory is notoriously 
unreliable, therefore unless the reports of the experiences of our 
subjective life are given very soon after their occurrence, they 
are likely to be erroneous. Immediate retrospection decreases
the margin of error, but even this is only a post-mortem inquest
1. 
on mental states that have ceased to live. All this means the
psychologist is a dissectionist, rather than a vivisectionist.
Professor William James expresses the verdict of expert opin- 
:ion on this subject in these words, "introspection is difficult 
and fallible; and the difficulty is simply that of all observation 
-of whatever kind. The only safeguard is the final consensus of
our farther knowledge about the thing in question, later views
2. 
correcting earlier ones {? . Professor Stout says, that when intro-
:spection is consciously used to throw light on questions of 
theoretic importance for psychology, it becomes a scientific method 
But to be effective it needs to be administered by the trained 
mind. "Introspection to be effective for the advancement of
science,must like other modes of observation, be carried on by a
3. 
number of experts in co'dperation". Now it is this most delicate
operation of turning the mind's gaze inward upon its own interior 
processes, which uninstructed and untrained minds are asked to 
perform in connection with the questionnaire method. It is notor 
:ious that the plain man misses all the finer detail of his mental
2|. 0
processes, when he is asked to exercise introspection.* ^ accoun
1. James W. Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p.189.
2. James W. OP. Git. p. 192.
3. Stout G.F. Manual of Psychology, p. 45.
4. Stout G.F. Manual of Psychology, p. 43]
18.
of the conversion of a psychologist appeared in the Hibbert Jour- 
:nal of 1923. It is a most disappointing narrative. Professor
Lutoslawski gives two or three variant reports of what happened in
1. 
the psychological moment of conversion. This indicates that even
in the hands of a trained psychologist introspection is not infall- 
ible, if even Homer nods, how much more enlarged then will be the 
margin of error, in the case of the plain man who is asked to re- 
:veal the sacred experiences of his subjective life, in response 
to a printed list of personal inter-rogations. This then is a 
grave defect of the question circular method. All the difficul- 
ties annexed to introspection as a method of observation are 
found here in an accentuated form. In a word, poor introspect- 
ive power makes many of the responses worthless to science.
It is noteworthy that the number of declinatures are greatly
2. 
in excess of the responses to a religious questionnaire. Now it
is these very people who do not answer, whose religious experiences 
are important to the psychologist. It will generally be found, 
that the spiritual experiences of such persons are typical of the 
community. The persons who respond with undue readiness to the 
stimuli of a questionnaire are chiefly persons of superficial 
religious character, the religious egotists, and those afflicted 
with religious mania. Since the value of the responses depends 
upon their being representative of the community, this fact seriou 
:ly impairs their worth. It would seem that the people who are
4
1. Lutoslawski W. "The Conversion of a Psychologist" Hibbert
Journ. Vol.XXI.No.4.July (1923) p.709.
2. Pratt J.B. "Psychology of Religious Belief, p. 234.
" I sent out 550 copies and received 83 answers. w
19.
representative of the religious community, because they have no 
dramatic experience to relate, put the questionnaire into the 
waste-paper basket. The subjects who hasten with indelicate 
expedition to expose to the psychologist their private experiences 
often write profuse reports of meretricious brilliance. These 
are likely to mislead the investigator, who is apt to think he has 
his finger on the spiritual pulse of the community, when he has 
learned the symptoms of a small species only of the genus relig- 
:ious men. The worth of a questionnaire is seriously impaired 
because the answers it tends to elicit are not typical of the 
community. The number of responses is always incommensurate with 
the size of the community from which they come. Therefore broad 
inductions on such meagre data are certainly hazardous. A study
 
of religious experience based on the questionnaire only, is prone 
to place all the accent on the shallow, or the freakish, or the 
pathological types.
Even when the interrogated subject is a typical representat- 
ive of the religious community, and is willing to write an 
answer to the circular, the power of suggestion resident in the 
questions often dictates the answers, in the manner illustrated in 
Hamlet's ironical dialogue with the syc]fiophantish Polonius.
"Ham. Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of a
camel?
Pol. By the mass, and 'tis like a camel indeed. 
Ham. Lie-thinks it is like a weasel. 
Pol. It is backed like a weasel. 
Ham. Or like a Whale? 
Pol. Very like a Whale". Act. III. Scene II.
Again it is worthy of note that many persons who are perfectly 
competent to describe their interior experiences, refuse to take
20.
pains in making their responses, and return an answer far too 
truncated to have any true psychological significance. The very 
fact that a searching question concerning his subjective life is 
put to a man, tends to put him on his guard, and sometimes to 
arouse resentment. The business like schedule of the religious 
psychologist is for some men too reminiscent of income tax returns, 
and is apt to create an atmosphere which is unfavourable to the 
divulging of the secret subjective history of their spiritual 
lives. We have to recognise the fact, that those whose relig- 
:ious experiences are worth most to the psychologist are the most 
diffident in setting these down in answer to a circular. 
Frequently, those whose experiences are most valuable are least 
voluble, while those whose experiences are least valuable are 
most voluble.
Even those persons who wish to meet the psychologist's de-
:mands, and sympathise with the whole object of the questionnaire,
1. 
are put into an attitude of deliberation by it. Such persons .
very carefully consider the whole matter, and finally write an 
answer in which the original experience the psychologist wants 
to get at, is overlaid and transformed by their own interpret- 
ations, inferences, reflective processes, and subsequent exper- 
iences. Many investigators have been impressed with this 
difficulty, and with the lack of spontaneity which is engendered 
and fostered by the questionnaire, and have therefore preferred 
the biographical method. Here they say, we get the spontaneous 
utterances of religious souls poured out with unpremeditated art.
1. Pratt J.B. "The Psychology of Religious Belief!' p.235.
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Persons absolutely sincere may make statements in response
to schedule of questions which are not true to fact, toy reason 
of a defective memory. The memory is notoriously unreliable. 
The original spiritual experience can be reconstructed in the 
memory only, and if this fails in any respect, then the witness 
is not very valuable for science. A faulty memory is one great
source of the fallibility of testimony meant to be absolutely
1. 
sincere. This fact also assists to discount the questionnaire
method.
Paucity of vocabulary must also be considered in this con- 
inection. Like many a good story, the most significant spirit- 
ual experiences may be ruined in the telling. Many religious 
people have at their command a conventional theological termin- 
:ology only, and a certain pietistic phraseology, which often 
clouds the issue, and drapes in drab the most dramatic occurrence 
in the religious consciousness. A unique experience may thus be, 
in appearance, reduced to the status of the most commonplace, and 
on the other hand, a commonplace experience may be gilded with a 
glory not its due. All this is likely to mislead the psychologist 
who depends entirely on written answers to his questionnaire.
Professor Stratton points out another objection to the 
questionnaire as used in America. He says, "the persons most easily 
reached by such means are, for the most part, adherents of one and 
the same religion, they are of the Occident, and naturally show a
preponderance of that special type of character that is ready to
2. 
grant to a stranger an access to the secret places of personality".
1. James W. "Principles of Psychology". Vol.1, p.374.
2. Stratton G.M. "Psychology of the Rel. Life".Preface p.V.
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Those most responsive to the questionnaire in America seem all to 
have belonged to the Methodist denomination, among whom reticence 
on spiritual matters is not conspicuous. A psychology based on 
returns from persons the majority of whom are members of one 
communion, can be the psychology of a particular denomination only, 
and not the psychology of religion.
All the faults however may not be charged to the account of 
the respondent for the psychologist himself may not put good 
questions. The questions may not be completely intelligible to 
the interrogated, and further the questions may not be apprehended 
by the questioned as understood by the interrogator. When we 
remember with Professor Coe, that not only must conventional 
language be interpreted by the psychologist in terms of his own 
mental make-up, but also whole religious complexes must be recon- 
stituted by him from fragments given in the answers of respondents, 
and that sometimes, the psychologist does not know what religion 
is from experience, then it must be conceded that the margin of 
possible error is very great.
It is for these and similar reasons that the bald question- 
inaire has become suspect. This method can never of itself, when 
applied to the subjective life yield exact scientific conclusions. 
It can at best indicate very general tendencies, and perform the 
function of "straws", by showing the general direction of the wind. 
The questionnaire may of course give valuable information regarding 
the externals of the religious life. The defects of the question- 
:naire method are so manifest, that no religious psychologist since 
Starbuck has used it without safeguards, or supplements, in the
23. 
1. 
shape of auxiliary methods.
2. THE BIOGRAPHICAL METHOD.
The psychologist however is. not bound to the questionnaire 
like Prometheus to his rock. He may read the extant autobio- 
:graphies of the mystics, and religious geniuses of his race. 
He may look into the biographies of the saints. He may study 
those spontaneous out-pourings of the religious soul in the great 
confessions of religious history. Or he may peruse the letters 
of men and women eminent in the religious life, and read what 
they have to say to the initiated. Here at all events, the 
psychologist is in contact with experts in experimental religion. 
This is called the biographical method, and was the method 
William James used in the preparation of his great book "The 
Varieties of Religious Experience". But even this method has 
the defects of its qualities. It is a truism to say that the 
substance of spiritual autobiographies, and biographies has to do 
with extraordinary, and even abnormal religious subjects. Such 
cases cannot possibly be typical of the life of a religious com- 
:munity. Therefore a psychological description based on this 
method alone, cannot be a true portrayal of the religious life as 
it exists for the majority of religious men. The picture painted 
will inevitably be too tropical in its pigmentation. Together 
with this wealth of hectic material there is the natural inclination
1. For discussion of the Question Circular Method in Religious
Psychology see:- 
Pratt J.B. Psych, of Rel. Belief" pp.232-235. also
The Rel. Consciousness" pp. 32-34. 
Coe G.A. "The Psychology of Religion" pp.44-48.
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of the psychologist to select for study those instances only, 
which are dramatic, and sensational. There is a tendency from 
which even psychologists are not exempt, to neglect cases that are 
normal as being commonplace and dull, and to focus the whole 
attention on extreme instances.
It has long been accepted as an interesting psychological 
fact that writers of their own biographies often mix fiction with 
their facts, especially, as James,says, where the marvellous is 
concerned. This fiction may not always be intentional. Some of 
the saints had a good deal of egotism mingled with their sanctity, 
and this at times tinctured and alloyed their autobiographies. 
James says, "everyone must have known some specimen of our mortal 
duet so intoxicated with the thought of his own person, and the
sound of his own voice as never to be able even to think the
1. 
truth when his autobiography was in question'1 . This no doubt is
an exaggeration of the truth. At the same time because of this 
egotistical failing of human nature we cannot accept the deliver-
H
:ances of religious biography naively. When the biographical 
method is used exclusively, and uncritically, the picture drawn 
of the religious life is bound to be out of perspective. The 
virtue of the biographical method, as of the questionnaire, is 
that it seeks to get at the private experiences of individuals. 
Both methods seek the subjective facts of the religious life.
1. James W. Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p.374.
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3. THE HISTORICAL METHOD.
Quite an opposite method has sometimes been taken by certain 
investigators of the religious life. This might be called the 
historical method. It is an objective method based on external 
manifestations of religion, its cults, rites, ceremonies, and 
creeds. It is an objective study of religion in all its 
institutionalised forms. Now strictly speaking, this is not a 
psychological method at all. Professor Billia goes so far as to
say that the historical method has no value whatever for the
1. 
psychology of religion. The objective investigation of rites,
ceremonies, theological concepts and primitive superstitions "gives 
the illusion of describing and cognizing a mental fact while re- 
imaining outside the fact itself". An objective study of cults, 
ceremonies, and creeds falls within the province of history, sociol- 
:ogy, anthropology, or theology, but this objective investigation 
is not psychology. Psychology is the science of the subjective 
life of individual minds. Psychology of course cannot ignore any- 
:thing that has to do with mind. Therefore certain data of 
philology, sociology, and anthropology which have been unearthed by 
the historical method, are of great interest to psychology.
7
Psychology takes over this data gleaned by the historical method, 
and works back by a process of inference to the subjective states 
which gave rise to language, ceremony, cult, and creed. This being 
so, works based on the historical method, though sometimes written 
by professed psychologists, partake more of the nature of contrib-
1. Billia L.lt. "The Problem and Method of Psychology of
The Monist. Vol.XX. No.l. (1910) p!l37.
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:utions to sociology and anthropology than to the science of
1. 
psychology.
4. THE COMPARATIVE AND GENETIC METHOD.
The fourth method of the American investigators is the 
comparative and genetic method. This is really the true 
psychological method which deals with the products of the histor- 
ical method. It is by means of this method, that the investi- 
:gator makes psychological reconstructions on the basis of the 
data furnished by history, sociology, and anthropology. The 
comparative method as used by psychology tries to get at genetic 
descriptions by studying the facts of the psychology of man in 
the various stages of his mental development. This includes the 
study of animal psychology, and that of social groups. uThe scope 
of comparative psychology is as wide as animal life, it extends 
from infusoria to man". The genesis and evolution of conscious- 
:ness in all its grades and levels, and its reactions to the 
physical and social environment, constitutes the subject-matter 
of the comparative and genetic method. This method assumes an 
unbroken line of descent in the phenomena with which it deals. 
It seeks to give a genetic account of the phenomena it investigates 
by reconstituting its antecedents. In the last analysis the 
results of comparative psychology are reached by a process of in- 
ference, not by direct observation. This method cannot show 
that certain antecedents and developments beyond the ken of history 
actually took place, but only that judging by parallel cases they 
most likely did take place. The comparative and genetic method
1. WundV'Wilhelm E.G. "Elements of Polk Psychology" and his 
earlier massive work "Volker -psychologic".
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then works back from the data of history and anthropology into
that unknown region with which the methods of these particular 
sciences are incompetent to deal. Here in this prehistoric
region, as Professor Tiele says, if any work is to be done on
1. 
religion psychology must do it. The ambition of the comparative
method is not only to indicate the probable forms of primordial 
psychic life, but also to make deliverances as to causes which 
lie back of pre-historic mental development. It aims at a 
genetic account of the beginnings of things psychic. Now this 
method can only give probability In connection with the compara- 
tive and genetic method more perhaps than with any other used in
connection with religious psychology, we have to beware of the
2. 
'psychologists fallacy 1 . The psychologist who studies the
religious life of primitive peoples often takes out of the 
inchoate mass of magic, religion and morals which meets him 
ideas which he himself projects into it. There is a natural 
tendency to read our own standpoint into the mental fact we are 
investigating. The psychologist is particularly prone to this 
fallacy when studying the mental life of animals. Professor 
Stout's example of the interpretation of the behaviour of the 
inhabitants of a bee-hive is a splendid illustration of this. 
Because the economy of the bee-hive shows adaptation of means to 
ends, differentiation of function, and division of labour, fore- 
:sight,  &»&  a political faculty of a human kind have- been
A
attributed to bees. As Stout shows, all the essential modes of 
bee behaviour can be explained by congenital tendencies, and
1. Tiele G.P. 'Outlines History of Ancient Religions' p.6.
2. James W. "Principles" Vol. I. p.196. J-^J-ons p.c.
28.
congenital differences of physical organisation. "The besetting 
snare of the psychologist is the tendency to assume that an act 
or attitude which in himself would be the natural manifestation
of a certain mental process must therefore have the same meaning
1. 
in the case of another". It will be obvious, that according to
the disparity between the mind of the investigator and the mind 
he is studying, so will be the difficulty of interpretation. 
After all, the psychologist can only interpret what takes place 
in the minds of savages on the analogy of his own experience. 
He must reconstitute the mental life of primitive man out of the 
elements of his own mind. All roads lead back ultimately to 
introspection as the one method of psychology. In connection 
with the comparative and genetic method we may say that no other 
method provides so many traps for the psychologist. The 
psychologist's fallacy is most frequently met here. To sum up 
in the words of William James we may say, "there are great 
sources of error in the comparative method. The interpretation 
of the psychoses of animals, savages, and infants is necessarily
wild work in which the personal equation of the investigator has
2. 
things very much its own way.
5. THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD.
Experiment is as Stout says, simply observation under test
3. 
conditions which we have arranged for ourselves. Psychological
investigators have attempted to observe the various mental
1. Stout G.F. "Manual of Psychology", p.49.
2. James W. "Principles". Vol.1, p.194.
3. Stout G.F. "Manual of Psychology", p.51.
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processes which enter into religious reactions such as suggestion, 
belief, and emotion under test conditions deliberately prearranged. 
Pathological religious subjects might be considered as experimental 
cases, nature having provided the test conditions which may be 
utilized by the psychologist. We might consider here the order of 
merit method, which can be used to determine the relative values of 
the different elements that enter into public worship, that is, 
what value these various elements have for the worshippers. 
Religious groups large or small are chosen as the subject of exper- 
:iment, and by a system of preferential voting the individuals of 
the group indicate the elements which to them are of the greatest
value by placing them in their order of merit, as "first", "second"
1. 
"third", etc. This method may be used to establish quantitative
relations. Statistical analysis of these preferences would make 
it possible to establish general tendencies and rough quantitative 
relations between certain religious elements.
Field use may be made of experimental methods. General con- 
ditions can be ascertained, by isolating and manipulating certain 
factors. The nature of the reactions of both children and adults 
to the specific stimuli of public worship and religious instruction
can be observed, classified, analysed, and certain general tenden-
2. 
:cies inferred therefrom.
Another species of the experimental method is that of hypnotic 
experiments upon religious subjects in order to ascertain
"An Experimental Study in Values*.
1. May M.A. Art. Journal Philosophy, Vol.XII. (1915) p.691.
2. Coe G.A. Psychology of Religion, p.55.
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peculiarities of temperament, and degrees of suggestibility.
The function of the experimental method is not so much to discover 
new data as to increase our knowledge of the old, and it is most
fruitful when it is used to settle some definite question. In its
in 
field use, in its order of merit form, and A the shape of hypnotic
experiment it constitutes a valuable auxiliary method. It may 
suggest lines of inquiry, and confirm certain generalizations
reached by other methods of investigation. The laboratory species
2. 
of experimental method however proves unsatisfactory in practice.
Religion does not prove to be amenable to laboratorial inquisition. 
Religious feeling is not to be engendered or manipulated by 
psychological experts at will. The purely analytic interest of 
the laboratory is a foe to religious emotion*, and the thought of 
psychological vivisection has a tendency to inhibit all genuine
religious feeling. The psychical processes of the religious mind
3. 
eludes! "these prism, pendulum, and chronograph-philosophers".
6. AN UNCLASSIFIED METHOD.
In order to complete this account of the methods of the 
American School of religious psychology, mention should be made 
of a sixth method which cannot be as clearly defined as those we 
have already reviewed. This mode of procedure consists in bring- 
;ing tremendous psychological insight to bear on ordinary facts of 
mental life. Professor Harald Hbffding in his book, "The 
Philosophy of Religion" illustrates this method better than any 
other modern writer. In part three, which constitutes the major
1. Coe G.A. The Spiritual Life, p.110.
2. Coe G.A. Psychology of Religion, p.54.
3. James William, Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p.193
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portion of the book he deals with the psychology of religion. 
None of the methods we have hitherto examined seems to have been 
invoked by Hdffding, and yet we have a valuable contribution to 
religious psychology. The only feasible explanation seems to 
be, that here we have a splendid intellect trained by the 
philosophic and scientific disciplines; rich in the acquirements 
of experience; practised in observation; and possessed of great 
powers of psychological insight, bringing all this powerful equip- 
:ment to the elucidation of the facts of the religious life. A 
primrose by a river's brim is more than a primrose to minds like 
this. Professor Coe says, such a mind sees far into common facts. 
We are justified in calling this a sixth method, and may legiti-
mately say, "research may take the direction of fresh analysis of
1. 
material that is commonplace". It may be thought that the
H 
mention of Hoffding's procedure is irrelevant in connection with
the discussion of the methods of the American School. It will be 
remembered however, that one of the opinions advanced in this 
essay is that Edwards' "Treatise on the Religious Affections", is
the first great psychological document in the archives of
2. 
American religious psychology. Edwards wrought after the manner
of Hoffding in compiling his great work on the emotions and 
sentiments of the religious life. Now we have seen that not one 
of the methods used by the investigators of the American School 
is infallible. What then shall we say to these things? These 
methods are the best psychologists have for the purpose. 
Naturally, the methods will vary in value according to the nature*
2 oe; ?;£'n T1?e ? sychoi°sy or Religion,Beckwith C ' A -
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and extent of the field with which they deal. Generally speaking, 
to achieve results of sufficient precision to be of value for 
science, each method must supplement, and check the other. When 
the questionnaire is supplemented by the biographical method, and 
these again are reinforced by the more objective study of the 
religious facts revealed by history and anthropology, together with 
the gleanings gathered from the study of origins by the comparative 
and genetic method, then the psychologist will be possessed of a 
reliable body of data upon which to build a sound psychology of 
religion.
Experience teaches that no method can be used alone with 
impunity. The general defects of the published works of the 
American School are largely due to the fact that each investigator 
is an uxorious monogamist, passionately wedded to some one method.
PART II. 
CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF PRINCIPAL WORKS.
33.
1. 





This epoch making study was the result of the conviction that 
Religion could be treated scientifically to the advantage of both 
science and religion. This conviction * » issued in two lectures 
which were delivered at Harvard in the years 1894 and 1895. These 
lectures were elaborated into 2 articles which appeared in the 
American Journal of Psychology of 1897.
These articles were the antennae of Starbuck feeling their way 
into the new world of religious experience, and in the year 1899, 
Starbuck produced his important book "The Psychology of Religion", 
a first work in the field of the new religious psychology which 
America is making so peculiarly its own.
Starbuck's basic assumption is that law runs through the 
universe all across, and that therefore no psychic event of man's 
life is exempt from law. Starbucks idealwas to make a faithful
1. Starbuck E.D. The Psychology of Religion,(1899)Walter Scott
London.
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inductive generalisation on the scientifically ascertained facts 
of the religious life.
Professor Starbuck at the outset differentiates the psychology 
of religion from sociology and history. He says, it is perfectly 
competent for us to study religion in the race, but this is not 
psychology, it is rather anthropology, sociology or history. The 
psychology of religion must study religion in the individual. It 
may indeed receive much help from data unearthed by other sciences, 
but it must go to the individual to discover the roots of religion. 
The psychology of religion is with Starbuck, as with all other 
writers of the American School, simply a branch of general Psychology
f
According to Starbuck there need be no antagonism between the 
psychology of religion, and theology or the philosophy of religion. 
The scientific study of religion tries to get at the factual data 
and their laws, while the philosophy of religion has the prerog- 
ative of interpretation.
Starbuck describes religion as a life, a deep rooted instinct, 
which will function whether we understand its machinery or not, 
but he says, it is to the interest of religion that it should be 
understood as well as felt. Scientific investigation will lead 
to better methods in religious education, and will increase our 
power of appreciating spiritual realities.
The purpose of Starbuck 1 s book and the method adopted is 
described in the introduction. "It is a purely empirical study 
into the line of growth in religion in individuals, and an inquiry 
into the causes and conditions which determine it". Starbuck 1 s 
work is based entirely on data gathered from autobiographies
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written in response to questionnaires. These personal records 
were then analysed. With heroic patience Starbuck spent several 
days over a single record. After critical analysis of the per- 
sonal records the results were classified, then followed general- 
isation and interpretation, which formulated laws, processes, and 
tendencies of growth, and indicated the relationships of the facts 
of religious consciousness to the facts of other sciences e.g. 
sociology, biology and psychology.
Starbuck's interpretation, is psycho-physiological.
The book falls into 5 divisions. Part I, treats of conver- 
sion, since in Starbuck 1 s opinion this experience reveals in a 
concentrated manner the cardinal characteristics of religious 
development. Part II, deals with the line of growth which is not 
characterised by cataclysmic changes of character. Part III, is 
concerned with the comparison of the chief lines of growth by way 
of conversion, with lines of development which do not include it. 
We shall now note the more important topics, and propositions, 
laid down by Professor Starbuck in each of the 3 divisions of his 
treatise.
PART I. (CONVERSION).
In dealing with the subject of conversion, Starbuck uses the 
term in its broadest connotation. It is made to cover ante- 
conversion experiences, the conversion crisis itself, and post 
conversion experiences. Conversion stands for revolution in 
character more or less sudden. Starbuck seeks to get at the 
psychic processes which are actually operative in conversion, by
56.
working over the raw material furnished by autobiographies 
written in response to personal solicitations. One hundred and 
ninety two records only, of those received in connection with 
Starbuck 1 s large questionnaire were deemed complete enough to use. 
It is interesting to note the personnel of the respondents. 
Almost all of them were American Evangelical Methodist Protestants, 
and as to vocation Ministers of religion and students preponder- 
ated. Starbuck concluded from his examination of these records 
which indicated that one fifth of the entire number of conversions 
took place independently of external influence,"that conversion is 
a phenomenon natural to religious growth", and is independent of 
revivals. In studying the age of conversion, 1265 cases were 
used. Syllabi were sent to two conventions of the W.C.T.U. 
California, and to two regiments of Soldiers stationed in San.Fran- 
cisco. Some records were gathered at a Methodist Conference in 
California. The alumni record of the Drew Theological Seminary 
Methodist, furnished 776 cases. All the charts and tables in 
connection with the average age of conversion are based on this 
data. Dr. Starbuck affirms as his inference from this data "that 
conversion is distinctively an adolescent phenomenon", connected 
with the physiological growth of that period of life. Starbuck 
concludes from his statistics that the relation between bodily 
growth and conversion is coincidental, while the relation between 
puberty and conversion is supplemental. Conversion avoids the 
year of puberty and coincides with bodily growth. At the same 
time,adds Starbuck puberty and conversion may be mutually con- 
ditioned. Starbuck establishes a connection between spiritual
37. 
events and physiological changes . The average age for conversion
according to Starbuck 1 s statistics is 16 S 4 years ,
Starbuck groups the motives and forces leading to conversion 
into 8 classes. He concludes that rational considerations play an 
insignificant part in conversion in comparison with instinctive. 
He finds moreover that response to teaching plays a small part, 
and that altruistic motives are least prominent, while fear of 
death and hell, and social pressure are the most potent motives. 
Social pressure is very prominent in revival cases of conversion,
while response to teaching and the lure of the moral ideal, were
1. 
found to characterise the non-revival cases.
Starbuck found that motives varied with age. In very early 
adolescence social pressure, conviction of sin, fear of death and 
hell were the powerful motives, whereas in later adolescence 
altruistic feelings, following a moral ideal, and response to teacfy 
ing motivated the convert. The conclusion therefore is that 
"conversions during later adolescence represent a different kind 
of experience from those in the earlier years". Starbuck further 
infers that objective forces rather than subjective govern the 
females in conversion, while subjective forces play a larger part 
in the experience of the males.
In connection with the experiences preceding conversion, 
Starbuck found that the central fact was the sense of sin, the 
form being determined by differences in temperament, and by what 
is most prominent in consciousness at the time. There is the 
passive type who feel helpless and estranged from God because of 
the sense of a sinful life, and there is the active type, who
1. See table VI. Showing the relative frequency of certain 
motives and forces which lead to conversion, p.52.
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press towards the new life, and there is a third type who vacillate
between activity and passivity.
Starbuck concludes"that conversion is a process of struggling 
away from sin, rather than of striving towards righteousness". 
It is a process in which the deeper instinctive life most strongly 
functions. The intellectual side of the mind plays a relatively 
inferior part in these pre-conversion experiences.
Starbuck 1 s statistics indicate a difference between the 
experiences of males and females, which precede conversion. He 
concludes that "feeling plays a larger part in the religious life 
of females, while males are controlled more by intellection and 
volition". Males when not at a revival insist on seeing their 
way clearly towards the new life, and on working their own passage. 
Females on the other hand are prone to accept the help of external 
influences, and surrender more easily to revival influences. A 
revival conversion for the male is a far more intense experience, 
but for females a non-revival conversion is the more intense. 
The females in this connection, contradict everything that is true 
of the males.
In his discussion of the nature of sense of sin, Starbuck 
points out that though it follows in the wake of evil conduct, it 
cannot be wholly due to conscious wickedness, for this sense of 
guilt is independent of conduct. Hence he concludes, we cannot 
consider the sense of sin simply as a spiritual fact, it is an 
experience largely determined by temperamental and physiological 
conditions.
From the discussion of the experiences which antedate conver- 
sion, Starbuck passes on to discuss the nature of the crisis of
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conversion itself. He found that the feelings involved immediate- 
ly before the crisis were very much intensified. Two sets of 
feelings are experienced at the time of the crisis. First,the 
feelings of the conviction period, greatly intensified, and second, 
those of relief, and exultation. Something happens in time 
between these two sets of feelings. There is a turning point 
where the old life ceases and the new life begins. Just what 
happens, says Starbuck, is at once the most interesting and diffi-
 
cult of the problems in the study of conversion. The conclusion 
of Starbuck 1 s analysis of conversion is that "the typical exper-
*
ience has 3 features, viz., dejection and sadness, a point of 
transition, and, lastly, joy and peace". This is a pretty barren 
description.
Dr. Starbuck discovers two types of conversion. The first 
type is marked by the dominant thought of escaping from sin. The 
second is characterised by a struggling after a larger life. In 
the first type, the sense of sin predominates; in the second, the 
feeling of incompleteness. The experiences of the two types are 
different. Type I, has a feeling of helplessness, then of the 
burden lifted, followed by a sense of freedom and joy. Type II, 
has a feeling of dissatisfaction, a struggling for light and life, 
then illumination comes, followed by a sense of harmony and peace.
Starbuck was unsuccessful in getting from his respondents 
reliable data for the reconstruction of the psychological moment 
in the conversion experience. It is evident that what happens
at the conversion crisis itself, escapes the notice of the convert.
The Conversion of a Psychologist by W. Lutoslawski. I. See Hibbert Journ. Vol.XXI. No.4. 1923 n
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He simply has the feeling something has happened. Starbuck 
holds, we must simply accept the descriptions of the respondents 
as they are given. He opines, that a study of these descript- 
ions will lead us to underground processes of the sub-conscious. 
An'analysis of the states and processes, thought by the subjects 
to be central in the crisis, revealed that spontaneous awakening 
is the most common experience, while that of self-surrender is 
relatively infrequent. The conclusion of the matter is, that 
there are two essential aspects of conversion; that in which 
self-surrender is the prominent thing, and that in which the new 
life bursts spontaneously into being. The will may indeed have 
been struggling in the direction of the new life, but at the 
crisis it must cease to strive, and the new life comes of itself. 
It is here that Starbuck comes to grips with the fundamental 
questions raised by the conversion experience, viz., how much of 
the conversion process as it is being worked out rises into 
consciousness?, and second, is there evidence of the automatic 
working out of part of the process by the nervous system? 
Starbuck accords to unconscious cerebration a large place in the 
dynamics of mental life in general, and in the conversion exper- 
ience in particular. He asserts that both conscious and uncon- 
scious processes are factors in conversion. The passivity of 
the will at the time of change, and the slight part played by the 
intellect in motivating conversion are adduced as evidence; of 
sub-conscious processes. His conclusion is, that in the major- 
ity of cases the conscious and unconscious forces act together, 
and their relationship is one of interaction.
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The conviction period is a mental disturbance caused by the 
presence of an incipient idea in the mind. But how does this 
troublesome thought work itself out into a spiritual awakening? 
Starbuck is agnostic here, the whole thing is done below the thres- 
hold of consciousness and therefore evades analysis. We explain 
it in terms of unconscious cerebration. Spontaneous awakening is 
the fructification of that which has been ripening within the sub- 
liminal consciousness. Religious awakening is the same in princi- 
ple as the sudden solution of perplexing mathematical problems, or 
the discovery of a scientific truth. There is in these cases a 
process precisely analogous to religious conversion. There is firs 
the intellectual want, the agonising mental laboui?, and restlessness 
then one day the finished thought flashes into the mind, relief 
comes, and an intense pleasure is felt. The conversion experience 
is therefore not a unique phenomenon.
The function of the will in conversion is to give impetus and 
direction to the unconscious processes of growth, which secretly 
work out the result aimed at, and present the finished product at 
last to clear consciousness. Starbuck 1 s maxim is "let one do all 
in his power and the nervous system will do the rest". Since the 
automatic factor of the mind is so active, what does the conscious 
will do in the matter of conversion? It does two things according 
to Starbuck. (L) Volitional striving clarifies the ideal we would 
be at. (2) It initiates the effort after the ideal. Its function 
is that of setting the mechanism of the sub-conscious in motion. 
Having done this there is nothing more the will can do. Further, 
conscious interference on the part of the will retards the delivery
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of the finished product of this underground sub-conscious factory.
This explains the paradox of conversion, why self-surrender 
should succeed when volitional striving cannot. The forces and 
instincts of the sub-conscious are unerring, and having been set in 
motion by the willed ideal, they must be left to themselves to 
bring about its realization. The subject therefore having active- 
ly initiated the process must become passive in order to receive 
its fruition. This act of self-surrender is also one of trust, 
there is a yielding of oneself to the new life, and the making it 
the centre of a new personality.
Starbuck says, the post-conversion experiences are almost 
antithetical to the pre-conversion experiences. The central fact 
is the functioning of a new and exalted personality. Joy, peace, 
happiness, relief, are the specific feelings of the post conversion 
experience in the order of their prominence. Starbuck attempts
to establish a law of sequence between the experiences before and
1. 
after conversion. "in general, the clean-cut positive experiences
after conversion follow the intenser pre-conversion phenomena".
The distinctive thing in the new life is the organisation of 
the whole life about a new centre. Conversion seems to do at least 
four things for a man. It gives a new sense of the worth of self; 
all things in his environment become new; a sense of reality is 
given to things which they never had before; and lastly, the man 
remains no longer self-centred, but becomes altruistic.
Starbuck says, the two essential aspects of the new developing 
life are first, the realisation of the worth of self, and second,
l.See table XV. Showing relation between the pre-conversion 
feelings and the post-conversion feelings, p.123.
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the going out of the self into the larger life of God and of 
society. New elements seem to enter into consciousness at con- 
version. It is suggested, these may have been latent in the 
mental life before conversion, and now are simply new to con- 
sciousness. These elements are, clarification of mind, new 
insight, and new volitional enthusiasms. Starbuck affirms, 
that conversion is a process of releasing the latent energies of 
the human personality stored up in the individual through his own 
activities and racial activities which he has inherited. But 
for the crisis of conversion these might have remained forever 
dormant.
Professor Starbuck lays down the proposition, that conver- 
sion is a natural psychological process which can be parallelled 
in the common non-religious experiences of life. In the matter 
of deciding between alternatives of conduct, choosing a profess- 
ion, deciding a fateful question, and falling in love, we have 
complexes analogous to the feelings before conversion, at conver- 
sion, and after conversion. There is the feeling of something 
on one's mind, the agony of indecision before the decision is 
made. There is the same analogy at the moment of decision. It 
is of the volitional, impulsive, or surrender type. The decis- 
ion is followed by feelings analogous to the post-conversion 
feelings,namely, there is relief, and a sense of satisfaction. 
Again the element of suddenness is conspicuous in non-religious 
cases of unaccountable awakenings of power and insight. In 
secular life there are sudden changes in emotional attitudes, 
hate turns to love, and love to hate. The case of breaking of
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habits is similar to religious conversion. Here we have a con- 
flict between the old group of propensities and the new which are 
seeking to establish themselves in the nervous system. If the 
battle goes to the new propensities we have a revolution compar- 
able to conversion.
Starbuck gives the conversion process as a whole a sociol- 
ogical and a physiological interpretation. The individual is 
controlled first by the egotistical instincts of self-preservation 
and self-enlargement. He himself is the centre round which he 
organises his experiences. "But as he grows he gathers much" he 
discovers that there is a physical world order, and a social 
order with which he must come to terms. He may rebel instinct- 
ively against these standards which have been fixed without his 
consent, but sooner or later he bends to the social will. Here, 
says Starbuck, "there is a sudden revelation and recognition of 
a higher order than that of the personal will". This is precise- 
ly what conversion is in the religious sphere. Adolescence is 
the natural time for this recognition of the larger life of 
society. Puberty is the physiological intimation that one is 
qualified to take one's place in the larger life of society 
through the avenue of the family.
Parallel with this physiological development elements of the 
psychic life are ripening;the moral sense, the aesthetic sense, 
the affections, and the appreciation of the truths of nature, all 
of which are developed in social relations, and are carried over 
into religion. The individual is brought into such a condition 
ripeness of mental capacity in adolescence that religious
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impulses find a hospitable organ ready for their reception and 
expression. This arriving at puberty is the occasion of tribal, 
racial, and social customs among all peoples savage and civilized 
alike. These universal customs initiate the youth into the 
larger life of the community, and their significance is psychol- 
ogical as well as physiological. So much then for the biological 
view and the sociological view of the question.
There is also the purely physiological aspect to be consider- 
ed. During Adolescence says Starbuck, there is a tremendous 
change taking place in the anatomy of the nervous system, espec- 
ially in those higher cerebral centres which are the seat of the 
mental states. The sudden bursting forth of new psychic powers 
in adolescence is due to the rapid growth, and new functional 
activity of the higher centres in the brain. Here then we find 
a clue to adolescent depression, unrest, and distress. All this 
is an indication "of high potentials of nervous energy which find 
no outlet of expression". Biologically then, "the sense of 
imperfection is the price we have to pay for the at first unwield- 
ly enlargement at the top end of the spinal cord". Through wise 
education, and normal development, helped on in some cases by some 
emotional crisis the fermenting life of the adolescent becomes a 
unity. In Starbuck 1 s opinion there is definite correlation 
between physiological adolescence and conversion.
Now Starbuck also sets forth a psychological view of the 
situation. The question is how does life get in such a state 
that conversion is necessary before things will get right? The 
answer Starbuck finds in the study of the growth of ideals. The
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self that might be stands over against the self that now is, and 
the youth sees the two in vivid contrast. The existence of the 
ideal over against the actual makes him dissatisfied. The 
second thing to be considered is native inertia. When a person 
becomes conscious of the ideal, he also becomes acutely conscious 
of down-dragging primitive impulses. The third thing is the 
complexity of the forces of the environment which drag the person 
in different directions. All these forces fracture the unity of 
consciousness.
This fracture often occurs beneath the surface of clear con- 
sciousness and shows itself as a struggling in the dark for a 
somewhat. Sometimes the subject is acutely conscious of the 
vacillation and the contrast between the ideal self and the actual. 
Now nature's method of healing the breach is to make it worse. It 
belongs to the nature of mind to emphasize contrasts. Revivalists 
work on this tendency. All the conviction phenomena which ante- 
date conversion belong to this fracture period. To this period 
of dislocation are annexed the sense of sin, the feeling of in- 
completeness, and disunity. The struggle continues in all such 
cases until exhaustion comes, and the subject surrenders to the 
higher forces that are trying to claim him. Then conflict ceases, 
and the self arrives at unity.
But this unity may be achieved in two ways. Where the sense 
of forgiveness and Divine aid are the distinctive elements at the
*
time of crisis it indicates that the forces which precipated the 
crisis are not recognised by the convert as his own subjective 
forces which have functioned sub-consciously. He seems to be a
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passive agent on whom work is done by an external agent, which he 
believes to be Divine. On the other hand where conscious self- 
direction is the central thing at the conversion crisis, it points 
to the fact that the subject of conversion has been a conscious 
participant in the whole process.
In connection with the abnormal aspect of conversion Starbuck's 
standard for testing the normality or abnormality of the experiences 
is the testimony of the respondents themselves, a most unscientific 
procedure. He wisely says however two errors must be avoided, the 
blunder of the alienist who thinks of everything in terms of 
psychiatry, and the mistake of the religionist who interprets the 
wildest excesses carried out in the name of religion as of God. 
Any normal process freed of its inhibitions becomes pathological. 
There are grave dangers in the emotionalism and excitement of re- 
ligious revivals. The principles of crowd psychology apply to
revivals. In mob action the tendency is for the higher cerebral
ro 
centres to relax, and for the lower centres escape from the
inhibitory control of the higher. This makes the mind more sug- 
gestible. Both the demagogue and revivalist work upon this fact. 
They make confident affirmations guiltless of reasoning and proof. 
They use the expedient of reiteration, and the mechanism of mob 
contagion. Starbuck says the dangers of the mob mind are greater 
in religion than anywhere else. The tactics of the revivalist are 
those of the hypnotist, the forces manipulated are those of suggest 
ion and hypnotism. There is just the suspicion that the imported 
professional revivalist is governed by the hunting instinct, each 
new convert being another scalp to hang on his belt.
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Starbuck is careful to point out that religious hypnosis is 
not an evil in itself, but he says, there must be some rational 
sanction to conduct, otherwise the frothy emotion will foam itself 
away, and terrible moral injury may be done to the supposed 
convert. The blunder of revivals is that they attempt to force 
a standard which is the best perhaps for the vicious, upon chil- 
dren, the virtuous, and on those temperamentally unsuited to 
these crude tactics. Starbuck says most justly it is criminal 
to focus all the terrible power of mob contagion" on a young 
child just beginning to feel its way into clear light". 
Starbuck concludes, there is no royal road for spiritual develop- 
ment. A man may be helped on his way, but he must be helped 
wisely.
PART II. 
( LINES OF GROWTH NOT INVOLVING CONVERSION.)
Starbuck states in this connection that many Christian 
Churches do not urge a catastrophic conversion, but teach rather 
that the spiritual life is a process of even and continuous de- 
velopment. It is this gradual growth type with which part II. 
has to do. Starbuck finds that the progress of this gradual 
growth type is just as definite as that of lines of growth invol- 
ving conversion, but there is no catastrophic crisis.
The data for this section was obtained wholly from autobio- 
graphies. Starbuck states that the judgment of the respondents 
was followed "implicitly" as to whether they belonged to the 
gradual growth type or to the catastrophic group. ""Complete 
reliance was placed upon the statements as given by the subjects".
49. 
The respondents were nearly all modern Americans and adherents of
the Christian religion.
Starbuck dismisses the subject of the religion of childhood 
in a few pages. He depends entirely for his facts upon the 
reminiscences of his respondents concerning the experiences of 
their childhood. Starbuck's respondents nearly all had similar 
early religious training of the orthodox sort, therefore their 
reports were fairly uniform. Starbuck found the following feat- 
ures prominent in the religion of the child. First, credulity, 
and unconscious observance. Second, the relationship with God 
or Christ was one of intimacy, not one of fear and awe. Third, 
fear, awe, reverence were hardly present, but love and trust were 
very prominent. Fourth, the sense of right and wrong was found 
to develop early, and was a potent factor in the religion of 
childhood. Starbuck found that credulity and conformity abounded 
in about one half of the cases he investigated, while great inti- 
macy with God occurred in one third of his cases. Again he found 
that fear, awe, and reverence the typical religious emotions were 
almost absent. All this indicates, that children especially are 
receptive to the influences of their surroundings, and that "relig- 
ion is distinctively external to the child rather than something 
which possesses inner significance".
With regard to Adolescence, Starbuck affirms it is the most 
vital period from every point of view, religious, moral and 
intellectual. Adolescence is a period of physiological unfoldment 
with coordinate psychological processes. It is a period of flux 
and ferment, and a most difficult period to study, because of its
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contradictory phenomena. Looked at from the point of view of 
the religious life, it is the period of clarification. The ideas 
of God, duty, and religious observances which have been external 
for the child begin to have a new significance for the adolescent. 
There is sudden intellectual insight into the meaning of religion, 
a new perception of the moral worth of things, and an emotional 
response. Now though it is the rule that an awakening of religious 
feeling comes during adolescence, the adolescent is not necessarily 
a religious being. There is simply a physiological and a mental 
unfolding of which education and religion may take advantage. 
This dawning of religious feeling during adolescence Starbuck terms 
"spontaneous awakening". This experience is distinctly an adoles- 
cent phenomena. It is related to conversion of the milder type,
1. 
but is more like the vision that comes to the poet and thinker.
There are no remarkable conviction phenomena, and no tremendous 
sense of change, instead there is just the gradual dawning of in- 
sight. In Starbuck 1 s opinion, this "spontaneous awakening" pre- 
cedes by a little the conversion experience. His general conclus- 
ion is, that religious experiences of all kinds cataclysmic or mild 
are generally confined to adolescence. Temperament, religious 
prepossessions, and training, explain why one adolescent should have 
a catastrophic experience and another a gentle awakening.
Starbuck asserts, there are three waves of religious feeling. 
The first culminates shortly after puberty at the age of 12. The 
second wave follows at about the age of 15^, coinciding with the
1. Starbuck suggests that had the subjects of "Spontaneous 
Awakening" been drilled in "Evangelical Phraseolop:v" it 
would have been termed Conversion, p.200. seoiogy lt
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period of most rapid development in physique and weight. The
third arrives at about 18 years, when the higher cortical centres 
show marked development. The religious experiences of this 
period are different from those which come earlier, in that they 
are more mature and have more insight. These three periods 
constitute the three crises in adolescence. The adolescent's 
energy seeks outlet not only in thinking and feeling, but it also 
takes a motor form. If this energy takes a religious channel 
the adolescent throws himself into church activities.
Starbuck points out the interesting fact, that as in the life 
of the Mystic, there are dry seasons in the life of the adolescent. 
There is an ebb and flow of religious feeling. Starbuck observes 
three things in this connection. First, with some subjects 
enthusiasm waxes then passes over into indifference. Second, 
with others indifference passes over into activity as a relief 
from tension. Third, in others enthusiasm and indifference 
alternate with rhythmical regularity. What are religious teach- 
ers to do when faced with this law of rhythm in adolescent life? 
Should they concentrate on the dry periods, or leave the subject 
alone until the pendulum swings back again. Starbuck counsels 
patience, the adolescent "is not hopelessly given over to the con- 
trol of evil".
Towards the middle of the adolescent period the most char- 
acteristic phenomenon is "storm and stress". This lasts with 
females about 3 years, but in the case of males about 5 years. 
The factors of temperament and environmental conditions give rise 
to well marked types of the "stoi^shfexstress" experience.
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Starbuck indicates five such varieties. Type I, where the pre- 
ponderating feature is the sense of incompleteness, which may 
become the sense of sin. This latter development may be due 
either to mere exaggeration of the sense of incompleteness, or to 
a real feeling of guilt. Type II, where brooding, depression, 
and morbid introspection are the prominent features. Type III, 
where the dominant characteristic is pain and distress in connect- 
ion with religious doubts. Type IV, where friction against 
surroundings is the most outstanding feature. Type V, is char- 
acterised by the struggle to control passion.
Starbuck 1 s conclusion is, that the physiological and psychic- 
al readjustments which characterise the period of transition from 
childhood to adulthood condition three sets of phenomena. First, 
"storm and stress", second, "spontaneous awakening", and third, 
"conversion". The age distribution he finds is much the same in 
each case. Conversion is just a concentrated form of adolescent 
growth. Religion when it brings its power to bear on the adoles- 
cent simply intensifies normal tendencies, and shortens up the 
storm and stress period by bringing things to a crisis.
Starbuck points out that behind these years of turmoil lies 
a physiological background. The physiological explanation of 
storm and stress is in terms of fast growth, ill health, and low 
physical vitality, all of which make for nervous instability. 
Parallel with this rapid physiological readjustment there is the 
development of psychic powers. Therefore physiological disturb- 
ances and spiritual difficulties synchronise. The adolescent 
restlessly desires and gropes after a somewhat. A larger world
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is crowding in upon him, he must take all this in, and make it
part of his personality. The pedagogical implications of all 
this says Starbuck, is that the adolescent should be treated 
with the utmost discretion. His cardinal needs are confidence 
and wise counsel. Physical strain should be avoided, and the 
laws of health observed. The loud pedal should not be put down 
on the fact of sin, personal unworthiness, and the horrors of 
hell. Moreover, the ideal of perfection should not be pitched 
as high as Everest. The wise religious guide will stimulate the 
hesitant and diffident youth to wholesome activity, with all his 
might.
In connection with the subject of adolescence Starbuck ad- 
dresses himself to the phenomenon of doubt. The adolescent he 
says, becomes a logician, and tries to prove everything. He 
questions authority, and wants to know the reasons on which it is 
based. Among the causes which Starbuck assigns for this phenom-
 
enon are calamity, misconduct of Christians, unanswered prayer, 
ill health, and external and sociological contact for the first 
time with institutional life. Educational influences play the 
greatest part. The study of science, philosophy, the reading of
new books, and the first real contact with new ideas and modern
1. 
thought, all these are important factors. Why asks Starbuck,
do these social influences take effect during adolescence and not 
at an earlier or later period? Because of the psycho-physiolog- 
ical changes in the organism. Doubt belongs almost exclusively 
to youth. The important fact is not that these external influ- 
ences cause doubt, but the fact that in the adolescent period
1. See table XXI. Showing relative prominence of the occas- 
ions of religious doubt, p. 256. occas-
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these influences find a most hospitable soil in which to germin- 
ate. Starbuck is of the opinion that if these same forces were 
brought to bear before or after adolescence they would not cause 
doubt. Starbuck 1 s deliverances on the objects of adolescent 
doubt are extremely interesting. He found that these were
principally the things which had become crystallised into creeds
1. 
and theologies, and handed down by tradition. Starbuck noted
that if one specific thing is doubted it leads to the rejection 
of all other things with which the first is supposed to be in- 
dissolubly bound. He also found, that there was a difference 
between men and women in this connection, the men began with 
doubts about specific things, and then went on to scepticism re- 
garding abstract and universal conceptions, while the women start- 
ed with the universals, lumped everything together, and doubted 
all. The period of doubt is assigned by Starbuck towards the 
lat^r end of adolescence, and is subsequent to the phenomenon of 
storm and stress. Generally speaking doubt is necessary if 
personality is to attain its highest possibilities.
Starbuck 1 s conclusion is that for women, adolescence is- 
primarily a period of storm and stress, whereas for men, it is 
a period of doubt.
Starbuck passes on to deal with the third phenomenon of 
adolescence, namely, alienation. One third of the persons Star- 
buck studied passed through a period of alienation either for a 
short time, or for several years. With some it became a chronic 
condition. The characteristic feelings of this period are 
scepticism, indifference, antagonism, and cynicism. Alienation
1. See table XXII. Showing the relative prominence of first 
objects of doubt, p. 238.
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is often the natural outcome of doubt, and storm and stress con- 
ditions. Starbuck finds the central principle in alienation, 
is the necessity of preserving one's own integrity of personality. 
The growing personality must become adjusted to the social order. 
What is to be the attitude of the adolescent to this social will 
which seeks to impose itself on him? He may adopt one of four 
attitudes. He may take up the antagonistic attitude, defend an 
egoistic point of view against the will of society, and so become 
an outlaw. Or he may accept things as they are, and let sleep- 
ing dogs lie. This is the attitude of passive acceptance. Or 
again, he may stand off from society and cynically criticise the 
social order. Yet again, he may with Voltaire laugh at society 
and the world, and adopt the satirical attitude. Alienation 
from all social and religious conventions occurs at the latter end 
of the adolescent period. Its significance is that it points to 
the fact that the difficulties of the two preceding periods, 
storm and stress, and doubt, are being settled one way or another 
by the intellect.
The central thing in the whole adolescent development is the 
birth of a larger self. A child, says Starbuck, is born into a 
social organism which sets certain social and religious standards 
to which he must conform if he is to take his place as an organic 
part of the social order.
Adolescent awakening is just an appreciation of the demands 
this social whole makes. As new life wells up in the adolescent 
it gets expression in enthusiasms and heightened activity. But 
says Starbuck, the power of insight grows in advance of the power
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of execution. There is therefore, a keen sense of the hiatus 
between the ideal and the actual, which creates a feeling of dis- 
cord. There is then first the power to see, but not to do, 
because of the lack of vital energy, or through the inhibition of 
the will by opposing motives; and second, the increased complexity 
of life that comes through the germination of new powers, and the 
capacities for new functions. All these things together result
in great disparity and discord between insight and power to act.
is 
This discordA characteristic of adolescence.
From a pedagogical point of view says Starbuck, we should not 
attempt to free young people from storm and stress, or doubt. 
These are necessary struggles. This is nature's way of producing 
full orbed manhood possessing self-reliance and spiritual insight. 
Starbuck draws attention to the fact that there are substitutes 
for religious feeling in adolescence. Energy is drawn off in 
directions other than religious. Three interests persist and are 
heightened during adolescence, namely, the ethical, the intellect- 
ual, and the aesthetic. The ethical takes pride of place, the 
intellectual interest comes second, and the aesthetic last. Now 
Starbuck points out, that these three interests are present when 
the distinctively religious feelings are absent. These three 
things are not constitutive elements of religion, but may be taken 
up into religion, and in all developed religions are so taken up. 
These three lines of development are late products of evolution, 
therefore they are delicately balanced, and are the first to 
succumb to emotional shocks. They are very susceptible to dis- 
integration at a time of physical, mental and nervous instability
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such as obtains at adolescence. Starbuck points out these 
pedagogical implications, namely, that it is along these three 
avenues that we may approach the adolescent. These three inter- 
ests represent demands which must be met by the religious 
educationalist. It is these interests which must be appealed to 
in order to help a certain type of adolescent through the crucial 
period.
Starbuck now passes from adolescence to adult life. 
Psychologically this period marks the end of adolescent ferment. 
It is characterised by reconstruction of the religious life. 
That which has been objective now becomes a subjective possession. 
The usual mode of religious growth says Starbuck, is from child- 
hood credulity, through the doubt reaction and estrangement to a 
positive hold on religion by means of an individual reconstruct- 
ion of religious belief. This reconstruction takes place between 
the years 20 and 30. Three modes may be discerned. The individ- 
ual works out a point of view independently of others and lives 
by it; or reverts to the faith of early childhood, giving it a 
larger content; or in the third place he mingles both these 
modes enumerated.
Among the means by which transition is made from adolescent 
ferment to mature decision Starbuck calls attention to five. One 
way of escape from storm and stress, and doubt is through some 
sort of activity. Three interests persist in the absence of 
religious feelings as Starbuck has shown, the ethical, the intell- 
ectual, and the aesthetic. Some find their way out by following 
a path of intellectual insight, others by following up the path
58.
of duty are led to religion through the moral instincts. 
Others again work their passage along the line of aesthetics. 
Starbuck also instances the strength and beauty of another's 
life; the dawning recognition of the social side of morality 
and religion, and the coming to appreciate religion from within, 
as influences making for reconstruction of the religious life. 
Among the forces which deatermine the processes of relig- 
ious growth Starbuck places as first in importance the influen- 
ces of home life, and second, the influence and example of
1. 
others. But he affirms that external influences rarely make a
deep impression after maturity. The adult's habits are formed, 
and his life is controlled by ideals of his own.
Starbuck has noted that some persons develop so evenly that 
we have the phenomenon of religious growth without transitions. 
He seeks the conditions of this harmonious development, and finds 
that four conditions are usually present. One is that the 
subject has been brought up from childhood in religious surround- 
ings. Another is that he has been kept from dogmas he is in- 
capable of assimilating. A third is that his needs as a child 
were met at every point in his development by wise parents and 
teachers. And in the fourth place there has usually been free- 
dom to question things, and enough trust and insight to remain 
rooted in the heart of religion.
The adult religious consciousness says Starbuck nucleates 
about certain distinctive beliefs. Starbuck has here two 
interesting tables showing what beliefs are central, and how
1. See table XXV. Showing the relative prominence of the 
external influences which shape the religious life.p.294.
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1. 
the intensity with which these are held varies with age.
Starbuck finds that belief in God is the most central conception. 
Belief in immortality increases with the years. Belief in Christ 
has chief prominence in the early twenties. The organisation 
of religious beliefs about morality is a constant factor in the 
religion of the mature mind. Another interesting conclusion is 
that religious beliefs which nucleate about science and philosophy 
are peculiarly a feature of the early twenties. The appreciat- 
ion of religion as an interior life makes definite progress with 
the years, and along with this there is a dropping of beliefs 
held to be nonessential. This appreciation of religion as inter- 
ior life is the most central tendency of adult religious develop- 
ment. Starbuck draws attention to the interesting fact, that all 
the religious types, those who have come through storm and stress, 
the catastrophic, and the gradual growth group meet at the same 
goal in mature life.
The religious feelings of adult life centre about three 
things: one's own spiritual life, the consciousness of a larger 
life outside one's self, and the sense of relationship between 
one's own life and the larger life. Starbuck 1 s table shows the
religious feelings of adulthood in order of prominence and fre-
2. 
quency. Schleiermacher 1 s feeling of dependence has pride of
place. Then come respectively, reverence, the mystic sense of 
oneness with God, and finally faith and trust. A comparison of 
the religion of childhood with that of maturity shows that
1. See table XXVI. Showing in per cent of cases the most
central religious beliefs, p.312. 
Also table XXVIII. Showing how beliefs vary with age.p.320.
2. See table XXIX. Showing the absolute and 
ence of the religious feelings? p
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reverence which is relatively absent in childhood is very prom- 
inent in adulthood. Starbuck's conclusion is, that here we have 
the permanent and essential elements of religion in terms of 
feeling. "Religion is that which centres about the relationship 
of the human being .with God".
Starbuck's analysis of replies to a questionnaire respecting 
the motives and ideals of adult religious life revealed three 
large classes of motives. 1. Egoistic motives, 2, Motives in- 
hibitory of egoistic motives, 3. Altruistic motives. In Star- 
buck's cases ego-centric motives are not mentioned as specific 
religious motives. Under class I, Starbuck places ideals like 
self-perfection, self-realization, and the urge to self-express- 
ion. Again the desire to know, based on the instinct of curios- 
ity belongs here. Under class II, Starbuck brings the motive of 
self-abnegation which inhibits the primitive outfit of egoistic 
instincts. Under class III, Starbuck considers the motives
based on social instinct, and the welfare of society, the desire
1. 
for union with God, and for the love and service of God.
Starbuck's analysis shows that the altruistic group of motives 
preponderated over all desires for self-enlargement. His con- 
clusion is, that from childhood to maturity the most fundamental 
line of development is from ego-centric motives to those that are 
anthropo-centric, and theo-centric. Religion then curbs and 
sublimates the primordial instincts. Starbuck's finding is that 
in religious growth there are three great stages. First, that 
in which religion is viewed externally as in childhood where God
1. See table XXX. Showing the absolute and relative Dromin- 
ence of certain religious ideals, p.343.
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is a being who lives in the sky, and where relationship with him 
is expressed in objective concrete terms. Second, where relig- 
ion becomes conceived subjectively as an inner life, the centre 
of activity being one's own personality. The third stage, is 
that in which the centre of activity again becomes objective, 
society becomes the centre, and God is conceived of as the all 
enveloping life of the whole of which the individual is a working 
significant unit.
PART III. 
COMPARISON OF THE LINES OF GROWTH WITH AN
WITHOUT CONVERSION.
In Part III, Starbuck traces the after development of persons 
who had experienced conversion. Are such subjects exempt from 
the storm and stress, and struggle and doubt which are annexed to 
the experience of the non-converted? The testimony of Starbuck's 
respondents was that after conversion, they were beset with the 
same difficulties that attend adolescent development from which 
this crisis has been absent. There was the ebb and flow of 
religious emotion. Religious enthusiasm waxed and waned. There 
was the painful struggle with old habits. There was the sense 
of incompleteness, and the feeling of the contrast between the 
actual and the ideal, which shows that conversion only clears the 
way for spiritual development. Thus Starbuck's correspondents
witnessed to the fact that storm and stress are not evaded by the
1.
fact of conversion. Starbuck concludes therefore that these 
things belong to the period of adolescence as such. Starbuck
1. See table XXXI. Showing the frequency and nature of the 
post-conversion struggles, p.357.
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affirms that the result attained by Conversion, namely, the 
birth of consciousness on a higher spiritual level is also 
attained by the moral outworking of adolescence without the 
conversion experience. Starbuck's conclusion from his com- 
parison is that at the end of the day it is the same with both. 
At the same time there is a difference between the two groups. 
"The conversion group approaches religion more from the emotion- 
al subjective standpoint; but at the sacrifice of an intellect- 
ual comprehension of it, and of a rational appreciation of the 
relationship they sustain to the world". The conversion group 
feel their way, while the non-converted religious subject prefers 
to see his way. The thought of all sufficiency and finality 
of their experience is prominent in the case of the converted. 
Three conceptions are absent in connection with the conversion 
cases. "Religion as centreing in scientific and philosophic 
conceptions, religion as a process of growth, and religion as 
concerned with conduct f( .
In connection with the subject of sanctification, Starbuck 
analyses the records written by persons who profess to have 
experienced sanctification. Fifty one such records were ex- 
amined. Starbuck considers sanctification as identical in form 
with conversion, but succeeding it in time, it is really a 
second conversion. Sanctification is the climax of spiritual 
development, differing from conversion in degree but not in kind, 
The period between the experience of conversion and that of 
sanctification varies from two months to 40 years. Starbuck's 
conclusion is that "sanctification is the step usually after
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much striving and discontent, by which the personality is finally 
identified with the spiritual life which at conversion existed 
merely as a hazy possibility".
Starbuck says, the purpose of religious growth is to make
the
over the credulous child into.full grown spiritual man. Starbucki\
indicates four distinct lines of development. I. Where the point 
of reference changes over from self to others, and one recognises 
that one is a part of the social whole. 2. Where the youth begins 
to realize that he is not only the passive heir of all the ages, 
but that he himself must contribute something of worth to the race, 
3. But he must not only act but act wisely, so in this third line 
of development the adolescent must see the truth of things for 
himself, and come to feel himself a medium through which the life 
of the whole finds expression. 4. The fourth line of growth is 
seen, where the individual reaches out after a fuller life in 
harmony with the instinct for self-enlargement. This is corrected 
by regulative sentiments which he builds up to restrain his in- 
stinctive appetites.
The function of adolescence is to effect all these transfor- 
mations. Adolescence in a word,is the period of travail which 
precedes and accompanies the birth of a full orbed personality.
In chapter 31, the last chapter of his book, Starbuck deals 
briefly with the pedagogical implications of his study. He says, 
the fact that thrusts itself into prominence is that of successive 
stages in growth from childhood to maturity. Now,says Starbuck, 
both ethical and religious education must recognise this fact and 
adapt themselves to the growing personality of the individual.
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"There are duties and ideals which are especially fitting for each 
stage in life, and so there is a religious ideal peculiar to each 
age n . Therefore, in childhood we should emphasize obedience and 
conformity. In youth we should stress the maxims, "insist on 
yourself; never imitate? "to thine own self be true". But in 
maturity the accent ought to be on service, and losing oneself in 
the cause. Special emphasis on each of these ideals is demanded 
in each period. To anticipate the stages of growth and lead on 
easily and naturally from one stage into the next is of paramount 
importance. But the different steps must not be hastened unduly. 
Starbuck says, "the interests of the religious life demand that in 
venturing to help in the processes of growth from childhood to 
maturity there should be a tact, a knowledge, a delicacy of treat- 
ment, in some measure commensurate with the infinite fineness of 
the organism with which we are dealing".
65.
CRITIQUE.
With respect to method, and handling of material Starbuck's 
book is imperfect. It ought to be stated in all fairness that 
this book is a first study in a comparatively unexplored and un- 
charted region of human experience. The defects which appear in 
Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion" are the inevitable defects which 
are annexed to a pioneer work in any field of inquiry. It is 
obvious at the outset that Starbuck attempted too much in a first 
work. He tried to cover the whole field of the religious life but 
with indifferent success. A feature of Starbuck's work is his 
fairmindedness. Starbuck has no naturalistic thesis to prove. 
His single aim is to get at the facts of the religious life in order 
to discern the laws of their interaction. Two of Starbuck's pos- 
itions need to be pondered by the more recent psychologists of re- 
ligion, for the investigations of whom, his own paved the way. le 
refer first to Starbuck's recognition of the fact, that the stand- 
point and method which the science of psychology adopts, impose
upon it definite limitations. The business of a psychology of
it 
religion as Starbuck conceived A was to get at the factual data of
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the religious life and their laws, but not to pronounce upon 
their essential nature, and ultimate ground. Starbuck's second 
attitude was that while it is perfectly legitimate to study re- 
ligion in the race, this is not psychology. A psychology of 
religion must study religion in the individual. Starbuck's 
insistence upon the distinction between anthropology, sociology, 
the history of religion and psychology still needs emphasis. 
Naturally like many other works Starbuck's book has the defects 
of its qualities. Most of these seem directly due to his 
method, which was personal and interrogative. His treatise is 
based entirely on replies to question circulars, and in the 
hands of no other author of the American School does the question- 
naire method so clearly reveal its imperfections. The question- 
naire at its best can only yield rough and ready indications of
1. 
general tendencies in a restricted field of instances. Data so
derived can never yield conclusions possessing that quality of 
precision which is requisite before an induction can receive the 
imprimatur of science. Starbuck has with Teutonic patience, and 
herculean labour collected and sifted a mass of documentary data 
gathered by a method that can yield loose approximations only. 
One would regret the fact of so much careful work,with so relat- 
ively meagre scientific results, were it not for the conviction 
which grows upon one with the perusal of the book, that Professor 
Starbuck has a passion for documents, and delights in diagrams. 
The book contains 32 elaborate statistical tables, and 14 carefully 
constructed diagrams. These tables leave the impression of
1. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion, p.48.
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1. 
artificiality and over-elaboration. Tables X. XV. XX. especially
seem to excessively multiply classes of feelings, bodily affect-
2. 
ions etc. These too exact numerical tabulations give spurious
scientific precision to the deliverances of the book. It is 
notorious that statistics may prove anything, an argument based 
entirely on statistics, especially respecting psychical realities 
needs careful scrutiny. It was an American who proved from 
statistics that bed was a most dangerous place, because more 
people died in bed than anywhere else. Statistics may be mani- 
pulated in favour of one's own thesis, and conflicting deductions 
may be derived from the same statistics. An interesting comment- 
ary on this fact is a comparison of Starbuck*s conclusion as to 
the average age of conversion with that of Leuba 1 s. This 
Starbuck finds from his statistics is about 17 years. Professor
Leuba who also used the questionnaire method shows from his
5. instances that the average age is about 25 years. The Doctors
differ here. The disparity is explained by the fact that Leuba£ 
question circular was calculated to elicit profounder religious 
experiences than Starbucks. These naturally occur more frequent- 
ly in manhood than in childhood and adolescence. While Starbuck 1 
on the other hand registered the most shallow experiences of 
childhood and adolescence as conversions. This general critic- 
ism applies more or less to the whole of the book.
The questionnaire used in isolation, and without safeguards 
is an inadequate method at any time, but Starbuck does not always
1. Coe G.A. Op.Cit. See footnote, p.47.
f * f^b^TV'AAt111! W10,108? °f ReliSion - PP.67.123.220. 
3. Leuba J.H. Art. A Study in the Psychology of
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use this imperfect method wisely. Starbuck's experimental
material is unsatisfactory because the cases he investigates are 
not numerous enough, nor sufficiently representative. Starbuck 
professes to be writing a psychology of religion, but he limits 
the scope of his questionnaire to practically one type of relig- 
ionists, and to one phase of the religious life. The reports on 
which he bases his conclusions come almost entirely from American 
evangelical Protestants of the Methodist persuasion. The types 
investigated then, are in the main American, and they are Ameri- 
cans who favour revival methods, and who use a certain pietistic 
vocabulary. Conversion to such is the central experience. Now 
what is true of Starbuck's respondents need not be necessarily 
true of religious men in general, nor of a denomination other 
than the Methodist.
It is quite apparent that Starbuck has studied not the genus 
man, but the species American Methodist, his conclusions there- 
fore are loosely true of this species of the genus religious men. 
The Roman Catholic Church has a distinct type of piety in which 
sacramental ideas occupy the prominent place conversion has in 
the religious life of the Methodist. Again the Lutheran Church 
has another type of piety which is the product of the Christian 
home, and the Christian community. Moreover a definite type of 
piety is produced by the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the 
Church of England, the Greek Church, not to speak of Buddhistic 
and Mohammedan Churches. All these important types are ignored 
by Starbuck. His generalisations therefore are scarcely valid 
with respect to the great national churches whose theological 
and psychological climate differs considerably from that of the
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American Methodist denomination.
Starbuck is frequently guilty of the fallacy of imperfect 
enumeration. His broad inductions repose on insufficient data.
Not only are Starbuck 1 s investigations confined to a narrow 
class, but his questions to this class were sometimes crudely 
formulated. Many of the questions overlap, more exact term- 
inology could have been used with advantage. Starbuck is deal- 
ing almost entirely with the members of a denomination which   
stresses the "Cross of Christ", and the "Shed Blood", as absolute- 
ly necessary for salvation, yet he asks no question designed to 
evoke information concerning the place of "The Atonement" in the 
religious experience of the representatives of this type of piety.
Again Starbuck 1 s definition of the conversion experience is
1. 
too wide. The term Conversion is used in the loosest sense.
It gathers up into its sweep experiences which differ tremendous- 
ly in quality and intensity. Profound experiences which sound 
the depths of personality are grouped with religious experiences 
of the most superficial kind. It is quite competent for any 
psychologist to treat of varieties of conversion by the method of 
comparison, but Starbuck 1 s mode of procedure is scarcely legiti- 
mate, for he masses unlike phenomena together, and then proceeds 
to draw exact statistical conclusions from them. Such conclus- 
ions are naturally misleading.
One of the irritating features of the book from a scientific 
point of view, is Starbuck's habitual use throughout this study 
of the theological language of his subjects. Starbuck uses the 
vocabulary of pietistic phraseology when psychologising without
1. Starbuck E.D. The Psychology of Religion, p.24.
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translating this language into the terminology of psychology. 
Such uncritical language is scarcely suitable as a basis for 
psychological classification.
In this study of the religious life Starbuck gives no evidence 
of introspective power. The impression grows upon one with the 
perusal of his book that Starbuck is judging the cathedral window 
from the outside. He seems to be entirely indebted to his 
written reports and returns for the whole of his material for a 
psychology of religion. With much more laborious care, and 
apparently with as much psychological insight as a civil servant 
compiling census returns he sifts, and counts, and tabulates his 
statistics in the most objective way possible. This may of 
course be useful as throwing light on the externals of religion, 
for the compiling of church statistics, and for the purposes of 
practical ecclesiasticism, but it is certainly inadequate when we 
have to do with fluid realities, and most complex subjective ex- 
periences of the religious life.
We have already referred to the fairmindedness of this in- 
vestigator, and to his passion for documents, a third character-
1.
istic is also prominent in his book, namely his naivete. Star- 
buck accepts the statements of his correspondents concerning their 
alleged religious experiences in the most uncritical manner. 
Referring to the question of the abnormal aspect of conversion, 
Starbuck says, "the testimony of the respondents, then is our 
standard of judging the two classes of normal and abnormal." 
Again with respect to sanctification Starbuck says,"we shall rely 
1. See Starbuck 1 s Psychology of Religion, pp.164.184.379.587.
71.
first upon the testimony of the respondents". We shall quote a 
typical response under this last head. One subject writes, "I 
felt so pure and clean so that I wished I were made of glass, so 
that everybody could look within my heart". This spiritual prig- 
gishness is paralleled by other utterances. Fifteen of Starbucks 
subjects professed to have become so free from sin as to be per- 
fect. All the various assertions concerning the most complex 
experiences, motives and influences of the religious life are 
swallowed by Starbuck, hook, line and sinker. He does not think 
it necessary to get corroboration for a single statement. Such 
artlessness on the part of a scientific investigator is extra- 
ordinary. Starbuck appears to ignore all across the psycholog- 
ical truism that it is just here with respect to the dynamics of
the subjective life that untrained introspection is most incom-
1.
petent and unreliable. It is precisely this uncritical accept- 
ance of anything his respondents put on paper that results in the 
plethora of classes of moods, feelings, and motives which receive 
such elaborate tabulation in this book. Many correspondents tell 
of the same or similar moods, feelings, and motives in inexact 
theological language, and Starbuck immediately taking their re- 
ports at their face value writes down as many motives as there 
are men. Starbuck admits that the language of his respondents 
is confused. He says, "it sometimes occurs that definite relig- 
ious awakening is not called a conversion by persons who are not 
accustomed to that specific terminology. On the other hand, a 
religious experience was called a conversion when it was specifi- 
cally said by the respondent that the experience had no especial 
1. Stout G.F. Manual of Psychology, p.43.
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significance". In spite of this knowledge Starbuck consistent- 
ly accepts the statements of his subjects at their face value. 
Professor Pratt when gathering data for his "Psychology of Relig- 
ious Belief", used the questionnaire, but Pratt in contradistinct- 
ion to Starbuck interviewed his respondents, and discussed their
2. 
answers with them. He refused to take them at their face value.
No investigator since Starbuck has ever used the questionnaire 
without safeguards such as these.
Starbuck 1 s study gives no information regarding the sources 
of religion in the individual or the race. He does not tell us 
in what the religious consciousness consists, or of the relation 
of religion with the other great master forces and factors of 
human life. In common with subsequent workers in this field no 
account is taken of the supernatural factor in religious exper- 
ience. The important subject of the religion of childhood is 
dismissed in a few pages. Starbuck 1 s dominant interest is in 
the adolescent development of American evangelical Protestants 
which he assigns to biological and physiological causes.
Starbuck 1 s study attempts to establish two important pro- 
positions. First, conversion and other adolescent phenomena are 
mutually related. Second, conversion and physiological adoles- 
cence are definitely correlated. Starbuck 1 s genetic explanation 
of conversion is fourfold. First, the sociological explanation, 
the individual grows up from childhood through adolescence to 
manhood. As a child he is egotistic, "but as he grows he gathers 
much," and realizes he is not the whole universe but a member of
1. Starbuck E.D. Psychology of Religion, pp.184.200.
2. Pratt J.B. Psychology of Religious Belief, p.254.
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society. He learns therefore that there is a social will to 
which he must submit his individual self. Conversion on this 
view is simply an aspect of the social phenomenon. Second, 
Starbuck explains conversion by biological conceptions. He con- 
nects conversion with sexual development, it is a by-product of 
puberty. Third, it may be explicated in terms of physiology, 
bodily changes, and transformations in the nervous system have 
much to do with religious experiences. Or in the fourth place, 
conversion may be given a psychological explanation. We begin 
life with the lower self as the centre of reference, but as the 
child passes to maturity the higher self grows in power and glory, 
a fracture of personality occurs, and the higher self becomes 
after a paroxysm of emotional intensity of long or short duration 
the centre of human activity. This experience is conversion. 
Conversion then with Starbuck, may be explained either in terms 
of sociology, biology, physiology, or psychology, or all of them 
together. Natural laws explain the phenomenon of conversion. 
Now plainly these things belong together, and there is some con- 
nection between conversion and all these things, but there is an 
obvious objection: many persons grow t,p sexual maturity; exper- 
ience all the normal physiological changes; and admit the claims 
of society, but they do not get converted, nor do they feel like 
it. If conversion is to be explained by natural laws this is a 
serious objection for natural laws operate universally. Therefore 
these biological, sociological, and physiological explanations 
are inadequate to account for the phenomenon of religious conver- 
sion. There must be another cause. Starbuck 1 s explanation
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seems to embody the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc, 
His inference that that which accompanies or goes before another 
thing has a causal connection with that thing is a hazardous one, 
At the period of adolescence there is the rise and development 
of new powers and as Starbuck, Coe, and Stanley Hall point out, 
conversion usually belongs to this period. But this is all the 
facts warrant us in saying. Professor Leuba's cases of conver- 
sion which are appended at the end of his first study took place 
at the average age of 25 years. Many of them occurred late in 
middle life. To say adolescence has a causal connection with 
conversion is to confound concomitant with cause.
The most remarkable and important conversions in the
history of religion are probably those of St Paul, St Augustine,
1. 
and Tolstoy and these are not adolescent conversions.
Professor Ladd seriously calls into question Starbuck 1 s 
general conclusion that the principl factor in religious con- 
version is the sexual changes that accompany the period of 
adolescence. He shows that Starbuck 1 s curve of conversion does
not agree with the physiological and sexual curve, and that
2. 
therefore Starbuck 1 s alleged induction has no scientific value.
In the whole of this study Starbuck does not present us 
with the complete religious history of a single subject. The 
number of recorded cases is legion, but we have no exhaustive 
study of any one case. Starbuck never seems to have followed 
through a single case to the end. Internal evidence indicates, 
that Starbuck 1 s plan was to get from a certain set of persons 
reports relating to their pre-conversion experiences. He would
1. Thouless R.H. Introd. Psychology of Religion, p.187
2. Ladd G.T. Philosophy of Religion. Vol.lT p.276.
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then derive from another group information concerning the con- 
version crisis itself. Then he would go to a third set of 
people for intelligence of the post-conversion phenomena. 
Again his conception of what the phenomenon of sanctification 
must be like is got from another group altogether. Having 
collected his data in this piecemeal fashion, Starbuck proceeds 
to fashion a mosaic. The inevitable result is that Starbuck 
builds out of these pieces of religious experience gathered from 
several different sets of subjects, an experience which no man 
ever had, or is likely to have. A psychology of religion rear- 
ed on such fragmentary data is not scientific.
Starbuck 1 s treatment of the religion of childhood leaves 
much to be desired. He dismisses this important subject in a 
few pages. He depends for his fact§ not as one would suppose 
upon the actual study and observation of the child-mind, but 
upon what adults like to tell him concerning the religious ex- 
periences of their childhood. "We shall have to depend", says 
Starbuck, "for our picture of the religion of childhood upon the 
reminiscences of the respondents". But why should we have to 
depend on the adult for our knowledge of the religion of child- 
hood when we may go to the child direct? Starbuck is clearly 
unscientific here. His unpsychological approach to this subject 
is all the more reprehensible since he admits that such state- 
ments of adults concerning childhood are largely invalidated by 
defects of memory, and errors of interpretation due to an adult 
standpoint. Starbuck 1 s conclusions with regard to the religion 
of childhood can be considered as probabilities only, until they
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receive confirmation by investigators who apply themselves to the 
observation and study of the child himself.
Starbuck at one time counts aesthetic and ethical feelings 
as real factors in religion, at another time he speaks of these 
impulses as substitutes for religion. On one occasion he refers 
to the sense of duty as one of "the most prominent and persistent 
factors in the1 spiritual life". Again referring to the ethical 
instinct* he says, it is"the most constant and persistent factor 
in the religious life". Then in another section of his work 
Starbuck shows that aesthetic and ethical feelings are not real 
factors in religion but are frequently substitutes for it during 
adolescent doubt, and storm and stress, and that when religion 
goes to wreck these things endure. But Starbuck cannot have it 
both ways.
We cannot find out what religion is by the questionnaire 
method alone, this method needs to be supplemented by an intensive 
study of actual cases which are subjected to both observation and 
experiment, and also by the biographical method.
Starbuck's classification of the content of the conversion 
experience is imperfect because of his absolute reliance on the 
questionnaire. Many of the things Starbuck sets down as factors 
in this experience overlap. There are many elements in a con- 
vert's experience, but when the psychologist comes along with his 
question circular, the convert singles out some one element which 
was most vivid at the time, and all the other elements tend to 
become obscured. Starbuck's classification of the content of 
this experience is imperfect, because he takes what his respond-
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ents affirm to be the central thing as the only thing.
The general defects of Starbuck 1 s book are perhaps the in- 
evitable penalty of strict fidelity to the questionnaire method. 
With all these defects, the most of which are unavoidable in a 
pioneer work, Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion" is a valuable 
contribution to that new science which America is making so 
peculiarly her own. Starbuck defined the topography of the 
field for subsequent workers. He stimulated a host of investi- 
gators to further enquiry along the lines suggested in his study. 
It is probable that Professor W. James's "Varieties of Religious 
Experience", would never have been written had Starbuck 1 s study 
not appeared. One of the valuable contributions Starbuck has 
made to the psychology of religion is his classification of types 
of conversion. Three definite types result from his research, 
the principle of classification being the attitude of the will in 
conversion. These three types are the positive determination or 
volitional type, the negative determination, or self-surrender 
type, and the spontaneous awakening type. Starbuck's types have 
become classical. The great stimulus Starbuck gave to this new 
line of inquiry; his own valuable research in this virgin field 
of study; and his clear recognition of the limitations of his 
science;also his eminently judicial spirit make him especially 






GEORGE ALBERT COE .
CHAPTER IV. 
EXPOSITION.
Professor Coe's book on Temperament and Religion appeared 
one year after Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion". "The 
Spiritual Life", though not of formidable bulk deserves more than 
passing notice for various reasons: first, this volume is one of 
the pioneer works of the American School; second, the results of 
Coe's independent investigations present marked agreements and 
contrasts with Starbuck's earlier work; and in the third place, 
Coe draws attention for the first time to the tremendous part 
played by temperament in religious life and experience. This dis- 
covery of temperament as the prime factor in determining modes of 
expression of the religious life is Coe's special contribution to 
the psychology of religion.
In this unpretentious volume, Coe groups under psychological 
1. Coe Q.A. The Spiritual Life. 1900. The Abingdon Press.
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laws many of the apparently isolated and unrelated phenomena of
religion. The whole book is written in a sympathetic spirit, and 
there is an evident desire on the part of the author to place the 
results and methods of the psychology of religion at the disposal 
of the practical religious worker and educationalist.
A brief exposition of Coe's book is here attempted.
IT
Professor Coe starts from the position, that coordination between 
religious development and the chief periods of physical and mental 
growth is one of the established facts of the psychology of relig- 
ion. Coe accepts as axiomatic the generalisation, that conver- 
sion or some equivalent personalising of religion is a normal part 
of adolescent growth. Coe finds from the examination of carefully 
compiled statistics concerning 1,784 men that the average age of 
conversion is 16*4 years. This investigator holds that the 
statistics establish the concomitance of two groups of facts, 
namely, puberty and conversion. Coe concludes that the average 
age of conversion synchronizes with the age of accession to puberty 
and that the mental condition accompanying the physical transform- 
ation is specially favourable to religious impressions. The 
general conclusion reached is, that while the physical changes 
which occur at adolescence do not actually produce religion, they 
certainly do make the subject of these transformations more impres- 
sionable.
Coe is conspicuous for the remarkable accent he places on the 
physiological causes of the characteristic feelings of adolescence, 
such as vague unrest, dissatisfaction with self, and general 
discontent. Even the religious difficulties of adolescence have
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a physical cause. Coe cites Starbuck as fixing the age of relig- 
ious doubt at 18 years for men, and at 15 years for women. This 
adolescent doubt according to Coe, is not perplexed reasoning, so 
much as it is a sympton of the physical conditions of the adoles- 
cent period. In Coe's opinion, whenever theoretic doubts produce 
morbid states the causes are physical not intellectual. According 
to this author, the strain on the nervous system at this period is 
terrific, and the worry, despondency, bad temper, indecision, 
morbid introspection, and susceptibility to sexual temptations all 
of which characterise adolescence, are the effects of nerve fatigue, 
Coe insists, that fatigue however induced is the neural basis of 
the morbid conscientiousness of adolescence. General mental 
ferment, bad teaching or lack of teaching, and an over-strained 
nervous system, these three causes according to Coe, lie back of 
the morbid states of adolescence. Coe protests against the pres- 
ent mode of religious instruction for leaving out of its reckoning
the relation of physiology and psychology to the spiritual life.
1. 2. 5. 
The theories of Bain, Havelock Ellis, and Leuba, which attempt
to explain variations in the religious experience of conversion, 
are criticized by Coe as inadequate, because they ignore the tre- 
mendous factor of temperament.
In order to substantiate his assertion, that temperament is 
the important determinant of types of conversion, Coe carefully 
examined 77 cases, of whom 52 were men, and 25 were women. It is 
worthy of note, that as to personnel nearly all were college
1. Bain, Emotions and Will, 5rd. Ed. p. 453.
2. KHis Havelock, Man and Woman, 2nd. Ed. p. 292.
3. Leuba J.H. Psychology of Religious Phenomena, Amer.Journ
Psych. Vol.VII. p. 340.
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students, sound in mind and body, and all had positive moral and 
religious training, for the most part of the Methodist type.
As the result of his investigations in connection with these 
subjects Coe discovered two things, first, that there were many 
differences between types of religious experience and that these 
varied greatly in degree, and second, that the differences between 
types of mental organization were also many and varied in degree. 
Coe arrived at the conclusion, that abrupt and striking religious 
changes happen among denominations that set out to get them.
Coe's subjects were divided into two great classes, those 
who had experienced a remarkable conversion were placed in one 
group, and those who had had no such experience were placed in 
another.
Coe then made a second classification on the principle of 
expectation of sudden transformation. Two classes were formed, 
one consisting of the subjects who expected a remarkable conver- 
sion, and another consisting of those without such an expectation.
Those who belonged to the expectant group fell before analysis 
into two classes, namely, those who got what they expected, and 
those whose expectations were unrealized. Coe insists here on 
the significant fact, that those who were disappointed had put 
themselves in the same attitude of will as those who were not.
Coe next looked into the temperament of these two classes. 
With regard to each of these groups, he raised the question as to 
whether the intellect, sensibility, or the will was predominant. 
He discovered that where expectation was satisfied, there sensi- 
bility predominated, and where the expectation was disappointed,
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there the intellect was sovereign.
Coe discovered the interesting fact, that those whose expect- 
ation was satisfied belonged to the slow-intense and prompt-weak 
varieties of temperament, which approach most nearly the tradition- 
al melancholic and sanguine temperaments, while those who were 
disappointed belonged to the prompt-intense species, which approx- 
imates to the classical choleric temperament.
This investigator now studied the relation of these exper- 
iences to mental and motor automatisms, and found that 65^ of 
those subjects who had a striking religious transformation also 
exhibited automatic phenomena, while only Q>% of those who had vain- 
ly tried for the striking experience had either a mental hallucin- 
ation or a motor automatism. Coe places on record therefore his 
conclusion, that "the mechanism of striking religious transform- 
ations is the same as the mechanism of our automatic mental pro-
cesses".
It is important to note Coe's use of experimentation in this 
connection. The two groups with which he worked vjere now placed 
under the influence of hypnotic suggestion, in order to discover 
the relative susceptibility to suggestion on the part of these two 
classes of subjects. Coe discovered that among those whose ex- 
pectation of a striking conversion was gratified, 13 out of 14 
were passive subjects possessing great suggestibility but showing 
little spontaneity. On the other hand, he found that 11 out of 
12 persons whose expectation of such a transformation was unreal- 
ized, were not very suggestible, and belonged to the spontaneous 
type. Coe's hypnotic experiments established a correlation
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between religious experiences and suggestibility, and resulted in 
the generalization, that susceptibility to suggestion is an im- 
portant factor in striking cases of religious transformation.
Coe maintains, that given these three factors, a tempera- 
ment of extreme sensibility, a tendency to automatisms, expect- 
ation and passive suggestibility, a striking religious transform- 
ation can be predicted. For Coe, the physiological and psychical 
make-up of a man determines the nature and mode of his religious 
experiences.
Coe goes on to show how all these facts bear upon the phen- 
omena of revivals, the "Power" phenomenon, trances, visions, 
miracles, mental therapeutics etc. The phenomenon of the"Power", 
which puzzled John Wesley is explained as induced by hypnotic pro- 
cesses. The pressure of religious excitement produces a sporadic 
case of hallucination, or auto-suggestion in the form of trance, 
vision, voices, or catalepsy. The by-standers are filled with 
dread lest they should be affected in the same way, and the auto- 
suggestion works, the more suggestible soon realize their fearful 
expectation, every fresh case adds power to the real cause, and 
soon there is an epidemic of phenomenal experiences.
Coe maintains, that the hypnotic rather than the moral or
tis
religious influences #?e often the decisive one» in revival meet- 
ings. The great evil of revival methods according to this 
author, is that all too frequently the mind of an earnest subject 
is fixed upon the attainment of some religious experience which 
his mental constitution and temperament makes impossible. This 
says Coe, often results in revulsion of feeling, and entails
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needless anxiety, and even positive antagonism to religion.
Coe's treatment of the subject of Divine Healing is distinct- 
ly illuminating. The law of mental healing is the law of suggest- 
ion, and according to Coe, 90$ of the population can be hypnotized. 
Suggestion is an instrument of great and subtle power, and it is 
easier to produce pain by suggestion than to remove it, therefore 
Coe insists, that indiscriminate hypnotic experimentation is danger 
ous, and the handling of suggestion should be left to experts.
Coe explains the visions that frequently accompany Divine 
healing as due to four causes: first, there is the extreme suggest- 
ibility of the subject; second, there is the possession of a stock 
of mental images of the saints, the Virgin, or the Christ; third, 
there is great emotional pressure; and finally, intense concentrat- 
ion upon Divine things.
All cures wrought in the name of faith at shrines, and in 
connection with the relics of the saints must be ascribed to sug- 
gestion. Coe reminds us, that cures have been wrought at shrines 
other than Christian, and that all the successes of Christian 
Science healing fall under the general law of suggestion. Coe's 
position here is, that cases which can be explained by natural law 
must be so explained. Trances and visions are to be explained 
therefore in terms of auto-suggestion. Suggestion moreover, is 
the clue to the miraculous element in the lives of the Saints, in 
the life of Christ, and in the wonders of religions other than the 
Christian. Coe raises the question here, why should it be thought 
a thing incredible that Christ should employ the ordinary forces of 
nature and mind at hand?
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Physical phenomena like the stigmata of St Francis of Assisi, 
and the five wounds of Louise Lateau are all explicable in terms 
of auto-suggestion. With Coe then, suggestion does not explain 
everything but it explains much of the phenomena of the religious 
life.
Coe 's last chapter, "A Study of Spirituality", continues his 
discussion of temperament and religion. Coe acutely examines 
the traditional conceptions of sainthood, contemporary hymnology 
and spiritual exercises, popular current conceptions of spiritual- 
ity, and the historic influence of Mariolatry. As a result of 
this penetrating analysis Coe concludes, that the feminine element 
unduly predominates over all others in worship and the religious 
life. Coe protests, that Christ's universally human conception 
of spiritual life has been warped into a narrow temperamental form 
by organized Christianity. Men who are full of intense purposes, 
eager, and earnest, whose need is action are sacrificed in the 
interests of those who are given to feeling, in other words the 
Choleric temperament is starved and subordinated in the interests 
of the Melancholic.
Coe impeaches organized Christianity because it does not offen 
the kind of spiritual refreshment, and modes of activity adapted 
to many-sided human personality. The great problem before the 
Christian Church according to Coe, is to find a solvent for the 
maladjustment of temperaments. Coe's remedy is to definitely 
broaden the psychological basis of Church life and ideals, so as 
to meet the needs of all the varied temperaments of men. Coe's 
constructive policy embodies the following propositions: first,
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the spiritual conceit of the melancholic temperament must be re- 
sisted; second, the spiritual trivialities of the merely sanguine 
temperament must be transcended; third,the spirituality of the 
moral will, and of the truth loving intellect must not only be 
conceded, but preached and gloried in. The Church must cease to 
look at things through feminine eyes, and must emphasize the more 
rugged, active, intellectual, and social virtues.
Coe's argument is culmulative, all his different lines of 
investigation converge upon this conclusion, namely, that organ- 
ized Christianity Protestant and Roman Catholic alike, places too 
light an accent on the more active practical qualities of goodness, 
in Coe's own words, "the forms of religious life natural to the 
choleric temperament are habitually discounted in favour of those 




Coe's "Spiritual Life", is one of the earlier works of the 
American School of religious psychology, it makes a distinct and 
valuable contribution to that new science to which America has 
proved so hospitable. Following hard upon Starbuck's book, Coe's 
treatment presents several important points of agreements with, 
and differences from that work.
It is interesting to observe, that Coe though working in- 
dependently arrives at substantially the same conclusions as
Starbuck with reference to the average age at which conversions
1. 
take place, namely, 16'4 years.
It is worthy of note, that while Starbuck 1 s classification 
of religious types is according to the attitude of the will in 
conversion, Coe's classification in contrast with Starbuck 1 s, is 
based on temperament.
Another point of difference between these first investigators 
is, that while Starbuck maintains, conversion and puberty are
1. Starbuck E.D. The Psychology of Religion. p,31. 
Cf.> Coe G.A. The Spiritual Life. p. 45.
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I. 
supplemental rather than coincidental, Coe insists, that these
2. 
phenomena synchronize and are vitally connected. This intimate
connection between puberty and conversion is a postulate not yet 
proven.
It will be remembered, that Coe's most important conclusions 
were reached as the result of an intensive study of 77 religious 
subjects. Goe f s respondents were intellectually, socially, and 
religiously a special class, they were University men and women, 
with a Methodist up-bringing which stresses peculiar religious 
experiences. Coe's generalizations therefore, are strictly true 
of this class only.
It must be conceded however, that Coe's study of his in- 
stances was most thorough and exhaustive. Both Starbuck and Coe 
use the questionnaire, but with a difference. Starbuck used the 
questionnaire without safeguards of anykind. Coe uses the quest- 
ion circular method, but safeguards himself at every step. "The 
Spiritual Life" was published one year after Starbuck 1 s"Psychology 
of Religion", it shows a great advance on Starbuck 1 s method, and 
indicates how quickly the inadequacy of the bald questionnaire 
was perceived by subsequent investigators.
Coe supplemented the question circular method by personal 
interview. He carefully cross-questioned his respondents. With 
the assistance of other psychological students, Coe kept his sub- 
jects under observation for objective evidence with reference to 
temperament. In contradistinction to Starbuck, who accepted 
everything his respondents liked to tell him at its face value,
1. Starbuck E.D. The Psychology of Religion, p.41.
2. Coe G.A. The Spiritual Life. p.45.
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this less ingenuous investigator, recognizing the fact that very 
few persons can give a trustworthy account of their own motives, 
refused to accept the facts recorded in answer to his question- 
naire without corroboration. Coe arranged for interviews with 
the intimate friends and close acquaintances of his subjects in 
order to confirm old facts or to elicit new data.
Coe's procedure is particularly important, in that it invol-
1.
ved experimentation. He subjected all his crucial cases to hypnot- 
ic experiment for the purpose of discovering degrees of suggesti- 
bility. The questionnaire used with these safeguards and supple- 
ments, becomes a valuable method for the psychology of religion.
Coe's thesis,that temperament is an important factor in re- 
ligious experience,and a most influential determinant of types of 
religious expression,must be regarded as being made out.
Coe's insistence on the simple psychological truth,which seems 
to have escaped the notice of popular evangelists and public advo- 
cates of the Christian religion,namely,that there are temperaments 
other than the emotional in existence,is to be commended. With his 
plea,that organized Christianity should strive to meet the needs of 
every temperament within its pale,we are in thorough accord. Organ- 
ized Christianity must appeal to the moral will as well as to 
sensibility.
Again Coe is right in urging,that the Christian Church should 
place a heavier accent on the Manliness of Christ. A religion ̂ tiich 
is set forth as a shelter,or a refuge,and which stresses the motive 
of playing for safety,does not appeal with any force to the robust 
mind. It was this sort of thing which provided Nietzsche with
1. Coe G.A. The Spiritual Life. p.110.
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material for his diatribes against Christianity. It can be 
safely affirmed, that any presentation of Christianity which 
emasculates it of its virile factors will fail to capture the 









"The Varieties of Religious Experience" is the most widely 
known of all the contributions of the American School. The 
author's eminence as a psychologist, the genius which gleams out 
of every page, and the fascination of an inimitable literary style 
have all contributed to the fame and popularity of this bewitch- 
ing book.
"The Varieties" can scarcely be called a systematic treatise 
on the psychology of the religious life. Professor James had a 
thesis to prove. The philosophy that appealed at once to his 
heart and mind was pluralistic idealism. James therefore sought 
support in the religious life for his hypothesis that the univer- 
se is a protean world of spiritual beings. In religious exper- 
ience James hoped to find proof of the invasion of human life by 
spiritual agencies. This then seems to be the animating purpose
1. James William, The Varieties of Religious Experience,1902
Longmans Green & Co.
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of this fascinating book. "The Varieties" does not treat of 
religious life as a whole, but that portion of it only which 
appeals to James as supporting his favourite hypothesis. The 
lectures therefore are chiefly concerned with the description and 
appreciation of two classes of religious phenomena, namely, con- 
version, and mysticism.
James sets himself to solve the problem is religion true? 
He begins by demonstrating the truth of the unique value of relig- 
ion in human life. Having establised the truth of the value of 
religion James addresses himself to the question of the truth of 
religion. After discussion of this problem James closes with a 
chapter and a postscript which contain his philosophical specu- 
lations concerning religion.
The method adopted was the biographical. James gets at the 
autobiographies, and personal confessions of extraordinary relig- 
ious men and women. His material is remarkable alike for range 
and fullness. With regard to the subject of religious experience 
whose God-consciousness is to be investigated by the science of 
psychology, James affirms repeatedly, that for profitable study 
we must go to the extreme type of religious temperament for whom 
religion exists as an acute fever. It is in this connection 
that James asserts there is intimate connection between religion 
and neurology. The extreme type of the religious temperament is 
usually a psychopath. James says a great number of the supreme 
religious figures have been psychopaths, but he argues if there 
be such a thing as inspiration from above, it might well be that 
the neurotic temperament furnishes the chief condition of the
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requisite receptivity. Morbid origin does not discount religion, 
for it is by fruits not by roots it must be judged.
In lecture I, James sharply distinguishes between existential 
judgments and judgments of value. Mere existential accounts of 
the facts of mental history do not decide their spiritual signifi- 
cance. Religious experience must be tried by empirical criteria. 
The test of religious experience must be pragmatic. Is the relig- 
ious mental state a happiness bringer?, is it morally helpful?, is 
it serviceable for life?, these are the criteria.
James divides the field of religion into two portions, namely, 
institutional religion, and personal religion. It is with person- 
al religion that James takes to do. Religion he says is a complex 
conception and must not be defined in terms of any one of its ele- 
ments. There is no one elementary religious emotion, but a store- 
house of emotions upon which religious objects may draw. Religious 
emotions are just natural emotions evoked by, and directed to relig- 
ious objects. James defines religion thus: "Religion is the feel- 
ings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so 
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever 
they may consider the divine". "The divine shall mean for us only 
such primal reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to 
solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse,nor a jest".
Morality and religion are differentiated from each other by an 
emotional mood, and by the way the universe is accepted. Morality 
obeys the regnant laws with a cold heart, and in the stoical spirit 
it is characterised by a tense volitional straining. Religion sub- 
mits with gladness and serenity to the redoing laws. A higher
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kind of emotion seems to carry the religious man through. Re- 
ligion gives a man a new sphere of power, and joy. James's 
conclusion is,that religion makes easy and felicitous what in 
any case is necessary, and it is the only agency that can do 
this. Religious feeling therefore is an absolute addition to 
man's range of life.
James affirms the reality of an unseen order, and that our 
supreme good lies in adjusting ourselves to it. He points out 
in lecture III, that one of the important facts of our human 
constitution is the determinability of our minds by pure ideas. 
Objects of thought lead to reactions as strong and even stronger 
than those elicited by sensible presences. Men who have intuit- 
ions of the unseen find them as convincing as any sensible ex- 
periences can be. If a person feels the presence of the living 
God, no critical arguments can change his faith. Therefore 
rationalism can't destroy religious convictions, neither can it 
give conviction when it chooses to argue for religion.
In lectures IV, and V, we come to James's fundamental class- 
ification of the subjects of religious experience. James
divides religious men into two great classes, the healthy minded,
1. 
and the morbid minded. James further takes over the terms of
Francis W. Newman, and labels the healthy minded"the once born", 
and the morbid minded "the twice born". James proceeds to show 
how religion tends to unify the mind, and to adjust it to its 
natural and social environment, in connection with both these 
chief types.
The healthy minded arrive at unity by deliberately turning
1. Cf., Hoffdings terms "Discordant Natures" and"Expansive 
Philosophy of Religion, pp.284.286. Natures' 1 .
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attention from evil, and denying that it belongs to us. This 
type systematically disregards the unpleasant in life. The re- 
ligion of healthy mindedness has found expression in the New 
Thought Movement of America with its vigorous propaganda. The 
leaders stake everything on healthy minded attitudes as such 
courage, hope, trust, contempt for doubt, worry, and fear. The 
movement has two sides, a speculative, and a practical. On the 
speculative side it is pantheistic, and on the practical side it 
can show therapeutic triumphs.
The religion of the morbid-minded on the other hand, asserts 
evil is so inherent that relief can only come from without by a 
deliverance  Failure, disappointment, sin, anguish of soul are 
realities in every life. There will always be misunderstanding 
between these two types, says James. The "morbid-minded" think 
the way of the healthy-minded shallow, while the healthy-minded 
think of the "sick souls" as unmanly and diseased. The cause of 
this distinction between these two types is temperamental.
This state of intense pessimism and melancholy on the part 
of the morbid-minded says James, is always the religious exper- 
ience of neurotic subjects. This melancholy when intense must 
lead to a crisis before relief comes. There is no getting grad- 
ually better and better, a crisis is reached, and a second birth 
is the only way out. There is no such morbid crisis in the 
religious lives of the healthy minded. Here then we meet one of 
James's important conclusions, namely, ant intense state of 
melancholy always exists as a temporary condition of spiritual 
evolution. The way to religious rapture is through this ante-
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cedent state of intensest unhappiness.
In his eighth lecture James deals with the subject of the 
divided self and its unification. In all of us says James, the 
normal evolution of character consists in unifying the inner self, 
The period of introducing order is marked by unhappiness vague or 
definite. In persons religiously quickened it takes the form of 
moral remorse and issues in intense melancholy. The unification 
of the self may come gradually or abruptly, through altered feel- 
ings, new intellectual insights, or new mystical experiences, but 
however, or whenever it comes, it brings relief. This reaching
unity is a psychological process which need not always take the
1. 
religious form.
Conversion is the psychological process of unification of a 
discordant self which takes the religious form. We need not dis- 
cuss the supernatural cause of conversion says James, but will 
simply consider the fact. The psychological history of conver- 
sion, is as follows: an individual's ideas tend to fall into 
groups which are relatively independent. If the individual con- 
centrates intensely on a single aim, a certain group of ideas 
nucleates about this aim. There are of course other groups of 
ideas in the mental field, but these are ignored. The habitual 
centre of the man's personal energy is the set of ideas to which 
he devotes himself. But when his interest is fixed on incompat- 
ible aims, we have the phenomenon of a divided self, for a man 
cannot have two habitual centres of personal energy, he must work 
from one set of ideas or the other, and the process of deciding
1. See cases of non-religious conversion and counter-conver- 
The Varieties, pp. 175 - 183. si on.
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which set is often agony. Now it makes a tremendous difference 
in a man's life whether any group of ideas he possesses becomes 
central or remains peripheral in his mental life. When oscillat- 
ion in emotional interest ceases, and the interest is fixed on one 
aim exclusively we have a unified self. This then is how a self 
may be divided and unified.
Conversion then simply means, that a certain set of religious 
ideas which inhabited the periphery of the mental field becomes 
central, i.e. the group of ideas to which a man devotes himself 
and from which he works. This shifting of the group from the 
circumference to the centre is of the nature of a painful dislo- 
cation. The former central system is flung out to the circum- 
ference, and the peripheral system rushes in as it were to the 
newly created central vacuum.
Why do sets of ideas which were peripheral become central? 
James is agnostic here, it is so, is all psychology can say. New 
insights, mutations of propensities and instincts, and emotional 
upheavals are believed to play a part. These factors, and othera 
unknown precipitate the crisis which leads to mental reorganisat- 
ion. James endorses Starbuck 1 s conclusion that conversion is a 
normal phenomenon of adolescence. There are two main types of
conversion according to James, the volitional type, and the self-
1.
surrender type. In connection with the first type the transfor- 
mation is gradual, it is the building up of a new set of moral and 
spiritual habits, but in the second type the change is sudden and 
remarkable.
The cause of conversion in both types is the same, namely, 
1. Cf., Starbuck, Psychology of Religion, p.100.
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sub-conscious maturing processes. James passes by the volition- 
al type as being less interesting than the self-surrender type 
where the sub-conscious effects are startling. One fundamental 
form of religious experience says James, is that in which the
dominant feeling is that conscious effort gets us nowhere, and
1. 
that success is attained by self-surrender. When the surrender
is made, a crisis occurs, after which regenerative phenomena 
appear. James translates the self-surrender type of conversion 
experience into psychological terms. He says,"when the new 
centre of personal energy has been sub-consciously incubated so 
long as to be just ready to burst into consciousness,"hands off" 
is the only word, it must burst forth unaided". Psychology agrees 
with religion that there are forces apparently outside the con- 
scious individual that bring redemption to his life, but differs 
from religion in that psychology holds that the whole matter of 
conversion is due to the incubation of the individual's own sub- 
conscious forces, and not the supernatural operations of Deity.
For James then conversion is a phenomenon of the sub-con- 
scious. Psychology, he says, holds there are two causes which 
shift the centres of personal energy in a man's life. These 
are explicitly conscious processes of thought and will, and 
second, sub-conscious incubation of motives deposited by the ex- 
periences of life. The whole field of objects present to the 
mind at any given time is the limit of the mental life. The 
margin of this field is vague. Outside this conscious field 
there is a smoky region the contents of which we are only half 
conscious. Beyond this smoky region again there float memories,
1. Cf. , Starbuck, Psychology of Religion, p.115.
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thoughts, feelings, and powers. The discovery of this extra 
marginal region of the mind in 1886 says James, casts incandes- 
cent light on the phenomenon of conversion. The important con- 
sequence of the existence of this world of the sub-conscious is 
that the ordinary consciousness is liable to incursions from it.
James's position is that conversion can be explicated by the 
"explosion" into the field of consciousness of ideas which have 
incubated in the underground mental life. If there be any 
spiritual agencies, the psychological condition of their influ- 
encing human life is the possession of a sub-conscious region, 
"which alone gives access to them". All this explains why there 
are two types of conversion, namely, the gradual and the sudden. 
It is not that there is miracle in the one case, and not in the 
other, it is simply the presence of a different psychological out- 
fit. The recipient of instantaneous conversion is a person with 
a large underground region to his mind where work goes on sub- 
consciously. When all is ready the finished product of the 
underground factory bursts through into consciousness. The con- 
dition of sudden conversion then is the possession of a large and 
active sub-consciousness, together with a leaking margin which 
admits invasions of the powers of the subliminal realm. The 
subject of the gradual experience is one whose conscious field 
has a tough margin, and a relatively small and inactive sub-con- 
scious region. In such a subject conversion if it occurs must 
be gradual, and resemble any other growth into new habits.
Conversion then is explicable in terms of psychology, does 
this discount its worth? James says no I origin never decides the
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worth of anything, if the fruits are goodthat is all that matters. 
What are these fruits? James' finds four things at least attain- 
ed by conversion: a new level of spiritual vitality, things form- 
erly impossible become possible, new endurances are born, and the 
personality is transformed. James's analysis of the conversion 
experience yields the following content: the sense of moral bank- 
ruptcy and extreme melancholy; the sense of a higher control at
the time of crisis; the achievement of moral unity; and the con-
1. 
sequent joyous conviction that all is well. In this affective
experience, loss of worry, new insight, objective change in 
physical world, and ecstasy are distinguishable elements.
In lectures XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, James makes a penetrat- 
ing analysis of the saintly character and its value, and concludes 
that religion in spite of all its blunders and excesses occupies 
a supreme place in human history. James affirms, that the best 
fruits of the religious life are the best things history has to 
show. Saintly character he says, may be defined as the charactei 
for which spiritual emotions are the habitual centre of personal 
energy.
James raises the question what is the value of that which 
religion adds to human life? He says when judging religion we 
ought to remember that most of the evils charged to the religious 
spirit should be charged to the ecclesiastical spirit. The only 
charge that can be substantiated against religion is fanaticism. 
All the virtues of the saintly character may be carried to extremes 
but this does not discount their worth for the world. James
1. Cf. , Starbuck, Psychology of Religion, p.83.
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estimates the value of the religious character in these words: 
men with interior resources of strength, with absolute purity of 
life and motive, with a great all-embracing love and divine 
patience, and with self-severity are men the world cannot do with- 
out. Saints have real sociological value. They are the leaven 
of righteousness in society. A society where all were self- 
seekers would destroy itself. There must be some who practice 
the Golden Rule literally, who despair of none, and who try love 
as the solvent of social problems. The environment gets better 
for the saint's ministry. The saintly group of qualities are 
economically indispensable to the world's welfare. Finally, 
James concludes, that worldly wisdom may be safely transcended is 
the saint's magic gift to mankind.
Lectures XVI, and XVII, treat of Mysticism. Here James 
maintains the proposition that personal religious experience has 
its centre in mystical states of consciousness. The states are 
real, and their importance is great. The differentia of mystical 
states are four in number, namely, ineffability, a noetic quality, 
transiency, and passivity. There may be non-religious forms of 
the mystic state induced by certain aspects of nature or by 
alcohol, and drugs, James says nitrous oxide stimulates the 
mystical consciousness to an extraordinary degree. Religious 
mystic consciousness has been systematically cultivated by Hindus, 
Buddhists, Mohammedans, and Christians. Mystical experiences are 
as varied as the idiosyncrasies of men. During some of these 
mystical states the intellect and sense swoon away. The fruits 
of the mystical states are sometimes stupefaction, sometimes
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overabstraction from affairs of practical life, and sometimes the 
energizing of the whole man. James holds, the non-admirable 
traits in the lives of the mystics are not due to their being 
mystics, but to the fact that their mysticism was annexed to a 
weak character and a poor intellect. Theoretically the mystic
is a pantheistic monist. The mystic becomes one with the Absolute^
I
Do mystical states of consciousness furnish evidence for the truth 
of the supernatural? James's answer is, mystical states have 
absolute subjective authority, but have no such authority over 
those who have not had the mystical experience. Mystical exper- 
iences show the possibility of orders of truth transcending the 
understanding and the senses. James concludes, the mystic is 
invulnerable, and must be left with his creed, he offers us an 
hypothesis we may ignore, but which as thinkers we cannot upset.
In lecture XVIII, James definitely breaks with philosophy and 
theology, neither he holds can guarantee the objective truth of 
man's religious experience. As a matter of fact dogmatic theol- 
ogy has never been objectively convincing. At best it can only 
find arguments for convictions which our mystical intuitions have 
already fixed. If 'an individual has experienced God, these argu- 
ments confirm his belief, but if the individual is an atheist they 
fail to set him right. Philosophical theology then can do little 
to establish God's existence, and less to establish his attributes. 
The principle of pragmatism when applied to God's metaphysical 
attributes reveals them to be utterly destitute of intelligibility. 
They do not matter for life and conduct. Our religious faith 
then must do without the backing of dogmatic theology.
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Further James asserts, the philosophy of modern idealism can 
do no better. James quotes Principal Caird as representing 
Hegelianism in theology. Reality is Absolute Spirit. Only in 
communion with this Absolute Spirit can the finite spirit realize 
itself. The ideal then is to completely identify the human self 
with this divine self. But in practice man finds a great gulf 
fixed between the actual and the ideal. Morality cannot bridge
this gulf, but religion can. The act of self-surrender to the
t,t><?
universal self which is made in religion involves the identifi- 
cation of the finite with the Infinite. All spiritual progress 
thereafter is not towards the Infinite, but progress within the 
life of the Infinite. This then is the philosophy of modern 
idealism in relation to religion. But all this James affirms, 
is only a very fine description in philosophic terms of the re- 
ligious experience of the mystic. James's conclusion is, that 
the attempt on the part of purely intellectual processes to demon- 
strate the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experienc 
is hopeless. Dogmatic theology, and philosophy are of no use to 
religion in their present state. They must become metamorphosed 
into a science of religions if they are to become of utility in 
the service of religion.
In lecture XIX, James says, that in the last analysis we 
must test religion by empirical philosophy. In a previous 
lecture James had implied that actual religious experiences bring 
their own verification of reality, they are self-authenticating. 
Here he says, the uses of religion to the individual who has it, 
and the use of this individual to the world are the best arguments
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for its truth. The test then is pragmatic, the true is that 
which works well on the whole. Immediately James goes on to 
say, religion stands or falls by the genuineness of prayer. If 
nothing happens through prayer religion is a delusion. The sub- 
jective influence of prayer is not enough. Prayer must liber- 
ate energy which operates in both subjective and objective 
relationships. James believes that prayer does release spirit- 
ual energy which becomes active in the phenomenal world.
James now goes on to say, manifestations of the religious 
life usually connect up with the sub-conscious mental life. 
Inspiration is due to incursions from the sub-eonscious beyond. 
The phenomena of revelation, religious mysticism, the striking 
unifications of discordant selves, and the extravagances to be 
met with in the saints of history all have to do with the region 
of the sub-conscious. In religious persons affirms James, the 
door into this region seems unusually wide open. Experiences 
making their entrance through that door have shaped religious 
history.
In his concluding lecture James presents us with certain of 
his conclusions. He lays down the proposition, that when we 
deal with private and personal phenomena we are dealing with 
realities. Positive science deals with symbols of reality 
only. The senee of a self occupying a certain attitude to a 
felt or thought object in its field of consciousness is a tre- 
mendous fact. This fact as felt or thought equals reality for 
us. Religion has contact with this kind of absolute reality, 
and therefore must play an eternal part in history. The
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psychological phenomena of religion have supreme biological 
worth. The faith state is one of the forces by which men live. 
All religious creeds give a uniform deliverance consisting 
of two parts. First there is an uneasiness, and a feeling of 
something wrong about us as we naturally stand, and second, there
is a solution, in the sense that we are saved from this wrongness,
i
by making proper connection with the higher powers.
What is the objective truth of the content of these subject- 
ive deliverances? The answer is to be found says James, by in- 
quiring what is that higher life which seems to connect with the 
portion of the higher life in us in religious experience? 
James now advances his hypothesis or over-belief that this higher 
power is a power beyond our sub-conscious mind but impinging upon 
it. The further limits of our being plunge into another dimen- 
sion of existence, name it the mystical, or supernatural region, 
or what you will. This unseen region produces effects in this 
phenomenal world. iffitien men commune with it work is done upon 
their finite personalities.
Now argues James, that which produces effects within another 
reality must be a reality itself, we ought not therefore to call 
the mystical or unseen world unreal. The Christian term for 
this enveloping reality is God. God produces real effects in 
the phenomenal world through the instrumentality of human person- 
alities who connect up with the unseen world, and allow God to 
pour his life into their veins.
Here says James"we have in the fact that the conscious 
person is continuous with a wider self through which saving ex-
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experiences come, a positive content of religious experience, 
which it seems to me, is literally and objectively true as far 
as it goes".
James's precise attitude to the transcendental region is 
indicated by the following diagram. First, there is the region 
of conscious experience. Second, there is the region of the 
sub-conscious where heterogeneous psychic elements abound. Here 
are the potentialities of snake and seraph. Both noble elements 
and trivialities abound in this region and occasionally break 
through into the region of conscious experience. Third, there is 
the region of the transcendent from which religious experiences 
come. This region contains God, The Absolute, or Reality as 
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Figure, showing James's doctrine of the sluice in the sub- 
conscious which admits incursions from the transcendental region
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mystical or supernatural region saving experiences come into the 
conscious life through a sluice in the sub-conscious which 
impinges on the transcendental region. It is the postulating 
of the existence of the realm of over-beliefs, this unseen 
spiritual region, and the affirmation of the existence of this 
sluice that differentiates James from the empirical psychologists
In the postscript to his book James confesses himself to 
be a piece-meal supernatural!st, in that he holds that in re- 
ligious experiences an unseen spiritual order breaks into the 
series of natural events. James however does not infer theism, 
immanence, or monism of any kind, but asserts "that a final 
philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic 
hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to 
consider it".
CRITIQUE.
The author of "The Varieties of Religious Experience*' was
in Professor Stanley Hall's words, "the most brilliant litter-
1. 
ateur and stylist in philosophy since Schopenhauer". Any one
who has read James's enthralling book will not deem this eulogy 
too extravagant. "The Varieties" is a piece of seductive writ- 
ing, which for sheer witchery is incomparable in the literature 
of religious psychology. When however we are able to break the 
spell which the author's genius casts over us, and sit down in 
a cool hour, certain grave defects become apparent.
One of the most obvious of these is, that the whole of the
argument of this important work is based on exceptions, this is
2. 
the fundamental defect of James's great book. James appears to
pass by the normal religious life in order to treat of the re- 
ligious experiences of extraordinary persons who have figured in 
religious history. One rises from the perusal of this fascin- 
ating volume with the impression that none other than the
1. Hall Stanley, Adolescence. Vol.11, p.292.
2. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, see foot-note
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extremely vicious, or the extremely neurotic can have a religious 
experience which is worth notice. All James's varieties of 
religious experience, and types of conversion have either bottom- 
ed the abyss of vicious degradation, or have been morbid psycho- 
paths in their psychological make-up. Stanley Hall asserts 
that"many if not the most of these experiences are the yellow
literature of religious psychology", and that some of James's
1. 
cases are positively "teratological". These strictures are
perhaps too harsh, but James's work certainly lends itself to 
such criticism, for "The Varieties" is entirely based on the re- 
ligious experiences of extraordinary religious subjects.
James attempts to evaluate religion by taking as his stand- 
ard extreme cases in religious history. He never seems to
differentiate the typical from the aberrational,and exceptional
2. 
cases are conceived as characteristic of the religious life.
Is this a sound procedure? Let us take an analogy from the 
realm of Art. There are fanatical persons in the artistic 
world who have delighted to violate the received canons of Art. 
These persons depict figures on canvas as a multiplicity of cubes 
as wheeling masses of pigment, or as a complex of vortices. 
There are three types of these fanatics, the futurists, the cub- 
ists, and the vorticists. NOT/ if we desired a right conception 
of Art in general, would we go to these freaks for our standard?
If freaks are not to be considered as normative in Art can they
3. 
be regarded as normative in religion.
1. Hall Stanley, op.cit. p.293.
2. James W. The Varieties, pp.6.45.50.486.
3. Coe G.A. The Religion of a Mature Mind. 2352-233
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It is true James reiterates that he has deliberately taken 
the extreme religious types as yielding the profounder inform- 
ation. At the very outset he lays down the principle that for 
profitable study we must seek out the abnormal type of religious 
temperament for whom religion exists as an acute fever. James 
consistently adheres to this principle throughout. Although he 
admits that such persons are usually psychopaths. We may con- 
cede with James that the psychopathic temperament has certain
advantages over the prosaic mentality, but with Stanley Hall we
1   
would add, these advantages "are at least only literary". It is
notorious that these psychopathic subjects of the religious life 
who have occupied a prominent place in religious history had also 
a passion for autobiography. Such documents are of immense 
psychological value, but they need to be critically examined in 
the light of the fact that a great deal of literary genius mingles 
with their piety. On the whole Jonathan Edwards seems to be in 
possession of a sounder principle of procedure v/hich he lays down 
in his great "Treatise on the Religious Affections", namely, "the
way to learn the true nature of anything, is to go where that
2.
thing is to be found in its purity". James's principle of pro- 
cedure is scarcely wise, for review of normal form and function 
ought always to precede the study of disease. James professes to 
be dealing with religious experience as a whole, therefore the 
extraordinary religious experiences of psychopathic subjects cannot 
be legitimately taken as the criteria of religious experience in
general.
1. Hall Stanley, Adolescence. Vol.11, p.293.
2. Edwards Jonathan, Collected Works, Vol.I. p.242.London 3834.
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Professor James seems to be perfectly cognisant of the fact, 
that normal religious life is other than that of the exceptional 
types with which he is so fascinated. Instead of going to the 
subject of the normal religious life to study religious exper- 
ience there, James holds that by removing with his scapel the 
extravagances of the extreme subject, by cutting off an abnormal- 
ity here, and a pathological feature there, what is left will be 
the normal religious experience. This is how James gets at the 
religion of the average man. This is a highly artificial and 
psychologically unsound procedure. James therefore never deals 
justly with the normal religious life. He seems to ignore all 
across the supreme fact, that religion is a world-wide phenomenon^ 
and that it is not the possession of a few psychopathic monopolists 
James's picture of religious experience is out of perspective, he 
paints in morbid growths with a broad brush, and presents us with 
what is really a caricature of the religious life.
In"The Varieties" James asserts that religion stands or falls 
by the genuineness of prayer. The effects of prayer are final 
proofs of God's existence, and that spiritual agencies break into 
the natural order. If prayer be not effective then religion is 
delusion. These effects may be subjective only, but something 
must- actually be effected by prayer which is impossible by other 
means. Religious experience however only warrants us in saying,
that the ideal power with which we feel ourselves in contact in
1. 
prayer is "something larger than ourselves". Now this somewhat
tame and even feeble conclusion is disappointing to readers of 
James's "Principles". James is clearly out to establish 
1. James W. "The Varieties", see pp. 465.466.525.
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empirically a transcendental scheme of things. This statement 
of the case does not seem to be as strong as James might have 
made it. The religious consciousness, and prayer life really 
demand much more than the vague "something larger than ourselves" 
of which he speaks in "The Varieties".
In his "Principles of Psychology", James finds proof of God 
not as in "The Varieties" in the subjective influences of prayer, 
but in the incessant urge to pray. Here the reason men pray is 
not because they experience subjective effects, but because they 
must. James discovers here that self-consciousness necessarily 
involves a reference to "the highest possible judging companion", 
and he says, "this judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the Great 
Companion". James asserts here that the impulse to pray is an
inevitable consequence of the fact, that the innermost social
1. 
self of man "can find its only Adequate Socius in an ideal world".
This appeals to us as being a more powerful forthsetting of what 
the religious impulse really demands.
In his lecture on the subject of Mysticism James asserts 
categorically "that personal religious experience has its root 
and centre in mystical states of consciousness". This certainly 
denies religious experience to a vast multitude of men of all 
religions, Christian and other than Christian whose commerce with 
Deity is objective and external rather than mystical. This non- 
mystical type of religion is more usual and certainly as influ- 
ential in the religious affairs of men as the mystical type. In 
the Old Testament we have represented a fundamental type of 
religious experience which stands over against the mystical. This
1. James W. Principles of Psychology. Vol.I.pp.515. 316 .
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is the prophetic type of religious experience. In the mystical 
experience man is merged with God, but in the prophetic exper- 
ience man retains his own individuality, and his transactions with 
God have the marks of externality. This supremely important type 
of religious experience which affirms personality and distinction 
between man and God, and which leans on history is ignored by 
James. For the Hebrew prophets and their modern representatives 
there is no fusion of God and man as in mysticism. The sover- 
eign! ty of Him who inhabiteth eternity occupied a towering place 
in their thoughts. With the Hebrew prophets God remains beyond 
and outside man as the judge of all the earth, the rewarder of
the righteous, and the punisher of the wicked. Man can maintain
1. 
with this Majestic Maker objective relations only. The type of
religious life then for which the Old Testament prophets stand, 
the type represented in modern times by Calvin, and by John Knox 
that lineal descendant of the Hebrew prophets, by Jonathan Kdwards, 
by Ritschl, Herrmann, Kaftan and a host of other pivotal men in 
religious history is cut out of "The Varieties"
Not only is this supremely important prophetic type of re- 
ligious experience ignored by James, but he. also fails to take 
account of several other important varieties. The melancholic 
temperament gets more than its share of attention. The religious 
experience of the subject of active temperament with the construct- 
ive instinct well developed, and to whom the call "come in and
help us to build the Kingdom of God" makes a specially powerful
2. 
appeal, finds no place.
1. Leuba James H. James's interpretation of Religious Exper- 
ience, International Journ. Ethics-. Vol.XIV.
2. Coe G.A. The Spiritual Life. p.244.  
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The religious experience of the intellectual type of whom
George John Romanes may be taken as a typical modern represent- 
ative ought to find a place among the varieties of religious
1. 
experience. This type of religious experience of which Romanes
is a classic example is finely expressed by Tennyson in the lines:
"He fought his doubts and gathered strength, 
He would not make his judgment blind; 
He faced the spectres of the mind and laid them, 
Thus at length he found a stronger faith his own, 
And power was with him".
Justice has never yet been done to this intellectual type of 
religious experience by either psychologists of religion, or by 
the Christian Church. For centuries the Church has sacrificed 
the interests of those who want to know, and to do, in the inter- 
ests of those who want to feel. Surely this type eager to seek 
truth, and wanting light as well as heat, this the noblest type 
of all, deserves consideration in a treatise purporting to deal
with the varieties of religious experience? "We should lapse into
2. 
spiritual barbarism were this type to fail in representatives".
Strangely enough though James omits these important types, 
he includes among his types of religious experience that of a
subject whose religious experiences are as varied and rich as
3. 
those of a well nourished gorilla. Here is a man who affirms
religion means nothing to him. God, Heaven, th© Angels are so 
much mythic bosh, and there is no agency of the supernatural. 
In spite of this blatant confession James includes this case 
among his varieties, and says the writer's state of mind may by 
courtesy be called a religion. Is not this carrying courtesy
1. Romanes G.J. Thoughts on Religion, see pp.28 and 184
2. Hoffding H. Philosophy of Religion, p.125.
3. James W. The Varieties, p.92.
115. 
too far?
In connection with the Instances of conversion phenomena re- 
corded by James, the majority of the cases cited took place about
1. 
80 years ago. This time factor is important, because at this
period the thought of the wrath of a terrible God, and the fear of
tt 
a literal hell were tremendous cooperant factors in bringing on
the crisis of conversion. Now it is quite evident that at the 
present day the terrible sanctions of religion, so effectively 
wielded by the evangelist of an earlier period have lost their 
potency. Fear and flight are no longer the results when the 
evangelist paints pictures of the ceaseless furnace or shows u lime-. 
light views of hell". Instead there is simply a scornful »smile 
for the idea, and a feeling of pity for the orator. In view of 
this fact it is significant that James's instances of the conver- 
sion experience are nearly all of ancient date. The great change 
which has taken place in psychological climate during the last 
half-century must considerably qualify any argument based on anci- 
ent instances. The conversion complex of to-day will be different 
from that of 100 years ago. More allowance should be made for 
change in psychological climate.
We are presented in James's book with an interesting analysis 
of the varieties of religious experience as a preliminary operation 
to the discovery of their value for human life by purely empirical 
standards. It will be conceded that James's description of the 
uses of religion is a powerful forthsetting of the case for the 
truth of the value of religion. But how is it when James address- 
es himself to the demonstration of the truth of that which he has
1. James W. op.cit.pp.189,223,220,171,196,157,159,217,212.
116.
so conclusively shown to be precious in human life? Here James 
is most disappointing to the theistic reader. He says, the
t
feeling of reality given in religious experience is presumptive 
evidence of its truth. Again he affirms, religious experiences 
bring their own verification with them, they are self-authentic- 
ating. Anon he says, the uses of religion are the best evidences 
for its truth. We are therefore led to anticipate that somehow 
James is going to make the value of religion prove the fact of 
its truth, but our anticipations are not realized. For James 
goes on to say, religion must stand or fall by the persuasion 
that effects do occur through prayer in the subjective life, and 
in the objective order, which would not take place without it. 
Here then in conversion phenomena, the uses of religion, the sub- 
jective effects of prayer, and in the metaphysical deliverances 
of the mystical consciousness, we have evidence that a spiritual 
world is in contact with the natural world, and that higher 
spiritual agencies impress and penetrate the human spirit.
Now observe how James the psychologist destroys the elabor- 
ate structure which James the transcendental!st has lovingly 
fashioned. Everything he has given with one hand he takes back 
with the other. More convincingly perhaps than any other 
psychologist, because of his known genuine sympathy with a trans- 
cendental explanation, James shows that all the phenomena of re- 
ligious experience can be accounted for by purely psychological 
processes and the laws of the science of psychology.
James definitely says, that in his opinion the most import- 
ant step forward psychology has taken was in 1886, when it
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discovered a vast extra-marginal field outside of the primary 
consciousness altogether with a set of memories, thoughts and 
feelings of its own. The most important consequence of this 
fact is that the ordinary field of consciousness is liable to 
invasions from it in the form of unaccountable impulses, obsess- 
ions, and hallucinations. This realm of the sub-conscious "is 
obviously the larger part of each of us, for it is the abode of 
everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that 
passes unrecorded and unobserved. It contains, all our moment- 
ary inactive memories, and it harbours the springs of all our 
obscurely motived passions, impulses, likes, dislikes, and 
prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, 
persuasions, convictions, and in general all our non-rational 
operations, come from it. It is the source of our dreams, and 
apparently they may return to it. In it arise whatever mystical 
experiences we may have, and our automatisms, sensory or motor; 
our life in hypnotic and hypnoid conditions if we are subjects 
to such conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas, and hysterical 
accidents, if we are hysteric subjects; our supra-normal cognit- 
ions, if such there be, and if we are telepathic subjects. It
1. 
is also the fountain head of much that feeds our religion".
Could James be more explicit and inclusive? He shows con- 
clusively that sudden moral transformations, startling conver- 
sions, the subjective effects of prayer, and mystical phenomena 
do not require a superhuman origin, all these religious phenomena 
are completely covered by the hypothesis of the sub-conscious.
1. James W. The Varieties, pp. 485-484
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Now it seems to be obvious from a perusal of James's book, 
that his purpose in writing the "Varieties" was to attempt to 
discover in the facts of religious experience an empirical warrant 
for the transcendental hypothesis. But can James get beyond 
human personality on his own premises? Can the existence of the 
region of "over-beliefs" be justly inferred from the data James 
places before us? Does not James show with cumulative force 
that the existence of the sub-conscious with its angelic and 
demoniac powers which explode under favourable conditions into 
conscious experience, is a sufficient explanation of the facts of 
religious consciousness? James does not really go beyond the
limits of human personality, on his own showing all can be expli-
1. 
cated in terms of the natural order. James gives us no grounds
for holding that our subjective religious activities are the 
work of God in us, other than our experience that it is so. He 
has conclusively shown that the transcendental hypothesis is 
superfluous in this connection. If James's purpose was to 
establish the existence of the transcendental region where God, 
The Absolute, and the Pluralistic Spiritual Agencies dwell, (on 
the empirical grounds recognised by science) then clearly he has 
not made out his case. As a matter of fact James's transcendent- 
al hypothesis is just a postulate of faith, it is in his own 
terminology simply an "over-belief". The scant comfort left to 
the friends of religion is simply, that a great psychologist pre- 
eminent in his department chooses to make his personal venture on 
the hypothesis of a spiritual order impinging on the natural order,
1. Leuba J.H. The Psychological Study of Religion, p.271.
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and infiltrating into this phenomenal world by means of the sub- 
conscious.
In spite of these issues which challenge criticism and con- 
troversy, one cannot pass from this great book without recogniz- 
ing that here we have a unique contribution to Religious Psychol- 
ogy. It is the work of a genius, and every page bears the 
imprint of the personality of the author. The book coruscates 
from commencement to conclusion. "The Varieties" is replete 
with penetrating insights and analyses. The following instances 
may be specially mentioned as illustrative of this statement. 
The analysis of the healthy-minded genus into two species, those 
who possess the involuntary natural happy way of looking at life, 
as exemplified by the Greeks and Romans, and a second species 
who systematically disregard the unpleasant in life as a deliber- 
ate policy; the clear delineation of the dominant ideas and driv- 
ing forces of Hew Thought and Mind Cure movements; the definition 
of the saintly type of character and the discussion of its feat- 
ures; the evaluation of the psychological levels of asceticism, 
and the differentiation of its varieties; the timely insistence 
on the need of iron in the blood of the present generation; the 
necessity of asceticism in modern life; the analysis of mysticism, 
and the investigation of mystical experiences induced by drugs 
and anaesthetics; the insistence on the full rights and primacy 
of feeling,intuition,and concrete personal experience as against 
the usurper claims of reason and merely rational constructions. 
Coruscations like these gleam out of every chapter. Finally,Jamess 
distinctive contribution to the psychology of religion is his
«
powerful forthsetting of the value of religion for human life.
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APPENDIX. 
CLASSIFICATION OF JAMES'S TYPES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.
James's book is a brilliant but unsystematic treatment of the 
religious life. The varieties of religious experience are pre- 
sented in any order, or in no order. The attempt is here made to 
isolate and classify the numerous types which are treated by 
James with irritating desultoriness.
First of all religious persons are divided into 2 main classes?
1. The Healthy Minded, of which there are 3 species:
1. The Pathological Optimist.
2. The Involuntary Happy Person.
3. The Voluntary Systematic Optimist.
2. The Morbid Minded, of which there are 2 species:
1. The Absolute Born Pessimist.
2. The Merely Serious Minded.
Two fundamental types of religious experience correspond with 
these two great temperamental classes set out above, namely:
1. The "once born" experience.
2. The li twice born" experience.
These experiences are differentiated from each other by \he pres- 
ence or absence of a crisis. The "once born" subjects have no 
startling crisis in their experience, and invariably belong to 
the Healthy Minded class. The "twice born" have a cataclysm in 
their interior life, and generally belong to the Morbid Minded 
class. These 2 fundamental types break up into the numerous 
varieties which are scattered through the book.
Analysis reduces the varieties of religious experience in 
James's book to 3 great classes which break up into many species; 
these are:-
I. The Conversion experience.
II. The Healthy Minded experience.
III.The Mystical experience.
I.
The typical conversion experience yields the following general 
content:
1. Antecedent Melancholy (James accentuates this.)
2. A feeling of Moral Bankruptcy.
3. An experience of crisis, and a sense of Higher Control.
4. The achievement of Moral Unity.
The Typical post-conversion results are:
1. Loss of worry.
2. Intense happiness.
3. Illumination.
4. All things become new.
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There are 3 fundamental types of the Conversion experience:
1. The Volitional type, where the subject struggles for the 
experience, and the will is at tension until relief comes, 
pp. 201, 207.
2. The Self-surrender type, where the subject at first con- 
sciously wills to possess the experience but he finds that 
the harder he struggles the less he is able to secure it. 
Then when it comes home to him that conscious volitional 
effort spells failure, or he becomes too exhausted to 
struggle anymore, he relaxes. Immediately a crisis occurs, 
and relief comes, and there is left a feeling of cleansing, 
peace and power, p.218.
3. The Spontaneous Awakening type, where the subject feels 
that he does nothing but is simply wrought upon by the 
Spirit of God. Here the experience just comes.pp.212,224.
Many of the varieties of religious experience in James's book are 
related to one or other of these 3 types of conversion, either as 
antecedents, concomitants, or results.
1. Antecedent 
Experiences.
. The Anhedonia experience, where the dominant 
characteristic is total incapacity for joy- 
ous feeling. There is no getting gradually 
better here it roust'be new birth or nothing, 
pp. 146 - 155.
2. The Prometheus experience, where the ante- 
cedent melancholy takes the form of positive 
torment. There is a diseased sense of guilt 
and morbid introspection. Envy of the placid 
beasts is a remarkable feature of this ex- 
perience, pp. 159, 186.
3. The Claustrophobia experience, where the 
dominant emotion is a panic fear of the 
universe, p.160.
2. Concomitant 1. The Vocal experience, where conversion is 
Experiences. accompanied by voices.
2. The Vision experience.
3. The Motor experience, e.g.Bodily Movements, 
Convulsions etc.
4. The Pyrotechnic experience, where conversion 
is accompanied by luminous phenomena, e.g. 
Photisms.
5. The Chromatic experience, p.253.
3. Post-Conver- 1. The Dionysiac experience, where conversion 
sion Exper- is followed by extravagant transports of joy. 
iences. pp. 254, 256.
2. The Panoramic experience, where the world 
appears to have undergone objective change, 
even the animals seem different.p.248.
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II.
The second great variety, is the Healthy Minded type of religious 
experience. This is the experience of the "once born" type. The 
general content of this experience is:
1. No intense feeling of vileness or guilt.
2. God is thought of as love rather than as awful Holiness 
and Majesty.
3. There is a feeling of being already one with the Eternal 
without any need of an abrupt conversion.
4. There is present a general feeling of calm trust in the 
Providence of God.
James's Healthy Minded type falls before analysis into 2 main 
classes:
1. The definite type which is the product of the great Nation- 
al Churches, and of religious education.
2. And the large and important class which is leavened by 
Christian principles, and practically influenced by the 
same.
III.
The third great type of religious experience is the Mystical. 




4. Passivity, pp. 380 - 381.
There are several varieties of the Mystical experience:
1. The Halcyon complex, where the chief element in conscious- 
ness is the experience of being enveloped in the great 
Being of God. There is an exquisite feeling of serenity and 
security, p. 276.
2. The Amatory complex, the content of which has 3 features.
1. Intense devotional feeling.
2. Great erotic emotion directed into religious channels.
3. Lover-like transactions with Deity, pp.345,347.
3. The Cataleptic experience characterised by 3 things, namely:
1. Great religious sensibility.
2. Feeble intellectual outlook.
3. Frequent swoonings. p.344.
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TABLE SHOWING JAMES ! S VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS
I. THE CONVERSION 
EXPERIENCE.
1. The Volitional type.
2. The Self-surrender type.






1. The Anhedonla experience.
2. The Prometheus experience.
3. The Claustrophobia experience.
1. The Vocal experience.
2. The Vision experience.
3. The Motor experience.
4. The Pyrotechnic experience
5. The Chromatic experience.
IV. POST-CONVER- 
SION
1. The Dionysiac experience.
2. The Panoramic experience.
V. THE HEALTHY 
MINDED
1. The type produced by religious education 
and the great National Churches.
2. The merely leavened class influenced by 
Christian principles.
VI. THE MYSTIC 1. The Halcyon complex.
2. The Amatory complex.
3. The Cataleptic experience.
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Professor Pratt's most interesting book makes a special con- 
tribution to the psychology of religious belief. The able author 
discusses his subject under three heads, namely, primitive credul- 
ity, intellectual belief, and emotional belief. The book falls 
into three divisions. Part I, deals with the psychology of belief 
in general; part II, deals with the manifestation of the three 
typical forms of religious belief in history; part III, discusses 
the status of religious belief at the present time.
PART I.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BELIEF IN GENERAL.
At the very outset,Pratt breaks with the traditional tripart- 
ite division of psychic life into knowing,feeling,and willing. 
Pratt maintains,the will is not an element at all but a psychic 
compound,and that psychic material when analysed will yield sensa- 
tion, ideation, and feeling only.
1.Pratt J.B. The Psychology of Religious Belief,1907.
Macmillan Co.
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In place of this conventional threefold distinction, Pratt 
proposes a bipartite one. He makes the distinction between the 
centre and fringe of consciousness well nigh absolute. According 
to this author, the reasoned results of thought belong to the cen- 
tre, while the non-rational intuitional products of feeling belong 
to the fringe. It is important to observe here, that Pratt makes 
the distinction between the focal experiences and the marginal ex- 
periences one of kind, whereas the majority of psychologists make 
the distinction one of degree of attention only.
Pratt's classification of the mental life then is twofold, 
there is a central part of consciousness which has to do with sen- 
sation and ideation; and a peripheral part, which has to do with 
feeling, emotions, instincts, intuitions, our inborn loves and 
hates etc. This feeling fringe links us to our past and to our 
ancestors. With Pratt, this marginal region is the basal region, 
his emphasis throughout is upon the vital importance of the in- 
stinctive life as manifested in this feeling background, especially 
in connection with the religious consciousness. Pratt tells us 
here, that his contention is, that the whole man must be trusted 
as against any small portion of his nature, such as reason, or 
perception.
According to this psychologist, three distinct bases may be 
discerned as underlying all belief, these are primitive credulity, 
reasoned belief, and emotional belief. Pratt includes under the 
term belief, reality feeling, and defines belief as "the mental 
attitude of assent to the reality of a given object".
Primitive credulity, in Pratt f s vocabulary, stands for naive
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acceptance of the given. Intellectual belief is that which is 
based on reasoning of some sort. Pratt brings belief on author- 
ity under this head, for here we believe because we have reasons 
for relying on the knowledge of experts.
Emotional belief is distinguished from the kinds already enum- 
erated in that it gets its peculiar strength from the feeling back- 
ground. In emotional belief we believe in things because we need 
them, the desired object may not indeed be present, but the organ- 
ism insists that it shall exist somewhere. This kind of belief 
may and does defy argument.
These three species of belief considered in connection with 
man's faith in the Divine have, according to our author, given 
rise to the religion of primitive credulity, the religion of 
thought, and the religion of feeling.
PART II. 
HISTORICAL.
In the second division of his book, Pratt traces the rise and 
development of these three typical forms of religious belief in 
four of the historical religions, namely, Primitive Animism, the 
Religion of India, the Religion of Israel, and the Religion of 
Christianity. In connection with each of these religions, Pratt 
attempts to show a credulous, an intellectual, and an emotional 
stage of development.
I.
Pratt affirms, that primitive credulity may be discerned in 
all religions, but more especially in the childlike faith of prim- 
itive peoples. It never enters the head of the unsophisticated
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savage to doubt the oral traditions concerning spirits and gods, 
or the reality of what he sees when awake, or in his dreams. Pratt 
maintains that in the early stages of Animism this primitive cred- 
ulity is all the faith there is.
But says Pratt, in the later stages of Animism there is evid- 
ence of the religion of thought. The transformation that takes 
place in the nature of the gods of primitive man is one proof of 
this. The gods are conceived of as withdrawing from the strange 
stone, the tree, and the animal, and become mobile spirits who use 
these objects as their manifestations. The old sense gods pass 
away, and gods who can be conceived only, displace the gods who 
could be perceived. All this according to Pratt, was the result 
of the application of reason. Spirit activity was the intellect- 
ual concept which explained every striking event and mystery for 
primitive man.
Primitive man believed in the gods because the elder men 
taught him so to do, but these are the experts in the matter,hence 
it is reasonable to believe on their authority.
Again Pratt points out, that when the mind of primitive man 
asks causal questions, we have the beginnings of generalization 
and inferential thought. The conclusion of this intellectual pro< 
cess is that great gods have made all things. Here then in the 
early history of the race, it is supposed we have manifestations 
of the re/ligion of thought.
Pratt now adduces his evidence for the religion of feeling.
at
He maintains, that A this primitive animistic stage emotional ex- 
pressions of the religious life verge on the abnormal, as
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illustrated in the ravings of the shaman. At this low stage of 
human culture uncontrolled feeling dominates the situation. 
This is seen in the religious dances which at once express emot- 
ion and arouse frenzy. The participant is roused not only by 
the dance itself, but by the contagious excitement of the crowd, 
and the feeling thus generated nucleates about the thought of the 
gods or gods in whose honour the dance is performed. The direct 
consequence of all this is, that the frenzied participants feel 
that they are in communication with the god or gods.
Pratt points out the interesting fact, that apart from this 
public excitement in which all alike share, there are phenomena 
experienced by individuals only, without the contagion of a cro-wd 
These remarkable individuals feel the emotional background of 
their minds boiling up, and there is cast upon the shores of 
their consciousness products which they feel are not of their own 
making, moreover their bodies also seem to be shaken by a power
 
which is not theirs. All this is interpreted as the possession 
of a man's mind and body by a spirit. Those only with a certain 
nervous make-up are prone to this possession, and such persons 
are reverenced at a low stage of human culture. This proneness 
to spirit possession is accentuated by the use of austerities 
and narcotics. In the higher religions says Pratt, possession 
is conceived of as not so much due to spirits, as to gods, and
4»
in the religion of the Hebrews, to Jehovah. Shamanistic phenom- 
ena continue even into civilisation.
Pratt emphasizes the fact, that he who has once had this 
experience of possession is absolutely convinced he has been in
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contact with the spirit world. Here we come on Pratt f s character- 
istic insistence, namely, that the religion of feeling is invulner*. 
able.
II.
Passing from primitive religion, Pratt next traces the devel- 
opment of religious belief through these three stages in the re- 
ligion of India. Primitive credulity he holds, is essentially 
the same in all religions. Pratt finds that ancestral tradition 
is a dominant force in the popular religion of the Hindoos. He 
points to the fact that in the Rig Veda the forces of nature are 
personified, and religious belief is based on the fact that one 
has been so taught, and further can see the gods, the sky, the sun, 
and the dawn with one's own eyes.
But gradually the religion of understanding supplanted the 
religion of primitive credulity in India. In addition to the 
physical wind which can be felt and heard, there grew up the idea 
of the god of the wind who can neither be seen, nor heard with the 
senses. The unifying tendency of the reason began to seek for 
the one power back of all phenomena, and as a first result of the 
application of reason many of the gods of sense perception were 
wiped out of existence.
Pratt holds, that the constitution of the human mind enables 
us to predict that the goal of a religion of thought will be a 
monism of some kind, for reason is driven by its inherent nature 
to seek an explanation of the particulars of experience, and fur- 
ther, it demands a single ultimate explanation. Now our author 
detects this monistic tendency in the religious thought of India.
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He traces the development of the religion of thought from its 
faint beginnings in the Rig Veda, to its highly metaphysical out- 
come in the absolute idealism of the Upanishads. Pratt points to 
the fact that the early scriptures are polytheistic, with a tendency; 
towards the formation of a pantheon with one supreme god. He indi- 
cates that the leaders of religious thought became dissatisfied 
with a plurality of gods, and the more philosophically minded began 
to think of the gods as manifestations of a single fundamental 
unity. , This monistic speculation issued in the conception embodies 
in the Upanishads, where all things, men and gods are merged in the 
Absolute, here Brahman alone is real, and all that- exists is 
Brahman. Here then according to Pratt we have a conception of God, 
the product of pure reason, which ignores the actual facts of lifefe 
experience, and all moral considerations as it cleaves its way to 
its unitary goal.
Pratt drav/s our attention to the significant fact, that 
throughout all this period of monistic speculation the masses clave 
to polytheism. Authority, habit, feeling, and the will all led to 
a clinging to the old gods.
Now as Pratt clearly points out, materialistic pantheism logic- 
ally issues in atheism. This actually occurred in India, an 
atheistic Samkhya philosophy grew up which became the matrix of the 
Yoga movement, and Buddhism sprang from the Yoga movement. This 
atheistic philosophy failed to grip the masses. According to 
Pratt, the problem Buddha set himself to solve was how to make this 
philosophy into a religion.
Buddha failed to solve this problem, he proclaimed that man
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must work out his own salvation by means of intellectual knowledge 
and the strict practice of virtue. Buddha's personality gave 
his atheistic philosophy a tinge of warmth in his own life-time 
which attracted a few of his contemporaries, but as Pratt says, 
the people have never been Buddhists. The deification of Buddha 
Pratt affirms, shows the futility of an atheistic religion. 
Atheistic Buddhism and Pantheistic Brahmanism cannot become real 
religions, both strikingly illustrate the fact of the insuffici- 
ency of reason alone as a basis of religious belief.
Pratt asserts, just as primitive credulity had to give way 
before the march of reason, so the religion of thought had to 
give way to the religion of feeling. Our attention is drawn to 
the fact, that in the Vedas we have the thought of getting super- 
natural power, illumination, and ecstasy as the result of ascetic 
practices. Traces of longing for the personal approval of the 
Deity, and a yearning for closer intimacy with the Divine may be 
discerned in the Vedic hymns, but this religion of feeling gets 
its completest expression in the Upanishads. Here says Pratt, 
the thought is that of mystical union with Brahman. This bliss 
of Brahman, this consciousness of identity with the Eternal is a 
religious experience of great emotional intensity, and is not to 
be gained by mere intellectual assent to a proposition, it is a 
thing of the heart, not of the understanding.
Pratt describes the Hindoo Mystic seeking by the inhibition 
of the senses, by devices such as the contemplation of a single 
idea, and the management of the breath, to provide favourable 
conditions for the coming of this supreme religious experience.
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These practices resulted in the narrowing and unifying of his con- 
sciousness, and in the intensification of a central emotion. The 
final result was the attainment of the state of ecstasy, which 
when prolonged issued in a state of unconsciousness.
A heavy accent is placed on the fact, that all these exper- 
iences of the Hindoo mystic arise in the vast feeling fringe of 
man's mental life. Here again, we have this author's reiterated 
insistence on the fact, that experiences arising in this fringe 
region are self-authenticating, he says, he who has once experien- 
ced union with Brahman can no more doubt the reality of Brahman 
than his own existence.
III.
Pratt now proceeds to trace the development of the credulous, 
the rational, and the emotional factors in the religion of Israel. 
He adduces the unquestioning acceptance of tribal traditions, and 
the authority of the law on the part of the Hebrews, as evidence 
of the presence of the religion of primitive credulity. It is 
asserted that the religion of the early Hebrews made its appeal 
directly to the senses, and that at this stage their unreasoned 
traditional faith required sensuous props. Pratt instances here, 
the Holy places of Palestine, the Messeba, the Ashera, the Fetish 
Stone in the Ark, the Ephod, and the many Images of Jehovah. 
Again attention is drawn to Israel's fetishistic view of Scripture 
every syllable and letter of which had to be handed down intact, 
as illustrating the credulous stage of religious belief.
Pratt now makes the transition to the religion of thought. 
He indicates that the time came when the more advanced minds of
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the nation disengaged themselves from the sensuous props of the 
masses. The prophets began to teach that the worship of visible 
objects was treason to Yahweh.
As in the case of the religion of India, the application of 
thought to religion on the part of the Hebrews pronounced the doom 
of polytheism. The history of Hebrew thought with Pratt,is the 
history of the evolution of an ethical monotheism out of a crude 
polytheism. Pratt brings out clearly here the striking differ- 
ences between the driving forces of Hebrew as contrasted with 
Hindoo thought.
He indicates that at first the concept of Yahweh was not 
ideally moral. He aptly says, Yahweh 1 s holiness in primitive 
times was like electricity, a close approach was fatal, but as the 
Hebrew thought of righteousness developed the concept of Yahweh 
became filled out with moral content. We are shown that the pre- 
supposition of all Hebrew reasoning was the moral righteousness of 
Yahweh, and so the problem of each generation was, given the right 
eousness of Yahweh, how to square politics and history with this 
t remend ous f act  
In this connection, a fine tribute is paid by the author to 
the six great individuals who reshaped the Yahweh religion,namely, 
Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the second Isaiah, if 
it had not been for them, in Pratt's opinion, the concept of Yahwefc 
would have had a different development.
Pratt finely brings out the fact, that the Hebrew God who was 
of too pure eyes to behold iniquity could never become the Absol- 
ute of Hindoo speculation who ignored all moral distinctions.
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The best thought of the Hebrew prophets was based on the moral 
category, this according to Pratt, is why Hebrew thought never 
issued in the pantheistic position of Brahmanism, but arrived at 
the goal of ethical monotheism.
For this investigator, the beginnings of Hebrew prophecy 
illustrate the feeling phase in Israel's religion. In his opin- 
ion, the early prophets were men of neurotic, if not psychopathic 
constitution who were subject to trances and frenzies. The 
frenzy was interpreted as possession by the Spirit of Yahweh, 
this wild frenzy becomes more spiritualized as time goes on.
Pratt asserts, that many of the convictions of the prophets 
are not to be accounted for by conscious reasoning, they are 
matters of religious feeling or intuition, and are sourced in the 
vast feeling background of the mental life. The declarations 
of the prophets come fully formed into their minds bearing with 
them that sense of externality which James speaks of as charact- 
eristic of the products of the sub-conscious. According to 
Pratt, this consciousness of immediate inspiration brings a new 
meaning into religion, Yahweh now becomes the God not merely of 
the nation, but of the individual, and this sense of a personal, 
as distinct from a public or national relation to God he points 
out is made articulate in the Psalms.
The general conclusion is, that everywhere we may see the 
same three factors at work in the religion of a people. The 
credulous basis of belief crumbles before the advance of reason; 
but the reason can never give the certainty the religious mind 
desires, it may fashion elaborate conceptual constructs for
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religion, but these fail to satisfy, religion therefore turns for 
support to the instinctive and emotional region of human nature.
IV.
In Pratt's view these three typical bases of religious belief 
may be found in all developed religions, Christianity is no ex- 
ception, and with Pratt, as always, the emotional basis is the 
surest.
Three phases of the Christian religion are taken as illustrate 
ing these three bases of belief.
Primitive credulity is illustrated by the dominance of authors 
ity in the mediaeval Church. The attitude of subservience to 
authority was says Pratt, typical of the middle ages up to the 
time of the Reformation, the traditional teachings of the Church 
were accepted simply because they were presented. Authority was 
at once the basis of faith and the court of appeal, and if science 
and philosophy did not agree with theology they were ipso facto 
false. Reason when used, was used to establish ecclesiastical 
dogmas, not to scrutinize the teachings of the Church, nor to come 
to independent conclusions.
The fact is emphasized, that at the Reformation the authority 
of the Church was overthrown for a large portion of Christendom, 
but a new authority arose in the shape of a Book, instead of a 
Pope, and the war between authority and reason recommenced, reason 
being represented by the science of Biblical Criticism.
Pratt now makes the transition to the religion of feeling, 
the emotional factor he says, may be clearly discerned in Christ- 
ian Mysticism. Mysticism is defined as the experience of union
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with God, and an epistemological doctrine founded on this exper- 
ience. The one doctrine of Mysticism is, that the human spirit 
can immediately apprehend Transcendent Reality independently of 
sense perception, or the processes of inferential thought.
The Mystic, says Pratt, deliberately attempts to get rid of 
discursive thought; he uses ascetic practices to free his mind 
from sense distractions; his whole field of consciousness is focal, 
ised on the idea of God; his self is put in the mood of passive 
waiting; then the ecstatic experience just comes. This mystic 
experience of union with God cannot be compelled, but passivity is 
a condition of attaining it. There is absolute assurance on the 
part of Mystics, that in their experience they have come into con- 
scious connection with a larger life which surrounds their own and 
is continuous with it. Here again, we observe Pratt ! s character- 
istic stress on the invulnerability of the religion of feeling, 
he says, the Mystic is absolutely convinced that he has been in 
communion with God,and his experiences remain inviolable when con- 
fronted with the objective realities of life, dreams and delusions 
cannot stand this test.
According to Pratt, the intellectual factor is to be discern- 
ed in Deism, the cold religion of the understanding which was the 
product of 18th century rationalism. Reason in this period he 
says was the final court of appeal in all matters of religion. 
In the 18th century it was supposed that the existence of God 
could be demonstrated by reason independently of revelation, the 
argument from revelation was valid enough, but it was held that it 
rested with reason to say what was, and what was not revelation.
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Pratt holds, that this type of religious belief based on pure-; 
ly intellectual grounds has been badly hit by the Evolutionary 
theory, and the Higher Criticism. The Design argument in his 
opinion has been destroyed by Darwinian!sm, and the Causal argument 
has been killed by Kant's conception of an infinite regress of 
finite beings. Certainly the scientific notion of law and order 
remains, but he says, arguing back from this notion we cannot get 
the kind of God religion demands. Moreover it is vain to look to 
the Philosophy of History for comfort, for it can prove any thesis 
we want to prove. If, says Pratt, we studied history without 
theological bias, we could never arrive at belief in the kind of 
God religion portrays, we could only logically argue to a limited 
Being baffled on every hand.
The conclusion is therefore, that if we are ever to believe 
in the God within the shadow keeping watch above His own, we must 
get that belief from some source other than an inductive argument 
from the facts of Nature and History.
Pratt f s discussion of belief in God based on rational grounds 
lands him in this dilemma, namely, the arguments the people can 
grasp are untenable, while the arguments which are tenable they 
cannot grasp. Pratt's opinion is, that the rational basis of re- 
ligious belief in modern times is approaching collapse.
PART III. 
THE PRESENT STATUS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.
The third section of Pratt*s Book is divided into four chap- 
ters. The first of these deals with the development of religious 
belief during childhood and adolescence, and follows familiar
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lines. Two of the chapters are based on the results of a quest- 
ionnaire, these are the most important contribution of the book to 
our knowledge of the contemporary religious consciousness. The 
first of these deals with the types of belief in mature life, and 
the second, with the value of God for the religious consciousness 
of to-day.
Pratt discovered that his respondents fell before analysis 
into three main classes. Those who belonged to the first class 
believed in God on authority, because they were taught to do so 
as children, and having formed the habit of believing, adhered to 
it through sheer inertia. This is of course Pratt f s religion of 
primitive credulity. The second class consisted of those whose 
religious belief rested on some sort of argument, good, bad, or 
indifferent. Pratt detected persons in this class who thought 
their religious beliefs were based on reason, when they were act- 
ually founded on feeling, or authority. These respondents had 
found reasons for beliefs which they held on grounds other than 
reason. A third well marked class consisted of those whose re- 
ligious beliefs rested on volitional, emotional, instinctive, and 
intuitive grounds. Pratt discovered two species of this large 
class, there were persons whose faith sprang from an intense de- 
sire and demand, and there were those whose faith was sourced in 
some affective experience, 40 out of Pratt's 77 respondents be- 
longed to this last class. The data collected by this psycholog* 
ist points to the great preponderance of the affective experience 
over reason and authority, as the basis of the religious beliefs 
of our contemporaries.
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Pratt's chapter on the value of God shows the actual signifi- 
cance which belief in God, and the practice of prayer have for re- 
ligious men and women in our own times. His questionnaire yield- 
ed the information that God's metaphysical attributes have little 
significance for the majority of religious people,but that His 
personal relations with individuals matter much. The answers 
pointed to this unanimous conclusion, namely, "God is valued not 
as an explanation of things but as an immediate help in the pract- 
ical and emotional life".
As against Leuba who asserts God is valued merely as a"Meat 
Purveyor", Pratt maintains, that God is valued as an end in Himself 
rather than as a mere means to an end. Pratt discovered that it 
is not as a giver but as a companion God is valued and sought, it 
is not His gifts but Himself which the religious soul desires. 
This investigator found that the religious consciousness values 
prayer not primarily because of benefits to be received, but be- 
cause it is assured by its means of coming into immediate social 
relationship with God. Pratt affirms, that in so far as God is 
regarded pragmatically as a giver, it is of spiritual benefits: 
e.g. strength, insight, comfort, courage, and serenity.
In his concluding chapter Pratt presents us with his obser- 
vations concerning the present status of religious belief. His 
outlook and adumbrations are rather gloomy. He notes the general 
reaction against uncritical acceptance of the authority of tradit- 
ion in all fields of thought, and that the outstanding feature of 
the present age is revolt against authority. He tells us the 
religion based on primitive credulity, and mere authority has
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ceased to play any influential part in the affairs of men. In 
Europe he sees nothing but hostility to religion, and in America 
indifference, men he says are seldom seen in Church.
Moreover he asserts, the old intellectual arguments are no 
longer valid, and in any case reason is not a sufficient basis for 
religion. It may of course furnish a satisfying belief for the 
more philosophically minded, but an involved and subtle argument 
which only a few of the most brilliant philosophers can appreciate 
can never form a foundation for the faith of a people.
What then shall we say to these things? Pratt's opinion is 
that the only religious belief that can endure in these days, is 
that which is broad based on a private quasi-mystical experience, 
but he exclaims pessimistically, half the religious community are 
non-mystical. The impression Pratt leaves is that religion is 
destined to become the possession of an esoteric circle of the 
mystically minded.
Be that as it may,Pratt is emphatic on the point that the re- 
ligion of authority, and of reason are both passing away, and that 
the one hope for the future lies in the religion of feeling.
In the last analysis Pratt holds that belief in God is not a 
theoretical matter but a vital matter, it is the religious man's 
reaction to the stimulus of the whole cosmos, it is an outcome of 
the needs and demands of the organism, not of the reason. Relig- 
ious belief in these days must be based on emotional convictions 
which are instinctive and a matter of the whole psycho-physiolog- 
ical organism. Religion must take its stand on the region of the 
non-rational instincts, intuitions, and feelings, here according
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to Pratt is the ITou <Troo of religion.
Pratt's conclusion is, that in the future religious belief 
will stand or fall with the religion of feeling; that religious 
convictions which are rooted in the vast feeling background of 
human nature cannot be shaken by literary or historical critic- 
ism, scientific discovery, or philosophic thought; and that 
personal inner experience is the only source from which religion 
in these days of naturalism, agnosticism, indifference, and 
hostility can draw its life.
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CRITIQUE.
Professor Pratt ! s admirable book is most lucid in style, 
interesting in matter, and illuminating in treatment. No invest- 
igator of the American School has given more evidence of a 
sympathetic understanding of the religious life. This has been 
the outstanding feature of all Pratt f s work in connection with 
the Psychology of Religion, and it especially characterizes his 
later and greater work, "The Religious Consciousness".
In this, his first book, Pratt deals with an aspect of the 
religious life to which his predecessors, Starbuck, Coe, and 
James gave little heed. These earlier investigators gave them- 
selves almost entirely to the study of the religious phenomena of 
Conversion and Mysticism. Pratt's special contribution is made 
to the psychology of religious belief.
In a work purporting to treat of the psychology of belief in 
general, and of religious belief in particular, would it be hyper- 
critical to suggest that the historical side of the book is 
rather fully elaborated and has been developed at the expense of
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psychological analysis.
One of the interesting and controversial points in Pratt's 
"book arises from his insistence on a distinction in kind between 
the marginal and focal regions of the mind. Here Pratt breaks 
with the most of his compeers. The distinction for the majority 
of psychologists between the central part of consciousness and the 
penumbral region is a distinction between degrees of attention. 
The same object may be in the region of hazy consciousness one 
minute, and the object of eager attention the next, it is all a 
matter of attention. Pratt's absolute distinction in kind betweerf 
the centre and fringe of consciousness cannot be held to be 
established.
For Psychology, the marginal region of consciousness is simply 
the region of dim awareness. Pratt puts more upon this fringe
H
region tha)& it can possibly bear. According to Pratt, this 
peripheral region links us to our past and to our ancestry; it is 
the storehouse of all our biologically innate dispositions, our 
inborn loves and hates, appetites, and instincts; it is the seat 
of our feelings and the emotional life. Now it is quite evident 
that Pratt makes this fringe region do duty for what modern psych- 
ology recognizes as the sub-conscious. We do not think Pratt's 
extension of his term to cover all the phenomena of the sub-con- 
scious is legitimate. Further, such an extension introduces an 
unnecessary confusion into a field of the psychical life which is 
already complex by nature, Pratt is not justified in taking a 
term like the fringe region, or the marginal region, which has a 
quite definite connotation in the vocabulary of psychology, and
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using it to cover phenomena which psychologists have agreed to
1. 
group under the concepts of the sub-conscious and the unconscious.
Pratt asserts, that many of our most important desires spring from 
a region of our life which is not conscious at all. Now this can- 
not possibly be the fringe region or borderland of the field of 
consciousness as understood by psychology, it must be the sub-con- 
scious region, which may be conceived as the continuation of Prattfe 
large feeling fringe of consciousness.
With Pratt's contention, that the whole man must be trusted 
as against any small part of his nature such as reason, or sense 
perception, we are in full accord. But does not Pratt himself 
depart from this very excellent principle by placing an unduly 
heavy accent on the element of feeling in human life. There is 
clearly a tendency on Pratt ! s part to subordinate all other factors 
in man's mental life to the element of feeling, and the impression 
is left that the emotional part of man's nature must be trusted as 
against the reason, or any other part of his nature.
Although Pratt is perfectly aware of the fact that the con- 
scious life is actually a unity, and not divided into three or 
four elements or compounds, his treatment leaves the impression 
that his conceptual divisions are the actual divisions. The three 
kinds of belief of which this investigator treats, namely, credu- 
lous belief, reasoned belief, and emotional belief, are not neatly 
divided off from each other, but all three may and do co-exist in 
real life.
Pratt's mode of treatment of the historical religions leaves 
the impression of successive dynasties, the one rising on the
1.Rivers W.H.R. Instinct and the Unconscious, p.9.
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ruins of the other. Primitive credulity crumbles before intell- 
ectual criticism and the relentless march of reason, next the 
dynasty of thought is swept away before the tidal wave of feeling. 
Pratt does not emphasize sufficiently the fact, that these three 
phases of belief not only tend to displace each other, but that 
they actually run parallel one with another, and may actually 
coincide in the same social group, and even in the same individual. 
Though we differ with Pratt on this question of distribution
f
of accent, it must be conceded that he has been very successful in 
showing how these three phases of belief have been manifested in 
the historical religions of India, of Israel, and Christianity.
In the case of each of these religions, Pratt, has clearly 
shown how credulity, thought, and feeling, act and react upon 
each other. But we do not think Pratt is quite as convincing in 
his case for the presence of the religion of thought in Animism. 
At this early stage of human culture, Pratt is certainly more 
successful in indicating the presence of primitive credulity and 
the factor of emotion, than that of thought.
In this book, belief is considered under three categories, 
namely, credulous belief, reasoned belief, and emotional belief. 
Now belief is never a matter merely of credulity, reason, or feel- 
ing, it is also a matter of will. Pratt does not here recognize 
sufficiently the tremendous part volitional belief'plays in 
human life and religion. This will to believe he subsumes under
the head of emotional belief, but it is clearly conative and
1. 
should therefore come under the voluntary head. Volitional
belief ought to be considered in its own right, and have a category 
l.Cutten G.B. The Psychological Phenomena of Christian! ty.p31Q
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to itself. Pratt himself seems to have been seized of this defect 
of his first book, and in his recent study he makes good this de- 
ficiency of "The Psychology of Religious Belief", by providing a
fourth category, namely, the volitional which does justice to the
1. 
powerful pragmatic tendency in human nature.
According to Pratt, the outlook is distinctly sinister for 
religion. Credulous belief he asserts, is no longer possible. 
Belief in God on the basis of authority is dead, and faith in God 
on the grounds of reasoned belief is dying. The old rational 
philosophic arguments for the existence of God were killed by Kant. 
The result of Pratt's whole discussion of the type of belief based 
on reason impales him on the horns of a dilemma, namely, "the argu- 
ments the people can grasp are no longer tenable, while the argu-
2 
ments that are tenable, if such there be, the people cannot grasp".
Now Pratt has traced the roots of religion to the instinctive 
depths of human nature. He finds that religious convictions are 
the outcome of the needs and demands of the psycho-physiological 
organism, not of the reason. His contention all across has been, 
that such beliefs are invulnerable. Further, Pratt has discover- 
ed from a careful study of his cases, that affective experience 
preponderates over reason and authority as the basis of belief. 
The real basis of religious belief to-day then, is not rational 
arguments but inner experience, and this religion of inner exper- 
ience is inviolable on Pratt's own showing, whence then his gloomy 
forebodings for the future of religion?
Pratt is inclined to exaggerate the importance of the decline
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, pp.13-14.
2. Pratt J.B. The Psychology of Religious Belief, p.194.
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of religious belief on the basis of authority. Pratt himself has
affirmed in connection with his discussion of the development of 
the religion of thought in India,that throughout all the period of 
monistic speculation the people clave to Polytheism. Authority,habit 
feeling,and will,all led to a clinging to the old gods. It is much 
the same today,imitation,habit,social pressure,sentiment,and author- 
ity will always determine religious belief for the majority of man- 
kind in the future,as it has done in the past. Belief on authority 
is far from being extinct,the majority of men do not do their own 
thinking,political or religious nor want to do it,they prefer to 
have it done for them. They accept their beliefs on authority.
As a matter of fact,a minority of religious persons only, 
arrive at their religious beliefs and convictions as the result of 
a process of discursive thought. Where reason is used by religious 
persons it is generally in order to vindicate a conviction which is 
held on grounds other than reason,or to merely formulate in an in- 
tellectual form their emotional and instinctive beliefs.
The alleged downfall of the old rational arguments which Pratt 
considers is fraught with such disaster to religion if proven will 
affect theology rather than religion itself. Religion never was 
built on these philosophical arguments. For the majority of relig- 
ious persons,God is never the conclusion of a syllogism,or a sorites 
but the Reality with whom they feel in contact in experience. Re- 
ligious convictions are reality feelings, and emotional beliefs.
If Pratt f s thesis is true,that religion is rooted in the vital in- 
stinctive depths of human nature,there seems to be no justification 
for his pessimism regarding the future of religion. All we know 
tends to verify the hypothesis,that men will continue to be relig- 
ious to the end of time,unlesstheir mental nature changes in a 
manner which nothing we know should lead us to expect. 1.
1. James William, Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p.316.
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With the dawn of the twentieth century, a relatively new- 
tendency made itself felt in the science of psychology, this was 
the disposition to view its data from an evolutionary-voluntarist- 
ic point of view. The University of Chicago seems to have been 
specially hospitable to this interpretation of human consciousness
o
under biological categories. " Professor Ames in his "Psychology 
of Religious Experience" definitely represents this movement of 
reconstruction of psychological standpoint with regard to religion,
His attitude in this book is that of the new functional 
psychology which is founded on biological patterns. The human 
mind is treated as a instrument, and an organism which functions
1. Ames E.S. The Psychology of Religious Experience, 1910.
Houghton Mifflin £ Co.
2. Coe G.A. Religion from the standpoint of Functional Psych- 
ology, American Journal Theol. Vol. XV. April. 
(1911) p. 501.
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in response to specific situations. All the psychical events in
consciousness are conditioned by the demands made upon the organism
1. 
by the environmental situation.
*
Ames gathers his data from Anthropology, the history of relig- 
ions, and the social sciences, and interprets this mass of material 
from the functional standpoint. The biological conception of re- 
ligion dominates Ames's thought throughout. The Thesis laid down 
is that religion is the consciousness of the highest social values, 
and that these are in the last analysis, simply the sublimated ex- 
pression of the biological instincts of food and sex. Ames sets 
out to prove that religion originates in the biological needs, and 
the social impulses and arrangements of men. In a word, religion 
is a by-product of social evolution. Professor Ames treats of the 
psychology of religious experience under four heads. Part I, deals 
with the history and method of the psychology of religion. Part II, 
discusses the origin of the religion in the race. Part III, treats 
of the rise of religion in the individual. And Part IV, deals vrith 
the place of religion in the experience of the individual and 
society.
PART I. 
THE HISTORY AND METHOD OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.
The book opens with an historical sketch of the movements of 
thought and the scientific and practical religious motivations 
which attended the genesis of the psychology of religion. Ames 
conceives that the business of psychology is to get at the mental 
activities, the psychic needs and desires which stand back of the
1. Angell J.R. Relation of Structural and Functional Psychol-
pf! 243P^ Phy * Phil - Rev -v°l-XII,May 1903,
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cultsand customs, the ritual, and the rites of mankind, revealed 
by the historian and anthropologist. Psychology asks in a word, 
what function do these things perform in the experience of the 
individual and of the race?
The Psychological Standpoint.
Ames treats the phenomena of religion from the standpoint of 
functional psychology. Three things are vital for Ames in this 
conception. 1. The mental life is to be conceived as an instru- 
ment by which the organism adjusts itself to its physical or social 
environment. 2. The emphasis must be laid throughout upon process- 
es directed to adjustments. 3. The adjustment is always made 
through the psycho-physical organism and is registered in neural 
activity and objective effects.
Now with Ames, mind includes the instinctive and perceptive 
processes as well as the reasoning powers. Mind is conceived 
biologically as the most important factor in the survival of the 
highest organisms, it is the biological instrument which enables 
adaptations to occur in complex situations.
There are two important implications of functional psychology, 
which ought to be noted here. The first, is the stress on will, 
it is voluntarlstic, therefore ideation, and feeling are secondary. 
The second is,that consciousness is always actual awareness of 
specific things. There is no such thing as ethical or religious 
consciousness conceived of as ultimate faculties. The kind of 
consciousness we have depends precisely on what we have attended 
to in life. Religion is not an original endowment, but normal 
people acquire it from their social environment.
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Ames makes (in this section) a series of statements of the 
most controversial nature concerning philosophy, logic, ethics, 
aesthetics, metaphysics, theology, and the philosophy of religion. 
He reduces all these disciplines to phases or elaborations of 
psychology. The new conception of the functional psychology has 
according to Ames, the last word in all these departments.
Ames holds, the psychology of religious experience is the con-: 
ditioning science for all branches of theology. Theology and the 
philosophy of religion are just the psychology of religion in full 
dress. Ames argues, if reality is given in experience then the 
science of that experience is the reasonable method of dealing with 
reality. The idea of God is subject to the same laws of the men- 
tal life as other ideas, it is therefore psychology which must 
pronounce on its truth.
The method of functional psychology is genetic and historical, 
it goes to anthropology and the history of religions for the con- 
crete setting of the psychic life of primitive peoples. It then 
works back from customs, ceremonies, and cults to the psychic 
states which occasioned these. The assumption all across is,that 
ideas and emotions are always sourced in practical interests. In 
the case of primitive man Ames holds, it is relatively easy to 
discover these practical interests because he is no introspective 
Hamlet but is entirely occupied with the outward objective life.
With Ames the early stages of religion are most important for 
the understanding of religion. In the rudimentary stages we may 
view religion in the germ when it is relatively simple,and we may
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see it in the process of becoming.
PART II. 
THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION IN THE RACE.
Ames contends religion at first is purely a matter of social 
custom. Man's life is determined from the very beginning by the 
two fundamental instincts of food and sex. In primitive society 
women is the social centre. Occupational activities develop- 
33. traits in both sexes. These occupations are reflected in all 
forms of savage culture, and specially in primitive religious 
ceremonies. In primitive life it is the men who organize and 
direct the ceremonials of the social group, but the processes re- 
flected in tribal ritual are those of the occupations of women as 
well as men. The means of life are the central objects in primi- 
tive religion. The ritual comprises the mimetic movements re- 
presenting the activities involved in securing the means of life.. 
Economic considerations determine the features of primitive re- 
ligion. Religion then with Ames in its first form is just a 
dramatic representation of the most vital group interests by means 
of social ceremonials. Ames's fundamental Thesis is that the 
elemental instincts of food and sex are in the last analysis back 
of all religion primitive or developed. Religion he asseverates, 
always mirrors the interests of man which have to do with the 
means, maintenance,and perpetuation of life.
Custom and Taboo.
In treating of the subject of custom and taboo Ames discusses 
and rejects the views of Frazer, Jevons, and Crawley, and la^s down
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the proposition that customs and taboos are non-rational in origin, 
(fehey Ames describes them as non-rational instinctive reactions to 
felt needs). If he says, we search for ideas and rational be- 
liefs in connection with primitive customs as the above authorities 
do we will be side-tracked, for they are mechanical and arbitrary. 
Human needs are the source of the customs of a group, not ideas 
and reflection. Sanctions are an inherent part of custom. These 
forms and customs of social life become fixed, and secured against 
change by terrible sanctions. All departures from the customs 
are taboo. The customs are the "Thou shalts" of primitive life, 
and the taboos are the "Thou shalt nots". The most important 
customs centre about the things vital to the life and well being 
of the tribe, e.g. Food-getting, childbirth, initiation at 
puberty, marriage, death, and war. The group is the custodian 
of the tribal customs. An irregularity on the part of a tribes- 
man is punished by the tribe as a whole. The objects of taboo 
are, in the last analysis, determined  * by the life processes 
which underlie reproduction, and by the tribal organization which 
includes the relations with the dead, with members of the opposite 
sex, with kings, and with the gods. Objects associated with the 
thing that is taboo becomer taboo also. Further a thing may be- 
come taboo because it is holy, or it may become taboo because it 
is unclean. The taboo thought may be extended indefinitely.
Ceremonials and Magic.
According to Ames, ceremonials are customs of a peculiar 
kind which have been elaborated into highly ritualistic observances 
and which are conducted publicly under the authority of the leader
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of the group in time of emotional crisis. Such ceremonials 
become hallowed by long usage. In this connection Ames lays 
down a fundamental proposition, namely, "all ceremonies in 
which the whole group co-operates with keen emotional interest 
are religious". Ames is emphatic on the point that that which 
makes these ceremonials religious is their public and social 
character. Ames sees in primitive religion, a system of group 
control in connection with acutely felt needs. The ceremonials 
of circumcision, initiation, marriage etc., all these group 
practices are religious.
Religious ceremonials then are group reactions in connect- 
ion with the fundamental biological processes which involve the 
very existence and welfare of the group. These group react- 
ions dramatically represent these processes in nature and human 
life.
Ames argues, since all the activities of primitive man are 
touched with magic and spiritism religion cannot escape this 
alloy. Ames makes no attempt to define magic, he contents him- 
self with indicating the things to which the term applies. In 
this connection Frazer, Jevons,and Lang are criticized for 
attributing far too advanced ideational, logical processes to 
the savage mentality. Ames scouts W.R. Smith's distinction of
magic and religion on the principle of individualistic versus
1. 
group action. This distinction he says is simply that between
collective magic and individual magic. Magic, says Ames, is 
an elastic term. There are many species of magic,imitative
1. Smith W.R. The Religion of the Semites, pp. 263 f.
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sympathetic,and direct, and public ceremonials illustrate all 
these types. Emotional reactions are involved in these ceremon- 
ies. Emotions arise in tense situations. The occasions of 
public ceremonials are the acute crises in the life of the group 
such as e.g. famine, hunger, love, birth, youth, pestilence, death, 
war.
Spirits.
Ames criticizes Tylor's theory of the conception of spirits 
because it is based on the supposition that primitive man is a 
metaphysician. On the contrary the savage, says Ames, is more 
like a child, he is an objective thinker, and his interests are 
immediate. For the savage any object that is thrust upon his 
attention in any exciting way is a living thing which is positive- 
ly friendly or unfriendly. Such objects are living agents or 
spirits. Primitive man's thought is hazy, therefore he does not 
distinguish between an object and its spirit, the object is itself 
the spirit.
With Ames, a spirit is any object that strikes the mind forc- 
ibly, and demands the creation of a conception. Now according 
to Ames all startling and awe-inspiring experiences are not relig- 
ious, but those only, which elicit social responses and become the 
occasion of public ceremonial. And in like manner all spirits 
have not religious significance but those only who have to do with 
group activities.
Ames insists,it is the central life interests that always 
hold the attention of the savage. Spirits symbolize these vital 
interests, and the environment determines the character of such
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spirits. Ames points out that there are two stages in the de- 
velopment of the spirit conception. First, where the savage 
makes no distinction between the object and the spirit. This 
is the pre-animistic stage of Marett,and the animistic stage of 
Tylor. Second, where the savage distinguishes between the two 
things. The usual features of the object begin to stand out 
against the phenomenal features, and so the spirit becomes separ- 
able from its object.
Ames affirms,that the economic, social, ethical history of 
the tribe can be read in its sacred objects and ceremonies. As 
the moral experiences of the tribe deepen the tribal spirit or 
god improves in ethical character. The development of the idea 
of god goes along with the social development of a people.
Sacrifice.
With regard to sacrifice Ames asserts its meaning is not to 
be found in the ideas it expresses but in what it does for the 
participants in the rite. The idea of worship in sense of re- 
verence and trust in a high God must not be read into the mind of 
primitive man. The basic act in this rite is that of eating 
food. Sacred objects were first sacrificed,not sacrificed to. 
The animal, the fish, and the plant became sacred because they 
satisfied hunger and gave strength. The sacrificial meal bene- 
fits the group in a very practical manner.
Ames argues against Jevon's view that the savage eats the 
totem because it has become sacred, on the contrary says Ames, 
the totem has become sacred because it is good for food. In the
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primitive and most typical form of sacrifice, the food object is 
the divinity, the god himself is eaten. The vague purpose of 
it all is, that the group may gain the magic power of the object, 
or deity thus eaten. The occasions of sacrifice are the critical 
junctures in tribal life.
A second means of gaining magic power grows up where contact 
with the sacred object is believed to effect the same result as 
eating it would bring about. The central fact in sacrifice is 
the getting of the sacred object f s potency by contact.
Sacrifice then with Ames>is a ceremony the function of which 
is to effect contact with the powerful sacred object or divinity 
in order to innoculate oneself against coming dangers, or after 
having touched a tabooed object in order to get more magic to 
counteract the evil power. Thus there are two types of sacrifice 
Type I, where the thought is to get into helpful relation with 
powerful agencies, here the thought of placating angry divinities 
is entirely absent. Type II, where the thought is to avert evil 
consequences annexed to violated taboos, or to overcome natural 
taboos. Here belong rites of purification in which water, blood, 
fire are used. The idea all across is that some potent quality 
is conferred by contact with these things rather than the thought 
of cleansing. The two views may be held together says Ames, 
contact with the sacred object expels something that is impure and 
also adds something to the worshipper's life.
Functional psychology asks what is done by this ceremony, not 
what is believed about it. The answer Ames gives is, that throu£ 
sacrifice contact is achieved with the sacred object in order to
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get its mysterious power into one. This is mainly done by eating 
the sacred object because that seems to the savage the surest way 
of getting its qualities, but this end also may be effected by the 
method of contact. Everything that manifests mysterious activity 
is sacred to the savage. Sacredness and sanctity are synonymous 
with mysterious power in the savage mind.
In the later evolution of sacrifice the mysterious forces 
become identified with particular objects and persons,e.g. the 
priests. The priests make the choicest sacrifices, and the sac- 
red objects are periodically distributed to the people to make 
them strong. The primitive thought of participating in the div- 
ine life through sacrifice endures throughout the whole evolution 
of the rite. The idea of a victim being offered to God is a late 
development. In primitive sacrifice the victim is the god, and 
the most sacred thing in the ceremony. The Roman Catholic Mass 
is true to the primitive type ,the body and blood of divinity are 
consumed by the priests and worshippers.
Ames affirms the modern idea of sin as transgression of the 
moral law did not exist for primitive man. The only sin in 
primitive society is breach of custom or taboo. The idea of sac- 
rifice as atonement for sin simply meant at first a rite which 
counteracted the physical effect of breach of custom or taboo. 
The expiatory sacrifices of the Hebrews perpetuate this function.
Ames points out that by means of sacrifice there were secured 
to the tribe homogeneous feeling, and contact with ancestors, and 
with divinities. Sacrifice consolidated the social life of the 
group, in this lay its value. Ames affirms that auto-suggestion
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increased the effect of sacrifice, i.e. it worked, the warrior 
really gained courage, the apprehensive peace, and the despairing 
hope from participation in this group ceremonial.
Prayer.
Prayer according to Ames plays a secondary part in primitive 
religion. We get a clue to the understanding of prayer through 
speech, which at its origin is a thing of gestures, and inarticu- 
late cries. The cry of pain, and the grunt of satisfaction are 
at first just instinctive reactions to environmental stimuli. 
Speech is an explosive accompaniment to emotion. Every thought 
and feeling of the savage as of the child is spoken out. In its 
beginnings then prayer is just an impulsive optative expression 
on an emotional occasion.
Prayers, and chants are found first, as incidental accompani- 
ments of savage group ceremonials. These verbal accompaniments 
are expletive or descriptive, they merely assert certain actions 
are taking place, and are just epiphenomena, the actions are the 
all important things in the ceremonies.
But Ames points out, prayer does not remain a mere epiphenom- 
enon, there arises the thought of power and magic resident in 
words as well as in actions, and prayer begins to be used to help 
the action out. Power is attributed to words to bless or curse 
with literal physical consequences. Ames maintains that prayer 
in its concussing character is spell whether it be impersonal or 
personal, as against Marett's view that impersonal prayer only, 
is spell.
Again the written word is thought to have the same magical
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power as the spoken word. Ames instances the Thibetan prayer 
wheel as a vivid example of this. Ames holds that this magical 
alloy in prayer may be detected in modern times in the Ave Marias, 
and Paternosters of Christianity which are often used as spells. 
When the scientific conception of nature exorcises magic from 
prayer, it becomes meditation and communion.
Mythology.
In discussing the subject of mythology,Ames differs from 
Wundt, Robertson Smith, Spencer, and Frazer in that he limits the 
term mythology to cult lore, which he regards as an integral part 
of the sacred ceremonies. Ames thus draws a line of demarcation 
between mythology and the folk-lore which is not bound up with 
the sacred ceremonies. The myth proper he asserts ,is a real 
part of primitive religion. The cult-myth is recited on special 
occasions only, with reverence and in archaic language. The whole 
drama of the tribe is reenacted in the cult myth.
Ames insists there are two sides to primitive ceremonial. 
The physical and psychical, the dance, and the trains of imagery. 
Both spring from the original occupations of the group, it is 
these which are being reinstated by the mimetic dance and the 
trains of imagery. When the trains of imagery get verbal ex- 
pression, they issue in the cult-myth.
Ames stresses the fact, that the occupational experiences of 
the tribe always determines of what sort their ceremonies shall 
be. The causes of cults and cult-lore are the activities and 
emotional strivings which arise from the elemental needs of 
primitive man. Self preservation and race preservation are the
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pillars of the whole social structure of primitive society.
The content of the myth then depends on the actual experien- 
ces of the group. Here then is Ames's explanation why the topo- 
graphy, the fauna, and flora of the country, and human heroes, 
either great hunters or warriors loom large in mythology proper, 
and why cosmic objects find so subordinate a place. The reason 
says Ames, is because the primitive interest is in food, not in 
first causes. The savage is no metaphysician or theologian, his 
mind is fixed on the objects that will serve his fundamental bio- 
logical needs and those of his group. Heroes are in the cult 
myths because their exploits result in a better food supply, or 
because they have been social saviours.
Ames emphatically maintains, that primitive ceremonial, cult, 
and cult-lore are all saturated with self-interest and tribal in- 
terest, and originate in fundamental human needs. Therefore it 
is a fallacy to seek the origin of primitive religion in the won- 
der and awe elicited by cosmic objects.
He points out we are not to look for rationality in primitive 
myths, it is a fallacy to suppose that myths are causal explanat- 
ions. They are not in the least scientific, but dramatic, the 
work of memory and fancy. Myths like customs spring up uncon- 
sciously and are non-rational. Primitive man lived in a small 
world, and all his thinking was concrete. Myths therefore can- 
not rise above the limits set by his life interests, therefore no 
large concepts need be expected.
The Development of Religion. 
Ames's fundamental proposition is that primitive religion is
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entirely a group concern. He Identifies social consciousness 
with religious consciousness. Ames asserts, that for primitive 
man the things upon which his life, and the well-being of his 
tribe depend are the precious things. This consciousness of the 
greatest values of life is with Ames, religious consciousness. 
Religion is the result of the outworking of the elemental instincts 
of food-getting, and sex, in a world unscientifically apprehended. 
The content of primitive religion is wholly determined by what 
will satisfy the elemental instincts of hunger, thirst, and sex. 
The form of primitive religion is the tribal ceremony.
By development in religion, Ames understands,simply enlarge- 
ment and elaboration of social interests, for it is in social in- 
terests that religion consists. Development in social organizat- 
ion, changes in economic conditions, and an increasing knowledge 
of how to control nature are the factors which cause advance in 
religion. All these make for the elaboration of the social con- 
sciousness which is synonymous with the religious consciousness. 
With Ames progress in religion is progress in group organization.
Now affirms Ames, the things that are vital to the life and 
well-being of the group, are always vividly prominent in the cere- 
monial of the group. Therefore in the progress of a people from 
savagery to civilisation, every stage in that social evolution is 
registered in their religious rites and traditions.
In illustration of his thesis, Ames cites the evolution of 
the religion of the Hebrews. Ames traces six definite stages in 
the social organization of the Hebrew people in their development 
from barbarism to civilisation. Everyone of these social,
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economic, and political stages in the evolution of the Hebrew 
race is recorded in their religion. Religion then with Ames,
is just a contemporary mirror which reflects whatever social,
i 
economic, or political conditions obtain at the time in a peoples
history. As these change it changes, if these remain static, 
it remains static.
Now Ames argues, since religion is so indissolubly annexed 
to the social organization of the group, and is as a matter of 
fact the highest social consciousness of the group, then every 
social, economic, and political factor which dominates the vital 
interests of the life of the group, must inevitably appear in 
the religion of the group. We find to-day that democratic ideajl 
and scientific methods and results occupy a towering place in 
the social consciousness of modern society, therefore it is these 
things which must determine the lineaments of modern religion, 
it must be says Ames,a religion of science and democracy.
PART III.
THE RISE OF RELIGION IN THE INDIVIDUAL.
Since Ames's thesis throughout, is that religion is synony- 
mous with social consciousness, the question of the rise of re- 
ligion in the individual is with him the question of the genesis 
of his social consciousness. Ames therefore proceeds to expound 
the view with which social psychology has made us familiar,namely 
that every individual is environed from birth by the social in- 
stitutions, beliefs, sentiments, and the practices of his group, 
all of which develop his personality. The individual gets his
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religion as he gets everything else from the social group into 
which he is born.
Ames f s treatment of the psychology of childhood follows in 
the main, the usual lines, but is marked by his characteristic 
heavy accent on the social reference of the child's development. 
During infancy says Ames,the child is a non-moral, non-social 
growing organism. At this stage he is non-religious because he 
is non-social. The child does not yet appreciate social relat- 
ions, and has not yet an outfit of social attitudes, but he has 
made a beginning towards personality. In the period of pre- 
adolescence there is the development and the tendency towards
AMP
co-operation with others^of social attitudes.
Ames concludes that there is no special innate religious in- 
stinct in the child, therefore if religion is to come to the 
child at all it must come from the social environment. Personal- 
ity, morality, and religion are not given,all are acquired as 
the result of social influences. With Ames, then religion is 
entirely social product, the child does not have it by nature, 
he acquires it by nurture. Ames's conclusion is that it is im- 
possible for the child under 9 years to pass beyond the non- 
religious and non-moral attitude to any considerable degree, but 
in later childhood he responds to social interests, and there- 
fore manifests tendencies which are religious.
Adolescence.
Ames accepts the conclusion of Starbuck, Coe, James, Leuba, 
and Hall,"that the period of adolescence is pre-eminently the 
period for the rise of religious consciousness in the individual"
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One of the best established results of the psychology of religion 
is, he says, that conversion or the beginning of religion is an 
adolescent phenomenon. In Liturgical Churches Ames reminds us 
this period of adolescence has been chosen for confirmation. 
These confirmatory ceremonies of modern times correspond to the 
initiatory rites of primitive society. Adolescence then is the 
period when the individual enters naturally upon religious and 
other social relations. He begins to respond to the established 
institutions of the group, and becomes seized of the importance of 
group values.
The appearance and development of the sexual instinct is the 
most important factor in the whole business. The adolescent must 
learn to accomodate his sexual desires to the customs, standards, 
and values of the social group of which he finds himself a,member.
Ames holds, there is fundamental connection between the 
appearance of the sexual instinct and religious awakening. They 
occur together, and they both have a social reference. Ames pro- 
ceeds, it is the social character of the sexual instinct which 
makes it significant for religion. Mere imitation, mental devel- 
opment, and social pressure are insufficient to explain the phenoot 
enal intensity of the adolescent's social impulses. The explan- 
ation Ames asserts must lie in the development of the sexual in- 
stinct. The new instinctive sensitivity of the adolescent to 
the praise or censure of his group is an irradiation of the sexual 
instinct, and this acute sensitiveness to the approval or disappro- 
val of the social group is the foundation and the safe-guard of 
all social relations.
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Now says Ames, Social groups themselves use the devices of 
the sexual life. The group woos the individual member, and he 
responds to the stimuli. The nation seeks recruits for the Army 
and Navy with the arts of the coquette. The appeal of a relig- 
ious revival is really a courting of the convert. The etiquette 
of nations employs the technique of the sexual life.
The maturing of the sexual instinct in adolescence is accom- 
panied by a remarkable development of the senses, the imagination, 
the will, and the intellect. Adolescence is the period of aspir- 
ation, altruism, and idealism. This is the period for the choice 
of a life work, for the development of patriotism, for a zeal for 
social reforms, and for religious enthusiasms. Psychology says 
Ames, does not corroborate the view that there is an innate relig- 
ious consciousness whose outcropping is inevitable, but it does 
affirm that man is disposed to social relationships, especially in 
the period of adolescence, and that given the opportunities to do
so, he naturally participates in communal activities, includingi
those of religion. Ames's conclusions then are as follows:-
1. Adolescence is the normal period for the rise of religion in 
the individual.
2. The rise of religion is directly associated with the maturing 
of the sexual instinct.
3. Out of this instinct spring the sympathetic social ties which 
are so essential to religion.
4. The same impulse which impels to the union of individuals in 
courtship is carried over into the brotherhood of families, 
clans, nations, and is employed by society in winning the
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individual for its support.
5. Religion is a social phenomenon and not a perversion of the 
sexual instinct. It involves a complex sublimation of that 
instinct.
6. Whether normal individuals become truly social i.e. religious 
depends on how their instinctive adolescent impulses are dir- 
ected "by their environment and education.
Normal Religious Development.
Ames recognizes that religious growth may be either normal 
or abnormal. The normal development of adolescence is marked 
by gradual growth, the abnormal by intense emotional changes 
brought about by manipulation. Ames agrees with Starbuck, that 
the ideal development is gradual without a crisis. He notes 
that the term conversion has been used in two senses. In its 
narrower connotation it signifies the sudden and forced emotional 
transformations which take place at revivals. In its wider mean* 
ing the term simply means the natural, normal process of passing 
over from childhood to adult life. Ames affirms "the methods 
and atmosphere of the Liturgical Churches tend to gradual growth.
Ames declares, that spontaneous awakenings are perfectly 
natural and occur outside religion altogether. The process of 
gradual growth comprehends various types which are differentiated 
by temperament. But says Ames, gradual growth must not be con- 
ceived as an absolutely even process. Religious growth follows 
the fashion of all biological growth, there are rhythm, periodic- 
ity, epochal moments, level planes and even shocks and crises.
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But Ames warns us, we must not put the loud pedal on the crises 
as if they possessed extraordinary value.*
The process by which the individual comes to share in the 
religion of his people is that of education. Ames puts a heavy 
accent on the proposition of modern educational psychology, namely 
"that education is not a preparation for life, but that it is 
rather a means of larger life at each stage as it unfolds!' Psych- 
ology he says, has discovered the epochal nature of the child T s 
development. There are five important general principles with 
which the psychology of religion furnishes religious education. 
These are:-
First, Religious education ought to respect the nature and individ- 
uality of the child. The psychology of religion does not 
find the child naturally depraved. 
Second, The education of the child must be more than intellectual,
it must exercise the will and the emotions as well. 
Third, The material for religious training ought to be found in
the duties, and companionships of home and neighbourhood,
and in the movements of the community life. 
Fourth, We ought to respect each stage or epoch of the child's
development as possessing a unique value of its own. 
Fifth, Religion is psychologically capable of extension in middle
life, therefore the educational process may be continued
far beyond adolescence.
Conversion.
In discussing conversion Ames uses the term in its narrower 
connotation, as that catastrophic emotional experience resulting
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from the direct control and suggestion of parents, teachers, and 
revivalists. Conversion in this sense says Ames, "occurs chief- 
ly in those communions which have cultivated an elaborate tech- 
nique to produce it".
The great national churches emphasize gradual development 
through education and ceremonies of confirmation. Ames finds, 
that the mental phenomena of the conversion experience are just 
those found in working out any intense problem under pressure, 
namely, first, a sense of perplexity and uneasiness; second, a 
climax and turning point; and third, a relaxation marked by rest 
and joy.
Ames follows Starbuck and James in his description of the 
content of the conversion experience. He refers as they do to 
the pre-conversion state or conviction period, to the crisis it- 
self, and to the post-conversion state. Like Starbuck and 
James, Ames finds,that the turning point comes at the end of a 
positive struggle, or in moments of passivity, hence there are 
the two main types of conversion with which Starbuck has made us 
familiar, namely, the self-surrender type, and the volitional 
type. Ames accepts Starbuck 1 s conclusion, that conversions 
vary with sex, age, and temperament. Ames's general conclusion
is the same as Starbuck 1 s that conversion is due to artificial
1. 
control and forcing of natural processes.
Ames has some interesting dicta concerning the revival meth- 
od of inducing conversion. He endorses the general finding of 
the psychology of religion that the method of the revivalist is
1. Starbuck E.D. Psychology of Religion, p.224.
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that of the hypnotist. The power of suggestion is set going 
months before the revivalist reaches the community. Advertising 
material is broadcasted. Directions are given to an army of 
local workers. In this way expectation is wrought up to a high 
pitch, and the attention fixed on the Evangelist. An important 
factor is the recital of the wonders the revivalist has done in 
other places. All the religious people in the community are urged 
to pray for the revival, and to talk of nothing else. Then when 
all is prepared the great man comes to the crowded building. But 
it is no mere crowd that awaits him, it is a psychological crowd.
Sometimes extreme art is used and several meetings are held 
before a definite call for decision is made. Those who are most 
suggestible of course are eager to surrender the first night, but 
they are kept back until enough are ready to go forward, and so 
make a more profound impression by their joint action.
The service itself begins with pleading songs. The address 
is constructed to hold the attention and to appeal to the emotions 
The revivalist employs familiar symbolism,the cross, the crown, 
heaven, hell, and rings the changes on home and mother. Few per- 
sons can resist the social suggestion operative in a crowd at a 
revival meeting. The majority of those who attend are religious 
and assent to all that is said, there is a subdued response, a 
nodding, and even an audible assent. The revivalist always 
plays to this gallery.
The reactions called for are simple, the lifted hand, stand- 
ing in one's place, or moving to the inquiry room. The tendency 
of crowd influence is to limit the attention to one or a small
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group of ideas which are presented. The whole effect is to 
intensify the emotions, the more primitive impulsive forces are 
unleashed and the higher intellectual processes are inhibited.
PART IV. 
THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN THE EXPERIENCE
OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY.
Professor Ames maintains that law, art, science, and relig- 
ion have all arisen from a protoplasmic undifferentiated mass of 
human activities all of which are sourced in the fundamental bio- 
logical processes. The religious consciousness is just the con- 
sciousness of the vital life interests of the tribe. The objects 
and functions which are held as sacred are always those in which 
the life of society is felt to centre. Religion then always 
reflects the life-interests of human society. Where these are 
purely material the religion will inevitably be concerned with 
physical satisfactions. Where ethical and spiritual interests 
are supreme in a people ! s life, the religion will reflect these 
interests. Every advance in civilisation and morals registers 
itself in the religion of a people. Religion must always adjust 
itself to the contemporary life interests and needs of the social 
group, in the 20th century these interests and needs are demo- 
cratic and scientific. Therefore if the present forms of in- 
stitutionalised religion refuse to incorporate these interests 
which are vital to the social group, then the real religious con- 
sciousness will find sanctuary outside the organized churches in 
the great living social movements of society. Ames affirms that
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the readjustment of organized religion to the vital needs of 
society must be a constant process which takes to its heart the 
ideal values of each age as these come into being.
Ames objects to a distinction being made between religion 
and morality. He identifies religion with morality. As a 
matter of fact religion and morality are concerned with the same 
things, namely, the vital interests of the social group. All 
moral idealswhich express the vital interests of society are 
religious. With Ames then, religious consciousness, moral con- 
sciousness and social consciousness, are interchangeable terms.
Ames tilts at the old associationist psychology with its 
water-tight compartment theory of mind. There is only one men- 
tal life involved in all the varied interests with which man con- 
cerns himself. There are not three natures:the rational, the 
moral, the religious,each with its own mechanism. Religion is 
an affair which involves the reaction of man f s entire nature.
Ames denies that there is any unique religious faculty or 
instinct, and repudiates the notion to which James gave his im- 
primatur that in the sub-conscious we have such a special organ 
of Divine revelation. Ames admits that religion gets sustenance 
from this underground treasure house of the sub-conscious, but sc 
does every other vital interest of human society. The artist, 
the poet, and the expert mechanic draw: upon the sub-conscious 
region as much as the saint. The sub-conscious self then is not 
in any way the special organ of religion. Religion has no mon- 
opoly of this source of insight, inspiration, and skill.
Ames strongly holds, that religion is a unity, and must be
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considered as a total activity of life, he therefore condemns the 
topical treatment of religion under the heads of Faith, Prayer, 
Worship, Mysticism, etc., this he holds, tends to issue in the 
fallacy of mistaking a phase of the religious life for the whole.
Ideas and Religious Experience.
In contradistinction to the old intellectualist psychology 
Ames affirms, the modern psychology has pointed out that man's 
life is governed far more by the non-rational factors in his make- 
up than by the rational. His instincts, habits, desires, and 
emotions control his conscious processes to a great extent. All 
ideational processes presuppose impulsive, instinctive activity. 
Here then we get at Ames's theory of the origin of ideas. Every 
state of consciousness tends to issue in a motor adjustment unless 
inhibited by other ideas or emotions. Our thinking is done in a 
social medium, and all our reactions to things are conditioned by 
our social environment. First then with Ames, are the basic in- 
stinctive tendencies. Second, these give rise to experiences 
occurring in a social environment which are mentally recorded. 
Third, the working of the mind on the materials supplied by the 
memory determine future activity. Ames's point is, ideas are al- 
ways secondary, and simply serve to register experiences. With 
Ames, ideas, and concepts are symbols of systems of motor activit- 
ies and adjustments. Ames emphasizes this motor phase of con- 
sciousness all across.
Ames proceeds to show how in every case theological ideas 
and doctrines, are determined as to form and content by the con-
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crete experiences of the individual and society. These ideas 
always arise out of a social context. In a most interesting pas- 
sage Ames illustrates his proposition by showing that everywhere 
and always the highest interests of man are projected into his 
God. Among primitive peoples the cereal, the fruit, the animal, 
these central objects in the life processes are the Gods. In 
more developed civilisations the Gods become anthropomorphic, and 
the social and political experiences of the people are projected 
into the Gods. Where a monarchial social condition obtains, a 
God conceived after the monarchial pattern will be found to exist. 
Where society is under a despotic rule, its God will be a despot. 
Where a democratic condition exists, the spirit of justice, and 
equity which have been developed in the social group will be pro- 
jected into the deity. The historic theological theories of the 
Atonement says Ames,are determined in the same waylpythe economic 
and political conditions of society.
For Ames, the idea of God simply stands as a convenient gen- 
eralization for those things which for us are the greatest values 
in human social experience. The conception of God then signifies 
the totality of human purposes and values. The reality answering 
to this idea says Ames,is "all that is involved in the deep in- 
stinctive historical and social consciousness of the race. It 
signifies the justice which government symbolizes, the truth which 
science unfolds, and the beauty which art strives to express".
Feeling and Religious Experience.
James, Starbuck, and Pratt, consider that feeling is the 
central factor in religious experience. As against this position
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Ames holds that feeling is not the basic factor in religious ex- 
perience. The characteristic of human life he asserts, is ad- 
justment to the physical and social environment by means of hered- 
itary and instinctive tendencies. These non-ideational forces 
Ames insists cannot be identified with feeling. All feelings, 
emotions, sentiments, and thoughts and ideas proceed from the in- 
stinctive teleological activity of the organism. Feeling then 
is a by-product which accompanies the process of adjustment to a 
given situation in the physical or social environment, it is 
annexed to the instinctive neural motor processes which sense per- 
ceptions and thought symbols set going. Ames stands for the 
parasitic theory of emotion.
Now he says, the most intense affective tones accompany the 
arousal of the vital instinctive activities, it is these last 
which give rise to both affective and ideational activity. Intense 
feeling is annexed to religion simply because it has to do with 
the vital instinctive interests of the individual and society. 
Therefore for Ames not feeling but the vital instinctive interests 
of the social group have the place of centrality in religion.
The Psychology of Religious Genius and Inspiration.
In his discussion of the above, Ames asserts that genius is 
not inscrutable. Geniuses says Ames, are not unique. The ideas, 
inventions, and discoveries which make for human progress are the 
culmination of the work of many men of different grades of talent. 
Therefore the man who lays the last tile ought not to get the 
credit of building the whole house, and of being a genius.
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With regard to the origin of genius, Ames rejects the theor- 
ies of Galton, and Cooley, and advances a characteristic theory 
of his own. With Galton genius is a matter of race, and is 
transmitted by heredity. The emphasis is upon original genius. 
Cooley admits that genius may be transmitted by heredity but sug- 
gests that education and social environment may favour or hinder
1. 
its development. Here equal stress is placed upon original
genius and the social factors. With Ames, as we might now anti- 
cipate, the original native endowment, and racial inheritance, 
is considered to be relatively insignificant, the all Important 
factors in the production of genius are the historical conditions 
education, and the social environment. It is these things which 
create and develop the powers and capacities of great men. 
Genius then with Ames, is a matter of historical conditions, 
social environment, and education. Great men are created by the 
social situation, it is the age which creates the genius.
"The geniuses", then according to Ames "are those who poss- 
ess fully the social consciousness and at the same time contrib- 
ute to its development". The genius is he who precipitates the 
great ideas held in solution by the popular mind. Ames asserts 
the great Hebrew prophets can be explained in this way. The 
prophets were always produced by a national crisis. They worked 
in an atmosphere, and with models furnished by the literature of 
the writing prophets whose finger was on the pulse of the social 
and political life of the people and the court.
1. Cooley C.H."Genius, Fame and the Comparison of Races",
Annals of American Academy,Vol.IX,1897. 
pp.317 £f. Quoted by Ames p.341.
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Ames cites Amos as a typical example. The vices of despot- 
ism in the social environment developed the prophetic genius of 
Amos. He became simply the spokesman of the outraged sense of 
social justice of his people, and he appealed to the social ideals 
then current.
Amos then was simply a creation of his age, and his social 
environment. His successors had their prophetic genius developed 
in much the same way by the stirring public events of their own 
times. Ames's conclusion is that religious genius is not differ- 
ent from any other genius. He is simply an individual of re- 
markable native ability who is saturated with the social conscious- 
ness, and labours to bring this to greater clearness.
With respect to the question of inspiration Ames's position 
is that the sense of external control to which the prophets refer 
is never proof of supernatural control, for hypnotism, suggestion, 
habitual activity, will give the same sense of external control, 
and of being a passive agent. The truth of falsity of the pro- 
phetic message cannot be determined then by the psychological pro- 
cesses said to be experienced, but by the social and ethical sig- 
nificance of the prophetic message, this with Ames is the acid 
test.
Non-religious Persons.
Ames's discussion on non-religious persons is a most vivid 
illustration of his characteristic point of view. The individual 
of social attitudes, sympathies, and activities is a religious 
person. The degree and range of a man's social consciousness is 
the degree and range of his religion. The religious man is he
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who enters enthusiastically into all the social movements of his 
time, e.g., Ames instances, School Teachers, Philanthropists, 
Settlement Workers, Patriots, etc. Non-religious persons are 
those who are unresponsive to the claims of the social order and 
who lack public spiritedness, and ignore community interests. 
Conscience, laws, symbols, ceremonials are all products of group
life, if then, asserts Ames, a man stubbornly holds that conscience
is 
is an individual matter, and that his religious consciousness Ahis
own private concern he is an irreligious man. "Non-religious 
persons are accordingly those who fail to enter vitally into a 
world of social activities and feelings".
The Psychology of Religious Sects.
In primitive society says Ames, the fact that religious con- 
sciousness is identical with social consciousness is plain. In 
developed societies the same relation obtains, but it is less ob- 
vious. The mind of the savage reflects the social mind, and the 
mind of the educated man of modern civilisation reflects the soc- 
ial mind of the set whose ideals grip him. He is indifferent to 
the attitude of many groups and classes with which he mingles, but 
there is always one group whose hostile stare is death, and whose 
sneer damnation. It is the opinion of that set that matters. 
This being so says Ames, the social psychology of particular 
groups helps us to get at the psychology of individual minds. This 
is Ames's characteristic approach, for him the individual mind is 
always the replica and product of the social mind.
Ames asserts the doctrines of religious sects are simply 
the products of social movements, and are means of social control.
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Denominations are determined by economic forces, and by personal 
leaders who simply precipitate the social ideals held in solution 
by the popular mind. Social forces are represented by great 
personalities who embody the will of the people,e.g., Luther, 
Calvin, Knox, Zwingle.
Denominations then, are social organisms, which win to them- 
selves people who are gripped by their own particular type of 
social ideal. Ames points out the fact, that denominations tend 
to operate among populations according to definite social strata. 
He asserts, that the different religious sects are just social 
clans possessed of all the primitive biological clan impulses to 
preserve the integrity of the group. Hence projects for union 
with other denominations are always viewed with suspicion. Ames 
states that the loyalties, antipathies, and methods of denominat- 
ions are based on race, and class inheritances and prejudices,
<
mixed with a little of the religion of Christianity. This clan 
spirit is specially strong in the official representatives. Now 
says Ames, the conclusion of the whole matter is that the social 
consciousness of the religious denominations is good as far as it 
goes, but it does not go far enough. The modern spirit he affing 
is against denominationalism. It demands that exclusive group 
attachments shall expand beyond the narrow denominational boundar- 
ies till they comprehend human race.
The Religious Consciousness in Relation to 
Democracy and Science.
Ames regards democracy and science as having complete 
ascendency in modern life, and emphatically states that convention 
al institutionalised religion must make pretty big concessions to
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these paramount tendencies of the 20th century. Democracy must 
not be understood to be merely a form of government, nor science 
merely a clearly articulated system of knowledge, both affirms 
Ames are powerful community attitudes.
There are in existence to-day democratic ideals, and a 
scientific spirit. Institutionalised religion is warned by Ames 
that it must make room for these ideals and that spirit. The 
alternatives facing religion are either reconstruction or destruct- 
ion. Democracy demands recognition for its ideals on the part of 
the church, it feels that what it is after is essentially relig- 
ious, therefore it resents the Inaction of the church and its 
lack of sympathy with its vast human aspirations. Ames warns 
organized Christianity if democracy has to win through to its 
ideal alone, then institutionalised religion cannot hope for any- 
thing except decent burial in the near future.
True religious interests and democratic interests are identi- 
cal opines «fr Ames. It is here in these empirically demonstrable 
living interests of the democratic social order, here in the 
scientifically verifiable facts of conscience, duty, patriotism, 
and social righteousness that Ames finds the real objective refer- 
ence of the subjective religious life. Ames holds, that when relig- 
ious consciousness is identified with social consciousness,"relig- 
ion becomes as natural and vital in a democratic and scientific 
age as in a patriarchal, custom ruled era".
Ames asserts,that science creates a special temper which may 
be described as a respect for facts which are experimentally veri- 
fiable, and an impatience with the products of imagination. This
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scientific temper is establishing itself in the modern con- 
sciousness, and religion must reckon with it. Ames believes 
that the view of religion he has maintained takes up into its 
sweep all that the 20th century democratic social consciousness 




It will be of utility to get a definite idea of what the new
Functional Psychology stands for, before passing on to a critical
estimate of Ames's work, which is characterized throughout by this
functional point of view. Angell gives one of the clearest outlines
1. 
of this new standpoint in an article written in 1903. Functional
psychology, he says, is the psychology modelled on biological pat- 
terns. The mind is conceived as an organism, and a mental anatomy, 
and a mental physiology are constructed to treat of the facts of 
psychical structure and function. Events of consciousness are view- 
ed as being wholly conditioned by the demands made up on the organ- 
ism by specific environmental situations. The mind then in funct- 
ional psychology is conceived simply as a favourable biological 
variation which gives the organism a tremendous advantage in the 
struggle for existence.
Professor Ames's "Psychology of Religious Experience" is mark- 
ed by great fidelity to this biological conception of mind. Not
1. Angell J.R. "The Relation of Structural and Functional
Psychology to Philosophy". Phil.Rev.Vol.XII,May, 
(1905) pp. 243 - 271.
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only does he bring all the phenomena of the religious life within 
the compass of this conception, but also every other phenomenon of 
human thought and activity* With Ames, functional psychology 
dominates by right the whole field of human life and thought: Art, 
Aesthetics, Logic, Ethics, Science, Theology, and Philosophy, all 
these possibilities of human history must do obeisance to this all
devouring functional Moloch. Psychology in its functional form
1. 
Is a trespasser on the domains of all other disciplines. With
Ames it even claims the right to pronounce upon metaphysical real-
2.
ity. Curiously enough Ames fails to see that if he were success- 
ful in establishing his thesis Psychology would inevitably become 
a branch of Biology.
In the second chapter of this most interesting and suggestive 
book Ames claims so much territory for functional psychology, and 
cuts every complicated Georgian knot so facilely with his function* 
al scimitar that suspicion is aroused as to the soundness of his 
conclusions. We feel in many cases that he solves complex pro- 
blems too easily, and that nothing could be quite as simple as he 
makes the most complex phenomena of the religious life to appear.
In saying this, it must be granted that Ames's functional 
notion is singularly fruitful when confined to primitive activities 
and the lower forms of religion, in which impulsive and instinctive 
action predominates. It must be conceded that the uttering of
Ames's functional "sesame" has wonderfully illuminated many of the
3. 
customs and ceremonials of primitive society. Further we are
1.Angell J.R. "The Relation of Structural and Functional
Psychology to Philosophy".Phil.Rev.Vol.XII.May, 
(1903) p.270.
2.Ames E.S.Psychology of Religious Experience pn 25 ?7
3.Coe G.A. Religion from standpoint of Factional Ps'ylnology 
Amer.Jour.Theol.Vol.XV.No.2.(1911) p.302.
184.
prepared to grant, that this biological conception when applied to 
human activities is a useful point of view. In Ames f s hands it 
has certainly proved a powerful methodological device in bringing
order out of chaos, and in reducing the multitude of disorganized
1. 
facts of the life of primitive man to a unity. But it needs to be
noted that it is in connection with prehistoric cults, customs and 
ceremonies only, that Ames's functional method seems to work with 
brilliant results.
The same success does not attend Ames's application of his 
method to the cultured minds of modern society, nor to the facts of 
a highly evolved religious life. Here the functional notion is 
inadequate. When psychology works with biological concepts human 
life is conceived of on the pattern of that of the lower animals,
and the functions of the human mind are reduced to the seeking of
and 
what will satisfy the primordial instincts of hunger, thirst, A sex.
Now this biological concept may work tolerably well when we 
have to do with the primitive activities of our prehistoric ances- 
tors which are largely instinctive and unreflective, but it becomes 
an inadequate notion, and even an instrument of confusion when we 
come to deal with the developed religious consciousness of a cultur- 
ed age. Ames has ignored the limitations of his method all across. 
As long as he keeps to the simplest mental reactions which have to 
do with food-getting, and procreation Ames's concept works fairly 
well, but this methodological device proves to be inadequate when 
we are confronted with highly complex reactions, not merely to 
stimuli, but to intricate and complicated situations of the modern 
environmental setting of human life.
1. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion, p.22.
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With Ames, everything in human life ancient and modern, may 
be completely explicated in terms of the adaptive biological activ- 
ities of the psycho-physical organism to the demands of its envir- 
onment. This challenges controversy. Ames has not sufficiently 
considered the fact that the mark of mentality in a phenomenon is 
the pursuance of future ends, and a choice of means. Human activ- 
ity is characterized by the pursuit of ideals which are self im- 
posed. The idea of an end determines the activities of the man.
"fhe processes with which the psychologist has to do tend to define
1. 
their own functions or ends, as merely biological processes do not!
The man whose activities are guided by the thought of the most
2. 
distant ends possesses the highest intelligence.
Our environment acts upon us and we adapt ourselves to it, 
Ames stresses this side of the truth over much, but he fails to 
give sufficient emphasis to the fact, that we act upon our environ- 
ment and make transformations in it to suit our human ends. There 
are adjustments, but these are made in accordance with a purpose 
which we set before ourselves, and willed by ourselves.
Further, all the adjustments we make cannot be reduced to the 
activities involved in food-getting and procreation. Ames does not 
give sufficient place to the fact that in the evolution of the 
human race, as Coe points out, instincts become sublimated and 
attain a function which the brutes do not share. This new function 
is not merely a further extension of the old biological function, 
a positive transmutation has occurred. With the higher types of 
our race love does not mean lust, and the desire is to commune
1. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion, p. 22.
2. James W. Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p.25.
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with a personality rather than to embrace a body. Coe quotes
the words of a dying man to his wife. "In thine eyes,my darling
1. 
have I beheld the Eternal". Here the sex instinct has become
transmuted and has attained a new function in which the brutes, 
and brute-like men have no share. In all such cases the biolog- 
ical concept breaks down, it is valid only when it confines itself 
to the organic and instinctive plane of human life.
Ames does not take sufficiently into consideration the char- 
acteristics of the developed mind. He fails to notice that here
mental activity considerably modifies instinctive activities and
2. 
impulses, and increases inhibitions to instinctive action. He
does not emphasize the important fact that the developed mind 
creates for itself new orders of value, new objects of desire, and 
attains to new estimates, and appreciations. In a word Ames 
ignores apparently the fact that values have changed for develop- 
ed minds. For primitive man and for primitive minds among modern 
men the values may well be, as Ames asserts, food, sex gratificat- 
ions, and the safety of one's own skin, and these Ames asserts 
were the values sought in primitive religion. But these are cer- 
tainly not the values of the developed religious consciousness. 
To apply the purely biological category here is at once inadequate
and irrelevant. Ames's functional standpoint ignores the inter-
3. 
ests of the developed mind.
Ames does not make sufficient allowance for the fact, that 
"man as we know him is a self-conscious being, that is, he is not
1. Coe G.A, The Psychology of Religion, pp.24-25.
2. James W. Principles of Psychology. Vol.1. p.22f. 23.
3. Coe G.A. A Proposed Classification of Mental Function*
Psych. Rev. Vol. XXII. (1915) p. S
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merely aware of instincts clamouring to be satisfied, but he is 
conscious of himself as the centre of ideas, feelings, and volit- 
ions, and of himself as the organizer of these. "Instead of be- 
haviour determined mainly by the necessitating power of instinct 
or habit, we have conduct shaped by foresight, the pursuit of ends 
that are not esteemed desirable till they are judged to be worth 
what they will cost, conduct guided by ends that are judged to be 
binding because worthy in themselves. Man as we know him can dis- 
cover ideals- and guide his conduct in the light of these. He can
1. 
live for Truth, Right and Beauty".
Now, "this active self making its judgments of absolute
values and pursuing ends which it recognizes as unconditionally
2. 
good"is something before which mere biological concepts of mental
life stand helpless. Ames f s error is that he ignores the real 
difference between human experience at the impulsive instinctive 
level, and that at the level of a self-conscious active being. 
A biological explanation of the conduct of developed minds, and of 
self-conscious agents is futile and obviously incompetent. It is 
plain that here we have a reality with which the biological con- 
cept, so useful at the lower instinctive level of life, is incom- 
petent to deal.
Our conclusion therefore is, that the biological conception 
of function with which Ames works, while it illuminates much that 
occurs in the primitive life of mankind at the appetitive and 
instinctive level, it entirely clouds the issue when we attempt to
1. Stewart J. MeEeliar."What is God",Lecture Published Mel- 
bourne, 1920. p. 12.
2. Stewart J. McKellar. op. cit. p. 13.
188.
apply it to the developed religious consciousness of cultured 
peoples. The notion of biological function utterly breaks down 
when it attempts to explicate the conduct of self-conscious agents 
Ames seems to ignore all across the vast qualitative distinction 
between the one range of mind and the other.
Ames works entirely with the notion of "adjustment". This 
is an utterly inadequate notion when applied to the human mind in 
its relations with either its physical or social environment. 
Ames's limitation of the functions of the human mind to mere adapt- 
ation to environment is unjustifiable in view of the facts. Let 
us consider the physical environment first. Do we actually adapt 
ourselves to a given rigid environment? Is it not a truer 
account of the facts to say the human mind seeks rather to remould 
the outer environment nearer to the heart's desire, and to bring 
about alterations in external conditions, in accordance with pur- 
poses it has defined to, and for itself.
"A man went down to Panama 
Where many a man had died, 
To slit the sliding mountains 
And lift the eternal tide. 
A man stood up in Panama, 
And the mountains stood aside."
The major portion of civilised man's physical environment is 
constituted by the constructions of human brains and human hands,
and he lives, moves, and has his being among embodied human pur-
1.
poses. Ames's notion then that the function of the mind is simp- 
ly that of adjustment to the physical environment needs a great 
deal of extension, for in the form in which it is used by Ames, it 
simply does not fit the facts.
1. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion, p. 26.
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When we apply Ames's notion of "adjustment" to the social en- 
vironment its inadequacy is just as apparent. Ames's biological 
conception of the mind as an organism adapting itself to a physical 
environment is misleading when applied to an individual in relat- 
ion to the social environment. There is doubtless a kind of
social adjustment but not in the biological sense of the term.
1   
Professor Coe's forthsetting of this issue is particularly clear.
He shows that the notion that the function of the mind is that of 
adjustment to a rigid social order, must not be interpreted as 
adaptation to other persons of the social group, but as adjustment 
to an ideal of personality to which they and we alike move.
If the term "adjustment" is to be used at all concerning the 
individual's relations with the social group it must get a bigger 
connotation than Ames gives it. It must include the thought of 
mutual, reciprocal adjustment of others to ourselves, as well as of 
ourselves to others, a reciprocal accommodation which leads our- 
selves and others to full orbed personality.' If then the notion 
of "adjustment" is to be used concerning the individual's relations 
with his environment physical or social, it cannot be in the mere 
biological sense of the term to which Ames restricts it.
It is to be noted that Ames's description of this biological 
concept is full of ambiguity. Mind, with Ames, is simply a valu- 
able variation which gives the human species a tremendous advantage 
over lower species in the struggle for existence, "it is the most 
important factor in the survival of the highest organisms". The 
mind has emerged as a favourable variation in response to the 
urgent needs of the organism. Further, Ames says, "functional
1. Coe G,A. The Psychology of Religion, pp. 27,28.
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psychology views the mental life as an instrument of adaptation by 
which the organism adjusts itself to its environment". Next Ames 
makes the statement, that "this adjustment occurs through the 
psycho-physical organism". Again Ames makes a further statement, 
namely, the adjustment, "is an adjustment in the psycho-physical 
organism".
Here then we have a shifting of emphasis. First the adjust- 
ment is made by means of the mental life. Here the mind is the 
tool or instrument of the organism. Second, the adjustment occurs 
through the organism itself. Here the mind is an aspect of the 
organism. Third, the adjustment occurs in the organism. Here 
the mind appears as the conscious agent that is doing the work, 
consciously determining its own ends, adjustments, and purposes.
Professor Coe says in this connection, "when functionalism is 
taken to mean that mind is a mere instrument, it is as natural as 
can be that somewhere as we proceed we shall smuggle in the mind,
no longer as a mere instrument, but as that which is being adjust-
1. 
ed, and eke as an agent that is doing the work. " The fact that
Ames brings in the mind as more than a mere instrument, is a con- 
fession of the inadequacy of the merely biological conception of 
function.
It is difficult to know why Ames uses the term religious ex- 
perience at all, as it appears to be irrelevant to the discussion. 
Ames himself is apparently unaware of this irrelevancy for the 
reason that he takes morality and social consciousness to be relig- 
ion. He defines religion, as "the consciousness of the highest 
social values". Ames does not explain what makes social values
1. Coe G.A. Religion from the standpoint of Functional Psych- 
ology, Amer.Jour.Theol.Vol.XV.April,1911.p.307.
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high as distinguished from other social values. Ames leaves us in 
the dark as to what facts are comprehended by the term "highest". 
Therefore the word religion as used by Ames is a most indefinite 
and ambiguous term. Evidently with Ames, social consciousness at 
any level is synonymous with religious consciousness. He makes no
distinction between primitive group feeling and advanced social
1. 
morality. It is quite apparent that when the term Religion is
used as Ames uses it, with a connotation so broad and comprehensive 
that it means everything, it means nothing.
An inconsistency is apparent in Ames's treatment of the relig- 
ion of the child. With Ames as we have already remarked, social 
attitudes and social consciousness are identical with religion. 
This is his fundamental position. Now Professor Coe has pointed 
out the fact, that though Ames emphatically maintains that the sav- 
age is genuinely religious, though entirely absorbed in the things 
of sense and material interests, yet the modern child brought up in 
a cultured civilisation cannot advance beyond the non-religious,
and non-moral attitude to any appreciable degree. Coe asks right-
2. 
ly, what of the social relations of the child with the family?
In family affection, and in the child's relations with its parents, 
and other members of the family, we surely have the beginnings of 
social consciousness, and there is an outfit, not necessarily elab- 
orate, of social attitudes, and if this is so, then this conscious- 
ness and attitudes on Ames's own premises, must be religious.
Ames consistently maintains throughout his book the position
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p. 260.
2. Coe G.A. Religion and Functional Psychology. Amer. Journ.
Theology. Vol. XV. No.2. (1911) p. 306.
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that religion is just social morality. His chapter on "non-relig- 
ious persons" vividly illustrates this position. Here he declares 
that the"non-religious persons" are those who do not have the wel- 
fare of society at heart, and who do not interest themselves in 
civic and public affairs. Sympathetic social service is the hall 
mark of the religious person. According to Ames, the typically 
religious persons are those who possess the civic sense, public 
spirit, and patriotic enthusiasm, and who take to do with town 
libraries, benevolent asylums, and hospitals. It is obvious then, 
that with this writer, social morality and social righteousness are 
identified with religion. Whoever then seeks the welfare of soc- 
iety is religious. This view, as Leuba points out, fails to re- 
cognize the significance of the difference in psychological attitude
that separates the adherents of any organized religion from the
1. 
devoted agnostic or atheistic social worker.
Now though it is perfectly competent for any man to call soc- 
ial morality by any name he likes, even by the term religion, yet 
Leuba 1 s criticism seems justified when he says, "to bestow upon one 
the appellation religious because he enters thoroughly into the
social movements of his time is to cause confusion by juggling with
2. 
the word". For the majority of thinkers morality and religion are
distinguishable realities in human life, and this distinction cer- 
tainly makes for clarity of thought. Morality and religion are 
terms with fairly definite general meanings. Morality is generally 
understood to have to do with the personal and social relations of
1. Leuba J.H. The Meaning of Religion and the>Place Of Mystic- 
ism In Religious Life. Journ. Phil. Vol.XVIII 
No.3. (1921) p. 57. '
2. Leuba J.H. Psychological Study Of Religion, pp. 53-54.
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the individual with society and religion is understood to imply 
the relations which man sustains to whatever he may feel to be 
Divine. Religion is an attitude which is simply not to be identic 
fied with any kind of morality.
In the last analysis there may be indeed morality without
1. 
religion, and religion without morality. The two act and react
upon one another, and in the higher religions especially in Christ* 
ianity they are found intimately interwoven. Man projects the 
noblest ethical attributes, and the highest moral excellence he
*
knows on to his God, but it is in his relations with his God, and 
not in his relations with his fellows t/hat religion consists. 
Therefore to use these terms as if they were interchangeable seems 
to be uncritical. Ames says on page285if religion is identified 
with the most intimate and vital phases of the social conscious- 
ness the distinction is not real. But religion is not identified 
with the social consciousness, therefore the distinction is real.
Ames's forthsetting of the claims of the functional psychology 
is not characterized by excessive modesty. He conceives of this 
new psychology in a somewhat grandiose fashion, as comprehending 
art, morality, religion, and all the possibilities of human his- 
tory. When all's done and said, ethics, aesthetics, logic, epist* 
emology, and metaphysics are with Ames, just different forms of 
functional psychology. Moreover, the new science of the psychol- 
ogy of religion is to so develop as to become the substitute for 
philosophy and theology.
This is an entirely gratuitous assumption on Ames's part, 
which stands in need of greater proof than he has seen fit to give
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p.9.
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it. On pages 26 and 27, Ames argues for the proposition, that "the 
psychology of religious experience becomes the conditioning sciencef 
for the various branches of theology, or rather, it is the science 
which in its developed forms becomes theology or the philosophy of 
religion".
Ames ! s argument is as follows: if reality is given in exper- 
ience, then the science of that experience furnishes the reasonable 
method of dealing with reality, including the reality of religion. 
He continues, "the philosophy of religion in its most ultimate 
problems and refined developments does not transcend the principles 
of psychology. The idea of God, which is the central conception 
of theology, is subject to the same laws of the mental life as are 
all other ideas, and there is but one science of psychology applic 
able to it". Professor Pratt has well said in this connection, 
why stop with theology and the various branches of philosophy? 
Why not swallow everything? Why not reduce also physics,chemistry 
and astronomy to functional psychology? The physical sciences, 
he says, are but formulations of experience, and is not psychology 
the science of experience. If Ames's argument holds good in the 
case of metaphysics it must surely hold good also in the case of 
physics. Again, if "the idea of God is subject to the same laws 
of the mental life as are all other ideas", the same can be said 
with equal truth of the idea of the solar system. Now says Pratt 
herein lies the fallacy of this pragmatic view. "Psychology stud- 
ies the idea of God and the idea of the solar system and stops
there. But neither astronomy nor theology means to limit its
1. 
study to our ideas. They both mean to be objective".
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p.41.
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Ames like Leuoa occupies the arrogant position that the
of 
science of psychology covers the whole/,reality, forgetful of the
fact that it is limited to a special field of facts, and that its 
function is to describe, and articulate the subjective facts of 
man's life into a coherent system. Within this special field of 
human experience the deliverances of psychology are entitled to 
respect, and are to be received as authoritative, but outside this 
field psychology has no franchise. Professor Pratt represents a 
much sounder position than Ames, when he says, the psychology of 
religion "must content itself with a description of human exper- 
ience, while recognizing that there may well be spheres of reality
to which these experiences refer and with which they are possibly
« !  
connected, which yet cannot be investigated by science.
With regard to the origin of cults Ames is emphatic that no 
antecedent religious belief is required to account for their 
genesis. They originate in practical needs and fundamental in- 
stincts. Group activities which become organized into cults then 
with Ames, are entirely explicated as to origin by these practical 
and instinctive adjustments to the environment. But while this 
may be accepted as a solution of the origin of group activities, 
Ames has not indicated how the religious cult arose.
Ames has set before us a very feasible theory of the origin 
of group activities, but he has not told us what makes these group 
activities religious. All tribal customs and activities cannot 
be religious. What then is the differentia? Here Ames gives a 
most unsatisfactory reply, namely, Ceremonials are group acts, 
that which makes them religious is their public and social character
 '
1.Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p. 42.
196.
"All ceremonies in which the whole group participates with keen 
emotional interest are religious". Here it is plain Ames makes 
no distinction between a religious ceremonial and any other form of 
emotional group activity. All group reactions are with Ames re- 
ligious. Hence a riot, a war*, dance, or the organized lynching of 
a negro, all of which are acts in which the group co-operates with 
keen emotional interest are according to Ames's definition relig- 
ious.
The difficulty then for us is, that we feel the necessity of 
knowing how social ceremonies become distinctively religious cere- 
monies. What we would be at is, what makes the social ceremony 
religious? Certainly this difficulty does not exist for Ames, 
because for him social public ceremonies as such, are religious. 
But though this question does not trouble Ames, it exists for the 
serious student of the psychology of religion who suspects Ames's 
too simple explanation. We may agree with Ames that all religious 
ceremonies are social ceremonies, but the converse is not true 
that all social ceremonies are religious ceremonies. This most 
vital question then, how came it that the savage mind formed a con- 
nection between his social ceremony and a non-human higher power 
which he felt controlled his life and destiny?is entirely ignored 
by Professor Ames in his discussion, he has no satisfactory answer 
to the question what makes the social act a religious act? *
Ames defines mythology as that body of traditions found in 
connection with group ceremonies, and since with Ames all group 
ceremonies are religious, the myths annexed to these social cere- 
monies are religious also. Cult-lore or myth is says Ames an
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, pp.260-261.
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integral part of primitive religion. Now as against Ames's pos- 
ition it has already been objected that all social ceremonies are 
not religious. Cult and myth are doubtless contemporaneous with
the beginning of human development but they acquire a religious
1. 
character only at a specific time. At the beginning there are
magic cults and demon cults and the mythology abounds in demons
and spirits, but neither cult or myth at this stage can properly
2. 
be said to be religious. "Pre-religious" and "sub-religious"
cults and myths are antecedent to religious cults and myths. This 
is ignored by Ames,- to whom all cults and their accompanying
3<!
myths are religious. Many myths have no religious significance. 
Just as we were forced to say not every social ceremony is relig- 
ious, we also say not every cult-myth is religious in nature.
Since Ames has given no differentia whereby we may disting- 
uish a religious cult and myth from a purely magical, demonologic- 
al, pre-religious, sub-religious or non-religious cult and myth,
we would suggest, that cults and myths acquire a religious char-
4. 
acter contemporaneously with the rise of belief in gods. It
would certainly make for clarity of thought if we reserved the 
term religious for deity-cults, and deity-myths only. We shall 
only flounder in a Serbonian bog unless we keep the term religion 
for those public ceremonies which were connected in the minds of 
the participants with that higher power which they somehow felt 
to be Divine and to control their lives and destiny, and for those!
1. Wundt Wilhelm, Elements of Folk Psychology, p.416.
2. Wundt Wilhelm. op. cit. p. 418, see also p.414.
5. Hoffding H. Philosophy of Religion, p.199.
4. Wundt Wilhelm, Elements of Folk Psychology, p.372.
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traditions which grew up along with and out of such religious 
practices.
Ames underrates the part played by cosmical objects in primi- 
tive life. He says, "everything known about the primitive mind 
supports the inference that to it there is little appreciation of 
cosmic distances or forces". It is doubtless true as Ames affirms! 
that undue importance has often been attached to natural objects 
when reconstituting the life of primitive man, but Ames has gone 
to the other extreme in his insistence on the purely social genesis 
of primitive man's cults, myths, «t«eb conceptions and emotions. 
Too great prominence is given by Ames to the purely social forces 
in group ceremonials and their accompanying myths. We need to
recognize as Pratt points out, that certain of these group activ-
1. 
ities have reference to non-human, non-social forces. There are
primitive public ceremonies where there is a feeling for a power 
neither social nor personal.
We must receive Ames's statement with certain reservations. 
His conclusion that primitive man was susceptible only to the soc- 
ial forces, the influences of the herd, and remained quite insen- 
sitive to the awe-inspiring, wonder-provoking phenomena of nature 
needs to be accepted with certain qualifications. Dr. Golden- 
weiser's statement supplies a wholesome corrective to Ames's over- 
emphasis on the social factor. He says, "our familiarity with 
man, modern, ancient, and primitive, leaves no room for doubt,that 
at all times and places man was strongly susceptible to the impress 
ions produced on him by the phenomena of nature, and that such 
impressions assumed in his consciousness the form of quasi-relig-




To fail to recognize the significant part played by non- 
human, and non-social forces in the cults, myths, and affairs of 
primitive men is to ignore one of the principal scientific cate- 
gories with which modern anthropology and the science of compara- 
tive religion works with such fruitful results. This is the con- 
ception of mana, a classificatory term of the wildest applicabil- 
ity. Mana is the category that most nearly expresses the essence
2.
of rudimentary religion. Modern anthropology sees in this in- 
definite, impersonal, diffused power which does things the earl- 
iest religious object.
Ames does not give sufficient weight to the real influence 
of cosmic objects or the cosmic sense in primitive life, nor can
he find a place for this most fruitful conception of Mana which
5. 
in modern times has become a scientific category. It is extremei
ly probable that the earliest form of cosmic sense was a feeling 
for this all pervading power which was thought by the savage to
inhabit every uncommon activity of man or process of nature, and
4.
which the Melanesians call Mana.
«
Professor Pratt holds, that during the last 25 years the
tendency to put over-emphasis on the social factor in human affaig
5. 
has become an "intellectual epidemic". This apotheosis of the
social, is especially conspicuous in the writings of that French
/
School of sociologists of which Professor Smile Durkheim is the
A.A.
1. Goldenweiser./t Religion and Society. Journ.of Phil.,XIV,
(March 1917) p.116.
2. Marett R.R. The Threshold of Religion.Chap.IV.
The Conception of Mana.also introd.p.XXIII.
3. Marett R.R. The Threshold of Religion, p.101.
4. Codrington, The Melanesians, see pp.118-20 for definition
of Mana in its Melanesian use.
5. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p.11.
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most eminent representative. In America Professors Irving King, 
and Ames seem to be innoculated with this view, that what is not 
social has little, or no significance.
Ames's chapter on Genius shows this tendency in a pronounced 
form. Genius with Ames is simply a product of the group life, 
Ames puts all the accent on the social factor. Now is not the 
thing that marks genius off from mere talent, its originality, and 
the fact that mere social categories are unable to explicate it? 
Historical conditions, education, social factors explain much, but 
they do not explain genius. The genius thinks in his own way, and 
not in the way socially prescribed. One of the characteristics
of genius is that it perceives things in a novel and in an unhabit-
1. 
ual way. The ideas of geniuses coruscate, and every subject
branches infinitely before their fertile minds. Bain, James and
other psychologists agree that the outstanding fact in genius of
2. 
every order is a native talent for perceiving analogies. Genius
is not a matter of laborious acquisition, and far from being an 
infinite capacity for taking pains, it is the capacity for doing 
infinite things without taking pains.
With Ames greatness is always thrust upon men by the social 
group, he ignores all across the fact that some men are born great. 
Any view which fails to take into consideration native endowments 
congenital pre-dispositions, innate tendencies, and propensities, 
is thoroughly incompetent to explain genius. Ames in his uxorious
regard for the social, ignores the fact of the intellectual origin-:
o  
ality, and the creative power of genius. He fails to recognize
1. James W. Principles of Psychology. Vol.11, p.110.
2. James f. Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p.530. 
5. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion, p.192.
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that society is as much the product of the individual as the indiv-;
1. 
idual is the product of society.
On Ames's view social progress is left without any rational 
explanation. . Is not social progress itself due to the power of 
the ideal as it becomes more clearly defined in the minds of rare 
individuals? The truth seems to be that the individual moral or 
religious genius gains a deeper insight into the ideal and lifts 
the community to a higher level. Far from being the mere creat- 
ures of their age as Ames supposes the prophets of Israel to have 
been, these moral and religious geniuses were miles in advance of 
their contemporaries, and even opposed current views by ideas that 
were often revolutionary. We therefore endorse Pratt's view 
which seems more in keeping with the facts, that their work is 
simply not to be accounted for in terms of geography and social en-|
vironment. Their contribution to the religion of their people
2. 
was unique.
The genius leaves his mark on his own and subsequent ages,
the 
Aristotle and Plato have moulded^minds of intellectual groups for
centuries. Consider the influence of the genius of Paul on 
Christendom. Consider the influence of Karl Marx upon millions 
of the proletariat of the Western World. "Consider the amount of 
life poured into the veins of humanity by such men as Gautama,
Jesus, St Augustine, St Francis of Assisi, Luther, Wesley, Booth,
3. 
and others". But what need have we of farther witness. No view
1. Fite Warner. The Exaggeration of the Social. Journ. of Phil.
Vol. IV. pp. 393 - 396.
2. Pratt J.B. The Psychology of Religious Belief, p.121.
3. Leuba J.H. A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena
Amer. Journ. of Psych. Vol.VII. Wo.3. (1896)
Footnote p.310.
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can be complete which fails to take account of both the individ- 
ual and the social factors in human life. Mental, moral, and 
religious development are acclerated by contact with the social 
environment but there would be no development without individual 
reaction which is also creative.
It is by no means as certain as Ames would lead us to sup- 
pose that religious ideas are solely the product of society. 
Professor Pratt has shown that the spontaneous origin of religious
ideas is a possibility. Pratt quotes the interesting case of
1. 
Helen Keller who was blind, and deaf, and dumb, also the cases of
2. 3. 
Mr. Ballard, and Mr. D'Estrella, two deaf mutes, all of whom were
cut off almost entirely from the social environment, and yet had
arrived at the thought of God as the result of independent
4. 
thought. It is extremely probable that in some cases at least,
the reason and imagination if left, to themselves would build up 
a belief in some kind of God.
We may grant that at a primitive stage in human development 
religious consciousness was a tribal matter, but as human develop- 
ment proceeds religious consciousness becomes more and more an 
individual possession. The general trend of development is from 
public to personal individual private religion. Ames takes no 
cognizance of this fact. Ames's extreme social point of view 
ignores that individual personal religious experience which is 
the prominent feature of the religious life in its developed form<
1. Keller Helen. The Story of My Life, with a supplementary
account of her education,by John Albert Macy 
pp. 568 - 370.
2. Porter Samuel.Is Thought Possible Without Language.
Princeton Review, 1881, Jan.pp.104-128.
3. James William.Thought Before Language,Phil.Rev.Vol.I.p.515
4. Pratt J.B. The Psychology of Religious Belief,pp.211-215.
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At a low cultural level where consciousness of Individuality 
has scarcely begun to be, and where critical reflection of existing 
social beliefs and institutions has not begun, there Ames's group
theory of religion is in smooth waters, for here as Durkheim says,
1. 
the individual type nearly confounds itself with that of the race.
But the inadequacy of this theory is at once apparent when it is 
confronted with religion as it exists in the individual at a high 
level of culture, who has attained a consciousness of his own in- 
dividuality to such a degree that he sits in judgment on the cus- 
toms, and the group consciousness of his race. Here Ames's theory
breaks down, it cannot deal with religion as it exists in the in-
2. 
dividual.
Ames's way out is to assert all religion is public, there is 
no personal religion. A man who knows what religion is, will 
never concede that the experience of God is something which is mere 
ly public, and which concerns the community only, in which the in- 
dividual as such has no direct part. A religious man is one who 
has a personal consciousness of fellowship with God. Modern re- 
ligion partakes largely of the nature of a personal experience 
which verifies to the individual the truth of the essential beliefs 
of his religious group.
The religious experience of developed peoples is analogous to 
aesthetic experience which while it may have arisen in a social 
matrix has become relatively independent of social control. It is 
a notorious fact that all forms of aesthetic expression have be- 
come a form of individual self-expression in which social conven-
s
1.Durkheim Emile.The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.p.6
2.Webb Clement C.J.Group Theories of Religion, pp.61,131.
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tions and prescriptions are repudiated, and social control resent-
1.
ed more than in any other department of human life. Social cate- 
gories then are valid only of low levels of culture where the con- 
sciousness of individuality over against the group is least devel-
2, 
oped, and where personal religious experience is least conspicuous.
Ames's group theory is unable to do justice to individual religion 
which is exemplified in the lives of the great mystics, saints, 
and figures of religious history, and which is the cardinal 
characteristic of modern religious life.
Ames fails to recognize the tremendous part played in relig- 
ious history by individuals. The great prophetic religions centre 
round towering figures like Buddha, Mohammed, and Christ. Among 
primitive peoples it is true religion is almost entirely of a soc- 
ial nature but in Pratt ! s words "as culture and thought advances
religion becomes more and more individual and constantly less de-
3. 
pendent on social forms and sanctions". Pratt ! s sane conclusion
is that "religion is the product both of society and of the indiv- 
idual". This balanced view fits the facts, and holds the scales 
evenly between the social and the individual factors in the relig- 
ious life of man. Ames's forthsetting with its "exaggeration of 
the social" does not fit the facts as we know them.
1. Webb Clement J.C. Group Theories of Religion, p. 182.
2. Webb Clement J.C. op. cit. Footnote p. 191.
3. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p. 12.
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1. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.
By
G. M. STRATTON .
CHAPTER VIII. 
EXPOSITION.
Professor Stratton's "Psychology of the Religious Life" is a 
unique contribution to religious psychology. The material, method, 
and point of view make this book distinctive among the writings of 
the American School. Stratton's data is drawn almost entirely from 
ethnological documents, and the sacred literatures of mankind. He 
blazes a trail of his own, his work is almost altogether independent 
of the researches of other religious psychologists. With Stratton 
the logical relations, rather than the function of religion are 
emphasized. He proceeds throughout on the assumption that in racial 
archives, in prayer, hymn, myth, and sacred Scriptures the psychol- 
ogist gets the best means of examining the nature of religion. This 
investigator then lays the ethnic records and sacred literatures of 
the world under tribute, and upon the data drawn from these opulent 
treasuries he builds his psychology of religion.
1. Stratton G.M. The Psychology of the Religious Life.
(Alien & Unwin, London, 1911).
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His catholicity is as remarkable as Ms originality, no race 
fails to find a place in his treatment of the religious life. The 
customs, ceremonies, myths, and sacred records of the Australian 
aboriginee, the Red Indian, the Mexican, the Chinese, the Japanese, 
the Malay, the Hindoo, the Egyptian, the Greek, the Roman, the 
Hebrew and the Arab, all alike are carefully considered. Stratton 
takes heavy toll of canonical writings, and works up his wealth 
of material into a complete picture of the interminable varieties 
of emotions, motives, ideas, and practices which play such a trem- 
endous part in the history of religions.
Stratton 1 s method is characterized by objective analysis all 
across. He groups the outstanding features of the religious life, 
and works back from these objective manifestations to the mental 
processes which gave rise to them.
Stratton 1 s purpose throughout is to give the reader a vita- 
graph of the eternal warfare of motives in the religious life. 
He vividly portrays the psychic life of religious men as a battle- 
field on which powerful antagonistic motives strive for supremacy. 
As Stratton looks out over the religious life of mankind he sees 
that it is everywhere characterized by conflict and inner tension. 
The mind at one and the same time wants contradictory things. It 
wants at once to be active and passive; to honour the intellect 
and senses, and to treat these with contempt; it wants its God to 
be one and many; it wants to exalt self and the world, and to 
despise these. Stratton 1 s picture of the religious life then is 
one of tension, conflict, and contradiction. He points out that 
these oppositions exist not merely between different religions,
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but within the same religion, and even within the same individual, 
and sometimes within the same act of worship.
This author does not consider the psychical details of individ- 
ual religious experience such as prayer, conversion, and the mystic- 
al experience with which other writers of this school have concern- 
ed themselves. Stratton's interest does not lie in mechanisms of 
religious processes, nor in the functions these perform, nor even 
in genetic or developmental questions, his Interest is concentrated 
on the conflict principle, which to him is the most prominent feat- 
ure of the religious life.
Stratton's thesis is that tension and conflict are of the very 
essence of the whole religious movement, and he supports this pos- 
ition by a plethora of citations from the religious literatures of 
the world.
Stratton's introduction provides a key to the understanding of 
his whole treatment. He explains the remarkable contrasts that 
appear in religion as due to differences in the psychological outfit 
of persons and races. According to this writer, man is conscious 
of a conflict in his interior life between the forces of good and 
evil, and he projects this inner struggle on to nature and the 
world of spirits. All nature then becomes for primitive man a 
theatre for the titanic conflicts of the personified phenomena of 
the world.
Now says Stratton, man is not an indifferent spectator of all 
this, for the issue is a matter of life and death to him, therefore 
he takes sides in the combat, and watches the outcome with tremulous 
hope and fear. He become a partisan of those powers which further
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his purposes.
At first the conflict has no moral significance, but it 
gradually assumes such. Stratton points out, that this feeling 
that life and the world are tense with conflict is not peculiar 
to religion, for art, philosophy, and political life are also 
characterized by this phenomenon. But in religion he opines 
man seems to delight in inconsistencies, and paradoxes. Stratton 
suggests that contradictory statements as to the nature of relig- 
ious objects may be the rhetorical way of religious minds of re- 
presenting the inscrutableness of Divinity. He concludes, that 
the religious man is acutely sensible of the warring desires and 
discords of his subjective life, and that all these inner tensions 
and conflicts are projected on to the outer world, or are object- 
ified in his conceptions of Divinity.
Stratton follows the traditional plan of distinguishing 
between feeling, will, and thought in the psychic life. In ac- 
cordance with this principle his book is divided into three main 
parts.
Part I, treats of conflicts with regard to feeling.
Part II, treats of conflicts with regard to action.
Part III, treats of conflicts with regard to thought.
Stratton concludes with a fourth section in which he deals 
briefly with what he regards as the central forces of religion.
PART I. 
CONFLICTS WITH REGARD TO PEELING.
The first thing Stratton observes under this head is the 
flict in the realm of emotion between the appreciation of self
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and the contempt of self. He discerns a self-depreciatory type 
and a self-glorifying type of mind. These two opposite traits 
are found both in the religion of individuals, and in that of larg$ 
religious groups. Stratton draws on Christianity and the relig- 
ions of Persia, and India, to illustrate these contradictory types 
of religious life, and reminds us that both self-appreciation and 
self-depreciation may exist within the same breast.
Next our attention is drawn to the fact that religion makes 
for both breadth and narrowness of sympathy in the individual, and 
in the religious body. There is an acute opposition of forces in 
the religious life. There is the narrow limiting caste spirit, 
and there is the widely sympathetic, expansive, democratic spirit. 
Stratton sees in Judaism and in Christianity illustrations of this 
fact. He acutely observes, that these two inconsistent sentiments 
colour the conception of the future life. The Sheol of the Jews 
is an anti-social conception, while the Elysium of the Greeks, the 
Valhalla of the Viking, the Paradise of Islam, and the Christian 
Heaven all reflect the broader range of sympathy. The idea of 
future punishment is also determined by these opposing feelings. 
Those of narrow sympathies consign the majority of their fellow 
creatures to endless torment while those of wide sympathies like to 
think of all men on their way to bliss. Stratton suggests that 
the size of sects roughly indicates whether the dominant feeling is 
of limited sympathy, or the reverse. Generally the narrow, self- 
righteous sects are small, while religious groups of wide sympath- 
ies are large.
Stratton discovers the explanation of these opposing tendencies
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in two causes. First, the causes sourced in the nature of relig- 
ion itself. He finds that sensitiveness to beauty and holiness is 
often achieved at the cost of human feeling. The contemplation of 
the Perfect tends to absorption in another realm, and great relig- 
ious experiences tend to eliminate the sense of need of intercourse 
with one's fellows. All this he says makes for neglect of social 
ties, and forgetfulness of others.
The Divine object however moves to contrary feelings, and the 
contemplation of the ideal has an opposite effect. In the light 
of the Ideal all differences of race, rank, fortune and culture are 
forgotten, and man is drawn to his fellows.
This opposition of feeling in the second place may be explain- 
ed in terms of human nature. This is equipped with an instinctive 
outfit, and these instincts oppose one another. But he argues, pug- 
nacity is as necessary as tender feeling in our common social life. 
For secular social progress there is necessary both imitation and 
originality. Imitation is connected with sympathy, we copy what 
we sympathize with. On the other hand originality is connected up 
with self-assertion. The reformer must fight against his kind for 
his kind. Secular progress then is full of conflicting tendencies, 
all of which are necessary for progress. Stratton concludes all 
this is just as necessary for religion.
Religion says Stratton influences our attitude to the world. 
We have to either turn our backs on the things of the world as 
rivals to the light, or convert these things to spiritual use. There 
is thus conflict between the acceptance of the world, and its re- 
jection. Religion drives some men to asceticism, while others
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feel that it requires no severe renunciation of the world. Both 
types exist in Christianity and it is Feeling that decides which 
tendency will triumph, Stratton points out, that these opposing 
tendencies are found outside the religious life, e.g., the miser 
renounces self-indulgence for the sake of what to him is the ideal 
good.
What, asks Stratton, are the incentives to renunciation? He 
replies,in primitive society an idea comes into being that evil 
can be got rid of, and good got hold of by various austerities. 
Again a nervous excitability is engendered by prolonged and extreme 
self-denial in the matter of food, drink, and sleep, and this ex- 
citability is favourable to the seeing of visions and the hearing 
of voices. A deep thought lies back of ascetic practices,namely, 
that if the soul is to grow it must not think too much of the 
stomach. All wise men must keep their physiological cravings in 
subjection or these will baulk noble purpose. The ascetic carries 
this effort to pathological extremes. Yet another motive Stratton 
mentions is the thought, that things most precious to us make the 
best gifts to God. In the ascetic life the world and all its 
treasures are laid at the feet of God.
Stratton perceives yet a fifth conflict of feeling,namely, 
that between gloom and cheer. He distinguishes religions of sad- 
ness, such as Buddhism from those in which joy and optimism are in 
the ascendancy such as Christianity and forms of Greek religion. 
Both types however are to be found in any religion, and a single 
individual may at one time be cheerful and at another gloomy. 
Some men are naturally melancholy, the sombre mood is their habit-
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ual mood. With most persons life oscillates between these two 
moods. External fortune has nothing to do with it, for according 
to Stratton physiological and psychical constitution determines a 
man ! s religious outlook to cheerfulness or gloom. The ideal acts 
differently on different individuals, it acts as a stimulant to 
some and as a depressant to others. Whole groups and even races 
may display this difference of constitution, so that there are 
ethnic displays of gloom and cheer.
With regard to the emotions, Stratton discovers two contrad- 
ictory practices in the religious life. Man evaluates his emotion 
al life and he either looks upon it as a thing of worth, or a 
thing to be despised. If he adopts the first attitude, he delib- 
erately intensifies his emotional life by certain practices; if 
the second, he as deliberately suppresses it. Stratton points 
out the feelings have been intentionally cultivated by worshippers 
in all religions primitive and cultured alike. Emotional excite- 
ment is accepted as a guarantee of the presence of the Divine. 
Therefore frenzied feeling has been deliberately aroused from 
earliest times by various excitants and intoxicants. The ecstasy 
engendered by such practices is regarded as holy for it is in the 
frenzy that the Divine is believed to communicate with men. The 
vegetable drugs which were used really produced visions of a 
strange world, hence the narcotizing devices were regarded as aids 
to worship. The emotional exaltation together with the hallucin- 
ations sealed the experience as religious. Stratton asserts,that 
these exciting means of working up emotion are not discarded in our 
own cultured age. We have only refined the religious instruments
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of savagery. Religious feeling may be deliberately worked up by
the revivalist as well as by the medicine man. On the other hand 
strong religious feeling may simply be a phenomenon of the natur- 
al rhythm of the psychic life.
In discussing the ramifications of feeling, Stratton points 
out, that religious sects conspicuous for emotionalism also dis- 
like ceremonial. The reason is obvious, for ceremonial implies 
a certain law and order, and imposes a restraint upon the impul- 
sive expression of religious emotions. Stately ritual itself, 
says Stratton, is a symbol of deep feeling, but its very impress- 
iveness tends to tone down extravagant expressions of this feeling
Stratton stresses the connection between religious feeling 
and art. All that is said or done in the service of God must 
have stateliness, dignity, and beauty of form as well as truth. 
He makes it clear however, that aesthetic feeling is not religious! 
feeling. Men do not get a new set of feelings when they become 
religious, but certain of their feelings get directed to new and 
divine objects. Only when feelings are evoked by Divine objects 
can they be said to be religious.
Stratton 1 s position is that man can only take to religious 
objects the mental equipment and emotional constitution he takes 
to his business or his politics. But that which makes a state of 
mind, or a set of feelings distinctively religious is the Divine 
object with which they are occupied. Further religion does not 
impress all the feelings into its service, our attention is drawn
to the fact that the feeling- of humour is conspicuously absent 
from religious sentiments.1. Only those feelings we esteem as
1. jjf.James William.The Varieties of Religious Experience.p.58.
"The Divine shall mean for us only such a primal reality as the 
individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely 
and neither by a curse norjajest". '
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noblest and most generous are utilized in the service of religion.
According to Stratton feeling is the very essence of religion. 
He stresses the important place feeling has in human life, it 
affects not only conduct, but also belief, it determines man's mor- 
ality, his heaven, and his idea of God. Preference, says Stratton^ 
depends on feelings of liking and disliking, and the worth objects 
shall have for us depends on preference. Our ideals are determin- 
ed by preference and feeling. Thought brings the world and its 
objects to the bar of the mind, but the verdict in the last analysis 
is determined by feeling. Emotions then tremendously influence 
religious conceptions. And when the Divine object evokes the emot- 
ions of men, human nature is as Stratton has so clearly indicated, 
torn in a hundred directions by contrary feelings and emotions.
PART II.
CONFLICTS WITH REGARD TO ACTION.
The second section of the book begins with a discussion of 
the origin and buttresses of ceremonial. Religious acts and rites 
according to Stratton, often have a shabby historical origin in 
magic. The dominant thought in magic is that certain objects and 
rites have inherent power of their own, independent of the influ- 
ence and action of spiritual beings. Now, says Stratton, in the 
history of ceremonial we meet with a transition stage which is half 
magical, and half religious. Here potency is conceived to reside 
both in the magical rite, and in the spirit, or god behind it. 
Stratton holds that not until objects and rites owe their whole 
efficacy to the power of spiritual beings and gods, do we get true 
religious ceremonial. He points out the fact, that a ritual of
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religion is prone to become a religion of ritual, and that when 
rites are thought to be effectual in themselves we have an atavist- 
ic reversion to sorcery.
Stratton notes that the same ceremonial may have hundreds of 
different meanings. In illustration of this, he cites the Jewish 
rite of circumcision, which at first was just a sanitary precaut- 
ion, but which became a most significant religious ceremony with 
a deeply spiritual connotation. Again he says, the communal rite 
of the eating of flesh or cereals, which at first was simply a 
crude way of getting the power of the spirit or god into oneself 
by eating him, becomes in Christianity saturated with the sublime 
thought of the spiritual communion of God with men.
It is pointed out that ceremony is not reserved for religion 
only but is used in connection with the opening of parliaments, 
the coronation of kings, the conferring of degrees and the like. 
The inner supports of ceremonial are manifold. In the first place 
ceremony makes for decency and order. Again there is the natur- 
al desire to give a great occasion a great setting, and further, 
experience proves that ceremonial creates an atmosphere which frees 
the mind from trivial thoughts, and fixes it upon the object of 
the rite.
The m*m- communal religious act gets another support in the 
fact that each participant both gives and gets sympathy and support 
from the group. Ceremonies, says Stratton, tend to unite men, 
the concrete social act gives outward expression to an inner com- 
mon purpose. The occasions of baptism, marriage, and burial, he 
affirms, are deemed too momentous to be lightly treated, therefore
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religious ceremonial is usually annexed to such occasions. 
According to Stratton, solemn rites are part of the search for 
the succour and protection of the spiritual world which man feels 
he needs.
With Stratton, myths are either personifications of great 
nature, powers, or projections of the actual deeds of men and 
heroes, or they are crude attempts at causal explanation. He 
scouts monogenetic theories of origin of myth or ritual, and sug- 
gests that the ritual may be due to the thought of influencing 
the course of nature by mimetic acts, or the religious rite may be 
the reproduction of a divine act recorded in a myth. Often,says 
Stratton, the religious rite is simply the projection into relig- 
ion of the ways of approaching great earthly officials, potentates, 
and sultans. The acts which in actual experience produce great 
effects with men are carried over into religious ceremonial.
Now we come to Stratton's characteristic treatment, which 
finds the conflict principle everywhere present in the religious 
life. He points out that along with the zeal for religious rites 
there grows up a feeling of antagonism to ceremonial. The cere- 
monial itself becomes suspect, and religious leaders begin 
philippics against external rites as the enemy of real piety and 
morality. Incense becomes an abomination unto God, and all the 
emphasis is placed on the religion of the heart.
Stratton suggests that antipathy to ritual is sometimes due 
to the fact that it is felt by certain minds to fetter the free- 
dom of the spirit. Yet again, the radical spirit in man resents 
what is rigid, and feels that its individuality is being asserted
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when it ignores set forms, and shatters fixed conventions. Be 
that as it may, Stratton asserts, that there is a natural human crav- 
ing for ritual, and if this is not met violence is done to human 
nature which will be avenged.
Stratton points out in his characteristic fashion that there 
are rival influences on action. Opposing forces war in man's soul.. 
Men have impulses and instincts, and they act from these as well as 
from deliberation and will. Human action seems to Stratton to be 
either remarkably unoriginal and fixed by convention, or remarkably 
original and defiant of convention. In religion therefore we have 
action that is conservative, and action that is radical. The great 
leaders in politics or religion says Stratton have always defied 
traditions. But the mass of communicants in any religion are al- 
ways conservative, they have no creative spirit and cling to the 
established ways of thought and practice. Stratton reminds us 
that Toryism is not peculiar to religion, for it is found in Art, 
politics, and science, and it is strongest in the life of savages.
Another conflict Stratton notes in the world of will, is that 
between the phase of religious life that seeks to express itself in 
action, and the opposing mood which finds expression in passivity. 
In the course of religious development, an idea grows up that the 
passive attitude increases receptivity to the divine influx. The 
thought comes to dwell in the minds of individuals, that God comes 
not in busy seeking, but in the stillness to the passive soul. 
Presently groups rise up within the religious movement who maintain 
that religion is entirely an inward thing. This contrast between 
the inner and the outer, is found in all advanced religions. Every 
religion has its externalists, its men of action, and its mystics.
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This, says Stratton, explains the quietists of all ages.
Stratton illustrates this contrast between the passive and 
the active religionist by reference to Judaism, Christianity, the 
religions of India, and the religion of China. The Vedas stress 
ceremonial, and the Upanishads show indifference to ritual, while 
the Bhagavadgita pour contempt on the action, and ceremony of the 
Vedas. The predominant thought of the passive religionist is 
that access to the Divine comes by detachment, devotion, and medi- 
tation, not by action. This contrast, says Stratton, is seen in 
Buddhism. One sect stresses monastic seclusion and passivity as 
the ideal, another holds up the ideal of a. life of active service. 
In China the same conflict is seen between the ideals of Confuc- 
ianism and those of Tao-ism. The Confucian books stress action, 
but the contrary spirit is seen in the Chinese sect of Buddhists 
called the Wu-wei,Le. ,the do nothing sect. It is along these 
lines Stratton brings out the fact of vivid contrast and opposit- 
ion between the religion of activity and that of passivity.
In his discussion of the motive of passivity, Stratton draws 
attention to the interesting fact, that the differences in relig- 
ious life we have just noted are annexed to marked differences of 
mental constitution in men. The distinction is after all that 
which obtains between two great contrasting classes of men,namely, 
the practical men of affairs, and the dreamers, the poets and 
musicians of our race. Neither class can understand the other. 
Stratton holds the greater part of mankind is more impressed by 
what can be sensibly perceived, and outwardly accomplished than by 
what can be conceived, thought, and imagined. This same differ- 
ence, he acutely observes, is seen in two classes of scientific
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men. One class is led to those sciences where the principal 
methods are observation and manual control of apparatus. The 
other class is led to Metaphysics, where the chief instrument is 
critical reflection. This he opines accounts for the coolness 
between natural scientists and philosophers. Among the philoso- 
phers themselves we have the materialists, the empiricists, and 
the idealists. All this suggests Stratton can be explicated in 
terms of mental constitution.
Stratton notes that the inclination to lean is strong in 
human nature. In the passivist the sense of dependence is strong- 
ly developed, he loves to lean on a stronger power, and considers 
the best action is inaction while in the active type the love of 
independence is marked. Stratton indicates the marked differences! 
in human desires. Rest is bliss to some, but intolerable to 
others, some desire change, others dread it, others again wish 
both change and repose. Now, says Stratton, for those who love 
the changeless, the inner life offers a better sanctuary than the 
outer, therefore this type of religionist usually withdraws from 
the world of action. But the active type who yearn for change, 
roust, mix with action lest they wither with despair . With this 
discussion of the antagonism between the will to action, and the 
will to passivity in the religious life Stratton concludes his 
account of conflicts with regard to action, and passes on to de- 
scribe those conflcits which arise in connection with the realm of
religious thought.
PART III.
CONFLICTS WITH REGARD TO THOUGHT. 
Stratton affirms thought is evoked by divine objects as well
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as feeling and action, and in the primitive myth we have dim inti- 
mations of the dawn of religious thought. Although we have here 
only the uncritical and artless setting forth of thought in crude 
narratives yet Stratton affirms, traces of the intellectual ele- 
ment are present. In nature myths we see the dim beginnings of 
the scientific spirit and witness the first attempts at causal 
explanation. This is clearly evident in creation myths.
Our attention is drawn to the fact that thought itself comes 
to be regarded as a powerful instrument which does things. Early 
man begins to conceive the idea that if he can get to know the 
source and nature of the powers in his environment he will be able 
to control them. Here Stratton affirms, we have science in embrjo 
not yet however divorced from magic. Stratton holds that as 
mental evolution proceeds, men begin to ponder things more, and a 
distinction is discerned between laboured thought, and effortless 
thought. In Stratton's opinion, religion at first regards spont- 
aneous thought as the more significant, but presently a notion 
swims into man's ken, that religious thought must conform to the 
syllogism. Men then begin to give themselves to logical thinking 
about religion, and become theologians. The emphasis is then 
lifted from the emotional and volitional in the religious life, 
and religion becomes largely a way of thinking. The emphasis is 
now on correct conceptions, and right belief, and religion becomes 
a matter of reasoning and creed.
Here again we have Stratton 1 s juxtaposition of oppositions. 
He points out that over against those who would thus exalt reason 
in religion, stands the mystical group whose instincts favour
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intuitional thought. To all such, the thought that is spontan- 
eous and which appears to dart in from another world ranks higher 
than that which is the laboured product of logical thinking, and 
critical scientific investigation. Thus there arises a conflict 
between a whole-hearted confidence in the intellect, and an ab- 
solute distrust of the same in matters of religion.
Moreover, adds Stratton, the thought becomes established that 
feeling is of the essence of religion, and it is felt that scienti-t 
fie curiosity is incompatible with the religious spirit, and that 
the intellect puts the emotions in a refrigerator. Stratton holds,} 
that the principal ground of distrust of human reason and science 
is that it tends to destroy cherished religious beliefs, and to 
banish the sublime emotions of awe and reverence from human life. 
The mystically minded feel instinctively that science is out to 
destroy the poetry of life, and the religious spirit. It notes 
that astronomy and microscopy have made many of the old religious 
ideas seem petty and ludicrous, that the science of literary and 
historical criticism has made the old ideas of verbal inspiration 
untenable, and that the doctrine of evolution has considerably 
qualified theological thought. Therefore in the religious move- 
ment we find irreconcilable opposition between the mystically mind- 
ed and the scientifically minded, the mystics are at enmity with 
the intellectuals, and the war is one of extermination.
According to Professor Stratton, the question of religious 
belief is a complex one. He states that in some religions there 
is belief in gods but no worship. Stratton uses a wealth of illus-j 
tration here. He instances the religion of the Arabs before
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Mohomet, here Allah was believed to be supreme over other minor 
divinities, but the lower gods got all the worship. In China 
also the people believe in the great divinities of heaven and 
earth, but worship their ancestors. The Roman believed that Jove 
was the greatest divinity, yet worshipped his household gods. 
The Greeks believed Zeus was supreme, but they built their chief 
temple to Athene, etc.
Stratton explains the fact of religious belief without wor- 
ship as due to a distinction of the supremest importance, namely, 
that between belief in existence, and belief in value. Both be- 
liefs may co-exist, but one may exist without the other. According 
to Stratton then, men tend to worship the gods not simply because 
they believe in their existence, but because they believe in 
their value. The high gods seem to man to be too far off to be of 
use to him, therefore the lower divinities who are close at hand 
receive his worship. Again Stratton suggests, that intellectually 
a man might be convinced that certain gods exist afar off, but 
emotionally he needs a god who does not dwell apart in lonely 
splendour. This mental fact then, that judgment and feeling re- 
quire different objects, helps to explain how there may be belief 
in gods, but no worship.
Stratton is emphatic that religion cannot exist without be- 
lief of some kind, but it may of course exist without formulating 
its belief in reality, or value. He holds, that the official 
creeds of Christendom are formulations of belief in existence,but 
not in value. With Stratton, formulae are precise instruments of 
education. He affirms that religious bodies have two paramount 
duties to perform, the first, is to transmit the truth already
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received, and the second, is to receive fresh truth, a duty gross- 
ly neglected, so much so, asserts Stratton, that the religious 
organization prefers to encourage secession rather than amend any 
of its formulae .
Stratton now leaves the miscellaneous contrasts of thought in 
the religious life in order to concentrate on one particular class 
of conflicts, namely, those which have to do with man's represent- 
ation of the Divine. Human consciousness affirms Stratton, has 
many ways of representing the Divine, three modes are outstanding. 
Man represents Divine Reality by objects of sensible perception, 
or by images which are symbols only of Divinity, or by a character 
which outruns human thought and imagination.
Stratton sees two great tendencies in human thought with re- 
gard to the Divine. One mood seeks definiteness in its descript- 
ion of the gods, the other proceeds on the view that the nature of 
the gods surpasses all human description and can be expressed in- 
definitely only. These moods of religious thought are opposed,and 
we have one of Stratton 1 s characteristic conflicts.
Stratton supports his thesis with a wealth of illustrative
i 
matter taken from the religion of the Hebrews, the Hindoos, the
Persians, and the Chinese. He shows that these two opposite ways 
of representing the Divine are found not only in different relig- 
ious groups, but exist in persons of the same religion, and even 
in the individual religious subject. We may see these two con- 
flicting tendencies in operation in the religion of Christianity, 
Protestantism distrusts the definite and precise representations 
of divine objects in pictures and images, whereas Roman Catholicism 
delights in definite representations, and revels in the machinery
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of sense Impressionism. With regard to the cause of this vivid 
opposition between these two tendencies of the mind Stratton is 
agnostic, he simply affirms the cause is obscure, and the facts 
are as he has stated them.
Stratton points out that as science advances poetry recedes 
from life, and imagination withers. Nature's way is to withhold 
one thing when she gives another, this Stratton suggests is why re- 
ligion runs to different extremes such as over-emphasis on social 
service at the cost of worship, too great an accent on emotional 
relationship with the gods at the expense of service, and the striv-| 
ing after a conceptual grasp of the Divine at the sacrifice of 
imagination and feeling.
Stratton 1 s conclusion is, that in a cultured age the religious 
mind consciously rejects sense imagery as inadequate to represent 
spiritual realities, and begins to use the materials of its sub- 
jective experiences to represent the Divine. Sense must furnish 
the materials of imagination, and so the thought grows that the un- 
seen world cannot be imagined. He asserts, that the transition 
from sense imagery to the more spiritual mode of representation is 
marked by acute conflict.
Stratton gives an interesting picture of the conflict between 
imagination and thought, using as his materials the matter of ear- 
ly religious literary monuments. A strange scene is spread out be- 
fore us complexed with oppositions, inconsistencies, and contrad- 
ictions. The fact is emphasized that the idealizing activity of 
thought outruns the sensuous imagination, and the image becomes 
inadequate to meet the necessities of thought.
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In this connection Stratton draws generously upon the Iliad 
and the Odyssey for his illustrative material. He points to the 
fact, that trickery, brawling, and adultery were common among the 
gods of Olympus, hence the demands on men were slight, religion 
simply consisted in right performance of ritual and was divorced 
from morality. But we find the gods beginning to take an interest 
in the affairs of men, and a belief comes into being, that man 
must not only perform rites, but he must be kind to strangers. A 
new phase arrives when the gods begin to look into the secular 
life of men, and reward uprightness and punish sin, now, says 
Stratton, religion and morality are coming together.
The fact is emphasized that the dramatic representation of 
the gods differs entirely from their representation in abstract 
thought. Stratton illustrates this by pointing out several in- 
consistencies. The first inconsistency has to do with the happi- 
ness of the gods. In the abstract the gods are represented as 
happy etc, but dramatically pictured the gods are hardly ever free 
from anxiety,e.g. Zeus the supreme divinity is constantly angered 
by the lesser gods, and chiefly by his beloved wife. Again in the 
abstract, the gods are omniscient but in pictured representation 
their knowledge is imperfect. Yet again in abstract thought, the 
gods are conceived of without beginning or ending, while in pictur- 
ed representation they are born like the mortals.
Stratton accounts for these manifest contradictions by a 
theory of the literary history of his documents. They are derived
i
from various sources; they are connected with different stages of 
culture, and were edited by men who did not do their work well.
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Again he suggests that the human mind swings between two opposing
moods, namely, the grave and gay. It is the serious mood which 
assigns the profounder attributes to the gods, while the lighter 
mood is responsible for the less worthy characteristic and undigni- 
fied stories. A remarkable fact is that there is consistency amid 
all this inconsistency. The degrading element is confined to the 
pictures and stories while the epithets denoting the attributes 
are consistently noble. There are many disgraceful anecdotes,but 
no besmirching epithets. Stratton advances the interesting theory, 
that the ungodlike things in the deity-myths were a concession to 
the dramatic interest. The unpuritan Greeks could make nothing of 
an abstractly perfect heaven, therefore they projected into it a 
little drama and comedy, which gave the whole thing movement. 
Again Stratton points out, the crudities are remnants of a less 
sensitive age. In Homer as in the Vedas the higher conceptions of 
the gods come from later insights, but these do not entirely crowd 
out the earlier and less worthy ideas.
The human mind says Stratton with his characteristic emphasis
e
gives sanctuary to the strangest contradictions, it thinks of its 
gods in opposite ways, and the works of its imagination contradict 
the products of its conceptions. Religion has two ways of repres- 
enting the Divine, namely, thought, and imagination. These two 
modes of expressing the Divine may exist and conflict within the 
same religious group, or in the same individual mind.
In the higher reaches of religious thought imaginative pictur-* 
es of the Divine are found wanting, they cannot express the fulnessj 
of the Divine. Men escape from this inadequate sense imagery along 
three lines:(I) They use sensuous symbols,(2) or they use material
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drawn from their subjective life, (3) or they seek to represent 
the religious ideal in terms of pure intellect. All these methods 
may be used together. Our attention is directed to a fourth type 
of mind which will have naught to do with any of these three modes, 
but affirms that God is above all predicates, and can be described 
by negations only. Here then Stratton gives us a view of four 
contrasting modes by which the human mind seeks to portray the 
Divine. He goes on to discuss the strange contrasts to be found 
in the nature of the Divine which is thus portrayed.
He discovers that the Divine is thought of as many, and as 
one. At a primitive stage in religion man believes in innumerable 
spirits, but presently a group of divinities stands out from the 
mass as supreme; then one god is conceived of as supreme over 
other gods; and finally, a belief arises in one god only. Accord- 
ing to Stratton, the stages of the evolution are polytheism, heno- 
theism, then monotheism. Monotheism has never been held in any 
large social way says Stratton except by the three great world re- 
ligions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The religious life 
then according to this author is torn by a conflict between two 
opposing movements of thought, one making towards many gods, and 
the other towards an austere monotheism.
An interesting list of motives is given for the polytheistic 
tendency of the human mind, together with an account of the motiv- 
es which make for the diminution of the numbers of the gods. We 
are warned that the facts of the religious life are many sided, 
therefore the passage over from polytheism to monotheism is a most 
complex process brought about by many forces. Stratton affirms
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the polytheistic and monotheistic attitudes are present in modern 
religious life, it is, he acutely observes, the polytheistic 
spirit which saves us from pantheism. Historically then these 
two forces stand over against each other and there is conflict. 
Some minds revel in variations and multiplicity, others are driven 
to organize the multiplicity of parts into unity and to seek the 
integrating principle of things. Progress says Stratton, is due 
to the conflict of these opposing forces. These opposing attitud- 
es run through human life all across,and in the last analysis, 
this marked difference in mental attitude is due to the differen- 
ces in the intellectual and emotional make-up of men.
According to Stratton, there are two different ways of con- 
ceiving the nature of divinity. God may be thought of as a defin- 
ite person with 'definite attributes, or as a being vague and in- 
determinable. Stratton supports his statement with abundant 
citations from the ethnic records. He holds, that God is outlin- 
ed fairly clearly in the Hebrew religion and in Christianity, but 
with his usual keen scent for contrasts he finds even in the
Hebrew Scriptures an opposite movement where the divinity is re-
1, 
garded as the mysterious unknown as in the book of Job. This
mood is still more accentuated in the reflective religions of the 
Orient, where God is not merely unknown but unknowable, here a 
conception of God is arrived at which is without form and void. 
These two tendencies of thought compete with each other in the 
religious life. Indefiniteness may be reached by affirming every- 
thing of God, or by denying everything of God, and so placing God 
beyond all predicates.
1. Job. Chap. 56. V. 26.
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Another contrast in the portrayal of the Divine which our 
author notes, is the tendency to picture the Divinity near at hand^ 
and the opposing tendency to think of God as far remote from com- 
mon things. According to Stratton, the human race has moved be- 
tween these two alternatives from the beginning of history. With 
great erudition he traces this conflict of tendencies from element- 
ary forms of religious life to the religion of Christianity. 
In Christianity itself he finds this opposition and conflict. The 
Christological controversies illustrate his statement. Stratton 
holds those who stood for the real union of the Divine and human 
in Christ were fighting for the ideal of a God close to man, while 
those who denied this stood for a God afar off. He argues that 
wherever we find personal mediation insisted upon between man and 
God, we have this idea of awful distance of God from man. This 
same impulse is found in Roman Catholicism where Christ is conceiv- 
ed of as too exalted to be approached directly, the Virgin, the 
Saint, or the Priest are required as intermediaries.
Further Stratton shows, that when God is conceived of as afar 
off in awful sublimity it seems to men to be sacrilegious to ascribe 
the work of creation to his own hands, hence men conceive the idea 
of a middle term. The Gnostics found this in a demiurge, and the 
great distance between God and the world was bridged by a system 
of effluxes. On the other hand, Stratton points out that where 
the gods are conceived of as close to man they are the actual 
creators of material things.
Stratton links up this conflict which he observes in the re- 
ligious movement with similar conflicts in secular life, in phil-
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osophy and politics we have precisely the same mental fact we have 
been observing with regard to religion. Stratton reminds us that 
in the Phaedo of Plato the Ideal is hopelessly set apart from the 
ideal, but the opposite tendency is illustrated in the Republic, 
here the philosopher must bring the ideal down to earth and make 
it actual. In the world of politics we see the same two tendencies 
at work. There is a group whose social ideals are so high that 
they cannot see how these can be made actual, therefore they do 
nothing and assume the attitude of superior spectators. A contrast- 
ing group seeks to make the ideal actual on this earth, Stratton 
concludes his discussion of these tendencies which compete for the 
making of the character of the gods with the deliverance, that the 
nature of the religious ideal is not fixed by political forms of 
government, but rather by the differences of desire in groups and 
individuals. Some men desire a remote divinity others a God clos- 
er than breathing, nearer than hands and feet.
PART IV. 
THE CENTRAL FORCES OP RELIGION.
Stratton gives pride of place to the idealizing act of the 
human mind as the fundamental process in religion. All of us says 
Stratton, want to remould things to the heart's desire. Human 
nature is naturally dissatisfied with what is given, in religion 
the given world of sense perception does not satisfy, hence we 
want an unseen larger ideal world. With Stratton an ideal is a 
picture of what will completely satisfy our desires.
Stratton's position is briefly, man desires physical and 
psychic power, hence this is projected into his ideal of God. Man
231. 
desires to know and explain, therefore the thought of creator is
brought into the ideal of God. Man also desires logical complete- 
ness, but this desire gets us into trouble at once, for our ideal 
must be perfect and unlimited. How then are we to think of weak- 
ness, imperfection, and evil? Logic lumps everything that can be
thought into the ideal of the Infinite all heedless of the fact
1.
that in so doing morals are subverted. But says Stratton, the in- 
tellect demands that the ideal of the Perfect must also appear the 
Perfect when estimated by interests other than the logical, the 
needs of the moral sense must also be met by the ideal, and the 
needs of the aesthetic sense, the ideal must appeal to the whole 
mind. Moreover the picture will become coloured by earthly organ- 
izations of state, and by the human desire for friendship. God 
therefore becomes conceived of as the great King, Judge, and Friend 
of mankind. All these things then and many more determine of what 
sort the ideal shall be. In a word, all that men prize most and 
desire most they put into their picture of God. Stratton 1 s finding 
Is, that it is the differences in mental constitution which deter- 
mine the outlines of the ideal rather than mere social influences.
With Stratton then, religion is not as with Ames, wholly a 
social matter. Stratton affirms religion does not flow entirely 
from the social nature of man. The reverence which men show to the 
Highest does not originate in social feeling, but has come into be- 
ing because it met and satisfied certain sensuous, aesthetic,causal 
and logical needs which are as independent of the social conscious- 
ness and social imitation as are the native innate likes and dis- 
likes of certain objects, tastes, sounds, and feelings.
1.  f., Pratt J.B. The Psychology of Religious Belief.pp.90-91
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Stratton 1 s position is that religion has not a social origin 
although it may subsequently acquire a social form. The idea of 
the Divine is fashioned by such a multitude of psychic activities 
connected with every function of mind and body, that no one act- 
ivity can be singled out as the sole source of that great re- 
sponse of the human spirit to whatever it feels to be Divine, 
which we call religion.
According to Stratton, there is incessant movement in relig- 
ion it is therefore impossible to find the permanent quality of 
religion in the objects that have been worshipped, for they are 
legion, nor can we find it in the contradictory feelings which 
have nucleated around this multitude of objects. Religion there- 
fore cannot be identified with the feeling of adoration, for in 
some religions the worshippers beat their gods. It cannot be 
identified with reverence, or awe, for it is not always a solemn 
reaction, nor can the essence of religion be found in the feeling 
of dependence as with Schleiermacher, for in some religions the 
gods depend on the worshippers for their strength, and need their 
sacrifices. Stratton 1 s conclusion is, that there is no special 
feeling which is religion's specific mark.
His own definition of religion is as follows:"Religion is 
the appreciation of an unseen world, usually an unseen company, 
it is man's whole bearing toward what seems to him the Best,or 
Greatest". Now,says Stratton this unseen world takes on the 
colouring of the seen world. The savage mind peoples this unseen 
order with the grotesque and sinister for it is the terrible 
things that stir the feelings most, but the ideas of goodness
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and kindness are also put into the picture at an early period.
Stratton affirms, that the picture of the gods formed by the human 
mind has everything in it that the human mind longs for. But he 
says the higher we go the more discontented we become with our 
anthropomorphic picture of the Divine, therefore as our power of 
idealization grows we paint a picture far too sublimated of the 
Ideal existence. Stratton goes on to show that although this 
ideal is formed to satisfy man's desire, yet the very presence of 
the ideal thus formed makes man dissatisfied, he feels the solici- 
tation and urge of the ideal scourging him upward, and he is 
troubled with a divine discontent.
Religion then is man's whole bearing to whatever seems to 
him to be the greatest and best, what then shall be the criterion 
of the greatest and best? Stratton replies, the ideal will be 
determined by types of mind, stages of culture, and variety of 
response. He points out,that humanity has recognized a variety 
of things as greatest and best during its history, but there is a 
constant impulse to regard the Greatest as conscious, after some 
animal or human,or divine manner. In Stratton's opinion, if this 
consciousness fades from the ideal then the religious object loses 
its characteristic mark. He frankly states that religion is our 
response to what for us is most significant, therefore the thing 
which appeals to us as of supreme worth need not be a monotheistic 
God, it may just as likely be a group, a class, a society, it is 
by no means necessary that the object most significant for man 
shall also be infinite or divine.
Men think of deity in different ways, what shall determine 
which ways are better, and which are worse? Stratton 1 s answer to
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this question, leads him from the realm of description to that 
of interpretation.
Stratton lays down certain standards of judgment of far 
reaching importance in the last chapter of his book. First, he 
says, the pure expression of any single religious motive is un- 
desirable, for if one motive is not opposed by another the relig- 
ious life is not nicely balanced, but he adds, though antagonis- 
tic motives are necessary one may well be dominant. According to 
Stratton, religion should make a place for every type of human 
thought, and meet every deep human desire. Second, Stratton lays 
down the proposition that the assertions of religion as to what 
is real should be true.
Stratton distinguishes four varieties of truth.
1. The truth of the Pragmatist, which is simply a useful 
judgment.
2. The truth of mere logical consistency.
3. The truth of the realm of values, which is concerned with 
what is consistent with the deepest impulses of our natur
4. The truth of mere fact.
Now, says Stratton, all these varieties of truth represent 
actual existence of some kind, and religion is concerned with 
truth in all its varieties. He says in other words, the spirit- 
ual world may be an idea helpful to me, it may.be an idea logic- 
ally consistent, it may be an idea of supreme value to me, but if 
it does not exist in fact, what boots it? Does the spiritual 
world exist in fact? And what disciplines can disclose reality? 
are the vital questions raised here. Is religion to passively 
receive deliverances concerning the truth of its objects from
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science and philosophy? Stratton replies emphatically, religion 
is justified in taking active part in the discovery of truth along 
with science and philosophy and claims an equal right to report on 
the nature of reality.
All these three activities of the human spirit affirm, that 
the real world differs from the world of mere sense perception. 
Science,says Stratton, is not all a matter of sure demonstration, 
the scientist approaches the world with a theory of knowledge, 
namely, that a principle of causality and unity runs through the 
most diverse phenomena. This epistemological principle cannot be 
seen with the senses yet no science could get going without it, 
for no causal explanation of anything would "be possible. Now, coni 
tinues Stratton, when the mind gets the results of science in the 
shape of causal explanations, it is logically restless until it 
gets a background for all this phenomena, and therefore the reason 
is driven on to the conviction that the world of reality is not 
only causally explicable, but is also shot through with rationality 
Metaphysics seeks to discover this rationality. Truth for philos- 
ophy just consists in the progressive discovery of the rationality 
of reality.
Stratton carries his argument a step farther, he says, the 
mind also by an inner compulsion feels the need of beauty. The 
only world the mind will acknowledge as real must be aesthetically 
satisfying. Stratton concludes then, that Beauty, Causality, and 
the Law of Sufficient Reason are all alike principles of discovery, 
Now, he says, there is a deeper need than all these, the need for 
sympathy and companionship, this brings its own great belief that
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moral order obtains in the world. Stratton holds that the world 
given through sense reports only, is an unintelligible chaos, or 
in James's words, "one big buzzing confusion". It can be made co- 
herent only by bringing to it the principle of causation, that of 
logic, the aesthetic principle, and the moral principle. Stratton 
concludes, there is nothing in observation or argument that can 
absolutely demonstrate that causation runs through the universe, 
or that the universe is rational, or that beauty and order char- 
acterize it, or that moral order exists therein. If we will not 
believe, there is no recourse, for no demonstration is possible. 
Stratton 1 s position then is briefly, if the principle that 
morality runs through the universe is needed to explain our moral 
experiences, and to make them intelligible, it is as real as these 
experiences. Whatever is absolutely needed to causally explain 
our experiences is as real for us as the experiences. Now, says 
Stratton, the causal principle simply tells us there is a cause foil 
a given phenomenon, the moral principle that there is a moral ordei 
etc., but we must discover it for ourselves. Religion has a right 
to take part in this discovery of truth. Profound needs bring 
their own convictions. The need of science is a causal explanation 
of the world; the need of art is beauty in the world; the need of 
science and philosophy is rationality in the world; the need of 
ethics is moral order in the world;and the need of religion is the 
conviction that Divinity sustains the world,and sympathizes with 
man. According to our author,that which satisfies the demand of 
the human spirit in its profoundest desires is the most real world , 




No brief exposition such as has been attempted in the preced- 
ing pages can do justice to Professor Stratton's most original book. 
The work bears the marks of massive erudition. The able author 
draws on the extant religious writings of the world, and marshals a 
formidable cohort of factual data, all of 7/hich converge on the 
thesis he seeks to establish, namely, that conflict of emotions, 
motives, and ideas is the cardinal characteristic of the religious 
life of savage, or civilised man. He demonstrates by an impressive 
array of citations gleaned from the sacred literatures, that there 
is in the religious life both appreciation and contempt of self; 
breadth and narrowness of sympathy; acceptation and renunciation of 
the world, etc.
If Stratton's aim is to reveal to our wondering gaze the whole 
panorama of the religious life from a new angle, as a maze of oppos- 
ing motives, a tangle of desires, and a perpetual war of contrary 
purposes, he has certainly succeeded in his object. But if his pur- 
pose is to establish the thesis that conflict is at once the cardi- 
nal and constitutive principle of religion, as a careful perusal of
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his book leads us to suppose,then we do not think Stratton has 
made out his case.
A critical examination of Stratton's work reveals the fact 
that it has the defects of its qualities. Stratton's method is 
broad based on an objective analysis of the ethnic records and 
sacred literatures of the different races of mankind. He treats 
of the objective manifestations of the religious life in various 
groups and races, and bases a psychological theory of religion al- 
most entirely on these records of the ethnic faiths. Here then 
we have all the advantages of objectivity, but we have all its 
disadvantages too.
The objective method cannot take us very far in psychology, 
its chief use as we have seen in our discussion of methods, is to 
supply the raw material for psychological analysis. The objective
or historical method to be fruitful needs to be supplemented by
the 
other methods, for example the questionnaire and Acomparative and
genetic methods. As Stratton has not invoked any of these auxil- 
iary methods, his field is necessarily limited, and his psycholog- 
ical results meagre. We certainly expect to find more psychology 
in a book which professes to deal with the psychology of the re- 
ligious life than Stratton has seen fit to give us in this work.
His historical description of the religious life in its objective
but 
manifestations is remarkably rich and full,,it is a just criticism)
to observe, that Stratton has over elaborated the historical side 
of his subject at the expense of psychological analysis. The 
historical treatment of the religious life is too full, while the 
psychological treatment, at all events for the psychological 
student, is not full enough. This defect of Stratton 1 s interest-
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ing book is due to the method of his choice, it is annexed to the
historical method itself. This method when used alone can never 
yield large psychological dividends.
Professor Coe observes that Stratton's attitude to religion 
is analogous to that of a musical critic who discriminates the
harmonies, discords, rhythmic contrasts, and the various themes of
1. 
a complex symphony, and then describes what he has observed. As
Stratton reads the sacred Scriptures of mankind, and the ethnic 
documents, they reveal to him that the big thing in religion in all 
its protean forms is conflict. His book therefore is severely 
limited by his point of view to an elaborate description of this 
conflict principle in the realmsof feeling, action, and thought.
Stratton's fundamental thesis is, that these conflict phenom- 
ena are the preponderating features of the religious life. He says 
the essence of the whole religious movement is conflict. Has 
Stratton made out his case? He has certainly abundantly, all too 
abundantly perhaps, demonstrated the fact that there is a conflict 
of feelings, desires, and motives in the religious life. But this 
fact of conflict is not the whole of the religious life, it is one 
aspect only, therefore we cannot help feeling that Stratton has 
fallen into the fallacy of mistaking the particular for the gener- 
al, and the part for the whole. The religious movement has many 
aspects, the conflict phase is one aspect only. Stratton does not 
look so much at religion as a whole, as he concentrates on one 
aspect of its many aspects.
It may be conceded to Stratton, that he has made out a strong 
case for conflict as a very important aspect of the religious life,
1. Coe G,A, Philosophical Review. Vol.XXI. No.6<(1912) p.6;6§
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but we need to be reminded that this life has other aspects, such 
as unity, reconciliation, harmony, joy, and peace. Not one of 
these aspects should be emphasized at the expense of others. As 
against Stratton ! s position, it is maintained that conflict is 
not the whole of religious experience, neither is it the principa] 
thing in the religious life. Stratton is clearly guilty of over 
emphasis here.
Moreover his excessive accent on this conflict principle 
does violence to logic and reason. It is impossible that the 
organizing principle of religion, art, morality, science, philos- 
ophy, or any other of the possibilities of human history can be 
that of opposition and dissonance, strife and conflict. Conflict 
simply cannot be the constitutive principle in the evolution of 
religion.
Stratton appears to under-estimate what Levy Brull and others
1. 
of the French School of sociology greatly exaggerate, namely,the
difference between the savage mentality and that of civilised 
man. He tends to mass his religious facts together, all heedless 
of whether they belong to elementary forms of religious life or 
to the religious life of contemporary culture. This fault may be 
charged to the purely historical method, but for psychological 
purposes this method must be eked out by the comparative and 
genetic method.
The primitive forms of religious life cannot become intelli- 
gible unless we take into consideration the psychical difference 
not in kind, but in degree between the mind of the untutored
1. Webb Clement, Group Theories of Religion.p.92. See also
Chap. VI, The Theory of Prelogical Mental- 
ity.
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savage and that of civilised man. Certain emotions and activities 
are far more easily evoked, and far more often exercised by the 
savage mind, than they are in the case of our contemporaries.
Leubatells us that fear and awe have almost completely faded from
1.
the modern man's religion, while Wundt informs us that fear is reg- 
nant in the savage mind, and a richly developed set of demon ideas
2. 
dominates the daily life of primitive man.
Now Stratton seems to ignore this important difference we have 
emphasized, and to imagine that his conflict principle is adequate 
to relate the facts of elementary religion with those which belong 
to advanced culture. But if our criticism, that conflict cannot be 
the constitutive principle of Stratton's diverse data be Just, then 
his evident disregard for the mental disparity between the lower 
and higher stages of human culture prevents him from really unifying 
his mass of heterogeneous religious facts, for as we have seen, 
the conflict principle cannot unify. Therefore Stratton f s factual 
data drawn from so many diverse sources,and from so many different 
stages of human culture are left unrelated.
Perhaps no psychologist can avoid utilizing the traditional 
tripartite division of the mind into thought, feeling, and will. 
At the same time great care needs to be exercised in the use of this 
abstract psychological construct, lest we treat these aspects of 
the human mind as if they were three separate entities. Stratton 
occasionally transgresses in this respect, sometimes his conflicts 
of feeling could be just as well described as conflicts of action,
1.Leuba J.H. Psychological Study of Religion, p. 150.
2.Wundt Wilhelm. Elements of Folk Psychology, p. 81. 
See also McDougall W. Social Psychology, p. 303.
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or of thought. As a matter of fact, all Stratton's three types of 
conflict overlap. The conflicts are not so sharply defined as his 
treatment would lead us to suppose.
Thought, feeling, will, these three phases of the mind belong 
to every mental act, at the same time one phase may predominate in 
any given situation. Stratton holds that feeling, more especially 
in the lower stages of religious development, is as central in re- 
J.igion as knowledge, and action. Does Stratton claim enough for 
the emotional element in the religious life, is not feeling more 
central than Stratton allows? Jonathan Edwards lays down the pro- 
position that true religion consists for the most part in the
1. 
affections, and Hoffding maintains that religious experience is
2. 
essentially religious feeling. These statements square with the
facts of the religious life much better than Stratton 1 s attenuated 
admission. Stratton underrates the preponderating part feeling 
plays in the actual religious life of man.
In his discussion of the place of intellectual belief in the 
religious life, Stratton makes a distinction which he holds to be 
of supreme importance, namely, that between belief in existence, 
and belief in value.He asserts there are cases where we may have 
belief in value but none in existence, his own words are"occasion- 
ally we find religion becoming an allegiance to an ideal which is 
felt to be unreal, there is still belief in the supreme value of
the object worshipped, but there is wanting a belief in its exist-
5. 
ence". We must break a lance with Stratton here, religion simply
1.Edwards Jonathan. Treatise on the Religious Affections. 
See Collected Works, (1834) Vol.1, p.256.
2.H6ffding H. Philosophy of Religion, p.106.
3.Stratton G.M. The Psychology of the Religious Life.p.215.
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would not be viable unless there were a conviction of the reality 
of its object. A conviction of value only, is far too slender a 
basis,for any religion, you cannot build a forty story building on 
a one story foundation.
As against Stratton's position, we advance this proposition, 
namely, that a belief in reality without a conviction of its value, 
or a belief in value without a conviction of its reality would cer- 
tainly not be a religious belief. The religious mind demands that 
its object shall at once possess reality and value. Professor 
Pratt makes this fact very clear in his splendid discussion of the 
subject of prayer. Pratt points out that there is a consensus of 
psychological opinion that prayer possesses value in the way of 
subjective effects. But the valuable subjective effects of prayer 
depend on the conviction of the reality of the objective relation. 
He goes on to say, "if the subjective value of prayer be all the 
value it has, we wise psychologists of religion had best keep the
fact to ourselves; otherwise the game will soon be up and we shall
1.
have no religion left to psychologize about". Stratton's posit- 
ion that there may be religion where there is belief in value but 
none in the reality of that which is valued is precarious, since
for the religious mind value and reality are indissolubly bound
2. 
together.
Stratton defines religion on page 343, as "man's whole bearing 
to what appears to him to be greatest and best". This definition 
is far too wide, it takes in too much that is other than religion. 
A definition should be per genus et differentia, Stratton has given
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p.336.
2. Hflffding H. Philosophy of Religion, p. 117.
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us the genus, but not the differentia. The moral consciousness,
the aesthetic, the patriotic, or the public school consciousness 
could be defined in Stratton 1 s terms. The definition is so broad 
that it could take up into its sweep the miser, the gourmand, and 
the libertine.
When all's done and said, the probability is that this most 
complex, living, fluid reality in human life we call religion can 
never be satisfactorily defined. Professor Leuba has collected 
48 definitions which fall into three fairly well marked types,
namely, the affectivist, the intellectualist, and the volitionist
1. 
respectively. Not one of these is entirely satisfactory, indeed
one eminent student of religion holds it is impossible to define
2. 
religion. We cannot well censure Stratton for failing to define
that which defies definition, but we simply record the fact that 
his definition is extremely inadequate, in that it does not serve 
to mark religion off from other things.
No definition can be very serviceable which leaves out what
Schleiermacher made the very core of his definition of religion,
5. 
namely, the sense of utter need and dependence on man's part, and
which fails to include an account of a superhuman power which can 
meet this need, and succour humanity.
On pages 345 and 345, Stratton speaks of religion as being the 
an appreciation of an unseen world, as the awakening to the signi- 
ficance of a special order of facts, and as the sense of value. 
This is good as far as it goes, but surely religion is all that and 
more, surely it is more than the sense of value. Stratton puts all
1. Leuba J.H. Psychological Study of Religion. See Appendix.
2. Webb Clement, Group Theories of Religion, p.59.
3. Schleiermacher F. The Christian Faith in Outline. 
D.M.Balllle. p. 15.
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the accent on appreciation. Is it not a truer forthsetting of
the facts to say, that religion is a desire for the things that 
are valued, and an active striving for the things that are valued, 
as well as the mere sense of value.
In his discussion of the ceremonial and its inner supports, 
Stratton lays down a proposition which challenges controversy.
He holds that the external acts and ceremonial of religion begin
1. 
in foolish mummery. To thus source the origin of savage ritual
and ceremonial in mere mummery is a most inadequate explanation, 
it really leaves the genesis of magical and religious rites un- 
explicated. Stratton's explanation is reminiscent of the old 
Hindoo cosmogony, which explained the world as resting on the 
back of four great elephants, the four great elephants on the 
back of a huge tortoise, and the huge tortoise on nothing.
Stratton 1 s causal explanation of the beginnings of savage 
ceremonial is much less convincing than Professor Ames's theory 
which postulates a vital connection between primitive ceremonial 
and utilitarian acts. Ames shows that far from being mere mummery 
primitive rites really duplicate biological processes which are 
felt by primitive man to be momentous for the life and integrity 
of the group. The primitive ceremonial is then at the outset a 
group act intended to secure practical benefits to the tribe such 
as food, children, protection from enemies, victory in warfare, 
and the like. Birth, puberty, marriage, and death, these events 
stand out vividly before the savage mind because they are vitally 
linked up with the life of the individual and his tribe. It is 
these concrete situations which evoke specific reactions on the
1. Stratton G.M. The Psychology of the Religious Life.p.133.
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par.t of primitive man which become organized into ceremonial. 1. 
Let us take one savage rite as an illustration, we refer to
the ceremonial connected with the Plum tree totem of the Australian
2. 
Aboriginees. Here we have a ceremony which re-enacts the drama of
growth and fruition. The aboriginee depends on this tree for food, 
it means his life, therefore the rite connected with this means of 
his subsistence is of vital significance for him, it is no mere 
mummery. Savage ceremonial is bound up with concrete environmental 
situations which have significance for the life of the individual 
and his group. Here then we have a theory of origin of savage 
rites and ceremonial which certainly fits the facts which anthrop- 
ology has revealed. Stratton apparently ignores these concrete 
situations which Ames shows play such an important part in the gen- 
esis of tribal ritual. As a theory of the origin of social cere- 
monial Ames's view is to be preferred to Stratton's, where Ames is 
disappointing is in failing to show how the transition from mere 
social ceremonial to religious ceremonial is made.
These defects we have indicated do not detract from the value 
of this rare contribution of the American School, indeed most of 
the defects we have noted are the inevitable accompaniment of the 
historical method when used in isolation. This method can hardly 
do other than describe primitive magical or religious ceremonial 
as meaningless mummery, for this is precisely how it appears to the 
investigator who approaches it from the objective point of view.
We must concede that Professor Stratton has given us in this
l.Ames E.S. Psychology of Religious Experience, pp. 73-74. 
2.Spencer and Gillen, The Native Tribes of Central Australia,
p. 320.
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notable work a fresh presentation of the facts of the religious 
life, it is in this new point of view that his originality consists, 
The book is characterized all across by a sympathetic understanding 
of the religious life. The place and function of the new psychol- 
ogy of religion are estimated with rare moderation and sanity. 
This most scholarly and sympathetic attempt to describe the signi- 
ficant features of the religious life, marks the author as belong- 









Professor Leuba 1 s "Psychological Study of Religion", is one 
of the most thought provoking books which has emanated from the 
naturalistic wing of the American School of Religious Psychology. 
The propositions of this book are definite and perhaps dogmatic. 
Dr. Leuba has made generous use of the materials furnished by 
anthropology, sociology, and psychology, he has also extensively 
utilized private documents, and the questionnaire. The method 
with which Professor Leuba has worked in this study, is that 
which he has used in all his writings on this subject, namely, 
the comparative and genetic method.
Leuba's book falls into 4 divisions, Part I, sketches the 
nature and function of religion. Part II, discusses the origin 
of magic and religion. Part III, deals with religion in its
1. Leuba J.A. A Psychological Study of Religion, its
origin, function, and future. 1912.
MacMillan.Co.
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relation to morality, mythology, metaphysics, and psychology. 
Part IV, reviews modern developments in religion, and specifies 
of what kind the religion of the future must be.
PART I. 
THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF RELIGION.
Leuba begins with the proposition, it is natural for man to 
attempt to use every power he thinks is active in the world, to 
secure his ends, and there will be as many methods of control as 
there are thought to be forces amenable to control. "Three sorts 
of behaviour conditioned by the conception of 3 kinds of power 
are found among all peoples". The first, is Mechanical behaviour 
distinguished from all other kinds, by the presence of an implic- 
it notion of quantitative ratios between cause and effect, and by 
the absence of any reference to personal powers. The second, 
species of behaviour is the Magical, here there is no recognition 
of quantitative proportion between cause and effect. The unseen 
forces impersonal, or personal, are thought of as powers to be 
concussed into doing man's will by means of a certain technique. 
The third variety, is what Leuba calls Anthropopathic behaviour. 
This is that mode of behaviour which obtains among men in their 
relations with animals, and society. Here conduct is determin- 
ed by the thought of the intelligence, heart, or will of persons.
Here then, we get at Leuba's differentiation of religion 
from the rest of life. Religion cannot be distinguished by any 
special emotion or instinct, its distinctive mark is a specific 
mode of behaviour. Religion then is a species of anthropopathic
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behaviour. The aim of religion is to get into touch with a power 
conceived of as psychic and superhuman, by the methods of human 
intercourse, in order to use it in the struggle for existence. 
A belief in psychic superhuman powers, personal or impersonal is 
one condition only of religion's existence, the essential thing is 
the anthropopathic behaviour which such a belief elicits. Leuba 
Insists that religion must be defined in terms of behaviour, not of 
feeling or purpose, and that it originates in the desire to live, 
and to live well.
Religion has no supernatural origin. Belief in gods., arises 
naturally in the human mind. All the gods from the most primi- 
tive to the Christian Father are mental creations. The contin- 
uance of belief in "non-existent gods" is explained by the advan- 
tages such a false belief brings. Man thinks he gets control of 
Nature with the help of the gods; he believes the gods willmake rain 
for him; will ward off the lightning; and guide his arrow to the 
heart of his foe. Belief in the gods has a moralizing, and soc- 
ializing influence; it generates confidence, hope, optimism; thus 
it has dynamic value. Therefore on the whole, belief in gods 
which do not exist, produces results which make religion a factor 
of biological importance.
Man seeks in religion the satisfaction of his needs and crav- 
ings. In primitive religion these all have to do with self- 
preservation, and self-aggrandizement interpreted in terms of the 
tribe. Religion then begins as a purely utilitarian method of 
behaviour, which the savage adopts in order to get superhuman aid 
in his struggle for existence.
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Leuba criticizes current conceptions of religion. He says, 
we can't define religion in\terms of the intellect, or in terms 
of feeling, or in terms of will alone. None of these serves to
differentiate religion. Intellectualist, affectionist, and vol-
1. 
itionist conceptions of religion are all alike erroneous. "The
unit of conscious life is neither thoughtnor feeling, but both 
of them in a synthesis co-operating toward the attainment of an 
end". Religion then, with Leuba is the concern of the whole 
man.
Professor Leuba reminds us, that contemporary psychology 
has discarded the old static conceptions, and now works with 
evolutionary dynamic hypotheses. Psychology therefore inquires, 
what is the function of religion in human life? It finds re- 
ligion has originated and continues to exist, because something 
is to be either gained, or conserved by it. Man makes use of 
the gods in his struggle for life and development. Religion is 
the expression of man's will to have life and to have it more 
abundantly.
Religion exists then because of its biological value. 
Every human emotion and sentiment may appear in religion, but 
none is the mark of religion. That which marks religion off 
from other forms of human conduct is the kind of power on which 
dependence is felt, and the kind of behaviour which this power 
evokes. The power is psychic and superhuman, but not necessar- 
ily personal, and the behaviour is of the anthropopathic type.
1. In Appendix, Leuba gives 48 definitions of Religion
illustrating the 5 attitudes, Intellectualistic, Emotion- 
al and Voluntaristic with critical notes, pp.559-565.
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PART II. 
THE ORIGIN OP MAGIC AND RELIGION.
In this section Leuba begins by asking what are the mental re- 
quirements for the appearance of magic and religion? Dr. Leuba 
discovers by the comparative method, that the coercitive, and the 
religious species of anthropopathic behaviour are absent from the 
animal world, whereas mechanical, and non-religious anthropopathic 
behaviour are present in rudimentary form. This points to cer- 
tain mental powers in man, which are not possessed by the animals. 
These are the presence of free ideas, and the ability of these to 
issue in action. The ideas of animals are tethered to sensational 
objects, but the ideas of man can function in the absence of the 
objects to which they refer. The animal's universe is made up of 
what is sensed only, man's universe is all this, plus what is 
thought and imagined as well. In magic and religion man acts as 
though unperceived objects were actually present, because of his 
power of imagination, and his susceptibility to suggestion. These 
then are the mental processes that make magic and religion possible.
With respect to the origin of the idea of impersonal powers, 
Leuba affirms, active experiences gave rise to ideas of unseen 
agencies. These ideas evoked modes of behaviour both magical and 
religious. In this connection Leuba lays down an important pro- 
position, namely, belief in non-personal powers is prior to belief 
in personal agencies, and has absolutely no genetic connection 
with animism which appeared second in order of time. The two 
beliefs have independent origins.
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In support of this thesis, Leuba argues, that an interest in 
causes appears very early in the child. Such inquiries witness 
to the presence of the idea of power in the child's mind. This 
power is conceived of by the child as that which does things. But 
Leuba insists, that the child's idea of power is not personal. 
The child thinks of the wind as an active living thing, but not in 
the likeness of a man. Leuba argues, the notion of impersonal 
forces both moving and producing movement is simpler than that of 
the concept person, therefore this establishes a presumption that 
it appeared before the notion of personal causes. This comes 
later, and is got from the experience of effort in doing things. 
The two notions then arise in this order, and the more primitive 
idea of impersonal powers persists after the second idea of person- 
al powers has come into being. This is true of the child, and 
therefore of the savage.
Primitive man conceived of this non-personal power as an 
active force. In its presence the savage stood in dread and awe. 
He sought to concuss it by magical devices. Leuba asserts, that 
Tylor's "Animism" was antedated by this conception of nature which 
he calls "Dynamism". This is a conception of impersonal force 
having as its constituent idea, active power.
In dealing with the origin of ideas of unseen personal beings, 
Leuba castigates all monogenetic theories of origin, and advances 
the theory of a multiplicity of origins. There are three chief 
sources from which these ideas take their rise. First, dreams, 
trances and similar phenomena give birth to the notions of ghosts 
and spirits in human form, with human attributes. The second
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source is the spontaneous tendency to personify natural objects.
 
In the third place, the problem of creation gives rise to belief 
in some maker or makers.
All these sources of ideas of superhuman beings, may have 
operated either simultaneously, or successively, any order is 
possible. Leuba affirms, "the conceptions out of which the gods 
arise are of individual origin". These ideas fructify in the 
minds of specially gifted individuals, and through them become the 
possession of the community.
Now the ghosts, unseen personal beings, and makers in whom 
primitive man believes are not necessarily gods. All are connect- 
ed with the life of the tribe, but some only, possess the potent- 
ialities of divinity. Those beings only, who are felt by the 
savage to have to do with his fundamental needs in his struggle 
for life become gods. It is the will to live, that drives man to 
commerce with the unseen powers. Primitive gods are economic 
gods, they are "meat purveyors" to the tribe.
According to Professor Leuba, the gods must possess the 
following qualifications before they can be of use to men. First, 
they must be psychic agents capable of being influenced by volit- 
ion, thought, and feeling; second, they must be thought of as 
personal beings, with powers transcending human powers, which are 
indissolubly bound up with their very nature; third, they must be 
generally invisible; fourth, benevolence to men must be thought to 
be part of their make up; and further the gods must be accessible 
through anthropopathic measures. Now it is impossible for man to 
believe in such gods without attempting to avoid their anger or to
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seek their favour. Practices therefore arise to do one or other 
of these things. This is the origin of cult.
Leuba draws attention to the fact, that recent anthropologic- 
al researches are reinstating the opinion that in the lowest 
savage races a belief in a supreme being can be discovered. This 
belief however does not point to an original monotheism, nor to a 
special revelation at the beginning of religion. Leuba opposes
Lang, who propounds the theory of degeneration from a relatively
1. 
high and noble religious belief at the origin of society. Leuba
says, these "High God", and "All Fathers", are usually negligible 
quantities, and are not worshipped. All the worship is given to 
inferior gods and spirits, over which the "high god" has little or 
no control; why is this? Lang says, because we are viewing a 
degenerative state of religion, these lower beings are degraded 
high gods. Leuba holds on the contrary, that the inferior deit- 
ies are not thus related to the High Gods. Man comes to the idea 
of superhuman beings by many routes. He gets his god-ideas from 
dreams, apparitions, and from his personification of startling 
natural phenomena. But, "the High Gods proceeded from an inde- 
pendent and specific source, they were originally the makers". 
This, says Leuba, agrees with the two deliverances of modern 
anthropologyj namely, "that there exists among the most primitive 
people now living the notion of a Great God high above all others, 
to whom is usually assigned the function of creator", and second, 
"that these same people also believe in a crowd of spirits and 
ghosts".
1. Lang A. The Making of Religion. 2nd.Ed. Preface p.XVI.
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The inferior gods are not then degraded high gods, but arose
from other sources. Leuba admits however, that the notion of the
* 
Great Maker became degraded as it passed from the finer spirits
who conceived it to the masses, but holds this does not prove 
Lang f s theory of the deterioration of a people from a high state 
of religious life, but simply the deterioration of the god-ideas 
of rare individuals, at the hands of the multitude, who have not 
yet risen to the heights of those who set them their religious 
ideals. Gradually then in Leuba 1 s opinion the Great Maker becomes 
more remote from the practical lives of the people, and tends to 
lose his identity. He also tends to have the meaner attributes of 
the inferior gods thrust upon him.
Now the host of inferior gods and spirits take too much to do 
with the affairs of men. Often they are conceived of as malevol- 
ent in intention, therefore it is they who are feared, and pro- 
pitiated. The "high god" is conceived of as benevolent in intent- 
ion, but he has become dimly conceived, and is too remote from 
man's practical life to be of any use, therefore he doesn't matter 
much either way, and hence receives no worship. Religious rites, 
and cults begin in connection with gods conceived of as being close 
to man, and his vital interests*
Leuba holds religion does not originate in the emotions, no 
specific emotion is the mark of religion. He scouts the theory 
that fear gave rise to religion, though he concedes that "Fear is 
the most conspicuous emotion of primitive religious life", but 
Leuba adds, other emotions are also present, the savage is not in 
a chronic state of fright. Leuba contradicts W.R.Smith who in his
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"Religion of the Semites", maintains that the propitiation of evil
1. 
spirits is not religion. As against this Leuba argues, since it
is an anthropopathic relation with unseen beings, it is religion.
Professor Leuba emphasizes the fact, that there is emotional 
progression in the evolution of religion. Fear gives place to 
awe and awe to reverence. Then later come the sense of the sub- 
lime, gratitude, and the tender emotion. Leuba asserts, that in 
modern times fear is being banished from religion, and awe is 
following in its wake.
Four reasons are given for the decline of fear in modern 
Christianity: First, intellectual criticism of the old doctrines 
of eternal torment; second, phenomenal increase in the knowledge 
of the physical world. Third, modern M* intellectual and moral 
instruction. These three modern influences have robbed the old 
doctrines of their terrors. And lastly, the realization, that the 
instinctive fear reaction is generally the worst way to meet an 
emergency. The old ideas of an angry God, judgment, hell and the 
devil have ceased to terrify therefore, not only because men have 
ceased to believe in the proofs of these doctrines, but because 
to-day, men are not so easily frightened.
Professor Leuba now takes up the subject of magic. He re- 
stricts the term to those practices designed to secure definite 
gain by coercitive measures. Two things mark magical practices: 
First, they ignore quantitative ratios between cause and effect, 
and second, they disregard anthropopathic methods in dealing with 
the mysterious powers. Frazer's classification is criticized as
1. Smith W. R. The Religion of the Semites, p. 55.
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being too narrow. With Frazer, the whole system of magic rests
1. 
on two principles, the law of similarity, and that of contagion.
These laws are seen in operation in two classes of magic, imitat- 
ive magic, and contagious magic.
Leuba asserts, that though much magic may be brought under 
Frazer*s two classes, his classification does not take cognizance 
of several important varieties. Leuba draws attention to the 
fact, that there is a species of magic based on the principle of 
repetition. The savage gets it into his head that something that 
has happened once is likely to happen again. "The hook that has 
caught a big fish once will do so again". Now says Leuba, "the 
magic based, on the simple conviction that what has happened once 
is likely to happen again finds no place in Frazer 1 s system". The 
most important species of magic which is not covered by Frazer f s 
two principles, is what Leuba calls "Will Magic". This is based 
on the belief, that the exertion of the will of the magician is 
effective at a distance. Here belong spells, curses, and incant- 
ations. Leuba quotes Marett in support of his thesis that "Will
2. 
Magic" is an integral part of true magic.
Leuba proposes a threefold classification as a substitute for 
Frazer ! s twofold system. First, there is that species of magic 
found on the principle of repetition. Second, there is Sympathet- 
ic Magic, founded on the principle that what is done to an object 
will take effect on an absent object, if the magician thinks the 
two things together. There are three species of Sympathetic 
Magic. The first, is illustrated in the case where the savage
1. Frazer J.G. The Golden Bough.1923.Abrid.Ed. p.11.
2. Marett R.R. The Threshold of Religion, pp.53.71.
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thinks, that by injuring the likeness of a thing, he injures the 
thing itself. The second is based on the belief, that what is 
done to the tooth of a person or to any part of the person will 
happen to the person himself. The third, is found where the 
savage thinks, that by cooling the arrow he will allay the inflam- 
ation of the wound which the arrow has made. Leuba's third large 
class is "Will Magic". Here the sorcerer feels his will effort 
is an efficient factor in producing the result.
In discussing the origin of magical behaviour,Leuba emphatic- 
ally asserts,"the idea of non-personal powers is no more synonymous 
with magic, than the idea of great unseen personal beings is synony-' 
mous with religion". Magic and religion are with Leuba, two kinds 
of behaviour absolutely antithetical, which man adopts in the pres- 
ence of exigencies, which arise in the course of his struggle for 
life, and aggrandizement. If he believes in the existence of 
mysterious unseen non-personal powers he will probably try to con- 
cuss them. It is this fact of coercion, which is of the essence 
of magic. If the savage believes in the existence of personal 
powers he will generally attempt to conciliate them, by anthropop- 
athic methods, and this makes his behaviour religious. He may 
conceivably hold both beliefs at once, then his behaviour will most 
likely be both magical and religious. Man may even try to coerce 
the personal powers, if so this is magic, and this is why magical 
practices may continue even after belief in personal powers has 
been established. The differentia of magic, and religion is not 
then the nature of the powers believed in, but the nature of the 
behaviour.
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With regard to the origin of magical practices revealed by 
anthropology, Leuba advances the following propositions.
1. Certain magical practices, and superstitions seem senseless, 
and to have had no rational genesis. At all events, no reason 
can be assigned in our present state of knowledge.
2. Certain magical beliefs are sourced in shrewd bogies, which 
were invented by sorcerers and chieftains for the utilitarian 
purpose of controlling women, children, and the tribe. Threats 
were made by medicine men, chiefs, and kings, for the purpose 
of preserving the things vital to the existence of the tribe, 
and also to secure their own authority. Mere bogies therefore^ 
became deep rooted magical beliefs.
3. The thought of being able to avoid calamity, and to secure 
success in war or the chase, by performing some praiseworthy 
action gave rise to other magical customs.
4. Many magical practices arose from the spontaneous response of 
the psycho-physical organism to specific situations of the en- 
vironment. Tension and excitement must issue in movement. A 
chance coincidence may be observed between such movements and 
success in fighting or in hunting. Thereafter it would become 
a magical practice. This is magic arising by chance. Movements 
without any magical intention thus get magical significance.
5. Magical practices however may be more deliberately brought into 
being. The principles of magic seem to be more or less defined 
for the mind of primitive man. The principle of "like produces 
like" seems to have been universally applied, but the savage 
cannot distinguish between the "likes" that produce "like" and 
those that do not,hence his unreasonable expectations.
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So much for the sources of magical practices, Leuba now turns 
to the origin of religious practices, which he dismisses in a few 
words. The sources he says are obvious, first, certain magical 
practices are taken over by religion, e.g. the magical ceremonies 
used in rain-making get transferred to religion when rain is re- 
cognized as the gift of the gods. Second, practices observed in 
human intercourse, such as approaching a potentate, are carried 
over into religion. Third, friendly offices towards the dead 
become transformed into religious rites. Fourth, when god-ideas 
appear, non-religious social feasts become part of religious cere- 
monial. And lastly, the occupations, customs, and principal inter- 
ests of a people become embodied in their god-ideas, and reflected 
in their religious rites.
In connection with Leuba 1 s discussion of the nature of magic, 
religion, and their relations to each other, he lays down a most 
important thesis. He asserts magic and religion are independent 
in origin,neither has genetic connection with the other. In this 
connection Leuba breaks a lance with Frazer. Frazer f s theory is 
briefly, that the finer spirits of the community began to recog- 
nize the futility of magical procedure to influence the course of 
nature, and that in their despair they were led to conclude there
were superhuman beings behind the screen of nature to whom they
1. 
turned for succour. In some such way Frazer conceives primitive
man making the transition from magic to religion. Leuba scouts 
Frazer 1 s thesis, he argues, Frazer 1 s theory of the genesis of the 
gods is superfluous, since they are already accounted for by a more 
valid hypothesis; namely, that in dreams, trances, apparitions 
1. Frazer J.G. The Golden Bough 1923. Abrid.Ed.pp.57.58.
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the impulse to personify natural phenomena, and in man's curiosity 
as to a creator of things, we have the manifold source of god-ideas 
Again, Frazer's assumption, that men lost faith in magic when 
they found it abortive is improbable, for the magician would at 
once ascribe his failure to the counter influence of another rival 
in his art. He would not therefore doubt the efficacy of magic. 
His one aim would be to get much more of it to defeat the machinat- 
ions of his rival. Again, primitive man does not write down his 
failures with a broad brush. Leuba says, Frazer ignores the psych
ology of credulity. It is easy for primitive man to account for
1. 
his failures without giving up belief in magic, Leuba holds,that
magic did not fall on evil days in the way supposed by Frazer. 
Religion has no genetic connection with magic. Magic maintained 
its existence long after religion came into being. Religion did 
not arise on the ruins of magic, but the two do react on each 
other. Ivlagic being prior to religion would tend to retard the re- 
ligious method of securing the same ends. Leuba makes a concess- 
ion to Frazer when he declares,"had magic satisfied man's desires 
he would have paid scant attention to the gods","for it is mainly 
in times of trial that man turns to them". Leuba seems to admit, 
that the inadequacy of magic was felt, and that the despair of 
magic, while it was not the origin of religion, certainly assisted 
its development. Leuba holds, that magic is prior to religion, 
though this question is for him not important, since these two
1. Leuba J.H. A Psychological Study of Religion,p.178, Here 
Leuba gives a splendid illustration of modern credulity in 
connection with Spiritualism which retains its hold in 
spite of thousands of failures.
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things are not genetically related. His argument seems to be that 
since more elementary observations, and simpler mental processes 
seem to be involved in magic than in religion, therefore magic 
antedates religion.
As against anthropologists who assert that in their rudiment- 
ary forms, magic and religion can scarcely be differentiated, Leuba 
maintains, that though magic and religion are often found together 
it is always possible to distinguish them. It is the feeling 
attitude and the consequent behaviour which constitute the touch- 
stone .
Leuba, while agreeing in the main with writers, who affirm 
that religion is pre-eminently social, public, and beneficent, 
while magic is individual, private, secret in its methods, and evil 
in intention, asserts there is nothing in magic to make it necessar- 
ily private or evil. "There is an abundance of magic performed 
not for the individual only, but for a group, or for a whole tribe, 
a magic the technique of which is public and the intention benevol- 
ent". Therefore with Leuba, the terms social, and individualistic, 
cannot be used to differentite magic from religion, the difference 
is between two opposite types of behaviour.
Leuba holds, that magic falls into disrepute sooner than re- 
ligion for two reasons. "Since the power with which magic deals is 
not personal, it cannot provide the comfort found in communion 
with a loving All-Father, and it cannot serve as a stay and inspir- 
ation of the moral life". The second reason is, that the princi- 
ples of science are opposed to magic. "Science is built on the prin- 
ciple that a quantitative relation exists between cause and effect
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As soon as this notion found lodgement in the human mind, magic 
became on logical grounds radically inacceptable".
Just as emphatically as Leuba contends religion is not deriv- 
ed from magic, with the same heat he argues magic is not the 
matrix of science. Magic is absolutely opposed to scientific pro- 
cedure. The clear recognition of the principle of quantitative 
ratios between causes and effects pronounces the doom of magic. 
This is Leuba 1 s proof that magic and science are not genetically 
related. From whence then is science? Science takes its rise 
from the third type of behaviour on the part of primitive man, 
which Leuba calls mechanical behaviour. He considers that the 
quantitative principle on which science is built is here present 
in the germ. When this principle is clearly recognized mechanic- 
al behaviour becomes science. "The savage is nearer the scienti- 
fic spirit, and its methods when he constructs a weapon to fit a 
particular purpose, or when he adjusts his bow and arrow to the 
direction and strength of the wind than when he exercises diseases, 
burns an enemy in effigy, or abstains from sexual intercourse to 
promote success in the hunt" .
PART III.
RELIGION IN ITS RELATION TO
MORALITY, MYTHOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY . 
With Leuba, morality has a non-religious origin, it is a spont- 
aneous human product issuing out of ordinary social relationships. 
The appearance of moral consciousness and conscience have no gene- 
tic connection with religion. Ethnological discoveries prove the
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the existence of social virtues among savages, without religious 
sanctions. Customs come into being and are enforced by the tribe 
to save it from disintegration. Punishment for violation of cus- 
tom comes not from gods, but from the elder men. The struggle for 
existence gives rise to two codes of morality. One which regulates 
the conduct of members of the tribe to each other, and another 
which has to do with the behaviour of the tribe towards members of 
other tribes. Here then we have in Spencer's language "the ethics 
of amity", and "the ethics of enmity". To kill a fellow tribesman 
is a crime; to kill a member of a hostile tribe is a virtue. 
Reflective morality succeeds this customary morality, and men at- 
tempt to outline an ideal social order. But both customary moral- 
ity, and reflective morality are the outcome of social experience. 
Ethical values are established without the assistance of religion. 
Though morality is not sourced in religion, religion is concerned 
in the maintenance of tribal morality. The gods come to be
thought of as the custodians of moral values. Man has moral needs 
and cravings, he therefore endows his gods with the moral attrib- 
utes which will satisfy these needs. Religion says Leuba always 
supports the accepted moral customs of the community. In one 
country it places its aegis over polygamy, in another it sternly 
condemns it. With Leuba, religion is an instrument of morality 
but an instrument of which morality is becoming increasingly inde- 
pendent. The gods may be used as devices to assist in the attain- 
ment of moral ideals. His conclusion is, that"morality and relig- 
ion do not need each other in order to come into existence, but 
when they have appeared, religious beliefs are speedily called
266.
upon for the gratification of moral needs".
With regard to religion and mythology, Leuba agrees with
1. 
Andrew Lang that these arise from two different moods. Religion
takes its rise from the earnest and serious mood, while the humour- 
ous and fanciful, is the source of mythology. Leuba affirms,
i
that the nature of the gods will depend largely upon man's moods. 
When in the aesthetic mood, man will model his gods in marble, and 
his attitude will be that of an artist; when the humourous and 
fanciful mood is upon him, man becomes a maker of myths; when man 
speculates as to the origin and nature of the gods, he becomes a 
philosopher; but it is only when man is terribly in earnest about 
his relations with the superhuman powers that he is religious.
In the chapter on Theology and Psychology, Leuba turns his 
artillery on the Ritschlian position. An attempt has been made, 
he says, in modern times by Theology to reject metaphysics and 
science, because it is afraid of their criticism. Along with this 
distrust of metaphysics there has been a scrapping of the old 
metaphysical arguments for the Being and nature of God. To-day, 
says Leuba, belief in the existence of God rests on an inner exper- 
ience which is considered to be an immediate revelation of God. 
Leuba cites a mass of documentary evidence to prove that this is 
the position of prominent contemporary theologians. Modern theol- 
ogy claims that religious'knowledge is given immediately in exper- 
ience, this inner experience is real, and is certain evidence of 
the existence of God. Now, says Leuba gleefully, since this is 
the position of modern theology, namely, that the existence of God
1. Lang Andrew. The Making of Religion. 2nd.Ed.Preface p.XII.
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is an inference from subjective experience, religion and theology 
are delivered into my hands. Leuba states, that as long as theol- 
ogy was reinforced by metaphysics her metaphysical deity was immune 
from attack by psychology, but since theology proclaims that sub- 
jective religious experience is the proof of the divine nature of 
religion, and that its Divine objects are inductions from exper- 
ience, then "the gods of religion are empirical gods, and belong to 
science". Modern empirical theology therefore, must become a 
branch of psychology.
Leuba concedes, that while the subject of religious experiences 
remains within the subjective sphere, his experiences are inviolable, 
Science accepts these as facts of consciousness which cannot be de- 
nied. But the moment the religious man asserts that these subject- 
ive experiences have an objective reality corresponding to them, 
then the science of psychology may pronounce on the question of the 
validity of this reality. We do not deny, says Leuba, that the 
religious man has certain experiences, but only that his construct- 
ion of these is true. The religious man affirms that his exper- 
iences prove the existence of God who is acting on his consciousness. 
Now,says Leuba, whatever appears in consciousness is fair game for 
psychology. If superhuman factors are at work in consciousness, 
psychology would be able to find them, or at all events, to dis- 
cover some mental phenomena for which natural causes cannot account. 
But there is no phenomena of the religious life which cannot be ex- 
plicated in terms of psycho-physical laws. Man's subjective relig- 
ious experiences have no objective reference. There are no Divine 
realities corresponding to the religious man's experiences. It may
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be comforting to believe that the world is controlled by a living 
personal God, accessible to human need, able to satisfy moral crav- 
ings, capable of being influenced by love, able and willing to 
guide, a spirit in some sort akin to ourselves, but it is a pleas- 
ant dream, for no such being exists. There are no gods.
Why then do the majority of sane men in modern times believe 
in God? Because says Leuba the wish is father to the thought. 
Men believe in God by an act of faith. They have the conviction 
that religion conserves'the things of supreme value for their life. 
When faced therefore with the scientific account of religious ex- 
perience, and the Theistic version, by an act of the will to be- 
lieve, they choose the unscientific account. Faith in God is 
based not on reason, but on human needs emotional and moral. Men 
actually find these needs satisfied with the gods of religion and 
these urgent needs defeat reason.
It is important to notice Leuba's conception of the task and 
scope of the psychology of religion. Leuba asserts that religion 
consists in relations maintained by man with superhuman powers of 
a psychic kind. If these relations take the form of sensations, 
images, conceptions, sentiments, and emotions, and issue in activ- 
ity, then they like other departments of conscious life are the 
legitimate study of psychology. The task of the psychology of 
religion then, is to observe, compare, analyse, and determine the 
conditions and consequences of these facts.
What of visions, revelations, the imperative sense of obligat- 
ion, and the definite feeling of being wrought upon by an external 
power, do not these phenomena require a transcendent explanation?
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Leuba says they do not, everything in the religious life can be 
covered by the laws of general psychology, the psychology of suggest 
ion, and the psychology of the sub-conscious. Leuba cites William
nJames in support of his assertion. James, he says, in his Varieties 
explained everything from conversion to mysticism without needing to 
posit an extra human cause.
Finally, Leuba meets the objection, that in order to under- 
stand religious experiences one must have been the subject of them. 
This he appears to think is a frivolous objection. "It is not
 
necessary", he says, "to be a soldier in order to understand milit- 
ary life, nor mad in order to make researches in mental alienation". 
"Devotion to religion is much more likely to make one hopelessly 
biassed, and blind".
PART IV.
THE LATEST FORMS AND THE FUTURE OF RELIGION. 
The last section of Leuba 1 s interesting and incisive work 
treats of the latest forms, and the future of religion. Five things 
are conspicuous in the environment of modern religion. First, pan- 
theism is pushing its way into modern religious thought. Pantheism 
has triumphed in philosophy says Leuba, because of its logical con- 
sistency, as witness, the "God" of Spinoza and Schelling, the 
"Regulative Idea" of Kant, the "Absolute Ego" of Fichte, and the 
"Absolute Idea" of Hegel. Pantheism would also sweep all before 
it in religion, were it not that it fails to meet certain human 
needs, which Christian Theism satisfies. Second, modern theology 
is attempting to use both the conceptions of Theism and Pantheism
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with a fine scorn for logical consistency. Here Leuba points to 
the heavy accent placed on the idea of immanence in modern theol- 
ogy. The attempt to reap the advantages of both Pantheism and 
Theism results in a fusing and a confusing of two contradictory 
conceptions.
In the third place, Leuba draws attention to the phenomenal 
rise and development of psychotherapic cults in modern times,of 
which Christian Science, Mind Cure, and New Thought are conspic- 
uous examples. Now the metaphysics of these movements defies 
logic, and even common sense, but these cults give simple formu- 
lations of a non-theistic philosophy tinctured with the absolute 
idealism of modern metaphysics. They also popularize the truisms 
of psychology concerning the influence of mind over body; further, 
they play on the great human need for deliverance from moral and 
physical miseries. These cults moreover, do cure a number of 
cases, and to the masses now as always, the most impressive thing 
about a cult, or a religion is its power to heal the body. All 
the cures that result take place in accordance with psychological 
laws, mental suggestion playing the chief role. These then are 
the main reasons why psychotherapic cults flourish in modern times.
Leuba emphasizes in the fourth place the fact, that "the one 
essential respect in which the religious situation is changed is 
the general absence of a bona fide belief in personal divinities". 
"The leaders in Philosophy, Science, Literature, and even in Re- 
ligion, as well as increasing numbers of the rank and file, reject 
openly or secretly the traditional Christian belief in a Divine 
Father in direct communication with man". These then are the
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most conspicuous features in the religious life of modern times 
according to Leuba. Another movement presents itself to Leuba as 
he looks out over modern life, and this is a tendency towards a 
religion of humanity after the manner of Comte.
Having thus indicated the chief circumstances of the modern 
age as these effect religion, Leuba goes on to say, modern men 
find it impossible to believe in the traditional religion, but 
they still want help to achieve their moral ideals, their needs 
are still clamant, and the struggle for life still exists. There- 
fore men must have a religion of some sort. Leuba now attempts 
to outline the kind of religion which will be seriously considered 
by the present and future generations.
The notion, that belief in God, or in a moral purpose at the 
heart of things is necessary to moral feelings and judgments will 
have no place in the new religion, but in spite of this ethical 
and humanitarian values will stand firm. Leuba insists a person- 
al God will not be tolerated in the future religion, such a God is 
not even believed in by the thoughtful men of the present generat- 
ion.
Again Leuba asserts, "the religion of the future will have to 
rest content apparently with the idea of a non-purposive Creative 
Force making of the universe neither an accidental creation nor 
one shaped in accordance with some preconceived plan". Leuba sug- 
gests, that man would find all he wants in Bergson's idea, of "a 
power describable as an impetus coursing through matter, and draw- 
ing from it what it can, a power appearing in man in the form of 
striving consciousness".
1. Bergson Henri, Creative Evolution, pp.248,251,261,265.
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Along with this last fact Leuba states, that "the great mass of 
enlightened men"can get along without the personal God, and immortal- 
ity, but they agree with the following utterance; "These three ideas*- 
the idea of righteousness, the idea that justice will gain the as- 
cendancy, and that there is a sublime purpose in things, these I 
would not give up". Hence room must be made for these apparently 
indispensable ideas in the new religion.
Leuba inclines to the view, that a religion is possible in 
which "the idea of Humanity would play a role similar to the one 
given it in Comtism, but in which Humanity would be regarded as an 
expression of a transhuman power realizing itself in Humanity". 
"Humanity idealized, and conceived as a manifestation of creative 
energy possesses surpassing qualifications for a source of relig- 
ious inspiration. In Humanity each person can regard himself as a 
link in the chain connecting the hosts of the past with the hosts 
that are to come. The recognition of this vast relationship would 
give a sense of fellowship and unity, a feeling of responsibility 
and dignity; it would make a world worthy of one's best efforts"
In Professor Leuba's opinion"The sense of weakness and imper- 
fection, the need of comfort and encouragement, the desire for the
 
final triumph of good", can all be met by the proposed new religion 
of humanity. This religion would gather to itself the best elements 
of the therapeutic cults, and would be in thorough agreement with 
"the accepted body of scientific knowledge". Such a religion nuc- 
leating about humanity"conceived as a Force tending to the creation 
of an ideal society", is for Leuba and"the great mass of enlightened 
men", the coming religion.
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CRITIQUE.
If any religious man fondly imagines that the psychology of 
religion is to be the handmaid of religion, and is to constitute 
the modern apologetic for Christian Theism, a perusal of Professor 
Leuba 1 s definite, and dogmatic book will speedily disabuse his 
mind of that idea. The Professor protests, evidently in antici- 
pation of the possible panic of the pious reader, that "he has re- 
tained a sympathetic appreciation and understanding of religious
1. 
life". All lovers of religion, who read Leuba's interesting
study will certainly lay down the book with a profound wish that 
the able author had a little less of this sympathetic appreciation, 
which strongly resembles the friendship of Brutus for Ceasar whom 
he slew. Leuba 1 s friendly regard for the religious life is like 
a boa-constrictor's sympathy for its victim, which is slimed before 
it is swallowed. Those religious leaders who trusted it had been 
Psychology which should have redeemed Israel, should ponder well 
this important book which is probably, the most formidable and 
subtle attack on religion, which has been published in recent times.
1. Leuba J.H, The Psychology Study of Religion. Footnote p.275,
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Leuba's book is a study of origins. It is a genetic treat- 
ment of magic and religion from the standpoint of a naturalism whose 
thoroughness leaves nothing to be desired. Dr. Leuba's book covers 
such a tremendous field, that a detailed critical estimate is impos- 
sible here. Certain of Leuba's statements however specially 
challenge criticism, to these we will now turn our attention.
Leuba insists that belief in impersonal forces preceded belief 
in personal powers. This statement challenges controversy. It 
has already been stated, that Leuba works with the comparative and 
genetic method. He takes the consciousness of a modern child liv- 
ing in the relatively cultured atmosphere of an American city as his 
norm of comparison, then by the process of deduction, he argues from 
the analogy of the mind of the modern child, to the mental state of 
prehistoric man. Leuba's confident pronouncements are made on 
this basis. This surely savours of recklessness.
Leuba asserts, that the child views anything that has self- 
movement such as clouds, wind, and smoke as alive, but not as per- 
sonal. Now Leuba argues, primitive man will conceive the phenomena 
of the natural world in the same way. He gets hold of the idea of 
something acting, and doing things, but the thought of person is far 
from his mind. It is natural that this notion of impersonal force 
should appear first, says Leuba, because, "this idea of forces cap- 
able of self-movement or of producing movement and change, is simpler 
than the concept person". Is this last assertion accurate? Surely 
the conception of a dynamic power, non-persona\l,and causal is far 
more involved than the idea of person, and as McDougall says, it is 




Again the statement that this rudimentary scientific notion 
takes precedence of the thought of personal powers in the average 
child's mind, needs to be accompanied with more proof than Leuba 
has thought fit to give. Even if it were true of the modern child 
it is a hazardous inference to^argue that this is also true of the 
mentality of prehistoric man.
Leuba's thesis, that primitive man begins his thinking about 
natural phenomena in terms of non-personal physical force, and only 
afterwards thinks these phenomena in terms of persons, contradicts 
a formidable phalanx of social psychologists, of whom William 
McDougall may be taken as a typical representative. The funda- 
mental doctrine of this school is, that all human thought begins 
with persons and in terms of persons, while the conception of the 
phenomena and forces of nature as impersonal powers belongs to a 
relatively late development. Self-consciousness is a social pro- 
duct arising from the interplay of the self with other persons.
McDougall asserts, that at first, the child does not disting- 
uish between persons and inanimate objects. "In the first months 
of life his attention is predominantly drawn to persons, at first 
merely because they are the objects that most frequently move and 
emit sounds, later because they bring him relief from hunger and 
other discomfits". Along with this, McDougall points out that 
very early from the experience of effort the child comes to assume 
in the objects of the external world"the capacities of feeling and 
effort, of emotion and sympathetic response, that he himself re- 
peatedly experiences. Inanimate objects are at first conceived
1. McDougall W. Social Psychology, p.505.
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after the same pattern as persons, and only in the course of some 
years does he gradually learn to distinguish clearly between per- 
sons and things, divesting his idea of inanimate things little by 
little, but never perhaps, completely, of the personal attributes,
the capacities for feeling and effort, which he recognizes in him-
1. 
self". The untutored savage likewise does not picture nature as
a system of impersonal forces but rather as manifesting conscious
2. 
will and personal agency.
We do not think that Professor Leuba f s argument for the prior- 
ity of belief in impersonal powers is strong enough to cause us to 
repudiate the deliverance of modern social psychology. Leuba here 
has apparently fallen into the snare of the psychologist, and has 
projected a sophisticated view of nature into the mind of the un-
THEsophisticated savage. The order of the development of A child-mind 
seems to have been at first merely sensational, then thought in 
terms of persons, and later thought in terms of impersonal powers. 
Durkheim holds that the powers of the physical world are at first 
conceived in connection with the ideas of authority and domination
which are socially created ideas. The first powers of which the
5. 
human mind has any idea are those which arise in human society.
Leuba maintains throughout this study, that three types of 
behaviour can be sharply differentiated, "even in the most primi- 
tive tribes": the mechanical, the coercitive, and the anthropopath- 
ic. Leuba 1 s differentiation seems too clear, and arbitrary. 
Professor Ames says that Lewis H. Morgan in his "Ancient Society"
1. McDougall William. Social Psychology.pp.183-184.
2. Frazer J.G. The Golden Bough. Abrid.Ed.1923. p.91.
3. Durkheim Emile. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
p. 366.
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suggests, "that if 100,000 years be assumed as the measure of man's 
existence upon the earth, the first 60,000 years must be assigned
to the period of savagery and only the last 5,000 years to civilis-
1. 
ation". Leuba places the differentiation of magical, religious,
and scientific modes of procedure at far too early a period. The 
majority of Anthropologists hold it is next to impossible to fix
severe boundaries between morality, philosophy, poetry, art, magic,
2. 
religion, and science in primitive life. Especially are magic,
science, and religion blent in an inchoate mass. In primitive 
life we do not have three well marked modes of behaviour, the magic- 
al, the religious, and the scientific, but just a protoplasmic mass 
of human activities and potentialities which gradually become dif- 
ferentiated and make themselves articulate. The mechanical type of 
behaviour which Leuba says, "implies the practical recognition of a 
fairly definite and constant quantitative relation between cause 
and effect" must have developed at a relatively late period. Leuba's 
picture of man's primitive life seems drawn out of perspective.
There is a strong presumption that primitive man lacked almost com-
3. 
pletely the conception of mechanical causation.
All through this interesting study, Leuba is concerned to prove 
that magic and science are not related in any wise. He is emphatic 
that science is not latent in magic. The two things are most dis- 
parate, are absolutely independent in origin, and are sworn foes. 
This is practically a petitio principil, for Leuba does not satis- 
factorily explain the origin of science. He dismisses this most
1. Ames E.S. The Psychology of Religious Experience.p.34.
2. Ames E.S. op.cit.p. 33.
3. McDougall W. Social Psychology, p.303.
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important issue with the few barren words,"Science is built on the 
principle that a quantitative relation exists between cause and 
effect. As soon as this notion found lodgment in the human mind, 
magic became on logical grounds radically inacceptable".
Leuba ! s thesis is, that embryonic science is resident in the 
mechanical type of behaviour, but not a germ of science is to be 
found in magic or religion. Leuba is antipathetic to the idea 
that magic had to do with the beginnings of science, apparently 
because he regards it as an inferior kind of behaviour. He cites 
the case of the savage adjusting his bow to the strength and dir- 
ection of the wind. This mechanical behaviour Leuba says is near- 
er to the scientific spirit, and is superior to the magical behav- 
iour manifested in the burning of an effigy. Can we so clearly 
differentiate the mechanical and magical modes of behaviour at 
this primitive stage of culture. If the arrows of the savage have
 
been subject to a favourable magic incantation, will he not adjust, 
and draw his bow with greater confidence. Again Leuba himself 
has shown, that man f s superiority to the brute creation lies not ir 
this kind of adjustment to a perceptual situation, but in the pos- 
session of untethered ideas, which make magic and religion imposs- 
ible. Therefore we opine, the savage adjusting his bow to the 
wind, is not performing an act superior to the burning of an effigy 
for this involves the use of free ideas.
In order to obviate the necessity of giving magic the honour 
of being the matrix of science, Leuba posits mechanical behaviour 
as its progenitor. When distinct types of behaviour corresponding 
with different conceptions of power, emerged from the undifferent-
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iated mass of primitive human activities, it is unlikely that the 
mechanical type which on Leuba's showing implies the recognition 
of definite quantitative ratios between cause and effect, was 
prior to magical or religious behaviour. The view which best fits 
the facts seems to be, that whatever consciousness the savage had 
concerning quantitative ratios between causes and effects, was 
part and parcel of his magic consciousness.
Evidence is not lacking to show that in primitive magic a 
great deal of crude science was seeking to become articulate. 
Magic and science have a great deal in common. Both are practical 
in aim, and seek to control natural forces. Magic is the express- 
ion of man's desire to control the forces of his environment,
while he is yet ignorant of their nature. As civilization advan-
!  
ces magic becomes science. It is most probable that magic was
the trail-blazer of science. Professor Wundt says, "the causality
of natural law as we know it, would hardly have been possible had
2. 
not magical causality prepared the way for it". Frazer points
out that the fundamental conception of magic is identical with
that of modern science. "Underlying the whole system is a faith, ,
3 
implicit but real and firm, in the order and uniformity of nature",
Frazer brings out the fact, that the magician can wield his power 
only so long as he strictly conforms to "what may be called the 
laws of nature as conceived by him". "The fatal flaw of magic
lies in its total misconception of "the nature of the particular
4. 
laws which govern the sequence of events".
1. McDougall William. Social Psychology, p.506.
2. Wundt Wilhelm. Elements of Folk Psychology, p.93.
3. Frazer J.G. The Golden Bough, p.49. 190*
4. Frazer J.G. ibid. 25 '
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Leuba adduces two facts, which he holds supports his view that 
science is not the precursor of magic. First, he points out they
are so disparate and unlike. But .likeness is no disproof of genet- 
ic connection. Lepidoptera are most unlike the grubs from which 
they take their rise. The second fact Leuba mentions is, that 
science is at enmity with magic and that the war is one of extermin- 
ation. But enmity does not disprove blood relationship, the most 
bloody wars are civil. The fact that magic is driven out of exist- 
ence, as science advances does not prove that these two things were 
never related. If magic were faulty science, and there is good
reason to suppose with Frazer that magic was the mental discipline
1. 
which prepared men for the scientific method, then Leuba' s proposit-
ion only means that crude formulations of the forces of nature, and
*
methods of control reeking with error, must go down to the grave un- 
wept, unhonoured, and unsung, when better formulations, and better
%
methods appear. In a word, bad scientific notions must give way 
to better. Copernican science pronounced the doom of the Ptolemaic, 
but this did not disprove their genetic connection.
Leuba asserts that as soon as the notion of quantitative ratios 
found sanctuary in the human mind, magic became "radically inaccept- 
able". Does not psychology place on record the interesting fact, 
that contradictory notions may dwell peacefully together in the same 
mind, their inconsistency hardly ever being perceived by the person 
who harbours them. A trained scientist may accept the mechanistic 
explanation of natural phenomena, and at the same time, as a devout 
Roman Catholic, hold the doctrine of transubstantiation which con- 
tradicts the laws of chemistry and physics. This strange phenomenoif 
1. Frazer J.G. The Golden Bough. 1923, Abrid.Ed.p.92.
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of the human mind is referred to by Macaulay in his essay on
Samuel Johnson, of whom he says,"he began to be credulous precisely 
at the point where the most credulous people began to be sceptical". 
Johnson rejected with fine scorn accounts which were not fully 
authenticated even when they were congruent with the laws of nature, 
but listened respectfully to the wildest stories relating to the 
invisible world. Leuba's assertion then seems to be untrue to 
these facts of human psychology. It is hard to believe that the 
notion of quantitative ratios destroyed magic as instantaneously, 
or as magically as Leuba's statement makes out. On the whole we 
think Leuba's argument for the absolutely independent origin of 
science, is not proven.
In connection with the question of the origin of the gods, 
Leuba's criticism of monogenetic theories of origin seems in the 
main just. It is singular however, that in his enumeration of 
the various sources of god-ideas he completely ignores the fruit- 
ful conception of MMana". Modern anthropology finds in "Mana" the 
protoplasmic mass which afterwards became individualized into Gods. 
Durkheim may be taken as a typical representative in this connect- 
ion, speaking of "Mana" he says,"this is the original matter out of 
which have been constructed those beings of every sort which the 
religions of all times have consecrated and adored. The spirits, 
demons, genii and gods of every sort are only the concrete forms 
taken by this energy or "potentiality", in individualizing itself".' 
"Mana" then in the opinion of the majority of modern anthropologistc
t»
is the most primitive conception of the supernatural which we have 
yet discovered. It is a conception which is universal among
1. Durkheim Emile.The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
p.199.
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savage peoples. It is known by the name of "Oudah" among the
1. 
Pygmies in Africa. The Sioux call it "Wakan". Among the Iroquois
it is called "Orenda". The Shoshone tribes name it "Pokunt", and
2. 
among the Algonquin it is called "Manitou". In Melanesia this con-
ception is known as "Mana". Anthropology has taken this term over 
into its vocabulary as the one best fitted to denote that diffused, 
amorphous, ubiquitous power which the Melanesian authority Codringtton 
says, "is a power or influence, not physical and in a way supernatur- 
al; but it shows itself in physical force, or in any kind of power 
or excellence which a man possesses. This mana is not fixed in 
anything, and can be conveyed in almost anything. All Melanesian
religion consists, in fact, in getting this mana for oneself, or
3. 
getting it used for one's benefit".
This concept "Mana" then is that with which modern anthropology 
works. The genesis of many of the god-ideas may be traced back to 
this primordial conception. This conception which has the imprim- 
atur of anthropology is the working hypothesis of not a few of the
eminent psychologists in the field of religion. Professor Coe
2. 
speaks of "Mana" as "the taproot of god-belief". Professor Pratt
holds "that the earliest religious object was in all probability 
that impersonal and superhuman power which the Melanesians called
"Mana". Pratt inclines to the view that both magic and belief in
5. 
spirits grew out of the "original concept of Mana". This theory of
a protoplasmic mass which has been subsequently individualized into 
gods, a theory which has the backing of a great number of eminent
1. Wright W.K. A Student's Philosophy of Religion, p.27.
2. Durkheim E". op.cit.pp.192-194.
3. Codrington. The Melanesians. p.118.
4. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion, p.90.
5. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p.310,311.
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anthropologists and psychologists deserves more recognition than
Leuba has seen fit to give it. In fact Leuba has ignored it com- 
pletely in his discussion of the origin of god-ideas.
In his study of religion Dr. Leuba seems over-eager to discount 
the part played by emotion in the genesis of religion, especially 
is he concerned to point out, that religion did not originate in 
the emotion of fear. In view of the fact that there is much evid- 
ence to support the view that fear was the primary and dominant 
emotion at the inception of religion, Leuba's assertions in this con- 
nection, need to be accepted with reservations. Though it is 
doubtless true as Leuba reminds us that the savage is not in a 
chronic state of fright, yet the objects of his terror were the 
first objects of his attention. The regular rising and setting of
the sun and moon, and other usual operations of nature probably
1. 
gripped primitive man's attention as little as it does our own. But
r-
it was otherwise with the irregular happenings in his experience, 
such as disease and death, flood and famine, the lightning's flash 
and the thunder's roar. These were the events upon which his mind 
pondered, and his imagination constructed terrible powers to account 
for these fearful events. The savage therefore was frequently in a 
state of fright, and instinctively tried to avoid giving offence to 
these awful powers. McDougall suggests that the gods have had an 
emotional and instinctive origin. His view is that the objects of 
primitive man's terror were also the objects of his curiosity. His 
imagination under the influence of fear pictured terrible powers 
back of the phenomena, immediately,the instinct of subjection was 
evoked with its emotion of negative self-feeling. Further primitive 
1. Wundt Wilhelm. Elements of Folk Psychology. P.92.
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man finding himself in this submissive attitude before these terri- 
ble powers, which is a personal attitude arguing a personal relat- 
ion, was led to project on to these powers the personal qualities 
of power and wrath which are the natural stimuli of this instinct 
among men. Thus primitive man evolved personal gods from the 
instincts and emotions excited by the objects of terror in his en- 
vironment. Man began by fearing and wondering in the presence of
these powers, he ended by humbling himself before them. This is
1. 
the beginning of religion.
McDougall's theory of the emotional and instinctive origin of
*
religion is supported by Wundt. He indicates that fear plays a 
larger part in the life of primitive man than Leuba is inclined to
allow, "a richly developed set of demon-ideas dominates the daily
2. 
life of primitive man". Wundt points out the fact that belief in
magic and demons is the most conspicuous feature of primitive life, 
This belief in demons is the product of terrifying situations. 
The terrifying phenomena of death and sickness are the. main sources 
of belief in demons. Magic comes into existence as a method of 
protection against the power of the demons, by its means they can
be propitiated or restrained. This demonology prepares the way
5. 
for religion proper. With Wundt, religion does not really begin
till gods emerge. The god is a fusion of demonamdhero.The point 
here however is, that these demons which dominate the life of prim- 
itive man are products of the imagination excited by fear and ter- 
ror. This characteristic belief of early man is the product of 
emotion. To speak therefore of religion as originating in the
1. McDougall W. Social Psychology, p.305. see also whole chap-
2. Wundt Wilhelm. op.cit.p.81. ter on,Instinctive Bases of




emotions, may not be ruled out of court as easily as Leuba imagines-
Leuba's assumption that the emotions have no part in the genesis of 
religious ideas is questionable, as is also his attempt to deprec- 
iate the tremendous part the emotion of fear plays in primitive
2. 
life and religion.
Leuba's opinions on the relationship of morality to religion 
are clear-cut. Morality has a non-religious origin. Religious 
motives are not associated with morality from the dawn of civilis- 
ation as is often supposed. Religion is by no means the original 
source of moral inspiration, though it may be and has been the cus- 
todian of morality. Since ethics and morality have come into be- 
ing without the assistance of religion, and are now of age, they 
don't need religious props anymore. Morality to-day is absolutely 
independent of superhuman beliefs. Leuba says "anchored in this 
assurance and fortified by a sense of human fellowship, man is pre- 
pared to surrender if need be the assistance which cruder generat- 
ions have found in superhuman beliefs". Let us set over against 
this ex cathedra utterance the considered opinion of Benjamin Kidd 
who affirms that the function of religious-beliefs in human evolut- 
ion is to "provide a super-rational sanction for that large class 
of conduct in the individual, necessary to the maintenance of the
development which is proceeding, and for which there can never be,
3. 
in the nature of things, any rational sanction".
Social psychology indicates a closer relationship between 
morality and religion than Leuba will allow. One of the most 
eminent representatives of social psychology in modern times
fe
1. Prazer J.G. The Golden Bough.(1923 ed.) see preface p.VII
2. Hflffding H. Outlines of Psychology, p.261.
3. Kidd B. Social Evolution, pp.107-108.
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emphasizes the closeness of the relationship between morality and 
religion. The two were not at the beginning separate, and then 
later fused together, they have from the first been vitally con- 
nected. Religion from its embryonic beginnings enforced by super- 
natural sanctions the modes of conduct prescribed by primitive 
custom. Leuba ! s confident opinion, that the withdrawal of the 
religious sanctions from the ethical life of modern society would 
make no difference to the body politic,is not shared by social 
psychology. Professor McDougall holds that in connection with 
this question of religion and morality"we must recognize that a
firm and harmonious relation between them has been in every age a
1. 
main condition of the stability of societies".
We remember that George Eliot's ethical ideals crashed when un- 
supported by religious sanctions, and we do not think the general- 
ity of men will be more successful. Professor Pratt in this con- 
nection records the significant fact that in answer to his question, 
"if you became thoroughly convinced that there was no god, would it 
make any great difference in your life, either in happiness, moral- 
ity, or in other respects"? The majority of his respondents affirm- 
ed it would certainly weaken their morality. Pratt commenting on 
this result says, the thought of a Divine Friend who cares does
support the feeble virtue of most of us, and the categorical imper-
2. 
ative of Kant would not have the same helpful power. We believe
that a dissolution of the vital union which yet obtains between 
morality and religion will be fraught with disaster to both.
Leuba's ex cathedra utterance, that the morality of modern
1. McDougall W. Social Psychology, p. 314.
2. Pratt J.B. The Psychology of Religious Belief, p.268.
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times is absolutely independent of religious sanctions is a theory 
which has yet to be tested. At present we must regard it as an 
assumption which awaits proof. History teaches that decay of relig- 
ion and moral decadence are bound up with each other in a singularly 
sympathetic and vital manner.
Leuba's constructive work is the most unconvincing part of the 
book. His account of the projected new religion of the future 
leaves an impression of confusion behind. Clearly, Leuba is more 
successful at casting down the walls of Jerusalem than in rebuilding 
them. He places a heavy accent on the fact, that ethical princi- 
ples and moral practice are absolutely independent of theistic 
beliefs and Divine sanctions. Man can get on quite well without 
belief in God, or in a moral purpose at the heart of things. "The 
religion of the future will have to rest content apparently with the 
idea of a non-purposive Creative Force, making of the universe 
neither an accidental creation nor one shaped in accordance with 
some preconceived plan". Elsewhere Leuba indicates, that though 
"the great mass of enlightened men can get along without the person- 
al God and Immortality", they hanker after three ideas which had 
better be included in the new religion. These ideas are, the idea 
of righteousness, the idea that justice will gain the ascendant, and 
that there is a sublime purpose in things.
Again Leuba says the coming religion will be centred about 
humanity conceived of as a manifestation of force tending to the 
creation of an ideal society. NOw these two ideas, that of"a non- 
purposive Creative Force", and "a sublime purpose in things" and 
that of a teleological force which creates an ideal society, could
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scarcely exist in one and the same religion without collision.
Again, as a substitute for the God of Christian Theism, Leuba 
proposes our great and noble ancestors. Theistic worship is to be 
replaced by a modern form of improved ancestor worship. Leuba has 
uxorious affection for a religion in which "the idea of Humanity 
would play a role similar to the one given it in Comtism". The 
great and noble men of all ages conceived of as embodiments of a 
Creative Force working in mankind and the universe are well quali- 
fied to generate the emotions which the theistic conception now 
evokes. Strength and satisfaction of moral cravings are to be got 
by means of prayers addressed to this ideal society. By the use of 
a little imagination Leuba suggests, a cult with appropriate symbols 
would arise on this atheistic foundation. It would seem as though 
Leuba has underrated the amount of imagination required in this 
connection. One is inclined to say "I have not found so great 
faith, no not in Israel". This is Leuba f s religion of the future, 
but if observation, history, and experience teaches anything it will 
not be the religion of mankind.
We can appreciate the difficulty of Leuba 1 s position, it was 
the same difficulty which beset Comte. The problem to which 
Leuba addresses himself is, after having shown that ethics, and 
moral practice and progress are absolutely independent of religious 
beliefs and sanctions; and after declaring the impossibility of 
theism, how to make a religion out of the non-religious fragments 
that remain. Leuba has done no better and no worse than any other 
man who has attempted the solution of the same problem. We do not 
think Professor Leuba has solved this problem, and we do not think
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any other man can.
To a psychologist of such logical ruthlessness as Dr. Leuba, 
this ought to have been apparent. Leuba has demonstrated to his 
own satisfaction the groundlessness of all religious ideas. There 
are no gods to swear by, and none to pray to. Further, he has 
emphatically declared that all man's moral aesthetic, and intellect- 
ual values are given to him by his race, and all his sublime inspir- 
ations, and the sense af_being wrought upon by a power not himself 
which makes for righteousness, come from no Divine source, but are 
the auto-suggestive products of his own human consciousness. 
Since these are Leuba's convictions, it would seem that all that 
remained to do after assassinating religion in the interests of 
science and humanity, would be to give it a decent burial, and 
usher ,in the enlightened age of the psychologists. But this is not 
so, Professor Leuba is too shrewd a psychologist not to see that in 
exterminating religion he has failed to extirpate the religious 
needs, and moral cravings of mankind. All he has succeeded in do- 
ing is to apparently destroy the natural satisfaction of those 
needs.
Leuba can see quite clearly that when he has taken away the 
people's bread their hunger still remains. Here then are urgent 
desires, and clamant needs and cravings. Leuba's problem there- 
fore, is to convince men, that if they were enlightened psycholog- 
ists they wouldn't cry for this bread that has been destroyed, but 
would swallow a new tabloid food that he and other psychologists 
deem more suitable for the men of this, and coming generations.
This tabloid *  contains a great deal of the Quit of Comte,
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some of the best features of the naturalistic Ethical Culture 
societies, and selected elements of Eddyism, Mind Cure, New Thought^ 
and other similar Therapeutic associations. Now this syncretism 
is certainly not a religion, and will never be accepted as such by 
the majority of "the enlightened mass of mankind". Leuba 1 s re- 
ligion so called, like Comte's lacks the philosophic background 
which alone can give it the breath of life. A philosophy or a 
system of ethics may be reared on a purely naturalistic and 
atheistic basis but a religion cannot be. We cannot agree with 
Leuba that the question whether a religion could be built on a 
consistently naturalistic view of the world is purely academic. 
On the contrary we believe this question is a practical one, and 
that if Leuba had seriously considered it, he would not have writ- 
ten this last chapter of his book. There can be no religion with- 
out Theism in a rudimentary or developed form. If Buddhism be 
cited as a contrary case, the reply is that Buddhism in its incept- 
ion was not a religion. It became a religion after the death of
1. 
its founder, when theistic factors were smuggled in. Whenever a
philosophy, a body of ethical teaching, a therapeutic association, 
or a Comte-like cult of humanity manifests religious symptoms, it 
is always because these brave cults discover that without certain
purely religious ideas their proud superstructures would crash.
  
They'/smuggle in in a clandestine fashion the theistic elements
A
which are vital to their existence. These plagiaristic cults do 
not scruple to incorporate vital elements of Christian Theism with- 
out acknowledgement. "The dishonest shifts to which traditional
1. Tiele G.p. Outlines of History of the Ancient Religions.
p.137.
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Christianity is now driven", we remind Dr. Leuba, are not the 
monopoly of theology.
In spite of Leuba 1 s asseverations to the contrary"the mass of 
enlightened men" know they cannot lift themselves up by tugging at 
their own boot-laces. Men must have a religion of Divine succour 
or none, It is said that Heine went once to look at the statue of 
Venus de Medici, but when he saw it, he wept, because the statue 
had no arms. In the worship of humanity there is no succour. 
When Heine was asked, as Leuba asks us, to worship humanity as God, 
he said, he thought men were very different from God, and very dirty, 
and therefore he would have to fall back on Another. Science can 
make a good soap but it cannot cleanse one human heart from con- 
scious guilt. Humanity can build Forth Bridges, and cleave con- 
tinents in twain as at Panama, but fails when it comes to the 
making of character, the comforting of the bereaved, and in the 
presence of death.
The weakness of Comte's religion of humanity which Leuba him- 
self so clearly exposes, is the same weakness which vitiates his 
own projected religion, namely, the absence of a philosophic back- 
ground which can make a religion possible. We therefore have no 
hesitation in saying Dr. Leuba's new religion is not viable.
Professor Leuba is on firmer ground when he asserts in another 
connection, that if we eliminate metaphysics, religious experience 
can give us no sufficient ground for faith in God. Leuba 1 s strict- 
ures on the Ritschlian attempt to eliminate metaphysics from theol- 
ogy are on the whole just, but he needs to be reminded that Ritschl 
himself never succeeded in this attempt, and that in any case
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Ritschl's type of thinking is not the genus theology, but only the
species Ritschlianism. Many Christian theologians have criticized
1. 
Ritschl's attempt to land theology in pure subjectivism.
Since Leuba's assumption that modern theology has discarded 
metaphysics is mistaken, his inference is erroneous also, namely, 
that theology minus metaphysics is only an articulated system of 
propositions about religious experience, and hence is reduced to a 
branch of psychology. Theology repudiates this accusation. It 
does not confine itself to the study of religious phenomena and 
their observed behaviour. This is the business of a psychology 
of religion, and one might add, its whole business. Theology is 
more than a science of religion, it goes beyond the psychological 
and historical data and faces ultimate questions, and attempts to 
explicate these in propositions which are intellectual in form.
Far from thinking with Ritschl that the supreme way of commending
no
theology to men, is to affirm there is*reason in it, modern theol- 
ogians proceed by processes of inferential thought, and theoretic 
judgments.
Modern Christian thinkers do not hold that a sound theology 
can be reared on judgments of value alone. It is true that re- 
ligion ignores logic, and the methods of the sciences. Religion 
proceeds by subjective estimations of spiritual preciousness, and 
solves her problems by intuition. The propositions of religion 
are expressed in poetic forms of thought, but theology is not 
religion. Theology has originated in response to a practical need 
for a rational explication of the content of the Christian Revelat- 
ion and religious experience. Theology is the discipline whose
l.Orr James. Ritschlianism,Expository and Critical Essays.
pp.18-20.
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deliverances have to do with the metaphysical implications of the 
facts of religious phenomena.
Leuba affirms, if we eliminate metaphysics, theology becomes 
a branch of psychology, and religious experience can give us no 
ground for faith in God. But theology does not eliminate metaphy- 
sics; it is not a branch of psychology. Theology is the metaphysics 
of religion.
A colossal petitio principii runs all across Leuba 1 s treat- 
ment of religion. Leuba takes for granted the fact, that fheism 
has become an absolutely impossible position. Clearly such an 
important assumption as this stands in need of proof, and must 
appear rather as the conclusion of a process of demonstration, 
than as a self-evident axiom. We agree with Leuba when he says, 
"the task of psychology in respect to the group of facts constitut- 
ing religious life is to observe, compare, analyze, and to deter- 
mine the conditions and consequences of the appearance of these 
facts". It is quite legitimate for psychologists to deal with the 
experiences of the religious subject, and make the following deliv- 
erances: these are the facts our methods reveal; this is the way 
they happen in human consciousness; these are the modes of their 
connection as ascertained by our methods. But in all our investi- 
gations, we have been unable to find in human consciousness any- 
thing of. the nature of a supernatural cause. These we hold are 
the legitimate deliverances of the science of psychology.
The case is other, however when the psychologist passes from 
his legitimate task and makes confident ontological pronouncements. 
Leuba is specially guilty in this respect. He declares religious
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consciousness has no outer reference in reality. There is no 
superhuman origin for anything in man's religious consciousness. 
There is no such thing as divine causation in religious experiences 
Now these ultimate references of religious consciousness are ques- 
tions with which psychology has nothing to do, and with which it 
is not competent to deal. These dicta of Leuba are not psychology, 
They are just the dogmatic unauthoritative ontological assertions 
of a psychologist who has laid down the tools of his own depart- 
ment.
Leuba defends his attitude by saying every transubjective 
reference falls under the criticism of the intellect. Leuba is 
quite right in arguing, that because an objective reality stands 
outside a subjective experience it is not on that account exempt 
from scrutiny of the critical intellect. But he is wrong in think- 
ing that this critical intellect must always be that of the 
psychologist. There are many physical sciences and metaphysical 
disciplines within whose special departments such transubjective 
references lie. It is the prerogative of psychology to make 
authoritative reports concerning human consciousness and its ex- 
periences, but the pronouncements of such a science affirmative or 
negative as to the real existence of the ultimate causes, and real- 
ities corresponding to subjective experiences, are as gratuitous 
as they are valueless.
In spite of these defects which have been briefly touched 
upon, Professor Leuba's psychological study of religion is a book 
which no serious student of the subject can afford to neglect. It 
is destined to determine in its main outlines the methods and 
munitions of modern apologetics.
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1. 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.
By
GEORGE ALBERT COE .
CHAPTER X. 
EXPOSITION.
Professor Coe's book represents a new and an inevitable 
phase in the history of American religious psychology. Prior to 
its appearance psychologists had confined themselves to special 
lines of investigation, and had given their attention to particu- 
lar portions of the field of religion. In Coe's book we meet 
with one of the first attempts to comprehensively survey the 
whole field. The book essays to outline the various problems 
that have emerged in connection with the scientific study of re- 
ligion, and an effort is made to coordinate the results which 
have been achieved. This book then, occupies a place of its own 
in religious psychology. In America, it has been accepted as tte 
best text book extant on the subject, and is used as such in 
several theological seminaries.
This psychologist deals with almost every important phase
1. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion.(Univ.Chicago Press
1916)
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of the religious life: the nature of religion, and of the relig- 
ious consciousness as such; the nature of religious psychology; 
the anthropological problems related to the religious life; and 
the relations of society and the individual. He also treats of 
various specific phenomena of the religious life, namely, conver- 
sion, mysticism, prayer, belief in the future life, and the sub- 
conscious. A most interesting chapter discusses the characteris- 
tics of religious leaders.
Three outstanding features mark this book. The first is the 
remarkable candour with which the author states his own religious 
predilections, and the frankness with which he puts us in possess- 
ion of his position with regard to the psychology of religion.
The second thing of note, is the fine alphabetical and topic- 
al biography which is annexed to the book. This large but care- 
fully selected bibliography is of great value. The student will 
find in it an apparatus of utility in following through the vari- 
ous problems raised by the psychology of religion.
The third important feature which gives us the key to Coe's 
psychology of religion, is his heavy accent all across on conscious 
ness as personal, functional, and social. According to Coe, the 
psychology of religion only becomes significant when it repudiates 
the old structural mechanistic mosaic psychology which describes 
mental states as static unities. The psychology of religion must 
recognize that each sensation,feeling, or other element of struct- 
ural psychology is simply a specific aspect of a self-realizing 
life, in other words it must go beyond mental states and mechanism, 
and deal with persons. With Coe then, the psychology of religion
297.
must view its data from the functional point of view.
Professor Coe begins his book with a rapid sketch of the 
beginnings and development of the science of religious psychology. 
Two great types of problem seem to him to have emerged in the 
course of the study of religion. The first is constituted by the 
nature of religious experience as a complicated complex, which 
must be analysed into its elements. While the second great pro- 
blem is that of the value aspect of religious experience.
Now the notion of mental function involves the thought of 
adjustment, but this does not mean with Coe, adjustment to the 
physical environment, for the mind moulds the outer environment 
to suit its inner requirements. If we adjust ourselves to any- 
thing he says, it is to our social environment, but even here we 
must considerably qualify our notion of adjustment, and rid the 
term of its purely biological connotation.
First what is it that gets adjustment through mental funct- 
ioning? It is, says Coe, a personality that wants to realize it- 
self. To what does the personality adjust itself? Coe says, to 
ideals to which the personality along with others of the group 
also moves. Persons adjust themselves to the ideals of personal 
social life that they set before themselves, and in the pursuance 
of these ideals they use as means whatever they regard as sub- 
personal. Coe denies that his forthsetting of this conception of 
a functioning self is at all obscure. All the obscurity that has 
been imported into this idea he affirms, is entirely due to the 
attempt to construe our socially communicable desires and purpos- 
es in terms of animal life which lacks means of communication.
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The psychology of selves then with Coe, is a psychology of 
persons communicating desires and purposes to each other, and the 
problems of such a psychology centre about values.
After a most interesting treatment of the various methods 
used by psychology in gathering its data, Coe passes on to an 
analysis of the religious consciousness. He criticizes definit- 
ions of religion in terms of belief, or feeling. We cannot,he 
says, reduce religion to any single phase of the mental life, for 
the whole mind is involved. As we might anticipate, since Coe 
adopts the functional point of view, he defines religion in terms 
of value. Religious consciousness is the consciousness of ends 
or values.
Religion with Coe then consists in the progressive discovery 
and organization of values. Needs change, and new values are dis- 
covered as a matter of fact and history. Religion then according 
to Coe, is a solemn or Joyous reaction in which the individual or 
group seeks life in the shape of any values whatever. Coe main- 
tains wherever men intensely identify themselves with something 
as their very life, there you have religion. Any reaction then, 
may be considered religious that seeks the conservation of any 
values whatever. Coe is emphatic that religion does not create 
any new value, religious value is not distinct from ethical value 
or any other value, religion is an immanent movement within all 
our valuations, it influences and operates upon all our appreciat- 
ions. The function of.religion then with Coe, is limited to that 
of unifying the scattered values of life.
Professor Coe maintains that religion is first a public
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matter, and only latterly a private matter. The beginnings of re- 
ligion therefore are to be sought in the primitive social group. 
This group is entirely dominated by customs which are enforced by 
the sanctions of social scorn and disabilities, and by fears of un- 
seen beings. Primitive religion is a body of customs which receive 
blind obedience from the individuals of the tribe.
The interests of the primitive group are narrow and non- 
intellectual. The savage lives an emotional rather than a thought 
life, and his crude picture thinking nucleates about food-getting, 
birth, initiation, marriage, war, sickness, death, and protection 
from beasts, elements and the like. Such interests are back of 
primitive religious customs, and all other customs. At this stage 
religion, morality, law, science, art are one undifferentiated mass 
life has not become departmentalized. At this stage the variant 
great man is swallowed up by the group. The course of evolution 
according to Coe, is away from instinctive action, through custom, 
to personal reflection. In primitive life the instinctive impulses 
of the individual are controlled not by his own reflection, but by 
the social pressure of his group.
Now says Coe, early tribal ceremonial has religious signifi- 
cance, and all the ancient rites religious and magical alike re- 
present two things, first, the social organization; and second, 
current ideas as to how the values of life are to be secured. The 
values recognized by primitive man are utilitarian, they consist in 
an abundant food supply, success against all human foes, beasts, 
the elements, and the preservation of the integrity of the tribe.
The various ceremonies of savage life are the measures primi-
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tive man takes to conserve these values. Coe holds, that primitive 
men seek three things: (1) to fill out values, men here seek 
plenty. (2) to conserve values, here men seek to produce a stable 
social order which shall be in favourable touch with the powers 
that be, upon whom values depend. (3) to unify values, here the 
aim is to produce automatic subordination of individual desires 
to social standards. According to Coe then, religion exists in 
primitive life because the savage believes it does things for him, 
not because any intellectual belief or ideation prevails. Relig- 
ion gets him food, gives him victory, and makes the group strong. 
It springs then from instinctive behaviour, and grows out of the 
social instincts which are back of custom and social organization.
Coe maintains, though religion started in the company of 
magic and spiritism it tends to grow apart from these. He holds, 
that theriomorphism preceded anthropomorphism, the totemic animal 
ancestor was first, and only afterwards were the gods thought of 
as having human form. Coe points out, that there is a transition 
stage where we can see theriomorphism passing over into anthropo- 
morphism, here we find the gods are conceived of as part animal 
and part man. He insists however, that anthropomorphism is pres- 
ent in religion from the very beginning, all through the savage 
reads the qualities of men into his totemic animal ancestors.
Coefe position with regard to magic is in substance the same 
as that of Irving King. He cites and rejects the view of Frazer
that when magic was found to fail, religion was tried as a substi-
1. 
tute. He rejects Leuba's view also, that magic and religion are
1. Frazer J.G. The Golden Bough.(1923) Ab.Bd. pp.57-58.
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absolutely distinct in origin and principle. Coe holds that
magic and religion have a common root, but afterwards become
2. 
differentiated, religion organizes life's values and seeks them
socially, but magic fixes upon a particular value, and seeks it in- 
dependently of the larger social order.
Coe affirms, that in discussing the origin of the idea of God 
at first there -were simply inchoate conceptions, then objectifi- 
cations of man's unorganized impulses in the shape of vague and 
shifty spirits, and a belief in Mana, the diffused power that does 
things, then finally man arrived at the idea of the gods. Five 
ideas seem to have entered into the construction of the god con- 
ception: (1) the form and ways of animals. (2) the form and ways 
of a man. (3) the ways of spirits,e.g., swiftness, invisibility. 
(4) some process of nature, and (5) Mana which Coe holds to be the 
tap-root of religion. All of these ideas according to Coe played 
a part in the evolution of the idea of God.
In answer to the question what are men about when they com- 
bine such elements into a god-idea?, Coe warns us we must beware 
of the psychologist's fallacy. It is necessary he says, to put 
ourselves in the environment of primitive man and ask ourselves 
how we would act with the primitive man's psychological outfit and 
knowledge? The savage's thinking is emotional thinking, he trans- 
fers the glow of his mind to the objects of his thought, therefore 
to him objects become living things positively friendly or un- 
friendly.
Coe maintains, that there was a preanimistic stage in religion
1.Leuba J.H. Psychological Study of Religion. Chap. 9.
2. CF. King Irving, The Development of Religion.p. 176.
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and that animism is not the origin of religion. Coe's argument 
is that the conception underlying animism is too advanced to be 
present at the genesis of religion, because it involves the recog 
nition of the distinction between spirit and body. Animism is a 
stage of religious evolution but not the first stage. Coe does 
not deny that man achieved the notion of a distinction between 
spirit and body. He cites the orthodox inference theory, that 
primitive man inferred from shadows, reflections, dreams, and 
trances that the spirit of a man existed separable from the body, 
and that it was the application of this conclusion to the world of 
things which peopled it with spirits. Now Coe admits, that such 
an inference may have been made, but he insists that the original 
factor in the whole process is the self-projection of emotional 
situations into objects, which personalizes them and makes them 
positively friendly or unfriendly, here he holds we have the real 
origin of spirits.
Now says Coe, we cannot rigidly mark off the gods from spirit? 
Both alike are projections of what men felt in themselves when 
they were emotionally excited. But gradually certain spirits came 
to represent the more valuable things of society, and were approach 
ed by group ceremonies, while the inferior spirits came to repres- 
ent the anti-social elements of society. These last instead of 
being worshipped by the group, were thought of as subject to the 
control of the individual, and thus magic became identified with 
spiritism, and religion with the gods. Coe discounts the wonder- 
theory of the origin of god-ideas. He objects, the striking 
phenomena of nature are really not so striking after all, the sun,
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moon, stars, lightning and thunder are too common to evoke wonder. 
Again the religious ceremonies in which natural phenomena figure 
are precisely the ceremonies which have to do with the food supply 
of the tribe. In a word,with Coe, the source of the god-idea is 
organic and social need, it is hunger and not wonder.
Coe's conclusion briefly is that primitive man has an underived 
conviction that the food-supply, protection from enemies, success 
in war, and the integrity of the tribe are the most precious values. 
Second, along with this conviction of values there grows up another 
conviction that an extra-human power resides in ancestors, nature 
powers, and spirits, which can help him to have and to hold these 
values for himself and his group. This spontaneous underived con- 
viction is the beginning of the god-idea.
Religion according to Coe is much the same everywhere in its 
primitive stages, but great differences are discernible in its more 
developed forms. Coe's explanation is that religion is not a 
separate interest with a unique character, but simply a principle 
which organizes the values that are recognized at any given stage 
of culture. Religion is a way of dealing with values or interests. 
If then we can get at the factors which condition the interests of 
a people, we will get illumination with respect to the rise of 
species of religion, as distinguished from the genus. Coe indicates 
seven such factors: (1) Geographical situation; (2) Economic devel- 
opment; (3) Social and political organization; (4) Interaction of 
peoples; (5) Cultural influences such as Philosophy, Science, and 
Art; (6) The institutionalizing of religion; and (7) The influence 
of great individuals.
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Coe does not attach much importance to racial traits as the 
cause of differences in religion. He accepts the theory that man- 
kind is a single species originating at a particular spot, whence 
it spread over the world. Racial differences are due to the con- 
tinued influence of a special habitat, climatic conditions, the 
nature of the food supply, and the presence or absence of the 
stimulus which comes from intercourse with other peoples. The 
minds of men everywhere are substantially the same, but these re- 
act in environments which do not offer the same stimuli.
Coe points out, that at first man is forced to think by the 
necessity to live, he is compelled to bestir himself in order to 
get his supreme interests conserved, but he continues thinking be- 
cause he finds an interest in the superhuman powers other than the 
fact that they subserve his practical purposes, as witness the 
wonderful theological structures of the human mind.
In discussing religion as group conduct, Coe points out three 
main species of this. The first, is illustrated by the crowd
where the characteristic feature is the suppression of inhibitions
»
the second, is the sacerdotal group where the prominent thing is 
manipulation by suggestion; and the third, is the deliberative 
group which is marked by organization and discrimination.
Coe's treatment of these three types of group conduct is most 
illuminating. Crowd action according to this writer,is action 
that results when inhibitions have been narcoticized by suggestion
 
Now crowds have certain functions which Coe indicates. The mass- 
ing together of men in a crowd satisfies the gregarious instinct; 
it engenders the pleasant feeling of freedom from perplexity, the
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loss of the feeling of responsibility, and gives the sense of
power; it offers opportunity for indulgence in instinctive impulses, 
and this massing together of human energy gives the feeling of en- 
hanced efficiency.
Now the crowd as such has severe limitations. Coe asserts, 
the crowd can enforce standards but can never reconstruct them,for 
this needs thought and deliberation. The crowd is cruel, immoral, 
and antisocial, these are its characteristic marks. The crowd may 
indeed be led by a morally discriminating person to social ends, 
but this is purely accidental, for it may just as easily be led by 
an unscrupulous rascal to anti-social ends.
The second species of group conduct is the sacerdotal, here 
says Coe, we have the specialized control of group conduct. Organ-* 
ized tribal religions, national churches, and all churches that 
attempt to enforce as final a particular form of doctrine, worship, 
or polity are instances of sacerdotal group conduct. The unity is 
brought about in the sacerdotal group not as in the crowd by de- 
sultory suggestion, nor as in the deliberative group by deliberat- 
ion among the members, but by systematized suggestion in the shape 
of ritual, sacrament, sacrifice, and a code of commands and pro- 
hibitions. Pictures, statues, processions and the like are all 
instruments of suggestion used by the sacerdotal group. These 
things do not promote reflection but bring the attention back re- 
peatedly to the same point, and so renew the control of the wor- 
shipper's mind.
Coe indicates in the second place, that this group is bound 
together by commands and prohibitions which deal with matters of 
belief as well as conduct. Here again we have suggestion in the
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direct form of commands. Perpetuity of control is sought through
diligent instruction of the young. Wow Coe insists this instruct- 
ion is not intended to stimulate individual thought and reflection, 
it simply provides for the repetition of the past, and consists in 
three things: the drilling of formulae into the pupil's memory,the 
moulding of habits of thought on the basis of direct command, and 
the strict predetermination of the conclusions of reflection. The 
sacerdotal group recognizes well enough the individuality of its 
members, but it seeks to control these personalities, and bring 
them into subjection to its authority. It enforces its will by 
means of sanctions in the shape of rewards, and pains and penalties
Coe indicates, that the sacerdotal group performs certain fun- 
ctions which are of value to the tribe and nation. For example,it 
makes the warrior more confident, and his obedience more sure in 
time of war. In time of war each army is encouraged by its nation- 
al church to think that God is on its side. Now Coe shrewdly 
points out, that the effect produced by the sacerdotal group is not 
due to reflective thought, but to pure suggestion, since the nation- 
al point of view, right, or wrong is sure to be backed by the 
sacerdotal group. Sacerdotalism says Coe, has a true kinship with 
the military type of social organization.
The third species of group conduct Coe indicates is that of 
the deliberative group, here the conduct is greatly different from 
the types we have already observed. Before each common act this 
group pauses to reflect. Is there any further discussion? is the 
question always asked before an act is done by this group, and in- 
dividual initiative is encouraged with a view to the reorganization 
of the group. According to Coe, this group performs certain
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important functions. It brings the satisfaction of weighing and
criticizing satisfactions, and the evolution of society itself,is 
due to the criticism and reconstruction on the part of members of 
the deliberative group.
Now it is plain, that a religious group may be considered 
under one or other or all these categories, namely, the crowd,the 
sacerdotal group, and the deliberative group. When a church par- 
takes of the nature of this last, says Coe, we find that the wor- 
ship is designed to stimulate the worshipper to thought and re- 
flection. The sermon plays an important part, and the minister in 
prayer tries to voice the aspirations of the group. Coe shows, 
that the ideal of the deliberative group influences the idea of 
God. The Divine Being is not looked upon as a King, but rather as 
the gracious Power back of all aspiration and achievement, the 
Power which inspires the ideals by means of which we judge all 
things. God becomes the inner pressure which causes the question- 
ing of standards.
Coe brings out very clearly the vast difference in the methods 
by which the various groups achieve unity. The crowd achieves 
unity by doping inhibitions and thus preventing its members acting 
as rational and responsible individuals. The sacerdotal group by 
prescribing in advance how the individual shall act, it manipulates 
its individual members. While the deliberative group heightens 
the individuality of its members by encouraging reflective thought, 
discrimination, and free discussion. It organizes the self.
From religion considered under the aspect of group conduct, 
Coe passes to religion as individual conduct. According to Coe, 
neither society nor the individual are static things, but are both
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in the process of becoming. Society does not control the individ- 
ual any more than the individual controls society. We cannot there- 
fore say that religion is an individual phenomenon any more than we 
can say it is a social phenomenon. The truth is, says Coe, that in 
the evolution of both society and the individual, religion has play- 
ed an important part.
Coe holds, the individual cannot become a developed personality 
without the help of society. With Coe, society and the individual 
are simply two indissoluble aspects of the same great human move- 
ment. Social consciousness and individual consciousness arise to- 
gether, the idea of self and the idea of socius come into being 
together and are never after separated. Coe holds, individuality 
may be spoken of as a social phenomenon, for it is the social en- 
vironment which really sharpens the outline and makes for the in- 
dividualizing of the self. Now religion acts in the same manner it 
makes men more conscious of themselves as individuals. According to 
Coe then religion on the whole is an individualizing process.
Coe asserts that the fact that religious self-realization takes 
place within a social medium is firmly established, and that when 
this self-realization is attained abruptly, and is accompanied by 
intense emotions we have the phenomenon of conversion. Coe's 
analysis of conversion yields four features: (1) the subjects very 
self seems changed. (2) the change seems wrought upon the subject 
by an outside agency. (5) the change takes place in the attitudes 
that constitute character. (4) there is a positive sense of attain- 
ing to a higher life.
Three observations are made here. First, the fact of abrupt-
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ness is not peculiar to religious conversions, it is seen in 
spheres other than religion. Second, conversion travels the same
way as gradual religious growth as regards process and content, and
.1   
at the end of the day both achieve the same general results.
Third, conversion is not co-extensive with religion, for the con- 
version of parents brings religion into the home, and tends to pro- 
duce in their children a natural non-catastrophic religious growth 
through nurture.
Coe observes, that there are four outstanding elements in the 
structure of the conversion phenomenon. First, we may discern 
traces of mental reproduction of the individual's own earlier ex- 
periences, the subject is converted to something the idea of which 
he has already met at home, church, Sunday school, or in his read- 
ing and reflection. Therefore the ideational factors in his con- 
version are simply reproductions of his antecedent experiences. 
If says Coe, the subject of conversion belongs to a Christian com- 
munity he is converted to the Christian idea of God, if to a Brah- 
min group he is converted to the Brahmin idea of God, and so on and 
so forth.
We may moreover discern certain sensory elements in the con- 
version phenomenon, such as the tone of the preacher's voice, the 
rhythm and melody of revival songs, the sight of others doing re- 
ligious acts, and the whole physical tone, particularly fatigue. 
Coe inclines to the view, that sensory factors may be one of the 
chief determinants in religious conversion. He als'o emphasizes the 
part which the instincts play in conversion. Those most prominent
1. Gf.a Starbuck E.D. Psychology of Religion, p. 519.
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are the gregarious instinct, the instinct of self-abasement, and 
the sexual instinct.
According to Coe, the connection "between adolescent conver- 
sions and the sexual instinct is an established fact of religious 
psychology. The connection is both indirect and direct. Indirect- 
ly the general state of restlessness due to the intrusion of a new 
set of organic sensations, makes it relatively easy for the adol- 
escent to acquire new interests of any kind; while directly, the 
developing sexual instinct fixes attention on persons, oneself and 
others, and extends and deepens tender emotion.
Coe explicates the conversion phenomenon psychologically in 
terms of the law of suggestion, the law of sub-conscious incubation 
and the law of habit formation. According to this investigator, 
all the sensations, ideas, motor tendencies, and instinctive de- 
sires are integrated by the process of suggestion. A preparatory 
process always precedes cataclysmic conversion. The convert's ex- 
perience is that of an explosion into his consciousness of new 
feelings, ideas, and points of view which are fully matured. New 
points of view mature unconsciously in accordance with the princi- 
ple of sub-conscious incubation. A suggestion would not result of 
itself in the precipitation of the crisis of conversion unless some 
maturing of motives had already taken place. Coe moreover asserts, 
that wherever the convert makes good it is because he is confirmed 
in the new life by the law of habit formation resulting from the 
religious social fellowship that follows the conversion crisis.
Coe proceeds to discuss the functional significance of conver- 
sion. It is well to remember that the functional psychology of
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Coe passes no ethical judgment on the values it investigates, it 
simply asks what is it in any situation that makes it of value to 
the man who finds it so? To get at this we must get at the man's 
point of view, and the best way to do this is to go to the man 
himself.
The following are the values which are obtained by the sub- 
ject of conversion: (1) new values together with a new standard 
of values; (2) a changed attitude to life, and a heightened real- 
ization of the self; (3) a new desire for mutual self-emancipatior 
and fellowship with men; (4) the world and the idea of God become 
the realities they never were before.
All these with Coe, are subjective facts which cannot be gain- 
said. But says Coe, the subjective impressions of an individual 
cannot be the criterion of absolute reality, therefore psychology 
cannot be invoked to support the religious man's deliverance that 
in his experiences he is in touch with divine reality, or that 
his sense of divine communication has ultimate validity. Science 
cannot recognize private facts, for it knows no unshared truth. 
Coe argues since the spiritual world and the divine reality with 
which the religious man asserts he comes in vital contact,cannot 
be empirically verified by a number of scientific experts working 
independently these objects of the religious man's faith cannot 
rank as scientific facts.
Coe's treatment of the mental traits of religious leaders is 
most interesting. At the outset he warns us that to characterize
religious leaders as neurotics or sex-maniacs is to fall into the
the 
fallacy of«psychiatrist who seizes on a few specimens of the genus
religious men which fall within the range of his own scientific
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speciality. Coe points out, that there has been an evolution of 
religious leadership, and that three broad types are distinguish- 
able, namely, the Shaman, the priest, and the prophet.
According to Coe, the Shaman corresponds with the modern 
psychic medium. The typical procedure is the trance or auto- 
hypnosis induced by dancing, monotonous music, or the use of drugs. 
In this trance the Shaman sees visions of the gods, or the culprit, 
or the issue of the impending battle. To the tribe the Shaman is 
leader because of the mana that is in him, but to psychology, his 
leadership is due to three factors: First, there is the actual im- 
press iveness of the trance phenomena. The Shaman is a neurotic 
with an aptitude for trances, which at this stage of religious 
evolution are actually helpful to his religious influence. Second, 
the Shaman shrewdly does the thing the people wish, he knows how 
to avoid crucial issues, how to surreptitiously gather information, 
and how to utter ambiguities which can be interpreted in accord- 
ance with the event. Third, the Shaman gains real wisdom from 
habitual dealing with public affairs. His automatisms are thought 
to be due to dealings with the superior powers, he thinks this him- 
self but when he finds he can help things out a bit, he becomes a 
conscious trickster.
The second type of leadership is priestly, whose function Coe 
interprets as that of conserving power over the group by means of 
institutions. Historically Shaman and Priest shade into each other 
the Shaman type yields in time to the priestly type. The priest- 
hood sees to it that ceremonies are duly observed, that places 
times, objects, persons are kept sacred, and that traditions are
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Handed down. The characteristic of the priestly mind is the ever 
present assumption of the validity of the past. The influence of 
the priestly type makes for the stability of the social order and 
trains men in the idea of law.
The third type of religious leadership is the prophet. Coe 
confines this term to the religious leaders who go directly to the 
sources of religious life, as contrasted with the priests and 
their system. Coe also points out that this going directly to the 
sources while superficially resembling Shamanism really contrasts 
with it, and transcends it. Coe takes as his examples the great 
prophets of Israel. These religious leaders says Coe, break with 
institutionalism and go to the primal sources of religious feeling. 
Here then we have a type of leadership which regards ethical con- 
duct as the true service of God, ethical fervour as the mark of 
Divine inspiration, and ethical communion with the Divine Being 
as the essential religious experience.
According to Coe, it was the prophetic element, and not the 
priestly that attracted Jesus, that formed his character, and be- 
came the basis of his message. Coe points out, that the apostle 
Paul had the qualities of all three types, he had the visions,and 
trances of the Shaman, his training and natural bent of mind built 
priestly qualities into his life, but the prophetic spirit of 
Jesus practically extirpated these shamanistic and priestly qual- 
ities.
Coe criticizes the neurotic hypothesis which has been advan- 
ced to explain the influence of prophetic leaders. This view, he 
ays, is extremely shortsighted, Buddha and Jesus cannot be provens
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neurotic in the scientific sense of the term. Only when processes
common to us all are so excessively prominent in certain subjects 
as to interfere with the carrying on of life's business in co- 
operation with others can we speak of them as psychopaths and neur_ 
otics. The ultimate test of mental morbidity is one's ability to 
fulfil one's functions as a member of society. Neither Buddha nor 
Jesus, were made inefficient by automatisms, nor trafficked in 
them, nor relied upon them to buttress the principles he taught, 
on the contrary both rested the authority of their teachings upon 
an analysis of life and the practical self-evidence of basal 
ethical ideals, and both dissented from the existent religious 
social order in the interests of a deeper sociality.
In discussing the relations between religious leaders and 
people Coe repudiates the notion that religion was invented by 
priests and imposed on the masses by priestcraft, this he says,is 
entirely unhistorical, for a leader does not make religion, it is 
a spontaneous process which is more or less guided by individual 
action. According to Coe the religious leader may do three things: 
he may focalize a standpoint for his people by bringing it to con- 
scious definition; he may bring one of two competing attitudes of 
society to victory by means of superior definition, or by an emot- 
ional appeal, or by organizing a party; and in the third place he 
may see something that his predecessors did not see, or what his 
contemporaries do not see, and may tell what he sees in a plain 
way. A religious genius or an ethical genius then not only artic- 
ulates the deep desires and needs of his people, but gives to soc- 
iety an original contribution of his own, he not only focusses 
existing light but emits an original ray. 1.
1. Contrast Ames E.S. The Psychology of Religious Experience.XVIII 
The Psychology of Religious Genius and Inspiration.
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The question of the relation of the sub-conscious to the re- 
ligious life is raised by such phenomena as visions, voices, vivid 
impressions of a presence, unexpected insights, involuntary muscu- 
lar reactions giving impression of external control, glossolalia, 
and the like. Can we, asks Coe, bring these experiences which 
apparently transcend the powers and functions of the conscious self 
under known psychological laws? He replies, first, these phenomena 
are not the unique possession of religion but occur outside its 
realm altogether. The common deliverance of the poets, musicians, 
and artists as well as prophets is that ideas are given rather 
than achieved, and that they are wrought upon by a power other than 
themselves. Must we posit a sub-conscious realm with laws of its 
own to account for these experiences.?
Coe's position with regard to the sub-conscious is guarded, 
he holds, it is not yet an empirical fact, but only an inference, 
and points out, that there are three types of sub-conscious theory. 
The first, is the neural theory, which states that all alleged sub- 
conscious deliverances are due simply to restimulation of brain 
tracts that have been organized in a particular way by previous ex- 
perience. On this view there is no sub-conscious incubation at all 
but only simple reproduction of the brain records of antecedent ex- 
periences .
The second, is the penumbral theory, which asserts that the 
field of attention includes a penumbra as well as a focus. The 
penumbral items of experiences can be integrated while m remaining 
at the periphery of the conscious mind, then when the attention be- 
comes directed to them the mind gets a shock of surprise at the
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organization of the penumbral items which has taken place during 
its preoccupation with other ideas.
The third species of theory is that of a definitely detached 
sub-consciousness. According to this theory each of us has an 
under-stratum of psychic life apart from ordinary consciousness 
with powers and a nature of its own.
Coe holds, the neural theory explains much that is often 
ascribed to the definite sub-conscious theory. The main mass of 
ideas attributed to the sub-conscious are phenomena of the memory 
process. Inspirations are just reproductions of previous exper- 
iences which have been registered on the brain records. Coe 
shrewdly points out, that only those who study and practice poetry 
get poetic inspirations, only those who study and practice music 
get musical inspirations, and mathematical solutions come by in- 
spiration to none but mathematicians.
Now Coe is also convinced that the penumbral theory explains 
much. Perceptions he says may be organized into idea systems 
without the cognisance of the conscious mind, because it has been 
busy with something else, therefore when the focus of attention 
shifts it perceives an idea system in full panoply. This complete 
product seems to t£e mind to be something new, and to have been 
injected into the consciousness whereas all can be explained in 
terms of the shifting of the focus of attention. Coe holds, that 
most of our opinions and prejudices are integrated in this region 
of dim attention, and many of the thoughts we think are not our 
own come from this penumbral region.
The doctrine of the detached sub-consciousness is popular 
says Coe, with those who are fascinated by the occult, the medical
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mind also favours it, moreover religious men make a last stand for
supernatural!sm here. It is held, that it is here that divine com-
1. 
munications come. Coe holds, that though the facts of multiple
personality and alternating personality seem to buttress this type 
of theory, we need to note that the secondary personality always 
uses the language, understanding, and memories of the primary per- 
sonality. As a matter of fact, says Coe, we are not dealing with 
two individual consciousness at all "but with one individual con- 
sciousness that has become disintegrated. The fact that sometimes 
the primary consciousness is unable to recall the experiences of 
the secondary does not prove the existence of two individual con- 
sciousnesses but simply the loss of memory, there may be complete 
amnesia, partial recall, or full recall. It is evident that Coe 
is not enamoured of the theory of the detached sub-consciousness,
his position seems to be that the neural theory supplemented by
2. 
the penumbral theory are together adequate to cover the facts.
Coe maintains, that the proposition, human nature is always 
the same, is true of the structure only of the human mind not of 
its functions. There is an evolution of mental functions through- 
out man's history. Nutrition and sex are probably the most signi- 
ficant instincts and motives at the beginning of human evolution 
but they are not so all across. Human development according to 
Coe, does not consist in finding new satisfactions for old nutrit- 
ive and sexual wants but in achieving new wants. As evolution pro- 
ceeds preferences change, there is then with Coe, an evolution of 
functions.
1. Of. , James W. The Varieties of Religious Experience, p.484
2. Cf., Pratt J. B. The Religious Consciousness. Chap. ill.
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All this has an important bearing on the psychology of relig- 
ion, for according to Coe religion seeks to change men's desires, 
and to make them want the right values. These values are revealed 
and these new desires are created by great religious geniuses of 
the race who call upon the masses to like what they do not like. 
These prophets are stoned by their own generation, but a later one 
builds them monuments. All this shows, that the later generation 
has changed its desires and has come to appreciate the true values. 
This then according to Coe, is the process that lies back of true 
creative evolution. He maintains that over and above the appetit- 
ive wants and instinctive desires of primitive man, we men of a 
cultured age have acquired a crowd of new wants that press for 
their own satisfactions. According to Coe religion seeks to com- 
plete, unify and conserve these values which have arisen in the 
course of human development.
Coe's important proposition in this connection is, that re- 
ligion is not only the insistence of the human spirit upon having
enough of what is desired, but it is also the criticism of desires
t
i.e., religion's function is the revaluation of values. Religion^ 
most significant characteristic then is this process of reestimat- 
ing values, and it defines the supreme value in terms of personal- 
social self-realization.
When it is held that the essence of religion is desire for 
value, and the criticism of values, does not this reduce religious 
experience to mere subjectivity? Coe replies, this is not so,for 
when we speak of religion as being concerned with value, we mean 
by value a discriminated satisfaction taken as the mark of an 
objective reality. Dynamic views of mental life dominate psychol-
319.
ogy to-day says Coe, and to modern psychology the mind is the 
name of an entity consisting of both potential and dynamic psychic 
energies which are imponderable. The mind therefore itself has 
actual existence in the real world order, it is objectively real, 
the mind in a word is reality. Mental process with Coe, is the 
process of the real in relation to the real.
Religion says Coe, is a root that goes on living when doctrin| 
have been withered by criticism, because it is an original acquaint 
ance with the real. Religion with Coe, is never a by-product of, 
but always a live issue in human culture. Coe holds society is 
more than the mere aggregation of individuals, it is an organizat- 
ion of persons mutually conscious of, and recognizing one another 
as such. The recognition of the sacredness of human life, the 
rights of man, and the worth of the individual is according to Coe3 
a modern discovery. Now since religion with Coe, contributes no 
new value of its own, but merely organizes the emergent values of 
social evolution at any given stage of human culture, it now simply 
reintegrates this discovery of the value of persons in terms of 
personal-social self-realization. Religion therefore is not only 
the desire for value, and the revaluation of values, but it is the 
discoverer and organizer of values. The supreme value which relig- 
ion has discovered is that of the worth of persons.
Coe maintains, that historically this growing social self- 
realization is bound up with the development of faith in Divine 
beings. The God-idea of men is always the articulation of what 
men have discovered concerning the worth of persons. The movement 
says Coe, is away from impersonal to personal gods. The earliest
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worship is not directed to personal gods. Mana the earliest object 
of veneration is not personal but simply the misty diffused power 
that does things, the spirits are not persons but are merely un- 
stable undefined powers, even the gods at first have no personality 
The personal God then according to Coe, is a late conception, for 
men must think of themselves as persons, before they can think of 
God as personal, and this appreciation of the worth of the individ- 
ual is a late discovery of social evolution.
Religious experience with Coe, is social experience. Spirits 
and gods are differentiations of the immediate social conscious- 
ness. According to Coe, to indulge our highest social impulses is 
to be religious,and the common-will for the common-weal is God in 
us and society.
In connection with the subject of mysticism, Coe begins with 
a clear analysis of the structure of the typical mystic experience. 
He discovers 5 constitutive elements:(1) there is a perception of 
objects not physically present. (2) there is a sense of external 
control of the thought and muscles. (3) there is an intellectual 
seeing without an intellectual process of thought or reasoning.
(4) there is an ecstatic climax to the whole experience, and (5)
1. 
the whole experience is incommunicable. As a result of the in-
describability of his experience the mystic resorts to symbolic 
language and the most contradictory paradoxes.
Coe points out, what is now a psychological platitude, that 
the mystic procedure is similar in all lands. Two practices in 
particular are common to all forms of mysticism, namely, withdrawal
1. Cf., James William. The Varieties, p.380.
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of the attention from sense stimuli, and second, the fixation of 
the attention on some particular object. Hindoo mysticism has de- 
veloped a system of psychological mechanics which prescribes atti- 
tudes, methods of breath control, and how to exclude the distract- 
ions of sense. He draws attention to certain doctrines which the
t
mystics of all lands hold in common, namely, that sense experience 
is illusory; that God is above all predicates; that finite individ- 
uality conceals the real; and that the supreme good is to be attain- 
ed by absorption of the finite in God.
Coe subjects the phenomena of mysticism to severe scrutiny, 
many of the facts he asserts, can be grouped under the heading of 
hallucination, others may be described as sub-conscious phenomena. 
What seems to the subject to be the opposite of self-control Coe 
suggests, may really be the result of habitual acts previously per- 
formed. Former activities and achievements explain much, therefore 
the impression of the mystic that he is not the author of the ideas 
that dart into his mind is not a sufficient proof that it is as he 
thinks. Coe argues, poetic inspirations come only to persons who 
have previously read, studied and practised poetry, mathematical 
inspirations come only to mathematicians, musical inspirations to 
musicians, in the same way mystical inspirations come to mystics 
only. Therefore he concludes, the mystical experience simply re- 
produces the teaching the mystic had previously received. Coe is 
certain that the mystic is never released from his own past and that 
the content of his experience is socially determined. He affirms 
the mystic brings back from his trance the sort of ideas he took 
into it. Coesillustrations are apt, he says the Christian mystic
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feels the presence of Christ, the Roman Catholic the presence of 
the Virgin or the Saints, but the Mohammedan or Hindoo mystic never 
does, therefore each religion confirms its own teaching through its 
mystics. This sense of real presence which looms so large in mystic- 
al experiences is due says Coe, to auto-suggestion, complete self- 
hypnosis is sometimes induced.
As 'against the argument that here in the mystics we have re- 
ligious experts equipped with a special mystical sense which immed- 
iately apprehends truth and reality, Coe points out the great dis- 
crepancy in the deliverances of the mystics of different types,the 
Protestant differs from the Roman Catholic, and the Hindoo from 
both. Which he asks, is right? There is a general agreement Coe 
concedes, upon the noetic quality of the experience, but this sense 
of insight and illumination has a psychological cause not a super- 
natural, it comes not by solving the difficulty, but by becoming 
blind to the problem. All doubts and perplexities disappear because 
the attention is diverted from them. Ordinary drunkenness and cer- 
tain anaesthetics will give the same feeling of illumination, all
1. 
difficulties vanish, and everything is possible.
The mystic bliss can be explicated in a similar fashion, it 
is due .to relaxation of tensions, and the removal of mental inhibit- 
ions, which yield a sense of satisfaction, and together with all 
this there is in the mystic the expectation of a condition of rap- 
ture got through the long mystical tradition, which suggests the 
state of ecstasy. This experience can also be paralleled in 
anaesthetic cases. The phenomena of levitation and the mystic's 
experience of being out of the body are due to suggestive
1. Of.', James William. The Varieties, p. 387.
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anaesthesia. Coe points out, that hypnotic experiments have fre- 
quently induced the phenomena of functional anaesthesia, and that 
this phenomena is induced in the mystical subject by auto-suggest- 
ion. He also indicates, that nervous instability will favour 
automatisms, and that this may be inherited or induced. There is, 
he says, close relation between the extreme mystical condition anc 
hysteria, epilepsy,or delusional insanity. The individual's own 
psycho-physical constitution therefore is a most important factor 
together with certain incidental conditions such as hunger,fatigue 
and sexual longing.
Now this mystical experience has certain functional aspects 
which Coe outlines. One might expect to find in this connection 
that the private nature of the experience would lead to variation 
from existing social ideas and standards, and that automatic con- 
trol would lead to reinstatement of instinctive pre-moral modes of 
behaviour, but these things Coe says, do not occur, instead the 
mystical experience simply focusses some existing social idea or 
standard which is already part of the subject's mental make-up.
The mystics give back as new discoveries of truth the old teaching
s
with which they have been indoctrinated. Coe's conclusion is, 
that mysticism has not contributed much to the world's thought;it 
merely conserves what is already approved; and it is no special 
instrument of discovery. Its fascination lies in the fact that it 
produces a delightful delusion of knowing what lies beyond the 
hill. At the same time Coe concedes, that the tendency of mystic- 
ism is towards serenity, poise, and an organized will.
In his discussion of the future life, Coe lays down two pro- 
positions, first, the instinct of self-preservation does not in
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itself denote desire for continuance of personal life; second, the 
idea that one's double frequents the place where one is buried ex- 
isted before any clear notion arose of personal life. Primitive 
man's belief in survival rested on this simple basis. According to 
this author, in a more cultured age men begin to acknowledge the 
validity of the principle that personal life as such is sacred,and 
this at once puts the notion of survival in a new perspective, for 
now death appears to be the destroyer of what men hold to be of 
supreme worth, and hence the fact of death must be squared with the 
notion of a system of personal-social values. Coe asserts, that 
the personal-social relationships men value most they desire to see 
perpetuated. When men reach a high level of social regard theyde- 
sire immortality for the socially worthy, if not for themselves, and 
the kind of immortality desired is that of indissoluble fellowship 
between persons.
Coe defines prayer simply as talking to a god, structurally it 
does not differ from conversation except that the divinity is in- 
visible. Prayer has developed out of earlier anthropomorphisms 
which at first were nothing more than exclamations of na'ive emotions 
that involved a sense of friendliness or the reverse in any extra- 
human object which was felt to be significant. The language of 
prayer need not be confined to supplication, it may partake of the 
nature of praise, flattery, the expression of fellowship, or that 
of submission to a superior will. Now says Coe, there is absolute 
belief on the part of the worshipper that prayer has two termini, 
man, and God. Coe points out that the dreams, visions, auditions, 
etc., which the worshipper interprets as responses to his prayers 
are relatively infrequent, therefore the worshipper's anxious
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interest attaches meaning to any unusual phenomena whatever. When 
an event turns out in accordance with the specifications of the 
prayer, this is at once construed as a direct answer, but if the 
event does not happen in accord with desire the devout say , "God 
knows best what is good for his children."
Coe interprets the religious man's experience of divine re- 
sponse to prayer in terms of auto-suggestion. The worshipper re- 
tires to a church replete with religious associations which are 
powerfully suggestive, the closed eyes exclude irrelevant impress- 
ions, the kneeling posture induces relaxation, and the memory pro- 
vides the language of prayer. Now says Coe, the worshipper brings 
all his needs and interests into relation with the organizing idea 
of God. The whole movement can be explicated as ideational, emot- 
ional, and volitional fixation of the attention on an organizing 
idea, this is just auto-suggestion.
Psychologically then, prayer is conversation both sides of 
which are the mental states of the one who prays. These movements 
of the worshipper's own thought are interpreted by him as immediate 
communications from the Divine Being. Coe's position like other 
psychologists, is that the presence of the supernatural factor in 
human life cannot be proved by the science of psychology, as far 
as it is concerned there is nothing at the other end. God for 
psychology is simply an ideational construct of the religious sub- 
ject's mind, and all religious experiences have subjective signif- 
icance only.
Nevertheless according to Coe the practice of prayer performs 
certain very valuable functions. Prayer has therapeutic effects,
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it calms the distracted mind, it gives poise, and power, it is a 
way of pulling one's self together. Moreover new insights are 
gained, because in prayer the mind becomes more capable of sustain- 
ed attention.
Again, Coe points out the great value of confession to another 
who understands and sympathizes. The Freudian method of relieving 
mental disorders is to bring into the light of day the most secret 
desires of the soul, and the mere exposure of these things often 
brings relief, in this respect says Coe prayer is of infinite value 
Yet again prayer is a method of cultivating the conviction that no 
value will perish, it is a process in which faith is generated. 
For these and similar reasons Coe holds that prayer performs funct- 
ions of great value to the individual and society, in spite of the 
fact that psychologically it is nothing more than beneficent auto- 
suggestion.
In connection with the discussion of the religious nature of 
man, Coe lays down the proposition that religion lies wholly with- 
in the natural psychological order. There is no evidence that a 
religious intuition ever arises in a man's mind without having a 
derivative connection with his own accumulated experience, and the 
history of his people. Psychology he affirms, knows of no relig- 
ious instinct, or mystic sense as such. No set of objects apart 
from previous experience can evoke an original religious reaction.
There is further, no evidence that all men experience a dis- 
content and longing which only faith in a divine being can satisfy. 
As a matter of fact says Coe, any interest may absorb man's whole 
attention from love to business, and from scientific research to
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golf. No specific attitude toward the divine or the human can be 
attributed to all men, attitudes are not given ready made, they are 
acquired, and evolve out of every sort of instinct.
Coe's conclusion then is, that we cannot posit an original re- 
ligious instinct. For all this he holds strongly that religion is 
deeply rooted in the nature of man. All normal men organize their 
experience in terms of what to them are the ideal values, and 
nucleate their other interests about the dominant one. This says 
Coe, is the distinctive mode of mental organization by means of 
which we meet the conditions of life, and this is one of the roots 
of religion in the nature of man.
In the development of human nature the social instincts tend 
to become the pre-eminent ones, and the interests which have to do 
with these tend to become the controlling interests around which 
others are organized. This distinctive tendency according to Coe, 
constitutes the second great root of religion in human nature. 
Religion itself, with Professor Coe, is a living movement which 
brings no unique value of its own into human experience but instead 
discovers and organizes all the values which emerge during the 
history of social evolution.
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CRITIQUE.
Professor Coe's "Psychology of Religion", is on the whole a 
most admirable forthsetting of the psychological thinking of the 
present time with respect to religious origins, the relations of 
society and the individual, conversion, mysticism, the sub-consciou^ 
and cognate problems, which have become clearly limned as the re- 
sult of the application of the principles of psychology to the re- 
ligious life.
Among the many illuminating discussions with which this book 
abounds, that of religion considered under the aspect of group con- 
duct is particularly fine. Coe's distinction between the three 
types of group conduct is extremely useful. We are clearly shown 
the characteristics of the religious crowd the action of which re- 
sults from suppressed inhibitions, and the unity of which is achiev- 
ed by desultory suggestion; then we are introduced to the sacerdotal 
group, where the few command and the many obey, "their's not to 
reason why", here unity is brought about by deliberate suggestion 
through sacrifice, sacrament, ritual, and codes of customs and 
taboos; finally, we are shown the deliberative group where unity is 
achieved by the free variation of thought and desire on the part of
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its memberSt
Coe's treatment of the mental traits of religious leaders is 
particularly helpful. He classifies them as Shamans, Priests, and 
Prophets, and shows that all three types may inhere in one individ- 
ual. Coe expresses unqualified admiration for the prophetic type. 
He finely brings out the fact that the fundamental trait of the 
third type of leader is "a broad and intense sociality that trans- 
cends mere institutionalism because it individualizes men as objects 
of love. The leader is now in a high ethical sense the lover, and 
he is able to lead because he loves, and therein represents God. 
This is the open secret of Jesus' influence upon men.". 1.
Coe's argument for the validity of the functional standpoint 
in the psychology of religion, in the form in which he states it, 
is sane and convincing. He utterly repudiates the merely biologic- 
al view of function, which would reduce psychology to a branch of
biology. In common with most modern psychologists Coe breaks with
2. 
the traditional structural psychology. He holds that the dynamic
3. 
functioning point of view is alone profitable, and that therefore
the psychology of religion must view its data from the functional 
point of view. Coe's accent on the preferential nature of psycho- 
logical function as distinguished from merely biological function 
is timely. He says rightly, we cannot understand the nature of a 
religious experience by simply reducing the complex to its elements 
we must go from our analysis which yields us the elements of a com- 
plex, on to a psychology of values and functions if we are to get 
at its meaning.
1. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion, p. 186.
2. McDougall W. An Outline of Psychology. Preface p. VIII.
3. Prince Morton. The Unconscious. Preface p. XV.
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According to Coe, functional psychology must be a psychology 
of personal self-realizations, in short a science of selves, The 
life seeking functioning self is the subject of psychology. Mental 
function with Coe, is mental action directed towards the further- 
ance of life, but where Coe breaks with Ames is in his emphasis on 
the preferential nature of psychological as contrasted with biolog- 
ical function. We go all the way with Coe when he affirms, human 
life cannot be construed by purely biological categories in terms 
of food and sex, and that we must recognize that in man highly 
evolved self-consciousness is annexed to the instinctive outfit he 
has in common with the brutes. We endorse Coe's conclusion that 
these instincts which with animals have a biological function only, 
in man acquire new functions and fresh values, and become sublimated
A function says Coe must be defined by reference to the value 
towards which the process moves, and value signifies an advantage, 
or anything thought of, or experienced as satisfying. The mind 
then seeks the preferred thing, and the object of the preferential 
function is always value. We are in entire agreement with Coe when 
he says to think of human mental functions as merely complex cases 
of sub-human function is to endanger the functional point of view 
altogether.
The most serious criticism that can be directed against Coe's 
book is against that section of it, in which he defines religion in 
terms of value. All other parts of the treatise are conspicuous 
for clarity of thought and expression, but here Coe is irritatingly 
vague. With Coe as we have seen, the mind is always exercising a 
preferential function and the object of this function is always 
value, and value is that which satisfies conation. Now Coe is
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emphatic that religion is not a value in itself, and that it creates 
no new value, it is simply a movement of valuation of all the 
values that emerge in the course of human history.
Coe's forthsetting of religion as valuation is most ambiguous, 
his definition is too wide and does not serve to mark religion off 
from other things. This leads Coe to assert, that wherever men en- 
thusiastically identify themselves with something as their very 
life, there you find religion. To Coe any reaction is religious 
which seeks to fill out, organize, or conserve any values whatever. 
Such a loose description would embrace the voluptuary, the gambler, 
the bridge devotee and the golf maniac, all these would be religious
according to Coe's definition.
1. 
Coe's description of the religious consciousness like Ames's
2. 
and Stratton's gives us no differentia whereby we may distinguish
it from the ethical consciousness, the aesthetic consciousness, or 
any other form of consciousness. Now Coe virtually concedes that 
this is so, he says "if it is asked wherein religious value is dis- 
tinct from ethical value, the answer is that it is not distinct 
from ethical or any other value."3- To thus make religion connote 
every kind of valuing consciousness is simply to make the term 
scientifically useless. This is why Coe cannot discern the real 
difference between religion and morality, and why many psychologists 
identify religion with social righteousness.
The simple truth that religious experience is differentiated 
from all other forms of valuing consciousness by its object is 
ignored by a number of psychologists of religion, hence the
1. Ames E.S. Psychology of Religious Experience. Preface pp.VII-
2. Stratton G.M. The Psychology of the Religious Life.p.343
3. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion, p. 74.
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perpetual confusion of the patriotic, social, ethical, or aesthetic 
consciousness with the religious consciousness. Coe has here at- 
tempted to construe the religious life without recognizing the 
great differentia which marks religion off from all other possibil- 
ities of human history. All such attempts are fore-doomed to fail- 
ure.
Coe's description of religion is certainly "better than Stratt^gii
Stratton made religion consist simply in the appreciation or sense
1.
of value. Coe takes us further, and says it is the active discov- 
ery of values, and it is the attempt to unify values. Religion 
however is not defined until with Leuba we add: to be religious is 
to enter into dynamic relation with an unseen super-human company 
because we appreciate that the outcome of this relation will be the 
conservation and augmentation of the values we seek. That then 
which differentiates the religious from the secular life is the
kind of power with which we have to do, and the ant hr op op at hie
2.
nature of this commerce with the unseen powers. Hdffding's class- 
ic definition of religion as consisting in the conservation of 
value is subject to m similar strictures. Conservation of exist- 
ing values is not the sole function of religion, for religion also 
augments values, it is not merely the organizer of the existing 
values of society as Coe maintains. All living religions create 
new values, this last fact has been ignored by Coe.
With Hflffding, the core of religion is the conviction that no
3. 
value perishes out of the world. Now to the genuinely religious
1. Stratton G.M. Psychology of the Religious Life. p.345.
2. Leuba J.H. Psychological Study of Religion, p. 52.
3. Htfffding H. Philosophy of Religion, p. 6.
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man this is not the core but the corollary only of religion. The 
core of religion is the absolute certainty that God lives and 
reigns, "that behind the dim unknown standeth God within the shadow 
keeping watch above His own". It is because of this certainty 
that the religious man infers as a necessary consequence that no 
value can be destroyed, for him it cannot perish because it is 
linked to reality. Coe seems to leave out of his reckoning the 
fact that the religious man sees in God the divine source of all 
his ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness, and that to the relig- 
ious man God is at once the origin, the consummation, and the eter* 
nal guarantor of the supreme values.
Psychologists apparently need to be reminded that religious 
experience whatever it means to the scientist who stands outside 
his facts, is for the religious man experience of God, and that 
religious consciousness is not ethical consciousness, social con- 
sciousness, or any other kind of consciousness, but simply God- 
consciousness. To define religion as Coe has done simply in terms 
of value is to define religion by one of its aspects only, that 
which makes religion unique among all the other possibilities of 
human history is left out. Without attempting a formal definition
we suggest that any definition that leaves out the unique object
1   
of the religious consciousness is utterly inadequate.
Generally speaking, religion is that psychological phenomenon
1. Not only is the Object of religious consciousness sui
generis, but the feelings evoked by this Divine Object are 
qualitatively distinct from all other human feelings. 
This qualitative uniqueness of religious feeling receives 
a powerful forthsetting at the hands of Rudolf OTTO in 
his remarkable book, "The Idea of The Holy" Oxford Univ.
Press. 1923.
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of life and movement in the history of mankind, which is indissol- 
ubly bound up with the conviction that unseen super-human power 
or powers exist and control the destiny of the individual and the 
race, to whom man may look for succour and help to conserve the 
values he deems most precious, and with whom he may have fellow- 
ship and communion. We hold with Wundt, that strictly speaking,
1. 
religion comes into being only with the rise of the god-idea.
A definition of religion need not adjust itself to pre-religious 
conditions.
The object of religious consciousness is always a power or 
powers conceived of as greater than oneself with whom one maintains 
personal relations. The religious interest differs widely, we 
reiterate, from all other human interests in that "it centres 
about a being whom it has never seen nor heard, seeks communion 
with Him, speaks to Him, and waits for His answer'.' Religious men
yearn for God not as Leuba suggests, because he is their "meat
2. 
purveyor", but because they have an affinity for God. Men seek
not merely to exploit God, but seek fellowship with God for its 
own sake. Both Leuba and Coe ignore a most important side of re- 
ligion, namely the mystical root. Men yearn for the friendship of 
God Himself, and long to have communion with God because they have 
an affinity for Him. Psychologists of religion seem to ignore all 
across the simple fabt that a religious man is one who has fellow 
ship with God, and is conscious of that fellowship.
Coe denies the existence in the nature of man of any religious 
intuition, Instinct, or specific longing for the Divine. The
1. Wundt Wilhelm. Elements of Folk Psychology, p. 569.
2. Leuba J.H. The Contents of Religious Consciousness.
The Monist. Vol.XI. (1901. July.) p. 571.
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position of nearly all the American investigators is that psychology 
knows nothing of a mystic sense, or a religious instinct. This 
agnosticism would not in itself disprove the existence of such en- 
dowments, for there are more things in heaven and earth than are 
dreamt of in psychology's philosophy. But what shall we say to 
these things?
If no tendency is to be called an instinct unless it is an in- 
heritance from our sub-human ancestry, then of course we cannot 
speak of a specific religious instinct. But though we cannot speak
of a specific instinct we can and do affirm that religion has an
1. 
instinctive basis. McDougall has shown conclusively that religious
emotions and impulses are sourced in various instincts. He espec- 
ially singles out the instincts of flight, self-abasement and curi- 
osity, with the accompanying emotions of fear, subjection, wonder,
2. 
and tender emotion. Is it not true that man has an instinct so that
when looking at the gorge, the torrent, and the volcano's glare a
feeling of awe and reverence is evoked independently of previous
3. 
experience.
Whether there be a religious instinct or not, a study of man 
in his reactions to the objects of his physical, social, and mental 
environment shows that he is governed by a principle the outworking 
of which is analogous to those instinctive processes which he 
shares with the animals. Man as we know him possesses an aesthetic 
endowment, an ethical endowment, and a religious endowment, these 
powers it is true belong to an advanced stage of human development, 
and if only that which goes back to the animal plane of existence
1. Marett R.R. Threshold of Religion, pp. 10-11.
2. McDougall William. Social Psychology. Chap. XIII.
3. Marett R.R. Threshold of Religion, pp. 14-15.
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and to our brute ancestry can claim the title of instinct then
these are not instincts, though it is hard to see what other term
1. 
can be applied to them which fits their nature.
McDougall's definition of instinct is that it is an "innate 
psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to per- 
ceive, and to pay attention to objects of a certain class, to ex- 
perience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon per- 
ceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular
2. 
manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action".
Is it not true, that man as man is so constituted that he can 
perceive beauty, truth, and goodness, and that in the presence of 
these realities an emotional and volitional response is evoked 
spontaneously by reason of his very nature? It is here maintained, 
that just as man has an aesthetic endowment which enables him to 
say when he perceives a picture, 'that is beautiful'; just as he 
has an ethical endowment which enables him to say of an ethical 
action, 'that is right or wrong 1 ; so he has a religious endowment 
which constrains him to utter in the presence of certain objects,
'this is Divine'. There is a pov/er in man which can recognize the
3. 
Divine when it sees it.
These aesthetic, moral, and religious endowments belong to 
man's constitution, they are a priori elements in his make-up. 
Because like the unwise Virgins these powers arrive late in human 
history psychologists will not allow them to enter in and take their 
place beside the other instincts. This seems a somewhat arbitrary 
procedure, since inall respects excepting that of sub-human lineage
1. Pratt J.B. Psychology of Religious Belief, p.294.
2. McDougall William. Social Psychology.p. 29.
3. OTTO Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy, See Chap.XVIII.The Mani- 
festations of the'Holy' and the Faculty of 
'Divination'.
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they have all the characteristics of genuine instincts. Though 
psychologists will recognize as an instinct only that which goes 
back to the animal plane of existence we must take man as he is, 
and as he is he has moral and religious instincts which start into 
action in the presence of the appropriate objects, these instincts 
are his by nature, though they are susceptible of great develop- 
ment by nurture.
The universal conviction of the reality of God is significant 
in this connection, even among the masses there is this instinct- 
ive belief. Now universality constitutes one of the characteris- 
tics of an instinct. Religion is a universal phenomenon of human-
1. 
ity, this at any rate constitutes a presumption in favour of a
religious instinct in man. Man prays because he can't help pray-
2. 
ing it is an instinctive activity, and man is religious because
constituted as he is he can't help being religious. As long as
3. 
man is man he will seek to know God, his instincts will compel him.
On page 91, Coe makes a distinction between magic and relig- 
ion which closely resembles that of W. Robertson Smith who holds
that religion is essentially social in its nature while magic is
4. 
distinctly individual and private. Coe says, magic is practised
in secret and by individuals, whereas the religious ceremony is 
above all things a group act for group ends. Again he says, relig- 
ion organizes life's values and seeks them socially, but magic 
fixes upon any particular value and seeks it individually, and
1. Tiele G.P. Outlines History Ancient Religions, p. 6.
2. James William. Principles Psychology. Vol.1, p.316.
3. Marett R.R. The Threshold of Religion, p. 28.
4. Smith W. Robertson. Religion of the Semites, p. 263.
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independently of the large social order.
Coe's distinction here is unsatisfactory and practically use- 
less, since no such rigid distinction between the social and the 
individual exists. The assured results of ant ropological research
i
make such a distinction between magic and religion untenable. 
Magic practices may and often are group acts of a public and social 
character. Frazer has given abundant illustration of how the
magic art may be employed for the benefit either of individuals or
1. 
of the whole community, it may be either public or private. Ames
has massed together a great number of instances of collective
2.
magic which are clearly group acts for group ends. Coe's distinct- 
ion simply cannot be maintained in the facte of the overwhelming 
mass of extant contrary anthropological evidence. Coe apparently
A
has taken this distinction as self-evident without sufficient ex- 
amination, only such an hypothesis explains his failure to note 
the plethora of negative instances.
The only scientifically useful differentia between magic and
3. 
religion is that which is expressed in terms of attitude. The
object of both magic and religion may be and indeed often is iden- 
tical. Since magical and religious practices connect up with the 
same super-human powers, we cannot therefore distinguish magic from 
religion by saying magic has to do with impersonal forces, while 
religion has relations with, personal powers. Magical practices 
may be linked up with the idea of personal powers or gods as well 
as with the thought of impersonal forces. Hence it is impossible 
to distinguish magic from religion by reference to its object,the
1.'Frazer J.G. The Golden Bough. (1923. Ab.Ed.) p. 61.
2. Ames E.S. Psychology of Religious Experience. Chap. V.
3. McDougall W. Social Psychology, p. 306.
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distinction must be set forth in terms of behaviour.
Magical behaviour differs from religious behaviour in that, 
in magic man attempts to concuss and coerce whatever powers there 
be to do his will by a certain technique, and by devices which are 
conceived in some way to possess inherent power to bring compulsior 
to bear upon the impersonal forces or personal beings, and so 
force them to give man his desire.
In religion, man seeks the fulfilment of the same desires, 
and conceives of the existence of the same impersonal or personal 
powers, but his behaviour is diametrically opposed to the magical
attitude. In religion man,in Marett's laconic phrase, passes from
1. 
"bluff to blandishment", he beseeches, he implores, or he attempts
to flatter and to cajole the powers that be to do his will.
Magic and religion often are found mingled together, they 
frequently overlap but the two can nearly always be separated from 
each other by the use of the above distinction. Professor Leu.ba 
has coined two useful terms in this connection. Magic he says is
marked by the coercitive type of behaviour, while religion is
2. 
characterized by the anthropopathic type of conduct.
In his treatment of the subject of mysticism Coe follows in 
the wake of the majority of American investigators who have dealt 
with this aspect of the religious life. The mystic is considered 
simply to be a religious person who is specially expert in the art 
of auto-hypnosis. The typical mystic process is held to be the 
same as that of ordinary hypnosis, and the typical mystic trance 
is held to be identical with a state of hypnosis.
The explication of all mystical phenomena in terms of auto-
1. Marett R.R. The Threshold of Religion, p.30.
2. Leuba J.H. Psychological Study of Religion.* Chap.I.
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suggestion seems to be open to the charge of over-simplification. 
We may concede to Coe that the acquirements of experience, social 
education, and the theological prepossessions of the mystic may 
account for the idea of God upon which he concentrates his atten- 
tion. But the important question arises, how does this traditional 
idea of God become transformed in the mystic's experience into the 
vivid sense of the presence of God himself?
Again, the common deliverance of the mystics is that this
1. 
sense of the presence of God possesses tremendous intensity. What
accounts for the extraordinary intensity of the mystic's experience
*
The mystic's answer is, the presence of God Himself. The psycholc 
gist's answer is, auto-suggestion. The mystic's answer more 
adequately fits the facts. We may admit that the factor of suggest 
ion is present, but we do not concede it is the sole factor,nor do 
we feel inclined to grant the gratuitous assumption that suggest- 
ion must necessarily work in the direction of error and falsehood, 
there may be true suggestions.
The second striking thing most psychologists overlook, is the 
great dissimilarity between ordinary hypnosis and the mystic state, 
the two are not to be identified. In ordinary cases of hypnosis 
the hypnotized subject on awaking remembers nothing that took 
place while in the hypnotic state, in remarkable contrast to this 
is the mystic's vivid remembrance of the experiences of his mystic 
state. This point of contrast deserves more notice than it has 
hitherto received.
Coe is not very enthusiastic over the contribution of mystic- 
ism to the life of society. He holds, that it simply conserves
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p. 451.
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what has already been approved, it is not a method of mental in- 
vention, and is no tool of discovery. Yet Coe admits, that mystic, 
ism has a positive function in the realm of mental therapeutics. 
Mental strains he says, may find relief in mystical practices. 
Mysticism organizes human life, unifies a discordant self, and its 
whole trend is away from distraction and disintegration to serenity 
poise, and an organized will. Surely this in itself is a valuable 
contribution to human life, and if mysticism did no more than this, 
its title to existence would be justified, for this would be a 
tremendous contribution to the happiness and sanity of society.
Mysticism seems to fall under Coe's censure because it does 
not usurp the functions of science and philosophy, but such usurpa- 
tion is far from its intention. In Professor Wright's words, 
"mystical states are chiefly of value, not in the discovery of new 
truths, but in engendering enthusiastic devotion and consecration 
to values already recognized. In this respect mysticism has been 
of inestimable value to religion. " Where there is no vision the
people perish." Where there is no mysticism, religion decays and
1. 
stratifies in dead legalism, formalism, and dogmatism."
If the real values of life are not to be set out in terms of 
£-s-d, or economic productivity then mysticism has a contribution 
of its own to make to human life and culture. In addition to the 
therapeutic value of the mystic life, Professor Pratt points out 
the mystics in their entirety have contributed a very great deal 
to the loftiest religious literature of nearly all the great 
religions. "Scarcely even the most hard minded philosopher could
1. Wright W.K. A Student's Philosophy of Religion, p.505.
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read over a well chosen collection of mystical writings, and 
then study the subtle influence which such expressions as a 
whole have exerted upon the thought and feeling, the courage and 
happiness, the daring and the humility of the race, without re- 
cognizing that mysticism has contributed something that the world
1. 
would miss". This appeals to us as a far juster estimate of the
contribution of mysticism to human life.








Professor Pratt's study is probably the most thorough and com- 
prehensive book that has yet appeared in connection with the new 
science of religious psychology. It is a general work, no import- 
ant aspect of the religious life is ignored, and the range and 
variety of its data are unique.
The author speaks with first hand knowledge of the religious 
facts not merely of the Occident, but also of the Orient. The book 
indicates an extraordinary appreciation of diverse types of relig- 
ious beliefs and practices. This investigator attempts with great 
success to get into the very mind of the religious subject he stud- 
ies, and is consistently a sympathetic, just, and candid critic of 
the religious life in all its protean forms.
His method is purely descriptive and empirical. Pratt holds, 
that the most fruitful procedure is to gather up the results of
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, (Macfcillan Co.1920)
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three methods, namely, the questionnaire with safe-guards, the
biographical, and the historical, and to subject these data to 
critical study.
The point of view all across is dispassionate and scientific, 
the ideal Pratt sets before himself, is to maintain throughout the 
attitude of empirical science. He affirms that the phenomena of 
the religious life should be described without introducing theolog- 
ical or metaphysical hypotheses, and is emphatic that psychologic- 
al phenomena must not be mixed up with philosophical evaluations. 
Pratt then, proposes no more than to go to experience and write 
down what he finds. He refuses to introduce the God of theology 
or the Absolute of philosophy into the psychology of religion as 
a scientific explanation. His position is that the claim of re- 
ligion to ultimate truth can neither be established nor refuted 
by the psychology of religion, for this is an empirical science, 
and as such cannot pronounce on questions of ultimate reality.
This psychologist begins with an analysis of the nature of 
religion, from thence he passes on to a statement of the method- 
ology of the psychology of religion; the role of the sub-conscious 
in religious phenomena is next considered, followed by a discuss- 
ion of the religious experiences of childhood and adolescence;the 
topics of conversion and revivals; the causes and content of the 
beliefs in God and immortality next receive Pratt's attention; he 
then passes on to treat of the causes and functions of the cult, 
and discusses in an illuminating way the question of worship in 
its objective and subjective aspects; finally, mysticism is given 
very thorough treatment, one third of the book being devoted to 
this subject. It is worthy of note that the material with which
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this author works is drawn almost exclusively from the highly de- 
veloped religions.
Religion.
Pratt begins by criticizing all theological and sociological 
definitions of religion as being too narrow, and submits as his de- 
finition that "serious and social attitude of individuals or com- 
munities towards the power or powers which they conceive as having
1. 
ultimate control over their interests and destinies". He claims
for his definition that it is at once workable in psychological 
analysis, and broad enough to take in all the phenomena of primi- 
tive and civilised life usually thought to be, religious, and yet 
narrow enough to differentiate religion from morality, theology, 
philosophy, and science.
This psychologist is careful to point out, that while relig- 
ion is a subjective response of the self, it is a response to some- 
thing, it is an attitude towards powers in whose ontological exist- 
ence one believes. The religious consciousness always considers 
its religion objective as well as subjective.
Pratt unlike Ames, clearly distinguishes between religion and 
morality. In all well developed religions we are able to disting- 
uish between an attitude to the controller of destiny, which is re- 
ligion, and a system of teachings about the conduct of life, which 
is morality, these two things are not identical.
This author with fine moderation holds the scales evenly be- 
tween the individual and society. As against Ames's exaggeration 
of the social, Pratt holds that religion has often been in part the 
product of the individual, as witness the great prophetic religions.
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p. 2.
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He rightly says, "Buddhism without Gautama and Christianity with- 
out Jesus would resemble strikingly Hamlet without Hamlet". 
According to this writer, as culture and thought advance religion 
becomes more and more individual and constantly less dependent on 
social forms and sanctions. Pratt lays down the proposition here, 
that religion is the product of both society and the individual, 
and gets itself expressed in both.
In discussing the various aspects of religion, this author 
adds another typical aspect to the three with which his first book 
"The Psychology of Religious Belief" made us familiar. Pratt now 
divides religious types into four, namely, (1) the traditional, 
which is controlled by the authority of the past; (2) the rational, 
which wants to break with traditional authority and to base itself 
purely on reason, and verifiable experience; (3) the mystical, 
which appeals to an experience which is peculiarly subjective and 
not scientifically verifiable; and (4) Pratt f s new type, the pract- 
ical or moral, which puts the accent on conduct rather than on be- 
lief or emotion. Pratt,shows that the ideal is the harmonious de- 
velopment of all four aspects of the religious life in one individ- 
ual, but the ideal is not the actual.
The Psychology of Religion.
Under this head Pratt treats of the methodology of the psych- 
ology of religion. Psychology according to this investigator is 
interested in religion as a great human fact but it does not go be- 
hind the psychological phenomena to discuss questions of ultimate 
causation, this work it leaves to theology and metaphysics. The 
psychology of religion with this author, seeks to be a science,
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and science with Pratt, is limited to human experience and is sole_ 
ly concerned with a systematic description of the verifiable facts 
of that experience. The function of the psychology of religion 
then, is to furnish a scientific description of the facts of re- 
ligious consciousness without aiming at anything metaphysical or 
transcendental.
The Sub-conscious.
The chapter on the sub-conscious is probably the best in the 
book. He clarifies this conception for the requirements of the 
psychology of religion. The term itself he says is ambiguous and 
has been over-worked. Pratt indicates three chief ways in which 
the term is used in contemporary psychological literature: (1) as 
the fringe of the conscious mind; (2) as a purely physiological 
neural process; (3) as an intricate psychical mechanism which does 
complex mental work without the cognisance of the conscious mind, 
to which the term co-consclous has been annexed.
Pratt casts his vote for the first two of these conceptions, 
he holds that the sub-conscious may be interpreted in terms of 
both the fringe region and the nervous system, and that the sub- 
conscious in this sense is what virtually makes us what we are. 
He holds, that the evidence is not strong enough to force us to 
postulate a sub-consciousness in normal persons the mental phenom- 
ena of whom can be sufficiently explicated by the fringe of con- 
sciousness, automatic nervous processes, and the accepted laws of 
psychology. But the case is other with pathological subjects, 
here evidence for the existence of a sub-conscious mental life is 
strong.
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Pratt's conclusion is first, the sub-conscious is either non- 
existent or negligible in normal persons, and second, in abnormal 
subjects it is always limited and inferior to the conscious self. 
The term sub-conscious with Pratt covers the physiological neural 
processes which connect us up with our past and that of our race; 
the fringe region of the field of consciousness; and the co-con- 
sciousness in those who possess it.
Pratt emphasizes the part the physiological factor plays in 
human life; it links us up with our own past, and that of the race; 
it preserves to us our instincts and habits; and it enables us to 
use our memories automatically and so to unconsciously utilize past 
experience. A man's religion then is not simply a matter of his 
own conscious processes it is bound up with his psycho-physical 
organism, his racial history, and his individual history. He comes 
into the world with an original outfit of instincts, needs, and ways 
of reacting of such a kind as to make him incurably religious. 
Again our individual history is shaped by our social environment, 
and this iB in combination with our racial inheritance makes us re- 
ligious.
The great source of the content of the sub-conscious with Pratt 
is the conscious experiences of the individual and the race. All 
the past experiences of the race, and of the individual find sanct- 
uary in the sub-conscious, and when all the burial places of the 
memory give up their dead in the shape of impulses to do things, 
fixed ideas, sudden inspirations, visions, automatisms etc., these 
things seem so unaccountable to the subject that he immediately 
assigns all this sub-conscious phenomena to a supernatural cause.
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The prophets and mystics of all ages have been influenced 
by sub-conscious up-rushings into consciousness of meanings, 
insights, and ideas which they interpreted as direct messages 
from God. The supernatural hypothesis is unnecessary to account 
for these messages since they are simply the explosion into the 
prophet's consciousness of the highest ideals of the nation which 
had been smouldering in the region of the sub-conscious. Pratt 
pertinently asks why should God communicate with a split off con- 
sciousness rather than with the conscious mind? He asserts that 
what is highest in the religious genius is to be found in his 
conscious states not in some form of insensibility. The highest 
type of man in the religious life as elsewhere is the unified and 
rational self.
He maintains that his view does not rule out of court the 
fact of Divine inspiration, or of communion with God, but merely 
discredits the theory propounded by James that inspiration etc., 
must come in clandestine fashion through the sub-conscious into 
consciousness. 1.
Society and the Individual.
In connection with the vexed question of whether religion 
is an affair of society or of the individual this author holds, 
that religion is both a social and an individual product. Pratt 
raises the question, how does the individual get his religion? 
His answer is in the first place, because the individual's psych- 
ical constitution makes him incurably religious, and in the sec- 
ond place, because of the experience the individual gains by
1. James William. The Varieties, p. 484.
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intercourse with his fellows.
He emphasizes m& two individualistic factors in religion. 
First, there is the reason and intellect by means of which the in- 
dividual appropriates social experience, and second, there is the 
psychic outfit of tendencies and instincts which determines what 
sort of attitude the individual will adopt to religion, both fact- 
ors are purely individualistic and independent of social influence. 
Reason then, and the original psychic equipment can account' for a 
religious attitude apart from the influence of society.
According to Pratt, it is an error to regard religion as a 
purely social product, we cannot ignore the great part individual 
religious geniuses play in the development of religion. In the 
last analysis, religion is an individual matter, each man must 
take up his own attitude, and this is a subjective, personal, and 
private thing.
But says Pratt, the religious life has matter as well as form, 
the form is determined by the individual, the matter is given by 
society. Men do come to think and feel religiously in ways in- 
fluenced by society. There is therefore in addition to the in- 
dividual's psychic equipment the important factor of the social 
contribution to religion. The individual cannot be studied in ab- 
straction from society nor society apart from the individual. 
Pratt argues, we come into our section of the world and find it 
worshipping and believing in specific ways. We imitate these ways 
and so assimilate the customs of the social group. Religious ways 
of thinking,feeling and acting are ingrained by one generation 
into the mental background, even into the nervous system of the 
next. These ways become in us habitual reactions, and this is
351.
explanation of conservatism in religion.
Two things found in religion are due to society, namely, its 
authoritative nature, and its traditional elements. Pratt makes 
the interesting observation, that conservatism of customs, is 
stronger than the conservatism of beliefs. The reasons advanced 
are: first, beliefs are subject to rational criticism and refutat- 
ion in a way in which customs are not; second, a breach of relig- 
ious observance is patent to the whole social group, therefore it 
arouses more indignation than an heretical idea; third, customs 
are more ingrained into the nervous system, it is therefore easier 
to change ideas than habits.
Two reasons are adduced for the authority of religious customs 
and beliefs, the one, is simply force of habit, the established 
paths of the nervous system determine the order of our doings, the 
other, is the impressive source from which they come, namely, 
parents, teachers, and priests. In a word, these customs and be- 
liefs are forced on the individual by society, this is the only 
authority we can empirically verify.
Pratt refers to a second kind of imitation which unlike the 
first which makes for the conservation of old ways, really init- 
iates new customs. Here the individualistic factor becomes signi- 
ficant. He shrewdly observes, that we believe differently from 
our grandfathers not because of greater originality on our part, 
but because we imitate the more advanced of our contemporaries.
Two psychological causes of change in belief are indicated, 
the first, is the fact that man is a suggestible being, and the 
second, is that he is a rational being and is liable to become
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innoculated with new ideas. But Pratt insists rational ideas de- 
stroy traditional beliefs not simply because they are rational, 
but because men of prestige teach them, it is this fact that gives 
them their hold over the popular mind. Pratt asserts, that theol- 
ogy is more conservative than religion. The religious genius he 
says, is always the innovator, and his appeal to individual con- 
science, and to immediate personal relation with God is against 
the traditional doctrines of the age.
Pratt's position with regard to the relative contributions of 
the individual and society to religion is briefly, that the influ- 
ence of society must be appreciated, but that the subject of the 
psychology of religion is the religion of the individual, and not 
sociology, anthropology, or history.
The Religion Of Childhood.
The discussion of the religion of childhood is illuminating. 
With Pratt the infant is a little animal fitted out with senses, 
reflexes, instincts, and incipient intelligence; the world into 
which he comes is a social world full of people stamped with ways 
of thinking and acting, who insist on stamping upon him the same 
ways. There is an innate tendency to imitation in the child, he 
therefore imitates the models he finds, and literally absorbs the 
customs, attitudes, and ideals of that part of the race to which 
he belongs.
Pratt asserts the child is incipiently religious, in the 
sense that he has a vague attitude to the powers that determine 
his destiny. For the child these powers are embodied in the 
immediate social circle, and hence his first exhibitions of love,
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trust, dependence and reverence are directed to actual persons,e.g.
mother, father, or nurse.
Our attention is drawn to two important presuppositions of 
religion's becoming explicit, namely, the development of self- 
consciousness and the development of social consciousness. These 
two lines of development are chronologically parallel. According 
to Pratt, three main factors form the child's God-idea:(1) the in- 
direct influence of the actions of older people; (2) direct teach- 
ing on religious subjects; and (3) the natural development of the 
child's mind.
The most significance is assigned to the first factor, because 
here the powerful law of imitation or ideo-motor action operates. 
The child is interested in people,observes what they do, imitates 
their actions, and so comes to indirectly share in their mental 
attitudes and feelings. Pratt draws the pedago gical inference 
that wherever children are growing up, the outward expression of 
religion is simply not to be replaced by anything else. Family 
prayers and grace before meat have therefore psychological signifi- 
cance.
In connection with the factor of direct teaching, Pratt ex- 
plains that the heterogeneous mass of religious ideas often found 
in the child's mind is a resultant of three factors: First, the 
indiscriminate instruction of parents, servants, teachers, preach- 
ers, playmates, books, and pictures; second, a misunderstanding of 
much that is taught; and third, the child's own imaginative con- 
tribution.
The third factor in the formation of the child's theology is 
according to Pratt, the child's own development. Pratt begins by
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pointing out that the instinct of curiosity makes the child a walk- 
ing interrogation point. Very soon the child's problems cannot be 
solved in terms of father, mother or the social circle, dependence 
on parents is no longer felt as ultimate, and there is a sense of 
a farther power beyond, on which they too with him depend. Theol- 
ogy says Pratt, is the child's first science, his questions drive 
his parents back to God as the ultimate explanation of most things, 
and on the whole the child finds this the most satisfactory solution 
of his questions. The developing mind of the child seeks an ade- 
quate cause and reason for things, hence the causal and teleological 
categories become necessary.
Authority says Pratt is the dominant characteristic of the 
child's religion. Two things mark the child's mind at this stage, 
namely, unquestioning acceptance of what is presented, and second, 
intense suggestibility. The critical faculty is at first dormant, 
but the day comes when a new idea collides with some old belief, 
the critical faculty awakes, and doubt begins.
According to Pratt, the doubts of childhood are sourced in two 
causes, they either result from conflict between authoritative theo- 
logical teaching and the child's own growing experience, or from 
conflict between authoritative theological ideas taught, and his 
own growing sense of justice and morality. Pratt holds therefore, 
it is egregious folly to teach theology which the child's own ex- 
perience can refute, and to teach a kind of God which his growing 
sense of righteousness finds insufferable. The defect of religious 
instruction according to Pratt, is neglect of emphasis on the fact 
of the indissolubility of religion and morality. The fact is stress-
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3d that there is a time when primitive credulity is replaced by 
critical understanding, and that the kind of instruction then 
given is decisive for life. Pratt suggests that one of the causes 
of atheism is religious instruction of the wrong kind.
Adolescence.
Adolescence for Pratt, is the flowering time for religion and 
most other things in human life. The adolescent makes three new 
discoveries: he comes into possession of all his bodily functions; 
new vistas open up to his intellect and imagination; and he dis- 
covers new and terrifying intensities of emotion and desire. 
Four great tasks confront the adolescent: (1) he has to develop 
the powers and functions of his body; (2) to appropriate his in- 
tellectual heritage; (3) to adjust himself to the society of which 
he has now become a real member; (4) and lastly, he has to grow out 
of thing-hood into self-hood.
Pratt criticizes Starbuck's classification of the religious 
life of adolescence as being suspiciously definite, and asserts 
that here we have actually a blurred picture only.
This psychologist's observations on sex and religion are wise 
and timely. His position is, that while the sex instinct manifests 
itself in religion so do other instincts, the importance of the 
sexual factor in religion is over-emphasized, and whatever influ- 
ence it has is largely indirect and unconscious. Religion has not 
one but many roots, hence it is unscientific to assign a purely 
sexual cause for the storm and stress period of adolescence.
The lofty aspirations of youth and the physical weakness 
attendant on rapid growth can account for much of this religious
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turmoil In which an exaggerated sense of guilt appears. Pratt 
believes that certain theological prepossessions in which adoles- 
cents have been trained accounts for much of this morbid sense of 
guilt which is such a striking phenomenon of adolescent religion. 
He finds, that in the religious lives of Roman Catholic youths, 
the adolescents of the religions of India, and those of the great 
national churches this morbid phenomenon which characterizes the 
youth of denominations trained in a narrow theology does not occur. 
Pratt accepts the view with which Starbuck has made us familiar 
namely, that a period of doubt follows the period of storm and 
stress. He assigns this phenomenon of adolescent doubt to three 
causes. The first, is a physiological one, obscure physical con- 
ditions having little to do with intellectual matters impel the 
adolescent to doubt everything in general, and nothing in particu- 
lar. Pratt endorses Starbuck 1 s deliverance, that adolescence is
for men generally a period of doubt, while for women it is a period
1. 
of storm and stress.
The second cause is both intellectual and moral. Pratt in- 
stances species of this, for example, new studies at the University 
are found to be inconsistent with the religion taught in childhood; 
a growing sense of goodness, justice, and truth makes some old 
dogma seem unworthy; faith in prayer becomes shaken because of fail- 
ure to get the answer one's childhood training led one to expect; 
or again the evil lives of professing Christians may destroy one's 
early faith,
Pratt diagnoses the pain symptom of religious doubt as due
1. Starbuck E.D. The Psychology of Religion, p. 241.
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not merely to a fresh apprehension of logical inconsistency, but 
to a conflict of desires. There is a desire to be true to a dear- 
ly loved faith, and a desire to be loyal to truth, and the struggle 
between these desires involves mental suffering.
Pratt advances a third cause for adolescent doubt in the fact 
of mass suggestion. He shrewdly observes, a conventional notion 
is abroad that youth must go through a period of scepticism, and 
youth tries to live up to the expectation. With many young men 
doubt is a matter of imitation, it is thought smart to doubt, onefe 
set doubts, therefore one doubts, hetero-suggestion passes into 
auto-suggestion. He concludes, that the natural phenomenon of 
doubt is abnormally extended by suggestion, and that its prevalence 
is exaggerated.
Pratt states, that the violent religious emotion of youth sub- 
sides in the post-adolescent period. Here doubts if there be any 
are intellectual, and struggles are less intense. One's theology 
may alter but one's religious attitude is settled.
Last comes the period of old age which is marked by two things 
The first feature is that active interests lose their hold on life 
and the second is the contrasted fact, that religious interests 
intensify. Pratt indicates three reasons for this: first, the 
earliest memories, and interests endure when the more recent fade 
away; second the critical faculty weakens and it becomes difficult 
to assimilate new ideas, therefore old age is less susceptible to 
the influence of the critical spirit; and finally, because relig- 
ion becomes more precious as death draws near, life's other inter- 
ests become dwarfed by comparison. The conviction deepens in old 
age that religion conserves the real values.
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Two Types of Conversion.
In his treatment of conversion, Pratt corrects details in the 
interpretations of Starbuck and James. These investigators con- 
fined their attention to the ultra-evangelical type of religious 
subject, and therefore exaggerated the importance and frequency of 
the catastrophic species of conversion.
Pratt interprets the term* conversion in the broadest sense 
as the whole process involved in the making of moral self. He de- 
fines the moral self as a group of powers united inthe service of 
a system of purposes. A moral self is one determined by purposes 
and ideals, but in the lives of most of us purposes conflict, and 
ideals clash, man's task therefore, is to subordinate the less 
loved ideals to the best loved, when this process of subjugation 
is complete the moral self is formed and the man ceases to be a 
divided self.
With Pratt a divided self is one torn between conflicting 
loves, before a man can will one set of ideals before another, he 
must come to love that set best, hence the all important thing is 
the emotional value we give to anything. New ideals must come to 
be loved better than the old before they can displace the old. 
Now Pratt points out that in the majority of cases new ideals 
silently displace* the old by a subtle modification of values, and 
at the end of the adolescent period the young man finds himself a 
fairly unified person. But there are exceptions, due to either 
temperament or environmental conditions. These exceptional forms 
of conversion have great psychological interest, but are not ethic- 
ally superior to the quieter types. Pratt's position is, that for
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psychology conversion is entirely a natural phenomenon which is 
independent of supernatural interference, the conventional relig- 
ious conversion, falling in love, and the process of counter con- 
version all follow precisely the same psychological course. The 
proposition, is maintained that conversion is generically, a pro- 
cess of unification of a divided self, and that it is psychologic- 
ally the same in all religions.
Two types of conversion are illustrated by Pratt. He adduces 
four typical cases of the volitional species of conversion, one 
from Roman Catholicism, two are taken from Hinduism, and one from 
the Russian Church. Pratt then takes John Bunyan and David Braineio 
as illustrating the conventional Christian conversion of the self- 
surrender type. He attaches special significance to Bunyan f s case 
for two reasons: first, because Bunyan's religious experience is 
probably the most vivid example extant, of how pre-conceived ideas 
of conversion determine the process, and second, because Bunyan's 
conversion has set the fashion of orthodox conversion ever since 
in ultra-evangelical circles.
The Factors at work in Conversion.
Pratt asserts the whole course of a conversion of the Bunyan- 
Brainerd type is predetermined by na'ively accepted theology the 
cardinal ideas of which are that intellectual insight, good deeds, 
and voluntary effort, are useless for salvation. Hence a gradual 
process of moral development is unthinkable, and conversion and 
salvation must be due to the supernatural factor alone, and be cat- 
astrophic in nature. Pratt affirms, the attempt to force human 
nature into this theological mould was signally successful with
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Bunyan and Brainerd, and has been more or less successful ever 
since with those who have brought up in this theological tradition.
Starbuck and James are criticized here, for concentrating on 
this self-surrender type of conversion at the expense of the moral 
and volitional type. This type of conversion experience fascinated 
Starbuck and James, says Pratt, because it is more startling, and 
the sub-conscious effects more abundant. He points out that there 
is no good evidence for Starbuck 1 s assertion that conversion is a
process of struggling away from sin, rather than a striving towards
1. 
righteousness. This says Pratt, is true onjy of the Bunyan-
Brainerd type, and imitators influenced by these cases. Pratt main 
tains as against Starbuck and James, that in most cases of conver- 
sion the process is just the reverse. It is a process of struggling 
towards something new as the result of a fascinating glimpse of the 
possible new life, and not a process of struggling away from sin 
at all. He asserts, that the phenomena of intense conviction of 
sin, and that of self-surrender, so prominent in conventional cases 
of conversion are artificially induced by a particular theological 
theory, and he accuses Starbuck and James of unlawfully using psych 
ology to buttress this arbitrary theology.
As evidence that the conventional conversion experience of 
ultra-evangelical circles is due to the influence of their peculiar 
traditions, and to the suggestion of a specific theology, Pratt sub- 
mits, that religious persons of the great national churches do not 
have this type of conversion experience. On the whole he makes out 
a convincing case for the proposition, that the theological training 
and prepossessions of the religious subject determine the fact and
1. Starbuck E.D. The Psychology of Religion, p. 64.
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mode of the conversion process. This psychologist holds it is a 
crime that the artificially induced misery of the Brainerd type,and 
the pathological morbidity of the Bunyan type should have become 
the standard of the conversion experience for earnest Christians.
Pratt corrects the exaggerated emphasis which both Starbuck 
and James placed on the self-surrender factor in conversion. He 
affirms that the only surrender in the matter Is the surrender of 
the old values because new values have become more desirable. 
Effort is supremely important says Pratt, when one's purpose is to 
give up evil habits, to acquire new insight, and to effect a revol- 
ution in one's ideals, values, and character, therefore to advocate 
cessation of effort is a dangerous theological fallacy.
Pratt is careful to point out that mere effort is not enough, 
a man must want to live the new life before he makes the effort, 
hence the great thing is to create the desire. Now says Pratt, 
there is no forcing of desires or tastes, but when these are got, 
effort inevitably follows. The problem then as it exists for Pratt, 
is how to make the new life first desirable, then possible. Several 
things make to-wards this end, Pratt instances poverty and crime 
with their resultant misery as one factor, falling in love is anoth- 
er, the sentiment of patriotism is also a factor, but above all the 
power of religion. It is this last, that gives to the man who is 
down the hope that the new life is a possibility. For with Pratt, 
there must be not only desire but that which is desired must appeal 
to the man as possible before he will indulge in effort.
According to this investigator, the majority of cases of con- 
version can be explained in terms of ordinary mental laws but there
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are certain aspects which belong to the violent type of conversion 
which transcend the field of ordinary mental occurrences and psych- 
ology seeks to explicate these more striking phenomena in terms of 
the sub-conscious. Starbuck, James and Coe in particular have in- 
voked the aid of this region to explain many apparently obscure
facts of the religious life.
in 
All conversion phenomena are explained by psychology*terms
either of ordinary mental facts, or in terms of the sub-conscious. 
With Pratt as we have seen this last category is cautiously used 
to cover the marginal region of the field of consciousness plus 
the unconscious non-psychical machinery of the nervous system. 
Pratt is very guarded in his acceptance of the thoroughgoing co- 
conscious theory with which James worked in his "Varieties". 
Pratt believes that his qualified theory is sufficient to account 
for the facts. In any case Pratt holds the sub-conscious process 
is not melodramatic, it is simply the gradual transformation of 
values which goes on in all of us from childhood to maturity. 
Religious conversion is due to the same mutation of values, it is 
in the last analysis a change of taste.
Crowd Psychology and Revivals.
Religious revivals are explicated by Pratt in terms of the 
laws of rhythm, and those of crowd psychology. According to our 
author the law of the pendulum is a fundamental characteristic of 
the human mind. He illustrates how the rhythmic needs of man are 
recognized and met by the great historic religions in recurrent 
periods for meditation and spiritual refreshment. He draws atten- 
tion to the fact that emotions are more intense in groups of
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individuals, than in an individual isolated from the group, and 
that this has been recognized by all religions. Revival methods 
are a deliberate means of arousing group emotion.
Pratt lays down here an important proposition, that the 
psychology of the crowd is not essentially different from that of 
the individual. All the phenomena of crowd psychology characterize 
the individual out of the crowd as well as in it. What the crowd 
does is to heighten the suggestibility of the individual, and to 
intensify certain other factors which were already his before he 
entered the crowd. The crowd then does not create suggestibility 
but it accentuates it particularly in two ways, namely, by destroy- 
ing inhibitions, and by getting for some one idea the whole atten- 
tion. The members of a crowd are therefore more suggestible and 
primitive in their reactions than they would be in isolation from 
the group. Now there are three ways in which a crowd breaks down 
inhibitions, first, in a dense crowd free movement become imposs- 
ible this engenders a feeling of loss of independence, second, 
there is created an increased sense of power, and third, together 
with this delightful sense of power, the sense of personal respon- 
sibility evaporates, hence ordinary inhibitions of prudence and 
propriety are cast aside. In addition to all this, the crowd 
makes direct suggestions in the way of beliefs or impulses to action
Now says Pratt, all these psychological characteristics of 
crowds in general are found in the revival meeting*. The creation 
of these characteristics is the sine qua non of a successful re- 
vival. There are four things a revivalist must have before he 
begins, first, like-mindedness, second, great suggestibility,third
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emotional excitement,and fourth, the absence of Inhibitions. It is 
necessary says Pratt that a state of mental strain, expectancy and 
subdued excitement should be induced throughout the community be- 
fore the arrival of the revivalist, when this is done it is not an 
ordinary crowd that meets the revivalist, but a psychological crowd.
The methods adopted by the revivalist on the spot itself are: 
first, hymn singing, which produces and communicates emotion, this 
breaks down inhibitions. Next comes the address the aim of which 
is not to convince the reason by logical arguments, for having got 
a crowd prepared psychologically the revivalist does not need logic, 
the critical faculties have abdicated, therefore his address is an 
appeal to the emotions, especially to those of love and fear.
Another means of suggestion which Pratt indicates, is the fre- 
quent use of repetition of significant words and phrases. The 
climax of the whole thing is the appeal for instant decision. 
Evangelists are unwilling that their hearers should go home and 
make their decisions in a cool hour, f decide now 1 is their cry. 
Pratt points out,that the procession of penitents to the inquiry 
room is itself a powerful suggestion. Hymns are then produced such 
as, "0 Lamb of God I come", which is a masterpiece of auto-suggest- 
ion. Between each verse the speaker says in tender tones, "come 
now", "will you not come". Then the audience sings, "I come,I come" 
this says Pratt, is the most obvious case of auto-suggestion that 
could be found. The most suggestible subjects start the procession 
to the Inquiry room, and the procession itself is a powerful sug- 
gestion to others.
According to Pratt the effects of revivals are both good and
365.
bad. The revival is the centre of enormous power, and this has 
often worked mightily for righteousness. It has transformed char- 
acter, and has led in many cases to lasting reformation of life, 
especially, and note Pratt f s qualification, in centuries before oui 
own. But says Pratt the effects are not always to be desired, for 
frequently revivals let loose a tremendous power which breaks down 
inhibitions connected with emotion. It is a bad thing when an 
appeal is made to the emotions upon questions where reason and evi- 
dence alone are relevant. It is here asserts Pratt, that we get 
the deceptive statistics of the revivalist.
Again inhibitions to action are frequently broken down, with 
the result that various motor impulses get out of control. Here we 
have the phenomenon of Glossolalia, Here too belong the bodily 
effects such as the rolling exercises, jerks and barks, where over- 
wrought nerves and great suggestibility have caused the entire loss 
of control over nerves and muscles.
Yet again, the third and worst result of revivals is the break- 
ing down of inhibitions in connection with belief. Many revivalists 
are able to change a man from a rational being into an impulsive 
animal, and to reduce audiences even of high intelligence to a 
state of primitive credulity. The worst result of revivals is in- 
sanity, weak minds roused by the abnormal excitement of the revival 
simply gofli to pieces. Pratt ! s conclusion is briefly, revivals of 
religion, morality, patriotism and ideals are necessary because of 
the fact of rhythm in human life, but that the day of the old 
fashioned revival is done with its inhibition of reason; of free 
and responsible action; and its forcing of emotions and convictions
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by semi-hypnotic methods, all these things avers Pratt transform 
the thinking man into an hypnotic subject, and dwarf human per- 
sonality.
Belief in God.
Pratt holds that cult, private prayer, and belief are the 
three important phenomena of religion, and that all three origin- 
ated and developed together. He lays down as the general condition 
of belief, that the proposed object must square either with our 
perceptual universe or with our conceptual universe before we will 
believe in its reality. The two great objects of religious belief 
are God, and the Future Life. Pratt is not concerned with the 
origin of these beliefs, but rather with the question of why men 
believe in these realities, and what psychological factors deter- 
mine the meanings|of these two terms?
First,Pratt discovers the idea of God is determined by three 
definite influences, a sociological, a psychological, and a con- 
ceptual or logical factor. The influence of society is an Import- 
ant factor in moulding one's idea of God. The place the senses 
and imagination play in belief has much to do with the determinat- 
ion of the notion of God. Again when men live in a conceptual age 
the need is felt for a less anthropomorphic and more rationally 
satisfying God-idea. It is this logical factor that has made the 
older ideas of God Incredible.
According to Pratt,three elements may be discerned in the God- 
idea, an imaginative, a conceptual, and a pragmatic. Pratt perti- 
nently criticizes Leuba, King, and Ames all of whom have pressed 
this pragmatic element to the point of absurdity. All these
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authors he says, in their over-emphasis on the pragmatic phase 
have ignored other real elements in the religious consciousness.
Pratt's four religious types which he defined at the outset 
are now illustrated in his analysis of the reasons why people now 
believe in God. Pratt discovers by statistics, percentages which 
point to the existence of these four types of belief, namely be- 
lief on authority, reasoned belief, emotional belief, and volition 
al belief. Pratt finds that belief in God is habitual or author- 
itative in 25^ of his cases; in 30$,belief is based on some form 
of reasoning; in 37^, it is based on some form of affective con- 
sciousness; while in Qfo only, is it due to the "Will to believe". 
Pratt opines the healthiest and highest type would of course draw 
strength from all these four sources.
Now the nature of belief in God does not so easily fit into 
Pratt's four categories. He indicates, that in many persons be- 
lief in God centres about imagery; in others the belief is more 
conceptual; while for many both images and concepts are thought to 
be symbolical of some deeper reality for the expression of which 
they are both alike inadequate. Pratt's position is, that while 
pragmatic motives are present they are not as strong as Leuba 
asserts, nor do men think of God as Ames and King suppose, merely 
as a projection of human ideals and values. For religious men God 
is a symbol of ultimate and independently existing reality.
Belief in Immortality.
Pratt finds that the people who believe in Immortality also 
fall under his four categories, but here he indicates that rational 
arguments have far less influence than feeling and volition. He
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notes an important difference between belief in God and that in
immortality, namely, belief in God is taught, while belief in 
immortality is not, it is ours naturally and implicitly.
Pratt emphasizes the fact that belief in survival is due not 
to reasoning but to feeling and desiring. Men have an instinctive 
feeling they are not to be obliterated. This conviction is based 
on the feeling of the worth of personality, which is connected 
with the instinct of self-assertion. The arguments men use to 
buttress this belief are largely negative being confined to show- 
ing that the opposite view is equally difficult to justify by log- 
ic. The best argument in Pratt ! s opinion is that based on the 
essential differences between consciousness and its processes, and 
the material world and its processes. Pratt discovered from his 
reports, that the "Will to Believe" class was the largest here, 
and holds, that this desire for survival is linked up with instinct 
as witness the fact that it is seen in all grades of mental and 
spiritual development, e.g., the peasant, the artist, the poet, 
the philosopher, the saint, and the mystic.
According to Pratt the pragmatic value of belief in immortal- 
ity is huge, it has value for life. This belief in a future life 
conserves values, and gives expression to two things: (1) it in- 
sists that conscious rational life and the supreme values of the 
universe shall not perish; and (2) that spiritual life is differ- 




As against Tylor and Tiele who maintained cult was subsequent
1. Tylor .Primitive Culture. Second ed.1875.Vol.II.Chap.18.
2. Tiele .Science of Religion. Vol.11, p. 127.
1. 2. 369 ' 
to belief, and in opposition to Ames and King who hold that Cult
is prior to belief, Pratt asserts that cult and belief originate 
together. Pratt answers the question Ames leaves unanswered,namely 
how do merely social ceremonies become religious ceremonies? 
There must have been according to Pratt, an early form of cosmic 
sense, a kind of Spencerian awe in the face of the unknown force 
from which all things come. The view of Goldenweiser is endorsed
that man is not only sensitive to social influences but also to
3. 
the influences of nature. Pratt maintains there must have been a
blurred belief in an indefinite power which was conceived of as 
controlling destiny. Modern anthropology calls this vague diffused 
power which is other than human, Mana, and sees in this the earli- 
est religious object. Pratt holds, individuals as well as groups 
maintained an attitude to this indefinite power, and this attitude 
constituted the first private, or public worship. Here then accord 
ing to Pratt, we have the earliest religious belief, and men 
naturally seized on the existing social ceremony most suitable to 
express this belief.
Now social ceremony takes on a new meaning when it refers to 
Mana the power that controls destiny, it becomes charged with a 
new significance and becomes a teligious ceremony. The forms of 
religious cult vary according to the group activities which have 
thus been appropriated, and to the local ideas of Mana. Each new 
rite added to the cult depends on a new belief that arises concern- 
ing Mana, or upon some old social custom being brought in. Local
conditions must be sought for the strange details of cult. These
1. Ames. The Psychology of Religious Experience, pp. 49,51.
2. King. The Development of Religion, p. 88.
3. Goldenweiser A.A. Religion and Society. A Critique of femile 
Durkhei^s fheorv of tRe drigin and Nature of Religion. Jour, of Phil. XIV. March 1917. p.116. ^j.j.6 j.un.
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then with Pratt are the fundamental principles at work in the 
formation of a religious cult.
Pratt holds, that there is no distinction at first between 
religious and magic rites, both emerge from the same matrix, but 
as the notion of impersonal force yields to the conception of 
supernatural personal spirits, religious rites break free from 
magic ceremonies. In animism, polytheism, and theism, the more 
developed stages of religion, religious cult is clearly different- 
iated from magic rites. The leading feature of magic according 
to Pratt, is that it seeks direct control of the mysterious powers 
of the universe and attempts to concuss these, while the character 
istic of religion is that it seeks to gain its end through the 
assistance of the spirits or gods. He holds that questions of 
origin and nature of magic and cult belong to anthropology.
Pratt f s main interest is in the psychological question, why 
has Cult been perpetuated? He finds that there are external in- 
fluences which cause the cult's continuance, first, cult is forced 
on men by the tyranny of custom; second, the religious reactions 
involved in the cult establish paths in the nervous system and so 
come under the law of habit. Four important reasons appeal to 
Pratt as explaining the retention of ritual, namely, the thought 
of pleasing God; the thought of influencing the audience; the de- 
sire to do things decently and in order; and the mere force of 
habit. Yet again says Pratt, ritual appeals to the instinct of 
gregariousness and to that of self-expression. Men like to per- 
form together actions related to their strongest sentiments, and 
their feelings demand expression by something a bit primitive and
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sensuous. Pratt agrees with Stratton, that when ritual is cut
out of worship violence is done to human nature which 7d.ll be
1. 
avenged. In all developed religions the kind of ritual indicates
the kind of God believed in.
Pratt holds men practice the cult because they find it satis- 
fying, it gives vent to the impulse for self-expression, and 
brings a sense of social solidarity which appeals to the gregar- 
ious instinct, and because they find it profitable, it reinforces 
religious faith, and helps men to the moral control of life, to 
peace, joy, and hope, and all the other values which religion 
mediates.
According to Pratt,the ends sought in cult are three, namely, 
to keep religious beliefs vivid; to stimulate religious emotions; 
and to fix attention on religion so as to make it vital for the 
worshipper. The means used to achieve these ends are six in num- 
ber: (1) Sensuous presentation; (2) Mental images of a vivid kind; 
(5) Appeal to the aesthetic sense; (4) Use of the powerful force 
of social confirmation; (5) Use of religious symbolism; (6) Use 
of public instruction.
Objective and Subjective Worship.
This psychologist distinguishes clearly, perhaps too clearly, 
between two types of worship, the objective, the aim of which is 
to produce an effect on God, and the subjective, the aim of which 
is to bring about a psychological effect in the mind of the wor- 
shipper. These two types are illustrated from the religions of 
the Orient, and from that of Christianity. According to Pratt,
1. Stratton G.M. Psychology of the Religious Life. p.150.
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within Christianity Roman Catholicism represents the objective 
type, while Protestantism illustrates the subjective type.
The objective type of worship is made evident by the very 
edifices of Roman Catholicism. Vast Cathedrals are built not for 
worshippers but for the glory of God. It is difficult to see the 
priest, it is impossible to hear him, moreover he turns his back 
on the congregation, and mutters in an unknown tongue. No matter! 
the only thing of moment is that God should be gloriously worship- 
ped. The essence of Catholicism says Pratt, is that God is present 
in an objective way in the wafer on the altar, and if one can close 
one's eyes to the scientific absurdity, the Mass is the most potent 
institution of any religious cult in history. Now this cult of 
the Mass is successful with two classes, first, with persons of 
mystic psychology, and second, with ignorant persons.
A vivid contrast is drawn between the worship of the church
  x 
of Rome and that of Protestant Christendom, and according to Pratt
the problem of Protestantism is to find a combination of the objects, 
ive and subjective types of worship. The need of more ritual is 
felt, and this need is sourced in human psychology. But says Pratt 
Protestantism must bring to the worshipper the sense of Real Pres- 
ence 7/ithout the aid of the two powerful things at the disposal of 
the Roman Church, namely, the naive belief which makes objective 
worship easy for large groups, and a ritual with the authority of 
generations behind it, hallowed by centuries.
Pratt f s conclusions are not very positive, he holds subjective
worship without objective worship is doomed; and objective worship
the 
of the sort that aims to please/.Deity is impossible to the modern
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man; therefore the only kind of worship left, which is possible for
the intelligent man at once objective and sincere is reverence in 
the presence of the Cosmic forces. In Pratt f s opinion then, the in- 
stinct of self-abasement with its accompanying emotion of negative 
self-feeling is all that is left for the Church to stimulate and 
direct.
Prayer.
Pratt holds that the earliest religious object was the imperson- 
al power which modern anthropologist's agree to call Mana. Accord- 
ing to Pratt individuals felt some kind of relation to Mana, and 
took up an attitude to it as well as social groups. This felt re- 
lation to Cosmic Power on the part of the individual gave rise to 
two phenomena, namely, private magic, and private worship.
Pratt criticizes Marett's view, that prayer originated in the
1.
magic spell. He affirms, that if as is most likely the case, be- 
lief in personal spirits developed out of the original feeling for 
Mana, direct appeal to these personal spirits was perfectly natural. 
For all this Pratt concedes that spell and prayer have reacted on 
each other. Private and public prayer tends to become formal, and 
even comes to be viewed as having an inherent power in itself to 
produce a desired result, this kind of prayer is simply a magic 
spell. Pratt instances here the Thibetan prayer wheel, the Latin 
Pater Noster of the illiterate peasant, and the Sanscrit prayer of 
the ignorant Hindoo. He asserts, that while a ritual of prayer is 
helpful to many as an aid to concentration, two classes of tempera- 
ment have no use for it, namely, the intellectual, and the mystical.
People pray, Pratt discovers, because they began to pray in
l.Marett R.R. The Threshold of Religion,see Chap.II. From
To Prayer, pp. 29 - 72.
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childhood as the result of instruction, and have simply continued 
through habit; or because they believe it helps them; or merely be- 
cause they can't help praying, it rushes to their lips instinctive- 
ly. He notes two features with respect to mature prayer, first, 
its limitations become recognized, and second, communion is sub- 
stituted for petition.
Pratt ! s functional explanation of why men pray, is because 
they have needs. They believe prayer will help them to get what 
they need; or because they cannot help expressing their need in 
prayer form; or because regardless of theory, men feel the benefit 
of formulating their desires in prayer form. The results of Pratt& 
questionnaire proved that the majority of persons do not think 
that God's actions are changed by prayer, yet they keep on praying 
for the last two reasons. At the same time Pratt emphasizes the 
fact, that many people pray because they believe they get objective 
answers.
Pratt's position here is that psychology is not concerned to 
pronounce on the validity of these objective answers. The whole 
question as to the objective reality of the Higher Power religious 
men feel in touch with in prayer, is a matter for metaphysics. 
Psychology is concerned with subjective religious states only, and 
it reports that these states are the results of an intense belief 
in the reality of a Higher Power and a Spiritual World.
Now says Pratt, the valuable subjective benefits of prayer 
are a matter of empirical observation. The prayer of confession 
relieves pent feelings, clarifies conscience, strengthens the will 
and as Freud, Jung, Prince, and Sidis have proved, has great thera- 
peutic value. Prayer is invaluable in the healing of disease
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through the power of suggestion and no other method asserts Pratt, 
is comparable to it for turning sorrow into resignation, fear into 
courage, despair into hope, and turmoil into peace. All this to- 
gether with spiritual uplift, renewed strength, and ability to 
accomplish ends, are the effects of prayer. He concludes,therefore 
that prayer is worth while even for the sake of its subjective 
effects. At the same time Pratt is careful to emphasize, that the 
subjective value of prayer is due to the fact that it has values 
that are not subjective, and his conclusion is, that prayer will 
become extinct if it can be proven that its value is subjective 
only.
Mysticism.
The treatment of Mysticism occupies one third of the book. 
Mysticism in general is defined as a special psychic experience in 
which there is the feeling of the presence of some being or reality 
not got through the ordinary channels of perception, nor through 
any process of reasoning or inferential thought. Religious mystic- 
ism is a species of this, in which the presence sensed is felt to 
be Divine.
A conspicuous feature of Pratt's treatment, is the clear line 
of demarcation he draws between the mysticism of the mild type in 
which there is a quiet sense of the presence of the Divine, and 
mysticism of the extreme hectic type which is annexed to a psycho- 
pathic temperament and constitution. Pratt is justly emphatic 
that to take this hectic species of mysticism and identify it with 
the mysticism at the heart of religion, must vitiate any conclus- 
ion that is based on such an illegitimate procedure. The patho-
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logical side of mysticism has in Pratt's opinion been over-done. 
Pratt finds two things in the mystical experience, his analysis 
reveals an emotional element, and an ideational element. Emotion 
is always present, but it nucleates round some truth or idea. 
The emotion intensifies conviction of the reality of this truth 
or idea, and determines the intellectual content. In the exper- 
ience of the mild type of mystic this truth is the certainty of 
the presence of a greater life which touches his own. This 
mystical sense of presence seems to be much the same as the ordin- 
ary realization of another person's presence, minus the sensory 
causes which normally give rise to it. This presence moreover is 
felt to be Divine, therefore the mystic experience has a special 
emotional intensity.
Pratt holds that the "pains" of the mystic experience are 
annexed to the extreme type only, and may be of the nature of a 
positive sense of being deserted by God, or merely negative in 
the sense of lacking the joyous experience. James is criticized 
here for neglecting to allow for the law of rhythm in the spirit- 
ual life. James's distinction between the "sick soul", and the
1. 
"healthy minded",is according to Pratt too sharply drawn, for the
"sick soul" may be "healthy minded" very often, there is ebb and 
flow in the religious life, religious souls are now sick and now 
sound.
The mystic Pratt affirms,cannot control the occurrence of the 
joyous states, he can only break down moral conditions which in- 
hibit their coming. He concludes, that when both outer circum- 
stances and inner conditions are favourable the sense of the
I.James William. The Varieties. See Lectures IV.V.VI.VII.
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presence of the Divine comes with a spontaneity and a suddenness 
which astounds the subject of it. Generally speaking, the ecstatic 
experience is not to be commanded, but mystics of the mild type are 
able to live as if God were always present with them, they have an 
inner assurance that such is the case which to them is morally sus- 
taining.
Methods.
Pratt holds that the intense mystical experience is for uncom- 
mon individuals only. The central idea of extreme mysticism is 
that of being absorbed in God. The extreme type of mystic does not 
consciously seek the luxury of a bath of ecstatic emotion, but is 
driven to seek this experience by his congenital disposition.
The mental traits of the mystic type of mind are according to 
Pratt f s analysis, first, a big margin to the conscious mind, the 
emotional and ideational contents of which powerfully influence the 
conscious life; second, a lack of inner unity bordering on distract- 
ion, and third, a tendency to mental dissociation in extreme ecstat- 
ics. Now says Pratt given an individual of mystical temperament 
who uses methods that have been deliberately devised to cultivate 
the mystic life,the desired mental state will inevitably be produc- 
ed. The mystical experience is a state of mind which is brought 
about by psychological means, and follows psychological laws.
The methods to induce the mystical state are practically the 
same in all species of mysticism. Protestantism uses them in a 
blundering unconscious fashion, while Roman^ Catholicism has reduced 
them to a science. Pratt reduces the whole traditional course of 
training for Christian mysticism to two stages, the first is char-
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acterized by inhibition, the second, by auto-suggestion. The 
austerities of the first stage, and the auto-suggestions of the 
second are fully described, illustrative material being drawn from 
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity. Pratt has an interesting 
discussion on why men practice ascetism? After which he passes 
on to deal with the climax of the mystic experience.
The Ecstasy.
Pratt's analysis of the mystic ecstasy is remarkably fine, 
he begins by differentiating between the mystic ecstasy, and the 
mystic life, the one is intermittent, while the other is a con- 
stant condition. Pratt finds two features conspicuous in the 
ecstasy. First, there is substitution of passivity for activity. 
The second great characteristic, is the unity and narrowness of 
the conscious field. Four elements are discerned in the ecstasy: 
the outside world is shut out; the senses are closed; the idea of 
God with its congruent emotions love and joy monopolise the whole 
conscious field; and finally there is immediate awareness of God.
The history of the development of the ecstatic condition is 
a gradual process of substituting an emotional for an ideational 
content on the one hand, and a corresponding process of narrowing 
the field of consciousness on the other. This ecstatic process 
carried to its extreme limit would issue in unconsciousness or a 
trance condition which actually results in some cases.
Pratt following James, declares there is a noetic element in 
the mystic experience which has two aspects, on the one hand,there 
is lack of conceptual knowledge, on the other, there is the pres- 
ence of an intense immediate experience. The most striking
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features of the mystic state are the visions and the locutions. 
Our author asserts, that psychologically the structure and causes 
of visions is not dissimilar from that the structure and causes of 
dreams. The symbolic visions of the mystic are caused "by the 
dream Imagination working on the mass of theological ideas already 
in the mind. Pratt cites Freud as insisting on the symbolic nat- 
ure of normal dreams, now says Pratt, if Freud is right then it 
should not astonish us to find that the dream imagination of the 
Christian mystic should work up visions of the symbolic sort.
Pratt stresses the fact that while visions, locutions, levi- 
tations, and hallucinations are simply pathological phenomena due 
to hysterical conditions, the great mystics themselves discount 
these things as being even in their least patholbgical form mere- 
ly accidental, and not essential to the mystic state.
Pratt asserts, the core of the ecstasy is ideational, the 
emotional elements always nucleate round some idea. The mystic f s 
experience is not one of emotion only, but of intuition of reality 
as well. The mystic in Pratt ! s words, knows psychologically 
though not epistemologically. The mystic is certain he has come 
into contact with an objective reality other than his own subject- 
ive consciousness.
According to Pratt, all the alleged revelations of new truth 
manifest two definite tendencies, one, towards optimism, and 
another, towards monism. We are cautioned to distinguish between 
the actual insights gained, and the results of reflection on these 
insights. Pratt refers to the fact, of the incommunicability of 
the revelations of the ecstasy, and criticizes Poulain's explanat- 
ion that incommunicability is due to lack of suitable terms.
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Pratt holds it is not lack of vocabulary, but lack of memory on 
the mystic's part, while Leuba maintains, the mystic has no truths
to communicate. Pratt is impressed with Leuba 1 s suggestion, that
that 
the mystic's beliefA he has had a new revelation of truth may be
1.
explained in terms of dream phenomena. In the dream logical dif- 
ficulties disappear, and there is a delightful feeling of mental 
insight and mastery, so in the ecstasy the mystic in his intellect- 
ual vision sees for example the problem of the Trinity without any 
of its logical difficulties, and on awakening from the ecstasy he 
remembers that he saw clearly then, though he has forgotten now 
how the difficulty was solved, hence he interprets his experience 
of sudden illumination as a revelation of new knowledge.
Pratt ! s own position, is that what the mystic experiences is 
not some newtruth but some old truth which because of the extra- 
ordinary psychological condition of the subject at the time, be- 
comes charged with the electricity of intense emotion and so trans- 
formed for the subject that he cannot recognize it for his own,but 
thinks that the old idea disguised in the glistering garment of 
emotion is a new revelation. His conclusion is, that the revelat- 
ions of the mystic are first taken into the ecstasy before they are 
taken out of it, and that social education is the source of these 
alleged new truths, and not the ecstasy. But Pratt warns us there 
is one exception, namely, the sense of the presence of God. This 
he holds to be the one great genuine and universal deliverance of 
the mystical consciousness. The mystic is certain that he has had 
experimental union with God, and has perceived God without the
1. Leuba J.H. Tendances Religieuses chez les Mystiques Chretiens
(Rev.Philosophique,LIV) 480.Quoted by Pratt pp409-ld
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instruments of perception.
The tendency of mystics to describe God by negative terms is 
explained as due to the thought that since nothing in human ex- 
perience can worthily be ascribed to God, He can best be described 
by negations. Pratt's explanation of the erotic terminology com- 
mon in the writings of the mystics is briefly,that there is no 
other language available to describe to the non-mystic what is 
felt. He moreover suggests, that the Song of Songs has powerfully 
influenced the Christian mystics and has given them their amorous 
vocabulary. These two reasons while explaining much do not ex- 
plain all, for the sexual tendency is present in mysticism. But 
says Pratt, sexual desires permeate most of our life. All emot- 
ions have physiological effects, and the emotion of love though 
it be divorced from every sexual idea is connected with the incip- 
ient excitation of the sexual organs. This is also the case in 
states of intense love of God and Christ, though the mystic 1 s 
mind may be entirely free from sexual thought and desire. Pratt 
concludes, the sexual is there in mystical states but the mystic 
himself is unconscious of the fact, therefore our valuation of 
the mystic from the moral point of view ought not to be affected 
by the fact of the physiological effects of intense emotion.
The psychological history of the mystic experience of the 
extreme type according to Pratt runs through four well marked 
stages:-
1, The higher centres of the brain are cut off from incoming 
sensory currents, and from those of the motor centres 
this results in complete insulation from the outside world
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2. Meanwhile, the field of consciousness is becoming narrowed 
until its content is one idea.
3. This state of monoideism becomes almost a state of pure 
emotion.
4. Finally, this state of pure emotion passes into a state of
unconsciousness or trance.
Pratt points out, that while this final stage of trance is approved 
by the Indian mystics, it is not encouraged by the Christian 
mystics.
The Mystic Life.
According to Pratt, the lives of mystics in general can be de- 
scribed by the word oscillation. By the law of rhythm the mystic 
must pay for his exquisite ecstasy by suffering and a period of 
drought. This phenomenon is explicable psychologically by the im- 
poverishment of the emotional life through its over stimulation 
during the periods of ecstasy, the emotional nature is worn out, 
and the intense joy is followed by a reaction.
Pratt asserts four things make up the life of a great mystic: 
ecstatic joy, with its inevitable reaction, contemplation, and a 
life of active service inspired by the love of God. There is in a 
word, a double rhythm in the lives of the great mystics, that be- 
tween ecstasy and dryness, and that between xjontemplation and the 
life of activity. Pratt criticizes the theory of Delacroix who
traces a well marked evolution from ecstasy to drought, and from
1. 
drought to a life of perfectly guided activity. These stages,Pratt
asserts, do not fit the facts, for these so called stages are not 
periods that come once each, but are actually states of mind that
1. Delacroix. "Etudes d'Histoire et de Psychologic du MysUcisme"
Chapters II, VI, XI. quoted by Pratt.pp.434-6.
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oscillate all through the mystic's life.
Place and Value of Mysticism.
In common with the majority of American investigators Pratt holds, 
that the phenomena of conversion, and the mystic's experiences 
and ecstasies are all alike explicable in terms of the laws of 
psychology. The objects which the psychology of religion studies 
are the emotions, visions, beliefs, apprehensions, and experiences 
of religious men, not what the religious subject interprets as 
the cause of this phenomena. The mystics do feel a presence,that 
is a psychological fact, but the fact that there is a presence to 
feel is not scientifically proven. Pratt f s definite position is, 
that it is hopeless to look to psychology for anything transcend- 
ent. All that is scientifically verifiable are the states, activ- 
ities, beliefs, emotions, and processes of the religious mind.
In discussing mysticism's place in religion Pratt administers 
wholesome castigation to the psychiatrists Janet, Murisier, 
Maudsley, Charbonnier, Marie, Binet-Sangle and others who class 
the intense mystics with the hysterics, the scrupuleux and the 
abouliques. We cannot argue that the mystics in general are 
paranoiacs, it is shallow thinking which identifies the mystics 
with the insane. Pratt emphasizes the fact, that there is no 
chaos of ideas in the mind of the mystic, and that the mystic seels 
to subordinate his errant impulses to the will of God as he re- 
gards it. Monoideism and suggestibility do«a not prove a patho-
THEY
logical condition in the mystic unless te, prove^ such in the lives 
of all the great men in history. There is a vivid contrast be- 
tween the mystic and the hysteric, the hysteric is subject to all
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sorts of haphazard suggestions, but the mystic is dominated 
throughout by an auto-suggested will bent on the pursuit of right- 
eousness. The flabbiness of will, and the disintegration of per- 
sonality which mark the hysteric are absent from the life of the 
mystic. Pratt emphasizes the remarkable strength of will that is 
engendered in the mystic. There is a determination on the part 
of the mystics to unify their lives, and to direct their activit- 
ies according to the Divine purpose.
This writer's estimate of the value of mysticism is remark- 
ably just. He quotes Von Hugel with approval when he says, with
the mystics ecstatic states helped them to produce their best
1. 
work, these were the ideal conditions of productivity to them, in
many cases the soul of the mystic is fortified and energized, and 
the ecstatic experiences have value for life.
"While Pratt notes that the mystics have not been conspicuous 
for practical activities, he finds that this is also the character- 
istic of the poets, artists, musicians, and dreamers of the world. 
He concedes the mystics have not contributed many original ideas 
to the intellectual store of the world but he affirms they have 
enormously enriched religious literature. Pratt holds that this 
contribution has had a subtle and far-reaching influence upon the 
thought, feeling, courage, and happiness of the race. His con- 
clusion is, that mysticism of the mild type from which the greater 
part of this valuable literature has come has contributed something 
that the world would miss,and that while every age has need of the
contemplative and mystical way of life,the twentieth century 
stands in special need of it.
l.Von Httgel. The Mystical Element in Religion.Vol.il.pp.58-59.
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CRITIQUE.
In this Book, "The Religious Consciousness", Professor Pratt 
deals with all the important phenomena which the psychology of 
religion has taken for its province. It is natural and inevitable 
therefore that a work so comprehensive should contain matter which 
at once challenges controversy and criticism. It should be stated 
however that most of the faults of this extremely able book are 
faults of emphasis rather than errors of fact.
One of the first things that strikes the reader in connection 
with this work which is so unique for the range and diversity of 
its data is that the author almost completely ignores genetic ques- 
tions and the elementary forms of religious life. Pratt concen- 
trates upon material drawn almost exclusively from the more cul- 
tured and highly developed religions. This neglect of genetic 
questions tends to lessen the book's value as a contribution to- 
wards the solution of psychological problems. It might not be 
hyper-critical to suggest in this connection that Pratt ! s splendid 
descriptive work is at the expense of psychological analysis.
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It is inevitable that one or two inconsistencies should 
appear in so comprehensive a work. In the first chapter of his 
book, Pratt lays down the thesis that the mystical factor is to be 
found in every genuinely religious person. But in the last chap- 
ter, he flatly contradicts this assertion by saying, "many truly
religious persons are emphatically not mystical, and mysticism is
1. 
by no means essential to religion".
A similar inconsistency occurs in connection with his discusa 
ion of tribal initiation ceremonies. At first, Pratt maintains 
strongly that the central part of the "puberty institution", and 
the rites celebrated on the admission of youth into it are obvious- 
ly purely social with no reference to any non-human influence. 
Then later, he just as emphatically asserts, "the initiation cere- 
monies of many primitive peoples are as truly religious in their
2. 
nature as are the Christian sacraments of confirmation and baptlsml
Again Pratt f s truly valuable and suggestive distinction be- 
tween the objective and subjective types of worship has the de- 
fects of its qualities. He does not make clear enough the fact, 
that the distinction between the two types is rather one for 
thought, than one which exists in practice. Both the objective 
and the subjective are often intermingled in the same religion, 
and even in the same worshipper. All Pratt is entitled to assert 
is, that in different religions and in different religious men we 
may perceive a lighter or a heavier accent upon the objective or 
the subjective in worship. It is not therefore a question of one
1. Pratt J,B. The Religious Consciousness. Cf. , pp.14 and 477.
2. Pratt J.B. op. cit. C.f. pp. 265 and 289.
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or the other, it is rather a question of distribution of accent. 
Pratt certainly makes the difference between the objective and 
subjective in worship too absolute.
A similar criticism may be offered in connection with Pratt's 
four temperamental religious types. Pratt's too severe line of 
demarcation between each of these four types: the "Traditional", 
the "Rational", the "Mystical", and the "Practical", or "Moral" 
tends to blur the fact that no actual religious subject exclusive- 
ly represents one or other of these four types. Inge refers to
this tendency to separate the different faculties as distinctly
1. 
mischievous, yet it is hard to see how we can altogether dispense
with this convenient schema which certainly makes for clarity of 
thought in many instances, it must be conceded it has pragmatic 
value. We cannot then censure Pratt for using the compartmenta1 
theory of the mind, but we mate think that he has not sufficiently 
stressed the fact that all four types may and do exist in the same 
man, and that religious subjects are predominantly rather than ex- 
clusively one type or another.
Pratt's treatment of the subject of conversion provides a need 
ed counter-blast to the extraordinary emphasis on the violent type 
of conversion on the part of the earlier investigators, Starbuck 
and James. But in reducing types of religious conversion to two 
only, is not Pratt guilty of over-simplification? Pratt has right- 
ly emphasized the volitional type in which the subject throws into 
the business of conversion the force of will, as against the self- 
surrender type beloved of Starbuck and James, but he completely
1. Inge W.R. Christian Mysticism, p.21.
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overlooks a third type of the conversion experience which these 
investigators hinted at though they failed to do it justice,
namely, the spontaneous awakening type in which the experience
1   
just comes upon one without any sense of effort at all.
Starbuck and James put all the accent on the self-surrender type. 
Pratt has certainly supplied a needed corrective to the exaggera- 
tion of the importance of the catastrophic species with its char- 
acteristic mark of self-surrender, by his equally powerful 
emphasis on the volitional type of conversion. But Pratt is 
guilty along with Starbuck and James of failing to do justice to 
a genuine type of conversion experience which just comes spontan- 
eously upon the individual. The position maintained here is that 
there are three fundamental types of conversion: (1) the self- 
surrender cataclysmic species emphasized by Starbuck and James; 
(2) the volitional type stressed by Pratt in opposition to Star- 
buck and James; and (3) the spontaneous awakening type, to which 
no psychologist has yet done sufficient justice.
Pratt lays down the thesis in this study, that the earliest 
religious object was a mysterious, indefinable, all pervading, 
impersonal power called Mana, and that this concept grew up as the
result of impressions made on the primitive mind by the tremendous
2. 
forces of nature. The primary cause of cult with Pratt is to be
found in this Cosmic sense. Pratt's position here needs to be
3 scrutinized in connection with Miss Campbell ! s re-study of Mana.*
1. James W. The Varieties, pp.212,224. See also Starbuck
Psychology of Religion, pp. 100, 200. '
2. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, pp. 261 - 262.
3. Campbell I.G. Manaism, Amer. Journ. Psych. Vol.XX.IX. No.l
1918. pp. 1 - 46.
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Miss Campbell makes out a very strong case for the spirituality 
and personality of the Mana-concept. From the evidence of the 
field-workers themselves she convincingly shows that we have no 
grounds for supposing the concept of Mana is impersonal.
Miss Campbell is not so convincing however in regard to her 
second point, namely, that impressive phenomena of nature have 
nothing to do with the genesis of the Mana-concept, but that it is 
entirely due to the consciousness of heightened power which the in- 
dividual experiences in a live group activity. According to this 
investigator, the mind of primitive man having once had this inner 
experience interprets all extraordinary things in terms of it, and 
ejects this experience of»power into objects which it supplicates 
for aid, and this forms what is known as religion. With Miss Camp- 
bell, the source of the Mana-concept is simply the experience which 
is the psychic correlate of the successful conation of the gregar- 
ious instinct.
In connection with Pratt's discussion of the question of the 
sub-conscious as it touches religion, he lays down a debatable pro- 
position, namely, that the co-conscious is always limited and in- 
ferior to the waking self. Pratt's statement does not seem to make 
sufficient allowance for the fact that one of the most difficult 
problems of this mysterious mental region is just that it is not so 
distinctly limited and inferior to the waking self as -he supposes. 
Dr. Morton Prince and others have shown conclusively, that there are 
most elaborate exhibitions of sub-conscious intelligence, involving 
not only memory, but logical elaboration of original experiences, 
reasoning, volition, and a high order of constructive imagination.
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It Is this fact that constitutes one of the hardest problems for 
the psychology of modern times. One of the questions of great 
practical and theoretic interest at the present time is just this,
can the sub-conscious processes perform the same functions as are
1. 
ordinarily performed by conscious intelligence? That such a
scientific question should have been formulated indicates that the 
limitations and inferiority of co-conscious processes are not as 
obvious as Pratt's proposition would lead one to suppose.
While Pratt's caution which resembles Coe's with regard to
f
the acceptance of the thorough-going doctrine of the sub-conscious 
has much to be said for it in view of the fact that neurologists 
and psychologists have not yet settled their differences with re- 
gard to this problem, yet we must concede that the sub-conscious 
which began as a theory based on observed facts and formulated to 
explain those facts has become more than a hypothetical concept.
The assured results of the investigations of Janet with hysterics,
2. 
and of Gurney with hypnotics, the researches of Freud, Jung, Sidis,
Morton Prince, and a host of other investigators force us to admit 
that the existence of co-conscious states amounts to demonstration,
and compel us to recognize in the sub-conscious a sound induction
5. 
from experimental and clinical facts.
In spite of the foregoing strictures it must be conceded that 
Pratt f s book is the most thorough and comprehensive study of the 
phenomena included within the new science of the psychology of 
religion up to date.
1. Prince Morton. The Unconscious, p. 165.
2. Prince Morton. op. cit. p. 157.
5. Prince Morton. op. cit. p. 544.
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Many admirable features of this work support this statement, 
several of these deserve attention. Pratt's discussion of the 
methodology of his science is the clearest we have met. He con- 
sistently recognizes all across, that the conclusions of the new 
science are valid within its own sphere only, that the methods it 
has adopted with such splendid success impose upon it certain 
limitations, and that these limitations constitute the very con- 
ditions of the psychology of religionsbeing a science at all. 
Pratt's book therefore will do much to win for the psychology of 
religion that place among the natural empirical sciences which was 
endangered by the ontological claims of Leuba, and the impossible 
claims of Ames.
Pratt's chapter on the sub-conscious is probably the best 
treatment of this subject that has yet appeared in any book on the 
psychology of religion, it clarifies this whole conception as it 
affects religion.
This author seeks to hold the scales evenly between the indiv- 
idual and society with a great measure of success, both the con- 
tribution of the individual and that of the social group are justly 
estimated. This judicious distribution of accent supplies the need 
ed corrective to the exaggeration of the social which is so con- 
spicuous a feature of the work of Ames.
Pratt's chapters on conversion are a salutary criticism of the 
one-sided emphasis of Starbuck and James upon the cataclysmic 
species of conversion with its prominent characteristic of self- 
surrender.
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Most critics will agree that the chapter on crowd psychology 
and revivals is the finest statement of the psychological princi- 
ples involved ever found compressed into a single chapter.
Pratt moreover draws attention in this able work to facts 
that have previously been overlooked by psychologists ,of religion. 
In his chapter on belief in immortality he corrects many of our 
mistaken Western conceptions of religious life in India. He points 
out the interesting fact that there is vital belief in immortality 
among all classes in India except those who have come under West- 
ern influence. Belief in immortality is stronger with the Hindoos 
than with us says Pratt, because Western science tends to destroy 
authority, to undermine ancient arguments for immortality, and to 
induce a form of imagination hostile to this belief.
The treatment of mysticism is finely done. Pratt makes the 
very necessary and helpful distinction between the hectic type of 
mystic beloved of most psychologists and psychiatrists, and the 
mystic of the mild type without whose existence the world would be- 
come a poorer place. Pratt's analysis of the mystic ecstasy is 
most penetrating, and his estimate of the place and value of mystic 
ism is the fairest we have seen.
No American psychologist has shown more sympathetic under- 
standing of the religious life in all its diverse phases than has 
this investigator. Pratt f s concern at all times is to get at the 
point of view of the religious subject himself. This extremely 
able book witnesses to his success in this respect.
"The Religious Consciousness", is certainly the best single
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contribution which has yet been made to the new science of the 
psychology of religion in America. This extensive study which 
traverses the whole field of the religious life is marked by the 
moderation and strict impartiality of a judge, none of the bias 
of the advocate appears in this work.
The science of the psychology is as yet a nascent science 
and good books upon it are scarce, but we can safely say that 
here is one of the good books upon the subject. The author con- 
fesses in the preface that his book is the outcome of twelve years 
of research and study. The result we opine has amply repaid this 
great expenditure of time and labour, and we fervently wish that 
many modern authors on the same subject could make a similar con- 
fession. Much of the work done in connection with the psychology 
of religion seems to have been written over-night. It is there- 
fore with peculiar pleasure we peruse this product of mature re- 






The nineteenth century was dominated "by the science of Biology, 
and enthralled by the magic word Evolution, in the twentieth century 
Psychology is supreme and Mesopotamia is displaced by the blessed 
words Auto-suggestion and Sub-conscious. In estimating the results 
achieved by the American school of religious psychology therefore 
we must withstand this Zeitgeist and view claims to omniscience on 
the part of this new science in a coldly critical spirit. We need 
to distinguish between the loose generalizations of the psychology 
of religion which are many, and the securely established results 
which are few.
It may be said at the outset, that the researches of investi- 
gators in this new field are not yet sufficiently co-ordinated, nor 
are the conclusions of the science sufficiently established for it 
to make absolute and dogmatic pronouncements concerning its subject 
matter. All that the psychology of religion can justly claim at 
present, is that it has surveyed the field in its broad outlines, 
and that it has formulated loose generalizations which are necessar- 
ily tentative and provisional.
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Strictly speaking, results have not been established so much 
as problems have been raised and questions underlined. Many of 
the so called explanations of the psychology of religion prove to 
be but re-statements of the mystery in other terms. The psycholog 
of religion cannot claim to have given final solutions to the 
problems it has raised, though it has made valuable suggestions 
as to the lines along which such solutions may be sought. In the 
words of Professor Coe we may say, "the psychology of religion 
may be expected of course to modify to some extent our religious 
practices and our theological notions, but it is not likely to
fill with great success the role of prophet, or of pope, or even
1. 
of business manager".
In saying this we do not attempt to depreciate the valuable 
work which has been done by psychology in the field of religion. 
It may claim to have accomplished much during the last twenty 
five years, and have its claim allowed, but it must not claim to 
have accomplished everything.
The Psychology of Religion claims that it has brought under 
the recognized principles of psychological science religious 
phenomena such as the miraculous disappearance of deep-rooted 
vicious habits, automatic writings, visions, revelations, prophet- 
ic inspiration, voices, glossolalia, anaesthesias, levitation, 
stigmata, monitions, visual and auditory hallucinations, trances, 
the sensational phenomena of revivals, all the striking facts ob- 
served in the phenomenon of conversion, the sense of presence, 
illumination, and all the phenomena of the mystic ecstasy.
1. Coe G.A. The Psychology of Religion. Preface, p. XV.
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Conversion has been shown to be an adolescent phenomenon 
which is conditioned by training, environment, physical develop- 
ment and social influences.* Far from being unique conversion is 
shown to be a perfectly natural psychological phenomenon which can 
be paralleled in departments of human life other than the religious 
It is generically a process of the unification of a fractured self, 
and involves the sub-conscious factors of the mental life.
The phenomena of religious revivals are explicated in terms 
of crowd psychology. Psychology asserts that the methods of the 
revivalist are those of the hypnotist.
The Mystic is explained as a religious person who is an adept 
in the art of self-hypnosis. He takes into his mystic trance the 
ideas which he imagines he gets out of it, all these insights and 
ideas are explained as due to his theological prepossessions, and 
his social education.
Prayer is considered as a genuine psychological method of re- 
laxation and an invaluable means of gaining power and poise. Its 
subjective effects are many and valuable, but all these valuable 
effects are due to auto-suggestion. From the standpoint of the 
psychology of religion, prayer is self-communion which has tonic 
results.
These then are some of the loose generalizations of the Amer- 
ican school. It is quite obvious that the general result of psych- 
ological investigations with regard to the religious life has been 
to reduce religion to mere subjectivism.
When we attempt to get at the actual concrete results of the 
work of the American School as distinguished from its generous
1. Ames E.S. The Psychology of Religious Experience, n.2
397.
assumptions and postulates we discover the interesting fact that 
these results in the main have to do with the remarkable and in- 
deed the abnormal phenomena of the. religious life. Now it must 
be conceded that most of the striking psychic phenomena of relig- 
ion have been expressed in terms of the laws of psychology and 
psychiatry. The most conspicuous successes of this new science 
have been in the field of the striking, the abnormal, and even 
the pathological in the religious life. But it is important to 
note, that outside this field of exceptional religious phenomena 
the results of the psychology of religion are relatively meagre.
The deliverances of the psychology of religion concerning the 
normal religious condition are disappointing. The normal relig- 
ious life is best seen "in the thousands of cheerful, wholesome, 
sometimes commonplace people who though very much like others in 
most respects, meet their problems and look out on their world in
the light of an inner experience whose authority they never doubt.
1. 
This belief in their God determines the whole tenor of their lives?
Such persons have seen no visions, heard no voices, and enjoyed no 
superlative ecstatic trances, therefore they have been neglected 
by the psychologist of religion. We are justified in saying that 
this normal religious life is as yet a comparatively untrodden 
field to the psychologist.
It is worthy of note that the results of the American psych- 
ological investigations have little or no apologetic value. There 
is no reason to suppose that the psychology of religion will be 
stronger here, all the evidence points the other way. We endorse
1. Pratt J.B. The Psychology of Religious Belief, p. 293.
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the pronouncement of Professor Pratt in this connection when he 
says, "I cannot help thinking that it would ultimately lead to 
great disappointment, if not to positive scepticism, if we should 
sanguinely expect, as I fear many cultured religious people have
been led to expect, that the psychological study of religion can
1. 
demonstrate any of the truths of theology".
The psychology of religion finds no empirical proof of a 
transcendent factor in human life. It has given no scientific 
proof of the existence of a spiritual order impinging on the 
natural, nor has it demonstrated any of the truths of religion. 
During the course of its investigations extending over the last 
twenty-five years the psychology of religion has not produced any- 
thing that would strengthen belief in extra-human agencies. All 
the evidence seems to point to the fact that while the psychology 
of religion has no direct apologetic value, it will largely deter- 
mine the nature of the religious apologetic of the future.
The investigations of the American School have issued in a 
position that is frankly negative. The whole tendency of the new 
science is towards the colossal petitio principii that since the 
truth of religion cannot be proved by psychology therefore relig- 
ion is not true. This tendency will be treated more fully in the 
chapter on limitations, suffice it to say here with Barry, "because
we begin to know how things are done we cannot simply assume that
2. 
God doesn't do them".
The psychology of religion has among its most assured results
1. Pratt J.B. The Religious Consciousness, p. 40.
2. Barry F.R. Christianity and Psychology, p. 172.
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the particular characteristics of the child-mind, the youth-mind, 
and the mature-mind. It has discovered that the period of adoles- 
cence is pre-eminently the period of the rise of religious con- 
sciousness in the individual. Moreover it has pointed out the ex- 
istence of connections between spiritual and physiological facts, 
and has placed on record the remarkable differences of temperament 
in religious individuals. Along these lines the psychology of re- 
ligion may afford much practical help to the religious worker. 
Instead of proceeding by rule of thumb, and learning by a process 
of trial and error, the preacher, pastor, and religious education- 
alist may proceed scientifically to cultivate the religious life 
in himself and others. The most firmly established results of the 
psychology of religion are pedagogical.
It is important to note in connection with the work of the 
American School that it has failed to define the religious con- 
sciousness. When we ask what is the religious consciousness? 
What is there in any given human experience which makes it specif- 
ically religious? What is it that distinguishes religious feeling 
from moral feeling, aesthetic feeling, gregarious feeling and every 
other kind of feeling? The answer returned is oracularly ambiguous
It will not be irrelevant in this connection to draw atten- 
tion to Dr. Otto's book which answers the question which is so in- 
adequately treated by the American School, namely, what are the
fundamental elements which distinguish religious experience from
1. 
experience of other kinds? Professor Otto in this timely work
1. Otto Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy, (Trans.) J.W.Harvey
1923. Oxford Univ. Press.
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makes articulate for the man who knows what religion is from ex- 
perience, what he has long wanted to say to psychologists of re- 
ligion. He convincingly shows, that psychologists have never made 
enough of the great qualitative differences between feelings,hence 
they have never discovered the fact that the religious feeling is 
entirely distinct from every other feeling.
The religious feeling is according to Otto, a specific kind 
of feeling-reflex resulting from the impact upon the human mind 
of an objective Transcendent Presence. This feeling-response in 
its most primitive manifestations is at once non-rational and non- 
moral it is simply the pure a priori apprehension of Transcendent 
Reality. This specific emotional response to the Divine as such, 
Otto calls "Numinous Feeling". This is a religious mental state 
perfectly sui generis and irreducible to any other, it is an ab- 
solutely primary and elementary datum. It is this specifically 
religious feeling emerging in the mind of primitive man which 
forms the starting point for the entire religious development in 
history. Otto points out that in this unique emotional response 
certain characteristic elements may be discerned which are supra- 
rational. There is the feeling of the "uncanny" and a shuddering 
awe quite distinct from ordinary fear, which with Otto is the 
basic factor underlying the whole process of religious evolution. 
There is the creature feeling, the feeling of self-abasement into 
nothingness before Overpowering Might and Majesty. And there is 
the element of fascination, man is attracted in spite of his shud- 
dering dread to the object of his awe. All these elements of re- 
ligious experience correspond with some aspect of the Divine
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which makes its impact upon the human mind. Otto indicates that 
in the course of history the idea of the Divine becomes filled 
out With rational and moral content, but in all the protean forms 
which religion assumes these basic "moments" of feeling are al- 
ways found. These characteristic reactions in consciousness to 
the impact of the Divine are exhibited in all genuine religion 
from its most elementary to its most highly developed forms.
Otto's forthsetting of the elements of religious feeling, 
and the specific religious experience is probably the best that 
has appeared in recent times. He does justice to the unique 
character of religious experience. He shows what the religious 
man has always known, that religious feeling is qualitatively 
distinct from all other feelings. He takes us beyond the mere 
subjectivism where the psychologists leave us, by rightly emphas- 
izing the objective significance of religious feeling. In treat- 
ing of religious experience, unlike the American psychologists, 
Otto does not leave out of account the Object of which it is an 
experience. Psychologists generally have ignored the elements 
in religious experience to v/hich Otto has drawn attention. The 
facts which Otto adduces cannot be disregarded by any honest 
psychological inquiry, they must be reckoned with by the psych- 
ology of religion of the future.
We would observe, here, that the greater part of the remark- 
able phenomena in connection with which the psychology of relig- 
ion has achieved its most conspicuous triumphs is merely accident- 
al to religion and not essential to it. Psychology has been 
most successful in its elucidation of the accidentals of the
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religious life, and least successful in its treatment of what 
essentially constitutes religious consciousness and religious 
feeling. There is no unanimity among the American psychologists 
as to what constitutes religious consciousness, or as to what 
makes a feeling specifically religious, these fundamental quest- 
ions are left in the utmost obscurity.
The results of the American School of Religious Psychology 
may be briefly summarized thus: the general result has been to 
reduce to law, and to make intelligible and conformable to the 
rest of our organized knowledge the major part of the striking 
phenomena annexed to the religious life.
The results of religious psychology have no apologetic value, 
but will probably largely influence the religious apologetic of 
the future.
The most firmly established results are pedagogical, and the 
most valuable contributions from the positive side have been made 
to scientific religious pedagogy.
Finally, the investigations of the American School have 




We have already seen that the investigations of the American 
School have issued in the main, in a purely naturalistic position. 
With this position we have no quarrel, for natural science as 
such is neither religious, nor irreligious, it is simply non- 
religious. But the case is other when the science of psychology 
leaves the limits of its legitimate province, and passes by the 
problems proper to its own sphere, in order to pronounce on the 
validity of the ultimate grounds of its phenomena. Then in the 
name of truth itself we must cry halt!
Several of the American investigators have attempted to in- 
vade the domain of metaphysics, and have given in ex cathedra 
fashion ontological deliverances. The whole trend of the psych- 
ology of religion is towards the somewhat arrogant position, that 
having explicated religious phenomena in terms of scientific law, 
the supernatural reference of such phenomena becomes entirely 
invalidated, and there is no objective reality corresponding to 
man's subjective religious mental states.
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In view of this fairly definite and increasing tendency it is 
necessary to challenge psychology's claim to omniscience, and to 
draw attention to the fact that the standpoint and method which it 
has adopted impose upon it definite limitations.
In this connection the limitations which belong to the inves- 
tigator ought to be considered first of all. Many psychologists
who confidently treat of the religious life do not know what it is
1. 
from experience. We are willing to concede to Pratt that the
psychologist who is a total stranger to religious sentiments can 
know as much about religion as a blind man knows about colours, or 
a non-musical person about music, but we would add no more. It is 
a psychological common-place that men may be so destitute of cer- 
tain mental traits themselves that they may be unable to under- 
stand their presence in others. This fact is vividly illustrated 
in a great deal of the work of the French School, where the sub- 
ject of religion is treated with so little understanding and 
sympathy as to be reckoned as a case of mental pathology.
As a matter of fact there are two ways only to procure psych- 
ological data, namely, observation of others and self-examination.
In the last analysis the psychologist is shut up to one method
2. 
that of introspection. The psychologist must construe the mental
life of others in terms of what he observes in his own interior 
life. It is obvious therefore that if an investigator has never 
known what it is to be conscious of the realities of the religious 
life, he is at serious disadvantage when he attempts to psychologize
!  Pratt J.B. Religious Consciousness. Footnote p. 35. 
2. James William. Principles of Psychology. Vol.1, p. 185. 
See also Stout, Manual Psychology, pp. 30 - 35.
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concerning the religious experiences of a God-conscious man. Even 
in connection with the historical description of the external facts
of religion the man who stands outside these facts is scarcely a
1. 
reliable historian.
As a matter of fact the non-religious psychologist does not 
really know what he is talking about. He certainly knows a number 
of things about religion, but he does not know what religion is. 
Now much work has been done in the psychology of religion by 
investigators who do not know at first hand what religion means to 
the man who has fellowship with God, and who is conscious of that 
fellowship. This accounts for the artificiality of many of the 
psychological constructs of the religious life one finds in the 
published works of the psychologists of religion. This fact needs 
then to be noted and set over against the confident naturalistic 
dogmatism of many of the representatives of this new science.
Professor Leuba has attempted to rebut the position here main- 
tained. He emphatically asserts, that the non-religious psycholo- 
gist is not handicapped in the least in his study of religion by 
his lack of experiential knowledge. In Leuba f s opinion it is de- 
votion to religion that warps the power of judgment. It is un- 
necessary to be a soldier, he says, in order to understand military
2. 
life, or mad in order to understand insanity.
It would be very unfortunate for Professor Leuba if he made 
the first of these two statements in the presence of an Australian 
who had been through the carnage and horrors of Gallipoli. I can 
predict that his academic ears would be assailed with wrathful
1. Webb Clement. Group Theories of Religion, p. 69.
2. Leuba James H. Psychological Study of Religion, p. 275.
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profanity, and his professorial person would be in grave danger 
of being treated with contumely, and that he would be glad to 
flee to the sanctuary of his study where such remarks are perfect- 
ly safe, because they never have to face the test of stern reality.
The argument that one need not be religious in order to undei* 
stand religion anymore than one need be mad in order to discuss 
mental pathology is a sophism. The fallacy is revealed by pro- 
ducing the true parallel, namely, it is not necessary to be a 
psychiatrist in order to discuss psychiatry. Now the fallacy be- 
comes at once apparent. We imagine that the dogmatic naturalistic 
wing of religious psychology would be moved with choler were the 
religious subject to affirm, it is not necessary to be a psycholo- 
gist in order to intelligently discuss psychology.
We do not here take up Professor Billia's uncompromising
attitude namely, that the non-religious psychologist cannot study
1. 
religion to any purpose, but maintain the perfectly rational
position that such an investigator works under serious disadvan- 
tages from which his religious compeer is free when treating of 
the phenomena of the religious consciousness. In a word, the 
limitations which beset all theorists belong to the non-religious 
student of the religious life. His verdict has as much value as 
that of the man who passes judgment on a cathedral window from 
the outside. In view of this fact, psychological constructs of 
religious experience on the part of non-religious investigators 
are extremely likely to be somewhat arbitrary, and to increase in
1. Billia L.M. Problem and Method of Psychology of Religion
The Monist. Vol.XX. No.l. (1910) p. 138. '
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splendour and amplitude the farther they recede from reality.
There is a widespread tendency in much of the recent psych- 
ology of religion to claim that it has solved all the problems and 
completely explicated all the phenomena of the religious conscious- 
ness. Such a claim to omniscience is preposterous but intelligible, 
it is due to the intoxication of this adolescent science, result- 
ing from its splendid triumphs in an altogether fresh field of
psychological research, but in our present state of psychological
1. 
knowledge such a claim is at once arrogant and unscientific.
We do not believe that the psychologist has banished the 
mysteriousness of the phenomena of the religious life by uttering 
the magic words', "suggestion", "pathological", "sub-conscious". 
Too often the psychologist when confronted with the inscrutable 
facts of the religious consciousness instead of explaining them 
relegates them to the sub-conscious, and becomes the victim of the 
auto-suggestion that he has explicated the facts when he has really 
dodged them. For religious psychology the sub-conscious frequent- 
ly serves as an asylum of psychological ignorance. The conviction 
grows upon one that the terms we have referred to, upon which the 
psychologist rings the changes so often have exempted him from the 
labour of thinking.
The saner representatives of the new science however do not 
claim omniscience, but recognize that there remaineth yet for 
psychology much mental territory to be possessed. James's words 
are as true to-day as they were when written. "At present psych- 
ology is in the condition of physics before Galileo". It is indeed
1. Thouless R.H. Introduction To Psychology Of Religion.p.261.
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strange to hear people talk triumphantly of the "New Psychology", 
and write "Histories of Psychology", when into the real elements
and forces which the word covers not the first glimpse of clear
1. 
insight exists".
It is simply not true that our knowledge of psychological laws
is sufficient for us to fully explicate the mental states of the
2. 
religious mind as Leuba unwarrantably assumes. But assuming that
the psychologist were to be able some day to completely explain 
the facts of religious consciousness in terms of natural law, this 
could not by any manner of means be construed as a scientific dis- 
proof of the presence of a transcendent factor in human life. 
This fact needs emphasis in view of the illegitimate assumption of 
the psychologist, that since he has explained religious states of 
mind by psychological principles he has ergo disproved the exist- 
ence of God. The position of the naturalistic wing of the Ameri- 
can School is that since the truth of religion cannot be proved 
by psychology therefore religion is not true, this is clearly a 
non sequitur.
Professor Pratt shows that the religious explanation of the 
facts is not in the least invalidated by any description of human 
experience which psychology has as yet given us or seems likely 
ever to give. His illustration supposes mankind living in perpet- 
ual sunshine, but that the majority of men are blind and that only 
a few see. When the eyes of one of these seers are open he will 
of course be receiving light sensations. The blind psychologist
1. James William. Psychology. (Briefer Course) p. 468.
2. Leuba J.H. Psychological Study Of Religion, p. 272.
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on investigating this rare phenomenon says Pratt, will connect 
the light sensations with open eyes, and their cessation with 
closed eyes. He would then set down the fact that the opening 
of the eyes was the cause of the light sensations, and that this 
was the adequate explanation of the psychical phenomenon. If 
the seer insisted that he saw the sun, and not merely his own 
sensations, the psychologist would assure him that the only veri- 
fiable scientific fact was his sensations of light, which had al- 
ready been explained without any reference to the sun, or any 
other outer source. Now says Pratt, both the seer and the 
scientist would be right. The psychologist explains phenomena 
by laws which take account of the psycho-physical organism only. 
The psychologist works like any other scientist within certain 
limits, within these limits his explanation is complete. But at 
the same time the light is really there, and the seer sees the 
sun. "Nothing, says Pratt, that the psychology of religion can 
say should prevent the religious man, who wishes to be perfectly
loyal to logic and loyal to truth, from seeing in his own spirit-
1. 
ual experiences the genuine influence of a living God".
It is a great fallacy to assume that because we can describe
the way things invariably happen in the physical and psychical
2. 
worlds therefore God does not do them. As a matter of fact the
truth of religion can neither be proved nor disproved by natural 
science. This question is not for psychological discussion. 
All that psychology has proved up to date and can ever
1. Pratt J.B. Religious Consciousness, pp. 457 - 458.
2. Cutten G.B. Psychological Phenomena of Christianity,p.260 
See also Barry F.R. Christianity and Psychology.p. 172.
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prove is that the mental world is a law ordered universe all 
across. Therefore what the psychology of religion has done is 
not to disprove the existence of the spiritual environment, or 
the reality of God, this it could not do if it would, but simply 
to demonstrate the fact that the religious man's God is not the 
Lord of misrule. Psychology has demonstrated that when man's 
mind is directed to religious objects it does not therefore be- 
come disintegrated and subject to anarchy, but that his religious 
like all his other experiences are characterized by laws and 
principles of consistency.
The psychology of religion has certainly made it impossible 
for the religious man to submit as evidence for the God-origin
of his mental states the fact that these are lawless. The man
-THE
who possessesA reverent type of advanced mind will not be perturb- 
ed by the deliverance of the youngest branch of psychology, name- 
ly, that his religious consciousness is not an arena wherein 
capricious forces and anarchic powers may riot, but a realm which 
obeys certain principles of consistency, which the intellect may 
discover and articulate into a coherent system of mental laws.
In the last analysis the utmost the new science has done,is
to prove that "religious experiences are not a chaotic mass in
1. 
which consequents have no respect for antecedents", if there be
a God we would expect things to occur in this way, and the rever- 
ent mind will always posit that:
"Though he thunder by law 
The thunder is still His Voice".
1. Coe G.A. The Spiritual Life. p. 16.
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In view of the confident ontological pronouncements of cer- 
tain of the American investigators it becomes necessary to state 
with firmness, that psychology is not entitled to be heard on 
questions of metaphysics. Psychology is a natural science proceed- 
ing by the empirical method, which has taken as its special de- 
partment of study the phenomena of the mental life. The psychology 
of religion is merely a branch of general psychology dealing with 
the religious phenomena of the human consciousness. It ought then 
to be simply empirical and descriptive. This religious psychology 
may gather factual data, and may proceed from this data to classi- 
fications, generalizations, and laws, thus far and no farther may 
it go. It must stop short at the problem of the objective valid- 
ity of the facts of religious experience.
Now much of the recent psychology of religion fails to recog- 
nize where psychology ends and philosophy begins. Therefore it is 
necessary to emphasis the important fact that the standpoint and 
method which the psychology of religion has adopted with such mag- 
nificent results, impose on it definite limitations. If spiritual 
fact exists it is utterly incompetent to declare anything as to 
its essential nature.
The words of Professor McKellar Stewart are worthy of note in 
this connection he says, rightly, "the time has arrived when, in 
the name of philosophy, morality, and religion, the recognition of 
the limitations of natural science should be insisted upon. In so 
far as science has been true to its own standpoint and method, it 
has paved the way for incalculable benefits to humanity. It has 
also encouraged some of the finest intellectual virtues- intellect-
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ual sincerity, toleration and enthusiasm for Truth. But should it 
transgress its limits, or should its conclusions, valid as they are 
within its own sphere and limits, be put forward as the only poss- 
ible achievement which mind can accomplish in its search for the
1. 
nature of reality, we immediately protest".
This dignified protest is timely in view of the arrogant 
assumptions of the extreme negative wing of the American School.
The psychology of religion has no right to violate the frontiers
2. 
of theology and metaphysics. Psychology has problems enough of its
own without seeking those which lie outside its proper field, its 
own theory of the sub-conscious is an explanation which needs ex- 
planation. Psychology's function is to describe the history of
the facts of religious consciousness and not to determine their
3.
truth. Whenever this youthful science forgets this fact and tres- 
passes on the province of metaphysics and the philosophy of relig- 
ion, its ontological deliverances are as worthless as they are 
impertinent.
The truth that the prerogative of interpretation belongs to 
philosophy is of course a common-place, it is so simple that it 
needs to be constantly emphasized in view of the increasing tend- 
ency of religious psychology to assume that its psychological in- 
vestigations and results have effectively refuted Theism. We 
reiterate if spiritual fact exists psychology is utterly incompetent 
to declare anything as to its nature. The decisions of religious
1. Stewart J.McKellar. What is God. Lecture published 1920Melb
2. Cooley W.F. Can Science Speak The Last Word In Theology,
Journ.Phil. Vol.X. (1913) pp. 296-301.
3. Marett R.R. The Threshold of Religion. Preface p.XIV. See 
also Barry F.R. Christianity and Psychology.Chap.on Psych- 
ology and Theology, pp. 158 - 173.
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psychology for or against the existence of the ultimate metaphysic- 
al grounds of religious phenomena are ultra vires. In any discuss 
ion of the ultimate grounds of the religious phenomena of the 
mental life the psychology of religion is not entitled to be heard 
nor has it any right to a vote.
CONCLUSION.
To one who is sure he has had a vision of God the scientific 
psychologist of religion can be no more than a blind man talking 
about colours, or a deaf man talking about music. The suggestion 
of the psychologist, that £B the religious man's experiences and 
the realities with which he feels in vital contact are the mental 
creations of his own brain will impose on all those persons into 
whose mental history religious experiences have never entered,but 
upon no others. The religious man is sure with Browning that:
"God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear
The rest may reason and welcome;
'Tis we musicians know."
James speaks truly when he says, the mystic is invulnerable, and 
must be left whether we relish it or not, in undisturbed enjoy- 
ment of his creed. The deliverance of psychology that in prayer 
we only hear the echo of our own voices is ludicrous to anyone 
who has really prayed.
The religious consciousness defies the psychology of relig- 
ion to disprove its claim that in its profounder moral and spirit- 
ual experiences it is in touch with reality, and challenges 
psychology to prove that natural science covers the whole of
414
reality.
Finally, if there be a Divine ground of the world, and no 
science or philosophy has ever disproved the existence of God; 
and if it should seem to the religious man that in his deeper 
moral and spiritual experiences he is in vital contact with 
Reality, can any valid reason be given why this fact should not 
be as it seems?
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